In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce,
Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 102–105 (
2018-05-09)
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Abstract
This chapter deals with fallacies that appeal to pity. Sometimes evoking pity can be a legitimate part of arguing, particularly if emotion is part of what is at issue. However, often appeals to pity in Western philosophy are irrelevant to the point at issue and are fallacious attempts to convince an audience to accept one's argument/position. Thus, a central problem in regard to appeal to pity arguments is figuring out when such appeals are legitimate and when they're fallacious. The two basic issues relevant to considering whether an appeal to pity is fallacious are: what exactly is the conclusion, and what is the understood point of the dialogue. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the meaning and use of these questions.