Abstract

Kant insists in the Rechtslehre that the right of possession is intelligible and abstracts from all sensible conditions but often maintains in his earlier drafts that empirical possession serves as the schema of intelligible possession. This paper addresses the questions, Why does Kant think in the early drafts that the right of possession requires a schematism? What work is this schematism meant to do? How does it operate in detail? What similarities between the schematism of possession and the first Critique schematism justify calling them by the same name? The investigation reveals that, without the schematism of possession, no objects of choice would be available to be possessed. At the same time, the schematism must not be confused with the concept of intelligible possession. In the Rechtslehre itself, Kant retreats from a schematism of possession to a construction of right on analogy with the reciprocal relation of physical forces, and I speculate about the reasons for this change.