Moral relativism and pluralism

New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press (2023)
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Abstract

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This Element discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases.

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David Wong
Georgia Southern University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relativism.Maria Baghramian & J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-60.
Relativism.Chris Swoyer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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