Abstract

I answer two questions in this dissertation. First, what is self-deception? Second, how should we evaluate self-deception? ;My general method is to examine discussions of self-deception offered by several writers. I aim to preserve what is good in each, while objecting to and rejecting what is bad. But I will examine these discussions in a predominantly constructive manner. That is, my goal is to develop a satisfactory account and evaluation of self-deception, and so I will object to points I disagree with only insofar as doing so helps further this goal. Thus, points that have little bearing on this goal, even if interesting and objectionable, will be ignored. ;In Part I, Chapters 1-6, I answer the first question. What is self-deception? To answer this, we will discuss the following questions. Should we model self-deception on other-deception? That is, do they share the same pattern or structure? Does the self-deceiver hold conflicting beliefs at the same time? Does self-deception occur over time? Must the self-deceiver act intentionally? Does self-deception involve the unconscious or other kinds of divisions in the self? To a lesser extent, I also discuss the methods of the self-deceiver. I describe many examples, explaining the possible social and cognitive strategies that a self-deceiver might employ to carry out his self-deception. ;The impatient or hurried reader can turn to Chapter 6 to find a brief summary of the results of Part I. ;In Part II, chapters 7-10, I turn to the second question. How should we evaluate self-deception? Using the same constructive method, I first discuss the arguments of Joseph Butler and William Clifford, who both strongly object to self-deception. I then discuss William James. Although he wanted to argue for only a very restricted thesis concerning religious faith and did not himself advocate self-deception, James nevertheless developed arguments that clearly supported self-deception in a wide variety of cases. I discuss four later pragmatic writers who embrace without apology James's arguments, and I then look at recent empirical evidence that offers some support for their conclusions. In the final chapter, I discuss some things that Plato and Robert Nozick say that call into question the positive pragmatic evaluation of self-deception. I then arrive at an overall evaluation of self-deception