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Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness
Abstract
My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differencesAuthor's Profile
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2009-01-28
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Citations of this work
Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano.Mauro Antonelli - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):301-322.
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