Abstract

Morally responsible agency and agentive authority are familiar themes in the philosophical literature on ethics and agency. Morally responsible agents are those who are apt candidates for the blaming attitudes and actions by which we hold one another accountable for moral violations. Those who lack morally responsible agency—e.g., non-human animals, very young children, and (some) individuals with severe cognitive impairments—are typically considered exempt from moral responsibility. Agentive authority is a normative position that grounds powers, claims, and rights to which one is entitled in virtue of being a particular kind of agent. As an autonomous agent, you have a claim-right against me (and I, a corresponding obligation to you) not to interfere with certain of your self-regarding decisions. In this paper, I consider whether and how exemption from moral responsibility might imply diminished agentive authority. Using (one type of) psychopathic agency as a test case, I argue that, contra some theoretical frameworks, one can retain agentive authority even if exempt from moral responsibility.