Abstract

A phenomenological approach to philosophy, criticized by some for analyzing only at the surface of the current state of affairs, is often contrasted with a genealogical approach, which is thought to look deeper for explanations. Friedrich Nietzsche's gives a genealogical account of the concept good in On the Genealogy of Morals, arguing for a shift in our understanding of the origins of the concept. In what is regarded as an opposing approach, Simone De Beauvoir gives a phenomenological account of woman in The Second Sex. I argue that Beauvoir in fact utilizes the Nietzschean approach in The Second Sex, demonstrating that conventional assertions about the stark differences between genealogical and phenomenological approaches are not well-founded. While there are a few clear differences in the particular methodologies of each, both accounts demonstrate a much less distinct line between genealogy and phenomenology, particularly as they apply to the question of metaphysical essences.