Abstract

Our practice of justification of action seems to be based on comparing agents’ and patients’ reasons for and against action. Standard Scanlonian contractualism, a theory that takes the idea of justifiability to be morally fundamental, evaluates the justifiability of actions on the basis of principles for the general regulation of behavior. In evaluating those principles, reasons for objecting to the widespread performance of acts of relevant types and reasons for objecting to the general authorization of such acts are taken into account. This might seem puzzling at first glance because it seems to differ from our ordinary practice of justification. This puzzlement poses the question of why contractualism employs such principles if it takes the idea of justifiability to be morally fundamental. I argue that the connection between contractualist justifiability and contractualist interpretation of respect for the value of persons provides a rationale for employing principles for the general regulation of behavior. For contractualism, regulating one’s own reasoning and behavior on the basis of contractualist justifiability enacts respect for the value of persons. Contractualists think that to respect the value of persons, we must recognize persons’ rational capacities. Employing principles for the general regulation in evaluating justifiability enables us to do it. In addition, I argue that appreciating contractualism’s two-level character shows that it is compatible with our ordinary practices because our practices do not imply that considerations, such as the general authorization of a type of act, are irrelevant in critical evaluations of grounds for justification. [If you do not have access, the link to Accepted Manuscript is on my personal website. I have added the link to my personal website to the external links in addition to the journal page.]