Must Punishment Be Intended to Cause Suffering?

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):863-877 (2013)
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Abstract

It has recently been suggested that the fact that punishment involves an intention to cause suffering undermines expressive justifications of punishment. I argue that while punishment must involve harsh treatment, harsh treatment need not involve an intention to cause suffering. Expressivists should adopt this conception of harsh treatment

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Bill Wringe
Bilkent University

Citations of this work

Why punitive intent matters.Nathan Hanna - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):426-435.
The Nature of Punishment: Reply to Wringe.Nathan Hanna - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):969-976.
Punitive intent.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):655 - 669.
Punishment, Jesters and Judges: a Response to Nathan Hanna.Bill Wringe - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):3-12.

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References found in this work

The Problem of Punishment.David Boonin - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
Punishment, Communication, and Community.R. A. Duff - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):310-313.
Say what? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism.Nathan Hanna - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.

View all 15 references / Add more references