Abstract

Rules of justice are often viewed as the product of a contract between individuals who would most like to act with impunity, and who also fear being acted upon by others with impunity. Rules of justice that stem from such a compromise are unstable: given their preferences all who are party to the contract will renege on it when the opportunity to do so arises. A key challenge to social contract theory has been to eliminate this instability. I explore four attempts to meet this challenge, those offered by Hobbes, Gauthier, Hume, and Rawls. ;I conclude that both Hobbes and Gauthier fall prey to a dilemma, namely that the aspects of human nature to which they appeal to explain the origin of instability also ensure that no mechanism to remove the instability can be established. Hume, I argue, does not face this difficulty, but his solution to the problem of stability involves the imposition of a single universal and comprehensive conception of the good, which I contend is an unreasonable requirement. Rawls, I believe, offers the first step toward a resolution of the problem of stability by holding that we must begin by removing the causes of instability. This is accomplished by first determining the fundamental ideas of a society, and second, by working up principles of justice supported by an overlapping consensus. In replacing compromise with consensus, Rawls seeks to remove the causes of the problem of stability. I argue that it will not be possible to fully replace compromise with consensus, and that a linking of consensus with compromise, while providing more stability than compromise alone, will not resolve the problem of stability. I conclude with several remarks on Rawls as a Post-Modern thinker