Peacocke’s Theory of Modality [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):649–654 (2002)
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Abstract

Chapter 4 of Being Known makes a bold and sophisticated attempt to integrate the metaphysics of modality with its epistemology. Memory sometimes enables us to know of something not happening in the present that it happened in the past; what enables us to know of something not happening in the past, present or future that it could have happened? Christopher Peacocke's answer roots the possible in the actual, more specifically in different ways of assigning actually existing items as the semantic values of Thoughts and their constituent concepts.

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Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

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Two axes of actualism.Karen Bennett - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):297-326.

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