Abstract

Recent Anglo-American commentators have described will to power as a metaphysical, an ontological, a cosmological, or an empirical principle, or as an idea which eludes any and all philosophical categorization. This dissertation attempts to explain how the differences in interpretation of will to power arise and whether the differences are philosophically real or only a matter of semantics. In the cases of classifying will to power as a metaphysical, ontological, cosmological, or empirical principle, I found that the differences were generally semantic, and that all of these interpretations could be grouped as "metaphysical" interpretations, given the rather broad sense of 'metaphysical principle' as a principle which constitutes the world and operates in every aspect of the world. ;For those who contend that will to power is elusive of any philosophical categorization, however, the difference is real. Their interpretation of will to power differs from the other, "metaphysical" interpretations primarly because they do not consider the Nachlass material when they are formulating their interpretation of will to power and because they believe that at least part of the thrust of Nietzsche's writing is to encourage thinking away from or outside of philosophical categories. ;Resolution of this real difference is contingent upon agreement on the status of the Nachlass material--whether the contents ought to be flatly rejected as representative of Nietzsche's position, accepted as Nietzsche's "true" position, or some more moderate position in between these two extremes. I argue that a non-contentious agreement is impossible due to the special problems and ambiguities surrounding the Nachlass material, and, therefore, that the Nachlass ought not to be rejected, but used with extreme caution