Risk, Rationality and (Information) Resistance: De-rationalizing Elite-group Ignorance

Erkenntnis:1-17 (2023)
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Abstract

There has been a movement aiming to teach agents about their privilege by making the information about their privilege as costless as possible. However, some argue that in risk-sensitive frameworks, such as Lara Buchak’s (2013), it can be rational for privileged agents to shield themselves from learning about their privilege, even if the information is costless and relevant. This threatens the efficacy of these information-access efforts in alleviating the problem of elite-group ignorance. In response, I show that even within the same framework, in this case David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright’s (2021), the rationality of this information avoidance rests on shaky ground in practice. In this framework, whether an agent should avoid information depends on the precise details of (1) how relevant they expect the information to be, (2) their priors about the value of various options, and (3) their risk attitudes. The model suggests that the rationality of elite-group ignorance is a function of structural factors that are pervasive but nonetheless not insurmountable, thus offering a way out of pessimism about elite group education.

Other Versions

reprint Yong, Xin Hui (2024) "Risk, Rationality and (Information) Resistance: De-rationalizing Elite-Group Ignorance". Erkenntnis 89(7):2849-2865

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Xin Hui Yong
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Games: Agency as Art.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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