Abstract

In this paper, I examine the claim that Nietzsche was already mad (or on the verge of madness) when he wrote Ecce Homo, arguing that this assumption, not the book’s quasi-autobiographical style, has been the chief impediment to a serious philosophical consideration of the text. I briefly take up several recent treatments of the work that attempt to counter the claim of madness commonly made about it, noting that while each of them gives us a good partial rejoinder, they all miss a crucial approach that helps make a great deal more sense of the text. Ecce Homo’s exceedingly bombastic claims, and much of its strange style, can be best explained by noticing Nietzsche’s incorporation of several traditional elements of Judeo-Christian apocalyptic narratives: a first-person narrative describing a revelatory disclosure (and the subsequent interpretation of that revelation); a cosmic dualism of forces (Dionysus and “the Crucified”) and radical eschatological worldview; and an exhortation to shift our cognitive and behavioral comportment to reflect the altered perspective on the world disclosed in that revelation. Thus construed, the text is no more a work of “madness” than the book of Revelation. It is, rather, the ironic appropriation and redeployment of a series of literary techniques and stylistic elements that highlight the importance of Nietzsche’s life and work as the destined surmounting of the (ostensibly) life-denying Christian worldview.