Why de dicto desires are fetishistic

Ratio 34 (4):303-311 (2021)
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Abstract

Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 303-311, December 2021.

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10.1111/rati.12317

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Xiao Zhang
University of Birmingham (PhD)

Citations of this work

Authenticity, Meaning and Alienation: Reasons to Care Less About Far Future People.Stefan Riedener - forthcoming - In Jacob Barrett, Hilary Greaves & David Thorstad (eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.
What is moral fetishism?Jessica Lerm - 2024 - South African Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):174-183.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
The sources of normativity.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
Moral cognitivism and motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.

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