Ockham y Wittgenstein. Acerca de los alcances y límites de la relación pensamiento-lenguaje

Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 12:69-93 (2018)
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Abstract

For Ockham and Wittgenstein the analysis of knowledge is based on language. Both authors uphold the conception of the world from a logical-philosophical dimension configured by the close thought-language relationship. This construct is developed on the basis of the following three aspects: first, concepts are signs of things; second, propositions describe “state of affairs”; and third, knowledge in terms of “habits” is expressed in propositions structured in terms of the “uses” of language. These propositions are established by the thought considered as “activity” and “operation of signs”. By analyzing certain a priori propositions, we recognize the very boundaries of the thought-language relationship, wherein the existential problems of mankind are revealed, whether out of the human tendency of explaining the world as a whole or out of the human attitude in the face of it.

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