This chapter contains sections titled: The First Way – The Argument from Motion The Second Way – The Argument from Causation The Third Way – The Argument from Possibility and Necessity The Fourth Way – The Argument from Gradation The Fifth Way – The Argument from the Governance.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Summa Contra Gentiles and Aquinas's Way to GodGaven KerrThere is to be found in Aquinas's writings a way to God which is his own and most personal. This way to God is the way from existence (esse) and arrives at God as pure existence itself, the fount of all being, without which nothing would be. It is deployed in several contexts ranging from the De (...) ente et essentia to the Summa theologiae [ST]. Yet, in the Summa contra gentiles [SCG], it is peculiarly absent. The proofs of God's existence which Aquinas offers in the latter are almost exclusively drawn from Aristotle, and they do not exhibit any of the refined metaphysical thinking about esse that characterizes Thomas's thinking about God in other works.1 For a work that is intended to be both apologetical in nature and explicitly philosophical from the outset, this is strange. Thomas is always at home in his own metaphysics of esse, and he deploys it with ease and finesse especially when demonstrating God's existence and discussing the divine nature. But in the SCG his proofs of God's existence and the subsequent reasoning about the divine nature are awkward and, one could even say, clumsy. Why did he not just dispense with the Aristotelian thinking on motion and movers and all the clarifications that involves? Why not simply stick with his own favored account of act and potency interpreted in terms of the metaphysics of esse?In the current paper I wish to address these issues. I shall begin with an account of what I take to be Aquinas's way to God and why I think it is [End Page 1273] his way to God. Having done that, I will then address the issue as to why this way to God does not appear in the SCG reasoning, but slowly emerges only after God's existence has been demonstrated. I shall conclude that the apologetical and consciously philosophical nature of the SCG offer us an insight into why Thomas did not lean on his metaphysics of esse in his (initial) discussions of God there.Aquinas's Way to GodAquinas famously argues that there is a distinction between essence and esse in things. The context of this distinction is that of universal hylemorphism, which holds that in all composite things there are two principles: a principle of potency and a principle of actuality. In traditional Aristotelian fashion, defenders of universal hylemorphism held that the principle of actuality in a thing is its form, whereas the principle of potency is its matter.2 All things other than God are composed of matter and form, since all things other than God have some element of potency. But to locate the potentiality of anything other than God in the matter of the thing creates a problem when it comes to separated substances (angels) and the immaterial rational soul. Such substances (or components of substances in the case of the rational soul) are taken to be separated from matter and all material conditions. Nonetheless they are created and thereby dependent on God, so they must have some potentiality.So how do we attribute matter—that is, potency—to separate substances?According to defenders of universal hylemorphism, the answer is to distinguish between corporeal matter and incorporeal matter. The former is the kind of physical matter that we typically take to be the matter of things, whereas the latter is a kind of non-physical matter which the separate substances possess. Thus, it is not proper to say that such substances are [End Page 1274] immaterial, but rather that whilst material they are incorporeal. Universal hylemorphism has the advantage that it neatly distinguishes all things from God by isolating a principle of potency (matter) which all things other than God have. Nevertheless, universal hylemorphism presents problems of its own, not least the thorny one of making intelligible just what exactly a real (as opposed to conceptual) kind of matter is that is incorporeal.Aquinas for his part rejected universal hylemorphism from his earliest writings.3 He holds that it is precisely because separated substances are separated from all material conditions that... (shrink)

The Summa Contra Gentiles, one of Aquinas's best known works after the Summa Theologiae, is a philosophical and theological synthesis that examines what can be known of God both by reason and by divine revelation. A detailed expository account of and commentary on this famous work, Davies's book aims to help readers think about the value of the Summa Contra Gentiles for themselves, relating the contents and teachings found in the SCG to those (...) of other works and other thinkers both theological and philosophical. Following a scholarly account of Aquinas's life and his likely intentions in writing the SCG, the volume works systematically through all four books of the text. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas was an Italian Dominican priest, philosopher, theologian, saint, and doctor of the Roman Catholic Church, famous for synthesizing the thought of Aristotle and Christian doctrine. His most important and well-known work is his Summa Theologiae. Here we will be reading from Aquinas’s other summa, the Summa Contra Gentiles. We will be taking a look at some of the early chapters of Book I in which he discusses the relationship between faith and reason. According (...) to Aquinas, there are two ways of coming to know truths about God: by reason and by faith through revelation. Aquinas thinks that both reason and faith are reliable and authoritative. He thinks that there are good reasons to expect that there would be truths of both sorts. And, finally, he thinks that, as a matter of principle, the truths of one can never really contradict the truths of the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES III, CHAPTERS 131-135: A RARE GLIMPSE INTO THE HEART AS WELL AS THE MIND OF AQUINAS LAWRENCE B. PORTER Setoii Hall University South Orange, New Jersey Introduction BERNARDO GUI, Saint Thomas's thirteenth-century biographer, relates in his Legenda S. Thomae the story of how once upon a time Saint Thomas was seated at the table of King Louis IX of France. Far removed from (...) mere dinner conversation, the scholar was absorbed in profound rumination on no less a problem than the existence of evil. Suddenly in the midst of the meal Aquinas came to an insight and " he struck the table, exclaiming : ' That settles the Manichees! ' " 1 More than a century later Fra Angelico presents us with a comparable image of the saint though in an appreciably different setting, not a royal dinner table but a cloister walk. If the reader were to walk in the cloister garden of the priory of San Marco in Florence, he or she would eventually come upon a portrait of Saint Thomas painted by Fra Angelico (in the lunette above the door to the right of the entrance on the south side of the cloister). The saint stands erect facing the viewer, holding open upon his chest a book with the pages facing us so that we might read them. Saint Thomas is looking off into space, not distractedly but with concentration, with arched eyebrows and fixed gaze. It is as though he sees directly what we can only read about in the text of his open book. 1 " The Life Of Saint Thomas Aquinas by Bernard Gui," in The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas: Biographical Documents, trans. and ed. Kenelm Foster (London, 1959), pp. 44-45. 245 246 LAWREN CE B. PORTER The image of Saint Thomas presented in these hagiographic and iconographic traditions is distinctly that of an intellect-at one time engrossed in speculative thought, at another time in mystic contemplation-but it is always the mind that is foremost engaged. The image is always that of the intellectual genius entirely taken up with recondite or divine ideas, far removed from this-worldly concerns or domestic distractions. These images cannot be easily dismissed, nor indeed should we want to do such a thing, for there is much truth in these images. Certainly Thomas was at times a mystic, and his powers of abstraction and concentration were nothing less than extraordinary. His own writings are the best witness to this. The method displayed therein-the dispassionate objectivity, the unrelenting logic, the economy of expression, the precise and telling distinctions, not to mention his encyclopedic knowledge of scriptural, mystical, and philosophical sources-makes for the impression of an almost disembodied intellect at work. No wonder he was given the title "angelic doctor"! However, the problem with such images and titles is that they never allude to the fact that Saint Thomas also had a human heart and human feelings, and that these, too, could at times have had an effect upon his thinking, especially when his feelings had been hurt. To illustrate this thesis, I propose to examine the interplay between thought and emotion, history and analysis, in the Summa Contra Gentiles III, especially as concerns Chapters 131-135. Chapters 131-135 constitute a small treatise on religious poverty and as such appear as a peculiarly recondite consideration amid Aquinas's much more general treatment there of the themes of divine providence and human freedom. I believe this peculiar feature can only be understood in relation to an historical controversy of the times, namely, the attack upon the new mendicant orders by the secular clergy. Indeed, I believe the true nuances of this small treatise can best be understood when it is seen more as the heartfelt response of Aquinas to a slur upon his dignity rather than as his dispassionate or purely reasoned response to a contest of ideas. Aquinas was once personally embarrassed dur- SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES III 247 ing his professorship at the University of Paris when a student demonstration broke in upon a Sunday sermon of his with pamphlet literature that poked malicious fun at his considerable body size and privileged social status. And... (shrink)

The thesis of Méndez is preceded by a preface by Cornelio Fabro, who explains the design of this important dissertation: the author gives a presentation of the metaphysics of Aquinas such as he sees it laid down in the Summa contra gentiles. He does so from the viewpoint of the doctrine of participation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS'S FOURTH WAY AND THE APPROXIMATING RELATION HERE IS, IT CAN BE SAID, at least one troubleome premise (to some, unacceptable) in each of the Five Ways recorded by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae (S.T., I, q.2, a.3, c.). Three of the W·ays, i.e., the First and the Second and the Fifth, have a premise which describes God-Prime Mover (Primum Movens, quod a nullo movetur), First Efficient (...) Cause (Causa Efficiens Prima), Intelligent Orderer (Aliquid Intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur in finem), respectively-in a way which falls short of a proper or adequate (unmistakable, unquestionable, unique) identification of God. That is, it is not necessary that the Prime Mover be God, or that the First Efficient Cause be God, or that the Intelligent Orderer be God. For, whatever else God is, God is the Creator, and the Prime Mover is not. And neither is the First Efficient Cause; nor is the Intelligent Orderer. This happens because the empirical point of departure of each of these three Ways gives the causality of the Prime Mover, of the First Efficient Cause, and of the Intelligent Orderer an effect and a scope which make it impossible to identify them with the effect and the scope of the causality of the Creator. The two remaining ways, though providing a description of God which quite properly or adequately identifies God-SelfNecessary Being (Ens per se necessarium), Most a Being (Maxime Ens), respectively-make an analytic claim which is troublesome (to some unacceptable), in any case difficult to understand. In the Third Way, it is the analytic claim that "... si... omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus;" and in the Fourth Way, it is the analytic claim that 17 18 JOSEPH BOBIK ". [si]... magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est...,... est... aliquid quod est verissimum et optimum et nobilissimum... et... maxime ens." There are three parts in the argument of the Fourth Way,1 and it is the first of these which is difficult to understand. The first part moves from the observed existence of the more and the less good, true, noble, etc. to the concluded existence of the most good, true, noble, etc.-the simpliciter good, true, noble, etc., as it is called in the Contra Gentiles formul,ation of an argument (S.G., I, cap. 13) which is similar to (though also quite different from) the Fourth Way of the Summa Theologiae.2 The second part argues that the most true or verissimum 1 It will be of help to the reader to have the text of the Fourth Way in hand, and to have its three parts explicitly distinguished. Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. First part: Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile: et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum et optimum et nobilissimum, Second part: et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Third part: Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum. 2 Whereas the Fourth Way uses the approximating relation to move to the existence of the Maxime Ens from the fact that there are real things which are more and less, the way of the G.G. uses the approximating relation to move to the existence of the Maxime Ens from the fact that there are propositions such that one is more false than the other (and so, less true than the other) more puzzling still than the Fourth Way. Here is the text of the G.G. argument: Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II enim Metaphys. ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES RECONSIDERED: ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DE TRINITATE OF HILARY OF POITIERS JOSEPH WAWRYKOW University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 0 NE OF THE most difficult and puzzling of Aquinas's works, the Summa contra Gentiles, has occasioned much controversy among scholars.1 Who are the gentiles against whom Thomas is writing? Is the work principally philosophical or theological (...) in character? Why has Thomas delayed discussion of the central Christian truths of Trinity and Incarnation to the fourth and final book of the contra Gentiles? How much credence should be given to the slightly later story (that is, post-Thomas) that Thomas composed the Summa contra Gentiles for "missionary purposes"?-these, and other such questions, have exercised the imagination of numerous students of Aquinas. In the recent literature, Mark Jordan's " The Protreptic Structure of the Summa contra Gentiles,, without doubt offers the most 1 Thomas Aquinas, Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores Infidelium seu 'Summa contra Geiitiles' Vols. II-III. Edited by C. Pera, P. Marc and P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1961). References to the ScG list the book, chapter, and section numbers according to the Marietti edition. P. Marc in Volume I of this edition (Turin: Marietti, 1967), provides an indispensable introduction to the principal issues in the scholarship, with a strong emphasis on the problem of dating; see especially chapter I, article 3. For an English translation, see A. Pegis et al., Summa contra Gentiles, Vols. IIV (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). I would like to express my gratitude to the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, University of Notre Dame, for a summer stipend that has supported the writing of this atricle. 617 618 JOSEPH WAWRYKOW innovative and promising approach to this controversial work.2 Jordan has raised the study of the contra Gentiles to a new level by identifying its genre through careful analysis. As his title indicates, for Jordan Thomas's Summa contra Gentiles is a protreptic work, an invitation to wisdom, to be precise, an invitation to Christian wisdom. Issued by one Christian to other Christians, the contra Gentiles in this view is a recommendation of the more serious and sustained pursuit of the Christian form of life, a recommendation that includes in its survey of the different layers of Christian wisdom the depiction of the failings of alternative, non-Christian, versions of truth.3 In the hands of Aquinas, this protreptic, moreover, itself becomes a schooling in wisdom (Jordan, p. 209) : in following Thomas in the numerous discrete arguments that constitute the contra Gentiles, the Christian reader will in fact become imbued in Christian wisdom, thus anticipating in the present life the completion of this pursuit of wisdom that will be provided in the beatific vision in the next. Jordan's is a powerful study and, on the basis of its structural observations about the contra Gentiles, both large and local, would seem in its core insight to be fundamentally correct. His recognition of the protreptic structure permits a balanced assessment of the traditional questions addressed to the contra Gentiles (for details, see the article), while highlighting the positive, Christian-theological intentions of Aquinas in composing this work. Yet, by observing two points at which his analysis flags, it will be possible to add to Jordan's genuine contribution. The first of these observations concerns Jordan's treatment of 2 Mark D. Jordan, "The Protreptic Structure of the Summa contra Gentiles," The Thomist 50 (1986) : 173-209. I have benefitted greatly from extended conversations with Professor Jordan about his work on the contra Gentiles. 3 Jordan specifies the term "protreptic" as follows (p. 192): "A protreptic was originally a persuasion to the study and practice of some art or skill; for philosophic writers, it became an exhortation to the practice of the philosophic art, which required virtues of inquiry and contemplation." Later (p. 194), Jordan indicates the ways in which Thomas has transformed ancient protreptic in offering this Christian protreptic. HILARY'S DE TRINITATE AND AQUINAS 619 Aquinas's approach to scripture in the fourth book of the Summa contra Gentiles. That the analysis of Thomas's approach here to scripture needs... (shrink)

This excellent book is a revision of Kretzmann’s Wilde Lectures in Comparative and Natural Religion delivered at Oxford in 1994. As the subtitle suggests, the book is a study of book 1 of Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles. Kretzmann envisions the book as the first in a trilogy on SCG, with one volume devoted to each of SCG’s first three books.

The article analyzes Aquinas?s arguments for real distinction between essence and being as presented in the chapters 52-54 of the second book of the Summa contra gentiles, in the wider context of his metapyhsics. First, the paper analyzes the determinations of God on the basis of real distinction, and after that it analyzes the role of the act and potency, priority of act, separation of the act from the form in Aquinas?s understanding of esse, as well as (...) the concept of existential participation; in doing so, the difference among those concepts in Plato and Aristotle and in Aquinas is accentuated. At the end, the paper analyzes the role of two kinds of causality, efficient and formal in real distinction. (shrink)

As Aquinas makes explicit, the argument of the Summa contra gentiles is ordered according to the twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. The first three books thus concern the wisdom which revelation announces but which nonetheless is available to natural human reason, while the fourth is devoted to that revealed wisdom incommensurate with human rationality. Interpreters of the SCG have been divided, however, on the question of how these two modes of truth (...) are related in regard to the structure and method of the work. Thomas Hibbs's provocative and engaging new study of the SCG proposes that the unity between them is found primordially in God Himself ; it is found, more precisely, in God as Author of the narrative of Christian revelation which orders the wisdom of the philosophers to Wisdom strictly considered. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Vetera Novis Augere et Perficere:Thomas Aquinas and Christian-Muslim DialogueJoseph Ellul, O.P.Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter Aeterni Patris, issued on August 4, 1879, sought to address many issues that were challenging nineteenth-century Catholic scholarship and academic life. In proposing the thought of Thomas Aquinas as a model of Catholic teaching, the Pope intended, in his own words, "to strengthen and complete the old by aid of the new,"1 not only (...) by reviving the study of the works and teachings of the Angelic Doctor, especially in the realm of philosophy, but also to uphold as perennial his method of engaging with his contemporaries within and without the Catholic faith.2 It is within this context that we are called upon to reflect upon this appeal: "vetera novis augere et perficere."The thirteenth century was indeed a time of intellectual upheaval, following the introduction of Aristotle and, later on, the translations into Latin of the Arabic commentaries on Aristotle by Ibn Rušd (Lat. Averröes; d. 1198). This event was met within the ecclesiastical world with apprehension, if not outright fear. Neo-Platonic philosophy and its interpretation by Ibn Sina (Lat. Avicenna; d. 1037) was already perfectly acceptable to Mediaeval Christian scholars. The latter was in fact considered an essential tool for understanding the illuminationist thought of St. Augustine. Étienne Gilson even spoke of Augustinisme avicennisant (Avicennized [End Page 1231] Augustinianism).3 The problem was Aristotle and his renowned commentator Ibn Rušd: a pagan commented on by an infidel.One must also note, however, that mediaeval Western intellectuals and institutions were able to encounter and adapt the Islamic legacy, because they already possessed a sufficient scientific base (with of course the contribution of translations of Greek together with Latin works) with which to understand, assimilate, and build upon this new knowledge that appeared from the East. In sum, mediaeval Christendom created living, vibrant societies, constantly searching, always discovering something new.In dealing with the specific (and delicate) subject of Aquinas's dialogue with Islamic thought, it would be necessary to reflect in particular upon two key works of his: the Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Errores Infidelium (A Book on the Truth of the Catholic Faith against the Errors of Unbelievers),4 popularly known as the Summa contra gentiles [SCG], together with his De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Gnæcos et Armenos ad Cantorem Antiochenum, better known simply as De rationibus fidei.At this point it would be necessary to articulate the term "Islamic thought." Of itself it should not be identified with Islam as a religion. Rather, it should be considered as embracing classical Greek philosophy as interpreted by the Neo-Platonic movement and disseminated through Oriental Christian and Jewish schools of thought. Islamic civilization absorbed these teachings and built its own proper ediice upon these foundations.A Model for Interreligious Dialogue?Proposing Thomas Aquinas as a model for engagement with Islamic thought may also raise a few eyebrows. Hence, it would be appropriate to pose an essential question: "What type of dialogue existed in mediaeval times?" One should begin with an a priori exclusion of dialogue as it is understood today, given the fact that there existed neither the motive nor the means to implement it.In fact mediaeval society was aware of only three religions: the pagan, which had been replaced by Christianity; the Jewish, founded upon the precepts of the First Covenant which "Christ fulilled by his actions and [End Page 1232] by his teaching"5 and which was also believed to prefigure the everlasting New Covenant sealed by Jesus on the Cross; and finally, the Christian, which believed in Jesus as the final revelation of God to humanity.6 With such a vision in mind it is obvious that any doctrine that is not situated within these parameters, or which proposes some form of belief or conduct which was different from, if not contrary to, the Christian vision of God, the cosmos, and society, would be considered as heretical and its promoter an impostor.7When Islam made its appearance in the Christian world, it carried with it a book that it considered of divine provenance, and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology inSumma contra gentiles I by Norman KretzmannJohn F. WippelNorman Kretzmann. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. xii + 302. Cloth, $45.00.In this book Kretzmann intends to contribute to our understanding of Aquinas’s natural theology as it is presented in Bk I of his Summa (...) contra gentiles(SCG). He hopes that it will be of value to medieval philosophical scholarship. Because he regards Aquinas’s natural theology as an ongoing active enterprise, he also wants to present a viable metaphysics of theism along the lines laid down by the medieval Doctor. Thomas himself indicates that in Bks. I–III of the four Books of this work he will set forth those aspects of Christian belief about God which can be established by unaided human reason. Kretzmann views Aquinas’s project in these three Books as the most promising and “most fully accomplished natural theology” of which he is aware.In ch. 1 Kretzmann discusses the relationship between philosophy and theology and suggests that a philosophical theology might be regarded as theology from the top down. Philosophy from the bottom up would seem to be the only kind of philosophy that can be distinguished from it. Kretzmann mentions the “philosophical theology” produced by many medieval theologians and by current philosophers of religion but, in a departure from Aquinas’s own terminology, regards this as a part of revealed theology. Kretzmann reserves the name “natural theology” for the theology that is a part of philosophy, and refers to it as theology from the bottom up. But, he suggests, if one were to take a metaphysically grounded natural theology as the first phase in a systematic presentation of the rest of philosophy, one could then refer to philosophy as proceeding from the top down, i.e., from an original demonstration of the existence of God and discussion of his nature to an examination of created reality and human nature and behavior as following from God as the first principle. It is this approach that he finds Thomas following in SCG I–III and which Kretzmann will subsequently refer to as his “natural theology.”In ch. 2 Kretzmann examines Thomas’s efforts in SCG I, c. 13 to demonstrate God’s existence. He thinks Aquinas is too demanding in requiring demonstrative argumentation for God’s existence at this point. For Rretzmann it will be enough initially to offer argumentation to show that the existence of God is an acceptable working hypothesis, and to move from this to an investigation of the divine nature. Thomas offers five a [End Page 528]posteriori arguments for God’s existence in c. 13, of which the first two, by far the lengthiest, are based on motion and deeply indebted to Aristotle. Kretzmann notes the close relationship between this first argument from motion and the later “first way” of Summa theologiae1, 2, 3. But because this argument has been ably analyzed and defended by Scott MacDonald, Kretzmann unfortunately bypasses it here and concentrates on the more complicated second argument. After submitting this to close analysis, he concludes that it has some fatal flaws which prevent it from being accepted as demonstrative.This result forces him in ch. 3 to move forward in his presentation of Thomas’s natural theology without having a conclusive argument for the existence of God or even of an extraordinary first being. But he is willing to use its conclusion, that there is an ultimate explanatory principle, as a working hypothesis, even though at this point he is not ready to identify this with even a hypothetically existing God. Instead, he will refer to it as “Alpha.” He follows Thomas’s employment of the way of negation in cc. 14–28 in removing a series of names that should not be predicated of God. As part of his effort in c. 15 to prove that God is eternal, Aquinas introduces a special argument based on the difference between possible (=corruptible) and necessary (=incorruptible) beings. Kretzman correctly takes this as in effect another argument for the existence of God... (shrink)

Few philosophers or theologians exerted as much influence on the shape of medieval thought as Thomas Aquinas. He ranks amongst the most famous of the Western philosophers and was responsible for almost single-handedly bringing the philosophy of Aristotle into harmony with Christianity. He was also one of the first philosophers to argue that philosophy and theology could support each other. The shape of metaphysics, theology, and Aristotelian thought today still bears the imprint of Aquinas' work. In this extensive and deeply (...) researched study, Eleonore Stump examines Aquinas' major works, _Summa Theologiae _and _Summa Contra Gentiles, _and clearly assesses the vast range of Aquinas' thought. Philosophers, theologians, and students of the medieval period alike will find this unrivalled study an indispensable resource in researching and teaching Aquinas. (shrink)

Investigates the intent, method and structural unity of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles. The author of this study argues that the intended audience is Christian and that the subject is Christian wisdom.

Aquinas’s reflection on the relationship between faith and science took place amidst serious controversy about the acceptability of the very form of science Aquinas had adopted. Aquinas uses the Aristotelian conception of science and his own view of the place of theology and faith, to produce arguments for the compatibility of reason and science. I examine the arguments he presents in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and I criticize details of his arguments, but I endorse what I see (...) as his general strategy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Edited by Timothy McDermott. Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1989. Pp. lviii + 651. $78.00 (cloth). There are probably just a few of us familiar with Dominico Gravina's Compendium rythmicum, an ancient little book that summarizes the entire Summa theologiae in the same Latin meter as " Tantum ergo." But doubtless many are familiar with the experience (...) Gravina must have had that led him to write such a book. It is the same experience that has led to a remarkable number of synopses, compendia, introductory translations, selections, and most recently to Timothy McDermott's Concise Translation. These attempt to present the doctrine of the Summa without the massive weight of syllogism and definition, unfamiliar style, and innumerable (sometimes obscure) references, which make it so daunting a task for the unprepared reader. For example, Paul Glenn in Tour of the Summa excises every objection and response and summarizes only the bodies of the articles. Walter Farrell in Companion to the Summa does not attempt trans· lation hut instead rewords and restructures the Summa in the typically modern paragraph style. However, these works have their shortcomings. By neglecting the doctrine contained in the responses and by failing to provide any transition from the summary of one article to another, the Tour considerably weakens the ordo disciplinae which, as Thomas argues in his prologue, is essential to this work. In this regard, even Anton Pegis's Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas tends to stumble along, despite being a close translation. The Companion, on the other hand, does preserve a continuity of thought, but in the final account it is Thomas's thought only secondhand. The Concise Translation, however, masterfully combines the strengths of these hooks, while avoiding their weaknesses. For it achieves concision in a manner that respects the order and development of the Summa, " not by selecting out parts, hut by compressing and distilling the whole" (p. xiii). Yet at the same time it is a translation. It is essentially Thomas in a similar form, approximately one sixth the size. McDermott admits that he has made certain omissions (for example, some of the remarkably lengthy discussions of the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Old Law), but in these cases he retains enough to give the reader a sense of Thomas's treatment. There are of course 7~7 728 BOOK REVIEWS many passages which would he impossible to make more concise (for example, the proofs for God's existence), except by adapting them to a modern format. Here McDermott's use of modern punctuation and sentence structure tends to smooth out the stacatto (though extremely precise) structure of Thomas's syntax. At a glance, the Concise Translation appears as a thoroughly modern text, with paragraphs, titled sections, chapters, bibliography, and indices. Not surprisingly, it is divided into three main parts: God, Journeying to God, and The Road to God. Each of these is divided into chapters (numbered continuously through the parts) that correspond more or less to the so-called Treatises. For example, Part One, Chapter Five, entitled "Man's Place in Creation," corresponds exactly to the Treatise on Man. These chapters, in turn, are divided into sections which correspond closely to the major divisions that Thomas outlines in his introductions at the heads of various questions. The ohjec· tion/response format, however has completely disappeared, and the only evidence of the question/article format appears at the heads of certain paragraphs and in the margins. But this does not mean that the ohj ections and responses have altogether vanished. McDermott's careful eye has picked out many of the important distinctions they con· tain and has skillfully incorporated them into complete and unified paragraphs. This holds true also with many instances of the sed contra. Finally, in streamlining his text, he has done away with most references, keeping just enough to indicate on whom Thomas primarily relied. This regrettably leaves the reader unaware of Thomas's extensive use of his predecessors. But all in all, McDermott's format makes the text eminently readable. The translation itself is remarkable for its fidelity to the original and ease of comprehension. It almost... (shrink)

When Norman Kretzmann died in August of 1998, he left unfinished what was to have been a three volume presentation of Aquinas’s natural theology according to the first three books of the Summa contra gentiles. This second volume, the successor to The Metaphysics of Theism, thus stands as his final work. Kretzmann’s hope was to present Aquinas’s natural theology in such a way as to show its contemporary philosophical relevance and viability; it was not to (...) be a historical reconstruction or a commentary, but rather a critical appreciation or even a rethinking of Aquinas’s achievement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DID AQUINAS CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT THE WILL? DANIEL WESTBERG University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia 0 NE OF THE MOST fundamental and challenging problems in the interpretation of St. Thomas is the proper relationship of intellect and will, on which so much of moral theology (and thus of the Summa Theologiae) hinges. As Alasdair Macintyre indicates in both After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? the problem involves (...) our understanding of how to appreciate the genius of Aquinas in the monumental task of harmonizing Aristotelian practical reason and the biblical and Augustinian categories of will, sin and the law of God. When this framework is brought to the reading of St. Thomas, it is very difficult to understand certain texts which can seem to be obscure or inconsistent. In some cases he seems to be following Aristotle's explanations of practical reason and choice, and elsewhere he emphasizes the freedom of the will. One method of dealing with this is to argue for a change in Thomas's thinking: that he shifted from an early emphasis on the intellect (his Aristotelian phase) to an appreciation for the dynamic freedom of the will (which he inherited and developed from the Augustinian tradition). This has the virtue of seeming to deal neatly with inconvenient texts by consigning them to a position which he abandoned; but as we shall see the treatments by Aquinas do not fit the chronology required by this schema of development. There is very little evidence, actually, to recommend this thesis ~even though it has been advocated by prominent scholars41 42 DANIEL WESTBERG and there are strong reasons why we should reject this theory of change. That this explanation has nevertheless been widely held says more about the tradition of voluntarism in our thinking (and our tendency to see Aquinas in that light) than about the merits of the case brought forward to argue for Thomas's shift from reason to will. Proponents of the Theory of Change Dom Odon Lattin questioned the dating of De Malo 6 to 126368 by Mandonnet (and ca. 1268 by Grabmann) on the basis that the work shows advances in the treatment of liberum arbitrium. He argued that whereas Thomas had placed the primary motive factor on reason in his earlier works 1 the emphasis was shifted to the will in De Malo 6 and ST I-II, q.9, a. 4. Therefore we could conclude that De Malo is posterior to ST I and anterior to ST I-II.2 Lottin was right about the dating, but not about the reasons given for it. He alleged that the structure of the argument in De Malo 6 is entirely different from previous treatments because the distinction between voluntas and liberum arbitrium has disappeared and been replaced by " liberty of specification " and "liberty of exercise." Lattin admitted, however, that the former belongs to reason and the latter to will implying (without realizing it, perhaps) that we might well interpret this as a change of terminology rather than a change of doctrine. Lottin softened his claims the following year in an article where he wrote: " ll ne faudrait pas urger la difference... qui eziste entre cet expose du De Malo et celui du De Veritate," admitting that the distinction between specification and exercise is also to be found in De Veritate. Therefore we should not speak "d'opposition ni meme de diversite de doctrine." 3 1 E.g. De Veritate 22.12; Summa contra Gentiles III, 89; ST I, q.82, a.4. 2 " La date de la Question Disputee De Malo de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 24 (1928) : 373-388. 3 0. Lottin, "Le libre arbitre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue thomiste 12 (1929): 424, n. 1; reprinted in vol. 1 of Psychologie et morale a=- Xlle et Xllle siecles (Gembloux, 1948). DID AQUINAS CHANGE HIS MIND 43 There is still a difference, however, in emphasis, Lottin argued, for two reasons: ( 1) In the De Malo a text from the Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle is quoted to indicate that God is the first mover of the will; this apparently undercuts the priority of the intellect over the will; Lottin... (shrink)

My article confronts three of Spinoza’s four arguments against free will in God with Aquinas’s contrary position in the Summa contra Gentiles, Book I. Spinoza’s three arguments come from his Ethics, props. XVII and XXXII. First, since free choice is always exclusive, free choice in God would leave unactualized power in God. Second, if God’s will could be different without entailing divine mutability, then a divine voluntarism would reign. Third, if God has freedom of will (...) but his willing is his essence, the God’s essence could be otherwise. I note that these pitfalls open by assuming that the divine will bears upon creatures directly and immediately. I then show that since for Aquinas, God wills creatures by principally willing himself, none of Spinoza’s criticisms follow. (shrink)

According to Thomas Aquinas, a sovereign government may legitimately execute sinners in pursuance of the common good. Aquinas outlines his defence of Capital Punishment in the Summa Theologica 2–2, q.64, a.2 and the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 3, Chapter 146. Aquinas's stance on this issue is well known and his argument in favour of CP has been extensively discussed. This article will focus instead on the objections Aquinas raises to the institution of CP in the ST (...) and SCG, along with his responses to these objections. After providing a brief sketch of Aquinas's account of legal punishment, Aquinas's argument for the legitimacy of CP will then be outlined. The objections which Aquinas raises to CP will then be individually examined, along with his reply to each. After examining the underpinnings of Aquinas's objections and responses, the outline of a critique will be offered which draws upon the thought of Augustine and Karl Barth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON REINCARNATION MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York I. INTRODUCTION AQUINAS EXPLICITLY addresses the question of whether reincarnation is possible on numerous occasions.1 Not surprisingly, his most extensive and subtle treatment of the subject is found in a work addressed to nonChristians, the Summa Contra Gentiles. Aquinas took it to be his duty as Christian philosopher to address errors which were apt (...) to have a detrimental effect on the faith of Christian believers.2 In this spirit I have undertaken the task of presenting Aquinas's philosophical arguments against reincarnation. For nowadays belief in reincarnation is becoming increasingly widespread, even among Christians, in spite of the fact that it is incompatible with belief in the resurrection of the body. My treatment of the matter will necessarily be summary, both because of the large number of arguments which Aquinas proffers, and because a full understanding of Aquinas's arguments presupposes an understanding of his teachings on natural philosophy, and especially on the soul. 1 A partial listing of the works in which Aquinas discusses reincarnation is as follows: In Super Evangelium S. Matthaei, ed. P. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1951), n. 925, Aquinas refers to transmigrationem animae. Reference is made to the Pythagorean fables on the subject in In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium (Turin: Marietti, 1959), n. 131 (hereafter cited as De Anima). Extended discussions of reincarnation are found in Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter cited as ScG), II, c. 83, ed. C. Pera, O.P., et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1961), and in Scriptum super Sententiis (hereafter cited as Sent.), IV, d. 44, q. l, a. 1 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1956). The Index Thomisticus indicates that the word "metempsychoseos" is used twice in the Catena Aurea (Matt.), but does not appear in any of Aquinas's own writings. 2 Cf. De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas. 33 34 MARIE I. GEORGE What is reincarnation? The problem in attempting to understand and to form a proper judgment about the idea of reincarnation stems from the fact that this word designates a cluster of disparate beliefs and doctrines, some popular, some philosophical, others religious. If reincarnation has always figured prominently in the religious and cultural fabric of Eastern thought, it has been less present in the West. In spite of some precedents in the past, it is only really quite recently that this idea has been gaining ground here, although in forms quite different from those of the East. The question, then, is a vast one. For this reason, among others, we intend to limit our consideration to those versions for which Western philosophers have offered a defense. Their claim is that upon death the spirits of at least certain people enter into other human bodies (generally those of newly conceived infants), or even into the bodies of lower life forms. Moreover, it is usually maintained that the kind of being one's spirit will enter after death depends upon how one has lived one's previous life. One might thus return as a queen, or as a poor and miserable person, or even as a slug, in correspondence to the goodness or evilness of one's former life. Aquinas's arguments against reincarnation are of two sorts. Sometimes he argues against what he calls the roots of a given version of the theory:' What he means by roots are positions the acceptance of which render reincarnation necessary or plausible. In showing that the roots are unsound, Aquinas refutes a given account of reincarnation, but does not refute the basic doctrine as such, for there may be some other account that would justify the belief. The other sort of argument which Aquinas gives positively establishes that reincarnation is impossible. We intend to consider here both sorts of argument.4 'Cf. IV Sent., d. 44, q. I, a. 1, sol. 1. 4 Note that Aquinas does not address the religious versions of the theory with the exception of Plato's theory which can be considered religious to the extent that it is derived from the Pythagorean mysteries. Aquinas interests himself in those theories known to him that both offer a rational account and have some plausibility. AQUINAS ON... (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas based on things "management" for the existence of God made ​​two different arguments, one found in the philosophy of Guinness, the other found in the Summa Theologica, which is the so-called "fifth way." First, the metaphysics, the fifth way is considered more important, so it is selected into the Summa Theologica. Secondly, I deal with this issue of the validity of the argument, stressing that this argument is based on absolute basis of experience. Thomas Aquinas presents (...) two different argument for the existence of a God based on the "government" of things, one in the Summer contra Gentiles and one in the Summa Theologiae, the latter the so-called "Fifth way". First, I argue that the Fifth way is metaphysically more fundmental, for which reason it is selected for use in the later Summa. Secondly, I address the question of the argument's validity, alling attention to its foundation in absolutely fundamental experience. (shrink)

Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. John I. Jenkins. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 267. 35.00 hb. ISBN 0-521-58126-5. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. pp. 302. 12.95 pb. ISBN 0-521-43769-5. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in the Summa Contra Gentiles I. Norman Kretzmann. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. pp. 302. 35.00 hb. ISBN 0-19-823660-3. Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations. C. F. J. Martin. Edinburgh, Edinburgh (...) University Press, 1997. pp. 212. 40.00 hb. ISBN 0-7486-0901-6. Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages. Robert Pasnau. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 330. 37.00 hb. ISBN 0-521-58368-3. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Metaphysics of Creation. Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles IIE.J. AshworthNorman Kretzmann. The Metaphysics of Creation. Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Pp. xiii + 483. Cloth, $65.00.Thomas Aquinas is astounding not just for the richness, complexity and timeless interest of his thought, but for the sheer bulk of his works. The challenge this (...) bulk presents to commentators has been taken up in various ways. Some people focus on Aquinas's architectonic, giving a global overview of individual works in such terms as the neo-Platonic exitus-reditus schema; others focus on the interplay of faith and reason in his works by classifying Aquinas as a theologian, or a Christian philosopher, or a philosopher-theologian; still others try to organize his thought by bringing together thematically-linked discussions from a variety of places. All three approaches tend to overlook perhaps the most striking feature of Aquinas's writings: the continuous progression of carefully-formulated, detailed arguments and sub-arguments.In the second book of his uncompleted trilogy on Summa contra gentiles, Norman Kretzmann combines the best of the first two approaches to Aquinas with an impressive and largely successful attempt to come to terms with Aquinas as an arguer. He takes an ample selection of Aquinas's own arguments in their order of appearance in SCG II; he analyzes their premisses; he shows how they function in relation to earlier and later arguments; and he criticizes their weaknesses. He does all this in an elegant, lucid prose that ensures the attentive reader an enhanced understanding of the specific topics discussed by Aquinas. [End Page 434]To understand the full import of the arguments examined, however, we need to consider what Aquinas hopes to achieve by his sequences of arguments. While granting that Aquinas is a theologian, and that he intends his Summa contra gentiles to give a full account of what Christians believe, Kretzmann argues that the first three books of SCG present a fully-developed natural theology which can serve as guide and inspiration to thinkers today. The key to understanding Aquinas here is the recognition that the philosopher, particularly the metaphysician, is, or should be, concerned with the first principles and most ultimate aspects of reality. If it turns out, as most philosophers before the twentieth century have believed, that these first principles are divine, then truths taught by revelation can be integrated with truths arrived at by reason. Moreover, once the existence and nature of God have been established, or at least rendered plausible, one can take God as a starting point for the explanation of this-worldly phenomena, from the nature of the physical world to the nature of the human person. This explanation, while buttressed by references to Biblical revelation, will nonetheless be fully natural, insofar as it relies on arguments whose premisses are those available to any rational being independently of revelation.In his earlier book, The Metaphysics of Theism (Oxford, 1997) Kretzmann examined the start of Aquinas's natural theology, the movement from things around us to God. In The Metaphysics of Creation, finished just before his death, Kretzmann takes up the emergence of things from God. The book is divided into three unequal parts. First, there is a long discussion of Aquinas's view of creation, and the precise way in which the world is dependent upon God, its first cause. Particularly notable in this section is the discussion of Aquinas's view that creation is compatible with the notion of a beginningless world. The second, very brief, section takes up Aquinas's treatment of the emergence of different species, and his willingness to reject the kind of literal reading of Genesis espoused by contemporary creationists. The third and longest section takes up the nature of the human mind or soul. What makes this section particularly interesting is its emphasis on the implications of the top-down approach. If we start with the ideas that God is a pure intellect, and that immaterial substance is possible, then the mind-body problem becomes that of explaining how intellect can ever be closely related to matter, rather that... (shrink)

This article analyzes the analogy made between Intellectus Agens and light, used by Aristotle in De Anima III, 5, commented by Aquinas. The investigation focuses on St. Thomas commentary, mainly on the limits of such analogy. It is shown how Thomas Aquinas is forced, in order to avoid the divinization of the Intellectus Agens, to bring a neoplatonic element to the discussion, incompatible with the Aristotelian spirit. References to the optic theories of Aristotle and Aquinas are made. It is discussed (...) what it means to say that the Intellectus Agens is an act. Finally, it is shown why does the nature of the Intellectus Agens demand an intervention of the Separate Substances. The discussion focuses on the Sententia super De anima, and recurs to other works, mainly: Quaestiones disputatae De Anima, Summa Contra Gentiles, Summa Theologiae, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas and De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Reginaldum. /// O presente artigo analisa a analogia entre o Intellectus Agens e a luz, analogia essa utilizada por Aristóteles em De anima iii, 5 e comentada por S. Tomás de Aquino. O estudo centra-se no comentário de S. Tomás, insistindo de modo particular nos limites dessa analogia. Em particular, mostra-se de que modo o Aquinate se vê obrigado, para evitar a divinização do Intellectus Agens, a introduzir um elemento neoplatónico, incompatível com o espírito aristotélico. O artigo refere as teorias ópticas de Aristóteles e de S. Tomás. Depois analisa o que significa o Intellectus Agens como acto. Finalmente, mostra por que razão a natureza do Intellectus Agens exige a intervenção das Substâncias Separadas. A discussão está centrada no Sententiae super De anima, mas recorre também a obras como as Quaestiones disputatae De Anima, a Summa Contra Gentiles, a Summa Theologiae, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas e De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Reginaldum. (shrink)

The head of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship at Harvard, MIT, and Tufts, Curtis Chang turns to the seminal works of Augustine and Thomas as a way of engaging the challenges of postmodernity. He accordingly argues that Aquinas’s De Civitate Dei and Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles were composed precisely to challenge a world growing suspicious, if not negligent, of the Christian story. The rhetorical strategy Chang cleverly uncovers in both DCD and SCG is threefold: both Augustine and Thomas enter (...) their opponents’ unique stories and worldviews, both retell that story by reinterpreting that story on their opponents’ own terms, and finally, each capture that retold tale and tell the eternal story of Christianity in a way that is now intelligible and attractive to their interlocutors. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Theism is the definitive study of the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of medieval philosophers, written by one of the world's most eminent scholars of medieval thought. Natural theology is the investigation by analysis and rational argument of fundamental questions about reality, considered in relation to God. Professor Kretzmann shows the continuing value of Aquinas's doctrines to the philosophical enterprise today; he argues that natural theology offers the only route by which philosophers can, as philosophers, (...) approach theological propositions, and that the one presented in this book is the best available natural theology. (shrink)