Harmful Salience Perspectives

In Sophie Archer, Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. Chapter 11 (2022)
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Abstract

Consider a terrible situation that too many women find themselves in: 85,000 women are raped in England and Wales alone every year. Many of these women do not bring their cases to trial. There are multiple reasons that they might not want to testify in the courts. The incredibly low conviction rate is one. Another reason, however, might be that these women do not want the fact that they were raped to become the most salient thing about them. More specifically, they do not want it to be the thing that others attend to the most—that others find most noticeable and memorable. In this paper, I introduce the notion of ‘harmful salience perspectives’ to help to explain this and related phenomena. This refers either to attention on things that should not be salient, or not enough attention on things that deserve to be made salient. Following ideas within the feminist literature on objectification, I argue that we can be harmed when aspects of our identity that do not reflect our personhood—our agency, rationality, personality, and so on—are more prominent in the minds of others than aspects that do reflect our personhood. Crucially, these ways of attending do not need to implicate false beliefs and harmful ideologies to be harmful, but can be harmful in their own right.

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Ella Whiteley
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.Georgi Gardiner - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein, Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry.Paulina Sliwa - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):117-137.
Varieties of Bias.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2024 - Philosophy Compass (7):e13011.
The Epistemology of Attention.Catharine Saint-Croix - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
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References found in this work

Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
Responsibility for implicit bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).
Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.

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