Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?

The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):247-263 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers endorse the idea that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and thus hold that such responsibility is essentially interpersonal. In this paper, various interpretations of this idea are distinguished, and it is argued that no interpretation of it captures a significant truth. The popular view that moral responsibility consists in answerability is discussed and dismissed. The even more popular view that such responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes is also discussed, and it is argued that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,314

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derk Pereboom.
Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):273–285.
Optimism about Moral Responsibility.Jacob Barrett - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (33):1-17.
Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (3):283-294.
Responsibility, Moral and Otherwise.Susan Wolf - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):127-142.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-09

Downloads
201 (#127,558)

6 months
13 (#197,488)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Zimmerman
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

View all 25 references / Add more references