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Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion
Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166 (1994)
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Citations of this work
The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
References found in this work
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1952 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp, The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..
Meaning, communication, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1980 - In Z. Van Straaten, Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 1.
Believing the Self-Contradictory.John N. Williams - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):279 - 285.
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