Abstract

In this article, we attempt to explore Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the world. Our focus is on the question of whether Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity can be seen as transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ in response to critical examinations made by philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, and Biemel. While their critiques have complex implications and are subject to debate, they contribute to our understanding of the intricate relationship between transcendental subjectivity and the world. It is important to clarify that this article aims to defend Husserl’s perspective rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of the critiques. We argue that, according to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, transcendental subjectivity is, in fact, integrated within the world’s transcendental structure. This argument is supported by three main points. Firstly, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its internal consciousness are not secluded but remain open and intentionally related to the external world. Secondly, Husserl clarifies the sense of transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ with subjective constitution revealing its sense. Lastly, Husserl proposes the notion of transcendental person as an attempt to address how transcendental subjectivity exists concretely in the life-world. This holistic perspective sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of transcendentally grounded subjectivity and its embodied existence in the world with the essential state of ‘being-in-the world.’