Abstract

Internalists approach practical rationality from the perspective of an individual agent faced with a choice between at least two alternatives. Among the theories of practical rationality offered in the last ten years, there are at least three theories that can be interpreted as adopting the same approach: individual utility maximization; Brandt's cognitive psychotherapy; and Darwall's impartialism. I argue against all three. The conditions individual utility maximization places on coherent preferences are unsupported for a general theory of practical rationality. Cognitive psychotherapy is meant to uncover the desires an agent would have if they were based on the facts. But as Brandt describes this therapy, it does not have the intended effect. Darwall argues via bootstrap from a basic internalist position to a version of impartialism. I argue that Darwall's argument is unsound. ;I also argue against the idea that people necessarily make choices by examining their own desires or preferences and acting on them. Rather people survey the facts, their preferences included. While it is true that they must be motivated to act, that motivation is not necessarily the object of their deliberation. ;On the positve side, if we accept a conception of rational agents as self-critical agents and if we adopt the internalist approach to practical rationality that strictly limits the discussion to the individual agent and his deliberation, then a plausible account of rational choice would hold that a choice is rational if and only if it would result from practical reasoning the agent could justify to himself.