Plotinus on the Soul is a study of Plotinus' psychology, which is arguably the most sophisticated Platonist theory of the soul in antiquity. Plotinus offers a Platonist response to Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of the soul that is at the same time an innovative interpretation of Plato's Timaeus. He considers the notion of the soul to be crucial for explaining the rational order of the world. To this end, he discusses not only different types of individual soul but also an (...) entity that he was the first to introduce into philosophy: the so-called hypostasis Soul. This is the first study to provide a detailed explanation of this entity, but it also discusses the other types of soul, with an emphasis on the human soul, and explains Plotinus' original views on rational thought and its relation to experience. (shrink)

In On the Soul and the Resurrection, St Macrina and St Gregory of Nyssa consider what the soul is, and its relationship to our body and identity. Gregory notes the way that our bodies are always changing, and asks which is most truly our ‘real’ body if we are always in a state of growth, decay and transience? What physical body will be with us at the resurrection? If our body is as important to our identity as our soul, then (...) who am I when my body changes? Macrina answers that our identity is bodily, but that the sufferings and passages of time that alter our bodies mean that we are an imperfect version of ourselves in this life. The person that we will be at the resurrection will be free from the influence of evil and the ravages of impermanence. Modern-day science fiction wrestles with Gregory’s problem—where is my identity located? If my body is altered beyond recognition, or my mind transferred to a new body, am I still me? These cyberpunk and transhumanist worries call to mind the ancient topic of mind/body dualism, and Macrina and Gregory have some surprisingly relevant insights to offer to our contemporary technological dilemmas. (shrink)

Essays on The Soul's Logical Life in the Work of Wolfgang Giegerich: Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority is the second collection of essays dedicated to the study and application of Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority - a new 'wave' within Analytical Psychology which pushes off from the work of C. G. Jung and James Hillman. Reflecting upon the notion of psychology developed by German psychoanalyst Wolfgang Giegerich, whose Hegelian turn sheds light on the notion of soul, or the (...) objective psyche, and its inner logic and 'thought', forming a radical new basis from which to ground a modern psychology with soul. The book explores the theme of "the soul's logical life" as it displays itself in various modern phenomena, from overwhelming anxiety, cryptocurrency, the dreams of Japanese college students, and contemporary psychoanalysis, to myth, music, social movements, and the question and relevance of truth in psychology and consciousness. The authors, comprising clinical psychologists, teachers, Jungian analysts, and international scholars, aim to reveal and convey the dialectical inner workings and speculative logic of the modern soul. Essays on The Soul's Logical Life in the Work of Wolfgang Giegerich: Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority will be essential reading for depth and clinical psychologists, Jungian psychoanalysts, and academics and students of post-Jungian studies, and for all those interested in what it means to think in the highly sophisticated and technological world of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

This volume features essays that explore the insights of the 14th-century Parisian nominalist philosopher, John Buridan. It serves as a companion to the Latin text edition and annotated English translation of his question-commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul. The contributors survey Buridan's work both in its own historical-theoretical context and in relation to contemporary issues. The essays come in three main sections, which correspond to the three books of Buridan's Questions. Coverage first deals with the classification of the science of (...) the soul within the system of Aristotelian sciences, and surveys the main issues within it. The next section examines the metaphysics of the soul. It considers Buridan's peculiar version of Aristotelian hylomorphism in dealing with the problem of what kind of entity the soul (in particular, the human soul) is, and what powers and actions it has, on the basis of which we can approach the question of its essence. The volume concludes with a look at Buridan's doctrine of the nature and functions of the human intellect. Coverage in this section includes the problem of self-knowledge in Buridan's theory, Buridan's answer to the traditional medieval problem concerning the primary object of the intellect, and his unique treatment of logical problems in psychological contexts. (shrink)

In examining Ennead VI 4[22], we find Plotinus in conflict with modern, i.e., Cartesian or Kantian, assumptions about the relation of soul and body and the identification of the self with the subject. Curiously, his images and exposition are more in tune with Twentieth Century notions such as wave and field. With these as keys, we are in a position to unlock the subtlety of Plotinus' analysis of the way soul and body are present together, with sensation structured through the (...) body and judgment coming from the soul. The problem of the self concerns not only the unity of the self in terms of body and soul, but also how the self is constituted in relation to other selves, both keeping its individuality and sharing its experiences at the same time. (shrink)

This article comments on a paper titled ‘Technique et eschatologie: le devenir des objets techniques’ that Gilbert Simondon presented in 1972. For Simondon, eschatology consists of a basic presupposition, which is the duality between the immortal soul and the corruptible body. The eschatology of technical objects can be seen as the object’s becoming against time. Simondon suggests that in the epoch of artisans, the product through its perfection searches for the ‘immortality of his producer’, while in the industrial epoch standardization (...) becomes the key mover, in the sense that different parts of the object can be replaced. This analysis of Simondon on the relation between technics and eschatology allows a speculation on the soul of technical objects by tracing his earlier works. This conception of the soul, as this article tries to show, allows Simondon to address the alienation of technical objects in juxtaposition to a Marxist critique of alienation. (shrink)

The problems that taxed the minds of people during the Renaissance were much the same as those confronting us today. In their perplexity many deep-thinking people sought the advice of Marsilio Ficino, the leader of the Platonic Academy in Florence, and through his letters he advised them, encouraged them, and sometimes reproved them. Ficino was utterly fearless in expressing what he knew to be true. His letters cover the widest range of topics, mixing philosophy and humor, compassion and advice, and (...) offering a profound glimpse into the soul of the Renaissance. This is the only accessible collection of Ficino's writings available in English. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to consider a certain set of notions in Kant as subsumable under a single notion – that of the soul’s intensity – as well as the possibility of a transcendental grounding of this notion within Kant ’s critical framework. First, I discuss what it means for Kant to attribute intensive magnitude to the soul, starting with his response to Mendelssohn where Kant introduces the soul’s intensity as a metaphysical notion immanent to the principles of rational (...) psychology. I show, however, that in Kant ’s counter-argument there occurs a subtle though crucial shift in perspective – from the soul’s substance to its powers. Then I move on to consider three fundamental variants upon the soul’s intensity – intensities of representation, of life, and of cognition – each governed, I argue, by the implied notions of measure of intensity and its balance. Also, I examine Kant ’s accounts of the life of a species and the necessity of sickness; of intensity of “enlightenment” in a society and the benefit of ignorance; and of sermon as a practical exertion of cognition’s intensity. Next, the aforementioned shift of emphasis allows me to demonstrate that the notion of the soul’s intensity can indeed be transcendentally justified by appealing to Kant ’s principle of the Anticipations of Perception. Finally, I conclude with an appendix on the possible connection of the soul’s intensity to Kant ’s aesthetics. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that a human being has a soul, whereas animals and lifeless things do not. The distinction made is of significance probably for most religions. Although it sets man apart and places him in a unique category, it should not be taken to imply that there is no difference between what is alive and has sentience, apart from man, and what is lifeless and unconscious. This was Descartes' error. For he ran together several distinctions and equated the (...) soul with consciousness. (shrink)

Discussion of the soul in this essay departs from the concept of the soul that for thousands of years has occupied the attention of philosophers and theologians and pervaded religious discourse. The author is concerned with what William James referred to as ‘the popular soul,’ the soul as it is invoked by expressions such as ‘an expansive soul,’ ‘a soulless person,’ ‘soul-mate,’ and ‘that melody touched my soul.’ Skepticism with regard to the existence of this soul is without warrant. How (...) this soul comes into being and develops; what its essential features are; how the world, when the soul is engaged, is transformed; what its relationship is to one's conscience; its importance in a human life; its connections to purity and perfection, to silence; its survival upon death; and the perils posed today to its development and existence are the principal topics considered. (shrink)

In examining Ennead VI 4[22], we find Plotinus in conflict with modern, i.e., Cartesian or Kantian, assumptions about the relation of soul and body and the identification of the self with the subject. Curiously, his images and exposition are more in tune with Twentieth Century notions such as wave and field. With these as keys, we are in a position to unlock the subtlety of Plotinus' analysis of the way soul and body are present together, with sensation structured through the (...) body and judgment coming from the soul. The problem of the self concerns not only the unity of the self in terms of body and soul, but also how the self is constituted in relation to other selves, both keeping its individuality and sharing its experiences at the same time. (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima is one of the great classics of philosophy. Aristotle examines the nature of the soul-sense-perception, imagination, cognition, emotion, and desire, including, memory, dreams, and processes such as nutrition, growth, and death.

The present study seeks to treat in depth a relatively restricted portion of Hegel's thought but one that has not yet received intensive treatment by Hegel scholars in English. In the Hegelian system of philosophical sciences, the Anthropology directly follows the Philosophy of Nature and forms the first of the three sciences of Subjective Spirit: 1 Anthropo logy, Phenomenology, and Psychology. The section on Subjective Spirit is then followed by sections on Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit. The three sections together (...) comprise the Philosophy of Spirit (Philosophie des Geistes 2), which constitutes the third and concluding main division of Hegel's total system as presented in the Encyclopedia of Philosophic Sciences in Outline. a Hegel intended to write a separate full-scale work on the philosophy of Subjective Spirit as he had done on Objective Spirit (the Philosophy of Right), but died before he could do so. · Thus the focus of our study is quite concentrated. Its relatively narrow scope within the vast compass of the Hegelian system may be justified, 1 Iring Fetscher (HegeUt Lehre vom Menschen, Stuttgart, 1970, p. 11) notes the lack of a modem commentary to Hegel's Encyclopedia, and in particular to the section on Subjective Spirit. Brief accounts of this section in English may be found in: Hugh A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel (Oxford, 1921), Chapter V; and O. R. O. Mure, A Study of Hegers Logic (Oxford, 1950), pp. 2-22. (shrink)

Since the publication of the edition of John Blund's Tractatus de anima by the British Academy in 1970 there has been widespread acceptance of the importance of this text for the history of thought. Blund (ca. 1175-1248) was probably one of the first commentators on the libri naturales at Paris before the prohibition of 1210, and later introduced them to Oxford. Indeed, apart from the prohibitions of 1210 and 1215, the De anima of Blund is the one text which sheds (...) light on the first reception of Aristotle at Paris. The text was probably composed at Paris, before 1204. Blund taught arts at Paris ca. 1200-1205, then at Oxford towards 1207-1209. He returned to study theology at Paris during the interdict (1208-1214) and the contemporaneous suspension of the schools at Oxford (1209-1214). He was regent in theology at Paris for twelve years, and taught theology at Oxford after 1229. With the Tractatus a whole area of philosophical speculation--namely Greek and Arabic psychology--arrived at Oxford, where it would continue to grow and be debated throughout the century. Blund did not know Averroes but he reflects the state of Latin Aristotelianism during the first third of the thirteenth century. Like his contemporaries Blund regarded the De anima of Avicenna as a commentary on Aristotle; indeed they found it clearer than the text of Aristotle and were guided by it. Blund is faithful to Aristotle and to Avicenna, rejecting, for example, the binarium famosissimum drawn from the Fons vitae of Avicebron. In expounding the doctrine of Aristotle and following the plan laid out by Avicenna, he considers the arguments for and against before offering his own reasoned position in the solutio. He defends the role of the philosopher as considering the nature of the soul and as distinct from theological considerations. This new English translation makes available this important text to a wider audience of scholars interested in philosophy, theology, medieval history and the history of science and psychology. Students who are learning medieval Latin will be able to follow the original Latin with the help of the parallel translation and text notes. (shrink)

Reflections on the linkage between and the provocative force of problems in the analogy of city and soul, in the simile-bound characterization of the Good, and in the performative tension between what Plato has Socrates say about the philosopher's disinclination to descend into the city and what he has Socrates do in descending into the Piraeus to teach, with a closing recognition of the analogy between Socratic teaching and Platonic writing.

Plato's central contribution to psychology is his theory of the tripartite soul. This is at once a theory about the nature of the embodied human soul and a theory of human motivation. This article emphasizes on the importance and immortality of the soul. Plato does say that perceptible particulars derive their names from the forms they partake of their souls. One of his arguments against the harmonia theory of the soul, put forward by Simmias, relies on the occurrence of conflicts (...) between desires and also of conflicts between how one decides to act and how anger or fear incline one to act. Among other things, he points out that people who are thirsty may nonetheless be averse to drinking. (shrink)

The Persian philosopher Ibn Sina (d. 1037), known in Europe as Avicenna, was arguably the greatest master of Aristotelian thought in the Muslim world. The symbolical 'Poem on the Soul' (Qasidat al-nafs), which portrays all earthly human souls as in temporary exile from heaven, is traditionally attributed to Avicenna, and was received with enthusiasm by its commentators. A highly significant commentary on the Qasida was written by?Ali b. Muhammad b. al-Walid (d. 1215 CE), a major early representative of the Tayyibi (...) Ismaili tradition, which emerged and flourished in medieval Yemen. In his view, the poem encapsulated Tayyibi beliefs, whose doctrines bear striking parallels with late antique Gnosticism. Avicenna's Allegory on the Soul presents the first edition of the Arabic text of Ibn al-Walid's commentary, 'The Useful Epistle' (al-Risala al-mufida), alongside an English translation and extended introduction. It offers invaluable insight into the intricacies of Muslim thought and a deeper understanding of Avicenna's substantial intellectual legacy. (shrink)

Aristotle's On the Soul aims to uncover the principle of life, what Aristotle calls psuchē. For Aristotle, soul is the form which gives life to a body and causes all its living activities, from breathing to thinking. Aristotle develops a general account of all types of living through examining soul's causal powers. The thirteen new essays in this Critical Guide demonstrate the profound influence of Aristotle's inquiry on biology, psychology and philosophy of mind from antiquity to the present. They deepen (...) our understanding of his key concepts, including form, reason, capacity, and activity. This volume situates Aristotle in his intellectual context and draws judiciously from his other works as well as the history of interpretation to shed light on his intricate views. It also highlights ongoing interpretive debates and Aristotle's continuing relevance. It will prove invaluable for researchers in ancient philosophy and the history of science and ideas. (shrink)

The limitation of act by potency, central in the metaphysics of Thom as Aquinas, has its origins in Plotinus. He transforms Aristotle ’s horizontal causality of change into a vertical causality of participation. Potency and infinity are not just un intelligible lack of limit, but productive power. Form determines matter but is limited by recepti on into matter. The experience of unity begins with sensible things, which always have parts, so what is really one is incorporeal, without division and separation. (...) Unity is like the esse of Thomas, since it is the act that makes a thing what it is and has its fullness in God. (shrink)

This essay situates Gregory’s treatment of the soul—especially, but not exclusively, in his dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrection—within the philosophical tradition of treatises On the Soul (περὶ ψυχῆς, to which he significantly added the Christian component περὶ ἀναστάσεως) and in conversation with Origen’s complex psychology. While Origen never wrote a work On the Soul, for precise reasons, he did write one On the Resurrection. His older contemporary Tertullian composed both a work On the Soul and one On the (...) Resurrection. Gregory opted for a synthesis—not in two separate treatises, but in the same dialogue—of the philosophical genre On the Soul with the Christian (for him Origenian) genre On the Resurrection (which in his view, as in Origen’s, coincided with restoration-apokatastasis) within the framework of a remake of a Platonic dialogue—namely, the Platonic dialogue on the immortality of the soul par excellence, the Phaedo. An investigation into the meaning of restoration with respect to the soul will be conducted in the light of Gregory’s philosophical definition of the soul and of the Platonic ideal of harmony and unity that are paramount in Gregory’s doctrine of the soul and nous. I shall finally tease out the role of the soul in what I call Gregory’s ‘theology of freedom’, deeply rooted in Plato’s philosophy, and the influence that he seems to have exerted on Evagrius’s theories of the threefold resurrection (of body, soul, and nous) and of the subsumption of body into soul and soul into nous (the so-called ‘unified nous’): it will be argued that the Christian Neoplatonist Eriugena was right to trace the latter doctrine back to Gregory of Nyssa. -/- . (shrink)

In this work, new light is thrown on the philosophical method of the great Stoic Chrysippus on the basis of the fragments preserved by Galen in his De Placitis books II-III. Included is a study of Galen's aims and methodologies.

Peter Lombard’s Sentences, book I, distinction 8 offers the starting point for the late medieval and Renaissance debate on the question of whether the soul is as a whole present in the whole body and in each of its parts. This paper summarizes the prehistory of Lombard’s theory that the soul is everywhere in the entire body, and analyzes the positions of two “Platonic” scholastics, the late-thirteenth-century Dominican John Quidort and the early-sixteenth-century Augustinian Giles of Viterbo.

According to Aristotle, the three main varieties of soul – nutritive, perceptual, and rational – are hierarchically ordered. I develop and defend an interpretation of the soul’s unity that centers on Aristotle’s attempt to explain this hierarchy’s organizing cause. Aristotle draws an analogy between this series of souls and the series of figures. I first elucidate the fundamental feature both series share: each series’ prior members are present in capacity in its posterior members. I do so by examining several other (...) cases – mathematical, biological, and physical – where Aristotle appeals to presence in capacity. I then argue that an organism’s living body is continuous by nature. That is, an organism’s soul is the principle, cause, and end of a single, articulate activity of living and each of an organism’s vital bodily movements are aspects or partial manifestations of this unitary, natural activity. This account of natural continuity is, I contend, the key to understanding what it is for one soul to be present in capacity in another. And this account of presence in capacity is, I contend, the key to understanding what it is for a soul that comprises parts to be a unity. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Ockham’s seemingly pessimistic epistemological assessments of what we can know about the human soul and its relation to the body reflect a sound appreciation of what is involved in the theoretical development of philosophy and natural science. In order to make my argument, I first undermine the idea that demonstration was a norm that scholastic disputation regularly expected to achieve; and second, I examine Ockham’s treatment of three major topics in psychology (thus illustrating how (...) alternative intellectual standards were in play in scholastic disputation). (shrink)

In the 1640’s Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes engaged in a philosophically rich correspondence. The most well-known aspect of the correspondence begins with a question Elisabeth asks Descartes about his account of the interaction between soul and body. This objection, often called the ‘problem of interaction’, has received much attention in contemporary scholarship and this attention frequently focuses on the exchange between Elisabeth and Descartes. Following the lead of Descartes himself, the majority of scholars treat the problem of interaction (...) as the core, or even the entirety, of Elisabeth’s objections to Descartes from this stage in the correspondence. In this paper I argue that the driving force of Elisabeth’s objections to Descartes’ account is not the problem of interaction. Rather, Elisabeth’s objections to Descartes fundamentally concern Descartes’ account of the nature of the soul. While Elisabeth clearly offers the problem of interaction, it is only one of several worries each of which is designed to show that Descartes’ account of the soul is insufficient. I argue that Elisabeth raises three distinct problems to Descartes’ account of the nature of the soul: the causal interface problem, the vapors problem and the principal attribute problem. (shrink)

A topic common to both Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of theories of the soul is the doctrine of the soul as a harmony of the parts of the body. Plato’s Phaedo as well as Aristotle’s De anima and Eudemus present this theory and argue against the identification of the soul as a harmony. This paper has two focuses, one philosophical and one historical. First, I will focus on the argumentation used by Aristotle in his dialogue Eudemus, which is often associated (...) with Aristotle’s early attachment to Plato. On the basis of the argumentation against the harmonia theory, I will try to show that the Eudemus is not a dialogue that depicts Aristotle’s Platonic phase. Instead, by comparing the arguments of the Eudemus with both Plato and Aristotle’s mature thought, I will argue that the argumentation of the Eudemus seems to be an indirect attack on Plato’s view on the Forms and on the nature of the soul, and that it seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s mature work On the Soul. Second, given that Aristotle discusses this topic twice, I will try, also on the basis of conclusions about the Eudemus and on later reception of Aristotle’s arguments, to show why this is the case. (shrink)

In this work I defend, not the content, but, rather, the logical coherence of Descartes’s system by insisting on the ontological priority of substance over attributes in spite of the fact that Descartes seems, on occasion, to suggest otherwise. This, in turn, however, allows us to better grasp the nature of Descartes’ Augustinian conception of the soul, and what it might resemble should it be granted God’s concurrence, and, thus, eternal life. At the same time, I demonstrate, by means of (...) his Thomistic inheritance, the philosophically sound reasons why Descartes leaves these issues somewhat opaque. Finally, these reflections lead us to Nietzsche, and by contrasting the latter’s thoughts on science and freedom to those of Descartes we are led to what, for Nietzsche, would be the ultimate desideratum of such Cartesian longings for the ‘tranquility’ and ‘happiness’ of life-everlasting: a ‘will to nothingness.’. (shrink)

Dating from 1267-1268, at the end of his time in Rome, St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's On the soul is the first of his commentary works on Aristotle, followed shortly thereafter by his writings on Aristotle's On sense and what is sensed and On memory and recollection, also included in this volume. Although commenting on Aristotle was not among Aquinas's duties as a university master, he seems to have undertaken this task in part as an aid to his theological (...) work: just as he later comments on Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics while drafting the material on moral theology in the Secunda Pars of the Summa theologiae, so too his writing of the Commentary on Aristotle's On the soul was contemporaneous with his composition of questions 75-89 in the Prima Pars, on the human soul. Displaying a sound grasp of Aristotle's thought as well as a deeply developed understanding of the human person, the Commentary on Aristotle's On the soul finds Aquinas working for the first time with William of Moerbeke's new Latin translations of On the soul and its paraphrase by Themestius. This important work of Aquinas is presented here with his other two earliest writings on Aristotle in a two-column Latin-English facing format. (shrink)

The commentary attributed to Simplicius on Aristotle's On the Soul appears in this series in three volumes, of which this is the first. The translation provides the first opportunity for a wider readership to assess the disputed question of authorship. Is the work by Simplicius, or by his colleague Priscian, or by another commentator? In the second volume, Priscian's Paraphrase of Theophrastus on Sense Perception, which covers the same subject, will also be translated for comparison. Whatever its authorship, the commentary (...) is a major source for late Neoplatonist theories of thought and sense perception and provides considerable insight into this important area of Aristotle's thought. In this first volume, the Neoplatonist commentator covers the first half of Aristotle's On the Soul, comprising Aristotle's survey of his predecessors and his own rival account of the nature of the soul. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide ed. by Caleb M. CohoeAttila HangaiCaleb M. Cohoe, editor. Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Hardback, $99.99.Guiding readers through Aristotle's science of the soul, this volume covers many major topics of De Anima (DA) and addresses specific questions, including perennial interpretive problems. The self-contained chapters approach the text either by illuminating its context or by (...) elucidating key psychological concepts. While some contributions refer to relevant [End Page 318] positions by Aristotle's predecessors or contemporary philosophers, connections drawn to other Aristotelian texts predominate. Throughout, the emphasis is on philosophical questions. The result is a first-rate philosophical guide through this densely written treatise, which allows experienced readers of DA to deepen their understanding of Aristotelian psychology. Since most chapters approach interpretive issues from new angles and presuppose familiarity with the existing scholarship, beginners may want to start elsewhere.In Reeve's reading (chapter 1), Aristotle pursues dialectic in DA to define the soul as the first principle for the science of life. He construes dialectic as "going through puzzles and solving them by appeal to endoxa" (21), and equates it with induction from perceptual experience to knowledge of principles and causes. Contesting this view, Carter (chapter 2) argues that the physicist's method is not dialectical because the predecessors' views, conflicting as they are, do not constitute endoxa. Through close readings of DA II.2–5, he shows that Aristotle investigates earlier theories to assess how well they explain the main functions of the soul. One pertinent theory takes the soul to be attunement (harmonia). Shields (chapter 4) elucidates Aristotle's case for hylomorphism as an advance over the harmonia theory. Although harmonia (as the proper arrangement of parts) implies normativity, it falls short of rendering the soul as a final cause with its own good, so it cannot explain the unity of the body. Frey's chapter 5 on the soul's unity deals with this latter function. The problem of unity stems from the fact that each level in the hierarchy of souls—nutritive, perceptual, rational—can be defined independently, yet a posterior soul presupposes the existence of all prior ones. The key Frey uses to understand unity is potential presence. Just as a triangle is present potentially in a quadrangle—for division of the latter yields triangles—so too is the nutritive soul present potentially in the perceptual soul, although not due to a separating act. This, however, has counterintuitive implications: animal nutrition would be the function of a perceptual soul; furthermore, the nutritive soul of the embryo (in Frey's biological example) would first be present potentially (as undeveloped) and, once actualized (when developed), would revert to potentiality (at the development of the perceptual soul). Frey's other proposal is more promising. It turns on the notion of natural continuity: having an internal cause for a characteristic change with a unitary goal. Thus, the soul's unity for Frey (despite his reservations) seems to boil down to teleology: the soul sets a goal achieved through the manifestation of species-specific life functions. Invoking the biology of animal reproduction, Gelber (chapter 6) complements the teleological unity regarding the nutritive soul-part with the unity constituted by the continuity of the processes of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, namely, unity by material and efficient causes.Among the three contributions on reason (nous), Scheiter (chapter 3), examining its separability, breaks with the traditional interpretation and takes Aristotle to show (in DA III.4 and I.3) that reason is independent not only of bodily organs but of any magnitude (megethos). This envisages DA III.4–8 as an investigation into how reason functions as a different kind of capacity. It turns out, according to Kelsey's insightful chapter 11, that reason's actuality—insight (noēsis)—is the same as its intelligible object (noēton), and so intelligibility depends on separation from matter by the actuality of reason, making all and only the immaterial things intelligible and intelligent. Cohoe (chapter 12) draws the conclusion: human reason for Aristotle—being the defining part of the human soul, most... (shrink)