Abstract

LIVING BODIES, APPEARING BODIES: FROM EXPRESSIVITY TO MANIFESTATION In this article, we will analyse the different ways in which Merleau‐Ponty deals with the problem of phenomenological subjectivity, consisting of the tension between the definition of the subject as transcendental power and his belonging to the world. We can draw two fundamental paths: the embodiment of consciousness through perception, that characterises the first production of Merleau‐Ponty, and the belonging of the subjective body to the world through a common and enfolding ground, the flesh, that permeates his last ontology. After that, following the criticism of Renaud Barbaras, we will consider the limits of the notion of flesh, that would be ineffective to solve the dualism between subject and world. According to Barbaras, what is lacking in Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology is a veritable reflection on manifestation, as proto‐phenomenalisation. Nevertheless, it is possible, in our opinion, to track down an attempt to formulate a “phenomenality without subject” on the basis of Merleau‐Ponty’s analysis on the expressivity of animal appearance.