Dretske on epistemic entitlement

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):607-612 (2000)
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Abstract

According to Fred Dretske, the debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology is about “Whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Externalists believe and internalists deny that there are such unjustified justifiers. Dretske’s first fundamental thesis is: externalists are right. Unjustified justifiers can be thought of as “given,” not because they are certain or indubitable, but because they are “free of justificational encumbrances.” Even knowledge—the supreme entitlement—requires no justification.

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Comprehending speech.Guy Longworth - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):339-373.
Reasons for reasons.Baron Reed - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):241-247.

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