Infanticide and Potentiality

Abstract

Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Kriegel defend the position that infanticide is morally permissible because an infant a few days old does not have a self-concept and thus is not a person. I argue their position is flawed and cannot principally rule out the possible permissibility of slavery.

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Benjamin Williamson
Liberty University

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