Value Pluralism and the Problem of Judgment

Political Theory 40 (1):6-31 (2012)
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Abstract

This essay examines the significantly different approaches of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt to the problem of judgment in democratic theory and practice

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Linda Zerilli
University of Chicago

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