Abstract

By excluding the general proposition about action from the realm of practical reason Ibnsina specifies a special place for this faculty. Sheikh statement about the moving and perceiving characteristic of practical reason has been critisiced as being in consistent. In this paper it is shown that despite Sheikh emphasis on moving characteristic of practical reason the triple relations which he attributes to the relation of practical reason with thebody, theoritical reason and celestial souls requires some kind of perception for practical reason. This faculty in relation to theoritical reason acquires the rational universals and makes use of them in its practical deductions. In its relation with the body it uses the individual perception of the imaginative faculty and in its attachment to the celestial souls intuites the individual truths. But practical reason has no perception in the sense of direct attachment to the active intellect and cannot receive the general truths. For this reason Sheikh does not consider the meaning of perception and intellection in the practical reason to be indentical and regards the application of the name intellect to these two as being literal communality and lays stress on the moving character of practical reason.