Emotion as the categorical basis for moral thought

Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):533-553 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I offer and develop an original answer to the question of whether emotion plays an important role in the formation of moral thought. In a nutshell, my answer will be that if motivational internalism provides us with a correct description of the nature of moral thought, then emotion plays an important role because emotion is required to explain or ground the behavioral dispositions that are involved in moral thought.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,561

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-04-04

Downloads
123 (#174,192)

6 months
12 (#269,036)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Demian Whiting
University of Hull

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-50.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Philosophy 75 (293):454-458.
Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?Carrie Jenkins - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):267-276.

View all 34 references / Add more references