A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness

Philosophy of Science 81 (5):691-713 (2014)
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Abstract

This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be understood in terms of the goals and purposes of causal thinking. This approach is distinguished from accounts based on metaphysical considerations or on reconstruction of “intuitions.”

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James Woodward
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Mental Causation for Standard Dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):978-998.
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal.M. Chirimuuta - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):849-880.
Halfway Proportionality.Bram Vaassen - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (9):1-21.
The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation.Naftali Weinberger, Porter Williams & James Woodward - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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References found in this work

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
What is a Law of Nature?David Malet Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.
Philosophical Papers, Volume II.David Lewis - 1986 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):201-202.

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