Willful Ignorance

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):105-119 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,676

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-24

Downloads
182 (#132,209)

6 months
17 (#169,860)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

What is White Ignorance?Annette Martín - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa073.
The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is White Ignorance?Annette Martín - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations