Is Affectivity Passive or Active?

Philosophia 46 (3):541-554 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper I adopt Aquinas’ explanation of passivity and activity by means of acts remaining in the agent and acts passing over into external matter. I use it to propose a divide between immanent-type and transcendent-type acts. I then touch upon a grammatical distinction between three kinds of verbs. To argue for the activity and passivity of affectivity I refer to the group that includes acts of transcendent-type and whose verbs in both voices possess affective meaning. In the end I focus on cases in which an act of affective f-ing is mirrored in its object as being affectively f-ed.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.
Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.
Laws. Plato - 1960 - Indianapolis, Indiana: Dover Publications. Edited by Benjamin Jowett.
Action, Emotion and Will.Keith S. Donnellan - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):526.

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