Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):49-52 (2007)
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Abstract

Advocates of truthmaker theory (like David Armstrong) regularly postulate both maximalism (that every truth has a truthmaker) and expressibility (that any truth can be expressed in a propostion). My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that these two theses are inconsistent, and hence that we must abandon one of them if we are to preserve truthmaker theory

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