A cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 (2018)
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Abstract

A general feature of our moral psychology is that we feel that some moral demands are motivated externally. Stanford explains this feature with an evolutionary account, such that moral externalism was selected for its ability to facilitate prosocial interactions. Alternatively, I argue that a cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism is a more parsimonious explanation.

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Jason Zinser
University of Wisconsin, Steven's Point

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