This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7.

This major addition to the series of Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought seeks to give students with no specialist knowledge access to both the practical and the metaphysical aspects of Hegel's political thought. The ethical and metaphysical texts in this collection both illuminate and contrast with those political and historical texts in which Hegel draws important conclusions about the modern world from remarkable comparative analyses of recent developments in England, France and Germany. The translator of these (...) texts, H. B. Nisbet, was responsible for the acclaimed rendition of Hegel's Philosophy of Right already published in this series, and Lawrence Dickey's lucid editorial commentary introduces this distinctive corpus of political writing by one of the very greatest thinkers in the European tradition. A full chronology, explanatory annotation, glossary and bibliography are appended to aid the student reader. (shrink)

This work brings together, for the first time in English translation, Hegel's journal publications from his years in Heidelberg (1816-18), writings which have been previously either untranslated or only partially translated into English. The Heidelberg years marked Hegel's return to university teaching and represented an important transition in his life and thought. The translated texts include his important reassessment of the works of the philosopher F. H. Jacobi, whose engagement with Spinozism, especially, was of decisive significance for the philosophical development (...) of German Idealism. They also include his most influential writing about contemporary political events, his essay on the constitutional assembly in his native Württemberg, which was written against the background of the dramatic political and social changes occurring in post-Napoleonic Germany. The translators have provided an introduction and notes that offer a scholarly commentary on the philosophical and political background of Hegel's Heidelberg writings. (shrink)

This work brings together, for the first time in English translation, Hegel's journal publications from his years in Heidelberg, writings which have been previously either untranslated or only partially translated into English. The Heidelberg years marked Hegel's return to university teaching and represented an important transition in his life and thought. The translated texts include his important reassessment of the works of the philosopher F. H. Jacobi, whose engagement with Spinozism, especially, was of decisive significance for the philosophical development of (...) German Idealism. They also include his most influential writing about contemporary political events, his essay on the constitutional assembly in his native Württemberg, which was written against the background of the dramatic political and social changes occurring in post-Napoleonic Germany. The translators have provided an introduction and notes that offer a scholarly commentary on the philosophical and political background of Hegel's Heidelberg writings. (shrink)

Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde (1930-2019) was one of Europe's foremost legal scholars and political thinkers. As a scholar of constitutional law and a judge on Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (1983-1996), Bockenforde has been a major contributor to contemporary debates in legal and political theory, to the conceptual framework of the modern state and its presuppositions, and to contested political issues such as the rights of the enemies of the state, the constitutional status of the state of emergency, citizenship rights, and challenges (...) of European integration. His writings have shaped not only academic but also wider public debates from the 1950s to the present, to an extent that few European scholars can match. As a federal constitutional judge and thus holder of one the most important and most trusted public offices, Bockenforde has influenced the way in which academics and citizens think about law and politics. During his tenure on the Court, several path-breaking decisions for the Federal Republic of Germany were handed down, including decisions pertaining to the deployment of missiles, the law on political parties, the regulation of abortion, and the process of European integration...--Page two of cover of volume two. (shrink)

Sentences such as Olivia can take Logic or Algebra (‘♢∨-sentences’) are typically interpreted as entailing that Olivia can take Logic and can take Algebra. Given a standard semantics for modals and disjunction, those ‘Free choice’ (FC) readings are not predicted from the surface form of ♢∨-sentences. Yet the standard semantics is appropriate for the ‘double prohibition’ reading typically assigned to ¬♢∨-sentences like Olivia can’t take Logic or Algebra. Several extant approaches to FC can account for those two cases, but face (...) challenges when ♢∨, ¬♢∨ and related sentences appear embedded in certain environments. In this paper, we present a novel account of FC that builds on a ‘grammatical’ theory of scalar implicatures — proposed by Bassi et al. (2021) and Del Pinal (2021) — according to which covert exhaustification is a presupposition trigger such that the prejacent forms the assertive content while any excludable or includable alternatives are incorporated at the non-at issue, presuppositional level. Applied to ♢∨, ¬♢∨, and similar sentences, ‘presuppositional exhaustification’ predicts that their default interpretations have an assertive component (roughly, the classical interpretation of the prejacent) and a homogeneity presupposition which projects in standard ways. Those predictions, we then show, support a uniform account of the puzzling behavior of ♢∨, ¬♢∨, and related sentences when embedded under (negative) factives (Marty & Romoli 2020), disjunctions (Romoli & Santorio 2019), and in the scope of universal, existential (Bar-Lev & Fox 2020) and non-monotonic quantifiers (Gotzner et al. 2020). (shrink)

This paper anticipates a peril involved in Catholic writing on trans issues, which I call perlocutionary dominion: the empowerment of cisgender voices, and disempowerment of transgender voices within our theological communities through perlocutionary acts. It finds an example of this peril in Helen Watt's paper, ‘Gender Transition: The Moral Meaning of Bodily and Social Presentation’, focusing specifically on the use of negative themes; as well as the less obvious, positive-affective feature of gestures of care. It then looks to Pope (...) Francis's ‘four principles’ in Evangelii gaudium as the basis for a methodological principle that can help to avoid it. It argues that Francis's principles exhort us towards a project of community building that embraces alterity and invites critical engagement with our own convictions, while reflecting honestly on how our speech shapes that community in ways beyond their constative function. It concludes by suggesting the principle, ‘Everything About Us, For Us’, which encapsulates the kinds of behaviours required by this project. (shrink)

Presuppositions are pragmatically considered as the conditions of the felicity of a speech act, or discourse move; however, the decision of setting the conditions of a move, which the hearer needs to accept in order to continue the dialogue, can be thought of as a speech act of a kind. The act of presupposing depends on specific conditions and in particular on the possibility of the hearer to reconstruct and accept the propositional content. These pragmatic conditions lead to epistemic (...) considerations: How can the speaker know that the hearer can reconstruct and accept a presupposition? A possible answer can be found in an argumentative approach grounded on the notion of presumptive reasoning. On this perspective, by presupposing the speaker advances a tentative conclusion about what the hearer may accept, hold, or know proceeding from factual, linguistic, and epistemic rules of presumption. (shrink)

Hegel and Plato are united as political theorists by the convergence of their philosophical aspirations. But their political writings manifest the general disparities involved in their particular ways of seeking to fulfil these aspirations. Professor Browning compares the political thought of Plato and Hegel by locating their political theorizing within the context of their divergent modes of philosophizing.

The following dissertation shows how German Literature negotiates the relationship between language and the visual arts, particularly in Romantic narratives. In contrast with authors of the Enlightenment, the Romantics tend to deny specificity to visual experience and in so doing dedifferentiate visual experience from the textual. ;The initial, methodological, chapter explicates perceptual models informed by the interplay of the philosophical approaches of Kant and Wittgenstein with the psychoanalytic discourse of Freud. In Chapter Two, I turn to Lessing's Laokoon Uder uber (...) die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie , in which he divides the arts into pictoral and linguistic signs. While the boundary between the two appears quite clear in Laokoon, his play Emilia Galotti reveals Lessing's anxiety that the difference cannot be so easily maintained. ;The subsequent chapter explores the representation of the visual arts in Tieck's Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen . After a discussion of Wackenroder's Herzensergiessungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders , 1 turn to Tieck's novel about a young student of Albrecht Durer. The novel responds to the ostensible binary between language and the visual arts by transmuting the distinction into one between readable landscape paintings and phantasmatic images that guide the protagonist. ;As another example of this Romantic viewpoint, I analyze Brentano's Godwi oder das steinerne Bild der Mutter . Here I use the distinction between symbol and allegory to point out the ways in which the text turns the difference between the arts into one between rhetorical figures. A similar manifestation of the problem occurs in Eichendorff's Das Marmorbild , discussed in Chapter Five. The novella follows the same lines as Lessing's Laokoon, thematizing the materiality of its eponymous marble statue. My final chapter concerns Kleist's model of visual perception, which is closely bound to his theology in his tales "Die heilige Cacilie" and "Der Findling" . ;Writing Images interprets the role of visuality in German Romantic literature in order to understand an unresolved problematic of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century thought for those who would too quickly either differentiate between or conflate the visual and the written. (shrink)

R. G. Collingwood saw one of the main tasks of philosophers and of historians of human thought in uncovering what he called the ultimate presuppositions of different thinkers, of different philosophical movements and of entire eras of intellectual history. He also noted that such ultimate presuppositions usually remain tacit at first, and are discovered only by subsequent reflection. Collingwood would have been delighted by the contrast that constitutes the overall theme of the essays collected in this volume. Not (...) only has this dichotomy ofviews been one ofthe mostcrucial watersheds in the entire twentieth-century philosophical thought. Not only has it remained largely implicit in the writings of the philosophers for whom it mattered most. It is a truly Collingwoodian presupposition also in that it is not apremise assumed by different thinkers in their argumentation. It is the presupposition of a question, an assumption to the effect that a certain general question can be raised and answered. Its role is not belied by the fact that several philosophers who answered it one way or the other seem to be largely unaware that the other answer also makes sense - if it does. This Collingwoodian question can be formulated in a first rough approximation by asking whether language - our actual working language, Tarski's "colloquiallanguage" - is universal in the sense of being inescapable. This formulation needs all sorts of explanations, however. (shrink)

An analysis of necessary condition and presupposition reveals that, as logical relations, these notions are basically similar to each other and different from the notion of entailment or other ‘if-then’ relations of logical consequence. Both necessary condition and presupposition seem to be two-directional in a rather peculiar way. Appreciating this is helpful in interpreting philosophers such as Kant and Strawson who have relied extensively on these relations in constructing the philosophical arguments often referred to as transcendental arguments. It also suggests (...) some fundamental shortcomings in Strawson's account of presupposition and in the logician's way of presenting necessary condition using ‘⊂'.In the discussion which follows I shall exhibit some of the differences between necessary condition and presupposition on the one hand and entailment on the other. I shall then go on to offer an explanation of these differences in conjunction with an analysis of necessary condition and presupposition which diverges from other contemporaty accounts. Once these distinctions and explanations have been stated, I shall make some suggestions about their relevance to the interpretation and assessment of philosophical texts and arguments. (shrink)

Three different models are described of the relationship of bioethics to the press. The first two are familiar: bioethicists often are interviewed by journalists seeking background and short quotes to insert in a story; alternately, bioethicists sometimes themselves act as journalists of a sort, writing op-eds, articles or even longer works designed for wide readership. These models share the notion that bioethicists can provide information and ideas that increase the quality of people's thinking on moral matters. They share also (...) a common difficulty: do the constraints the media impose on bioethical discourse keep bioethicists from deepening public reflection, and if not, how can those constraints be most effectively kept from distorting what bioethicists wish to say? The third model reverses — in part — the presupposition that bioethics bestows moral sophistication on a public naive about ethical issues, holding rather that matters run both ways; bioethicists stand to learn a great deal from their interactions with various publics and the media that serve them. On this view, the constraints imposed by media conventions constitute opportunities for new and potentially important forms of bioethical writing. Various concerns generated by the first two models are surveyed. It is concluded that while none of the difficulties constitute knock-down arguments against these forms of collaborating with the press, the worries are problematic enough to provide some support for considering the less familiar third approach. Further reason for taking the third model seriously draws on moral theoretic considerations. (shrink)

According to one view of linguistic information, a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: by asserting the content as new information; or by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it. A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly (...) open to challenge. Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self-paced reading experiments with an on-line stops-making-sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate relative to non-presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition-assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions. (shrink)

The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal (...) to metalinguistic disagreement are discussed, and it is argued that, although they help to clarify the issues, they do not fully explain why such impressions remain under enlightenment. To do it, the paper develops a suggestion that other writers have made, that the lingering impression of disagreement is a consequence of a practical conflict, appealing to dispositions to practical coordination that come together with presuppositions of commonality in axiological matters. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:On Dialogue: An Essay in Free ThoughtMichael L. HallOn Dialogue: An Essay in Free Thought, by Robert Grudin; ix & 228 pp. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996, $23.95.In the fifth chapter of his recent book Robert Grudin touched on a question that had been vexing me since I began reading On Dialogue: An Essay in Free Thought. There, amongst his ruminations on the “Social Channels of Free (...) Thought,” Grudin recalls a luncheon celebration for his first trade book during [End Page 181] which one of the executives asked him: “Where in the bookstore would you display this book for sale?” In the four years it had taken him to write the book, Grudin had not given that question a moment’s thought. But it startled him into the realization that books are commodities that must be marketed; as a result he found himself confronting a powerful truth, “that money, like water, flows in channels, and that projects that ignore these channels are likely to come up dry.” More to the point: “These market channels give the American book industry, and hence current American literature, their overall shape. They largely dictate what will be written and read and what will not” (pp. 82–83).Grudin had not only anticipated my question, his response was a practical demonstration of the need for dialogic thinking, for a greater array of choices, questions and answers. I had been looking at On Dialogue from a kind of market perspective, or worse, an academic market perspective. Was it philosophy? Was it literature? Was it both, or neither? I was following the same familiar channels, but Grudin was telling me, quite explicitly, that my approach was unnecessarily limiting. Were I to employ, instead, the method of Renaissance copia that Grudin recommends as a propaedeutic to dialogic thinking, I would quickly discover that On Dialogue is certainly philosophy, and literary criticism, and that it partakes of the history of ideas, dabbles in personal memoir, and takes up theories of interpretation, and education, and creative writing, as well as various forms of psychotherapy, journalism, political theory, and economics.Grudin is obviously at home in the realm of literary criticism. His deft uses of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and of Henry James’s Daisy Miller advance his discussion of dialogic thinking, while at the same time offering focused interpretations of these works. And his examination of the Renaissance rhetorical practice of copia provides a stunning example of the way Grudin grounds his presentations in history and makes connections to other disciplines, thus extending the reach of his arguments. For instance, his reading of Plato’s Parmenides as a “Dialogue of the One and the Many” transforms Plato from an advocate of dialectic to a practitioner of dialogue: “The deep message of Plato’s Parmenides is that wholeness and fragmentation—the One and the Many—are valuable only as joint parameters. They cannot be objects of choice, because they are the nature of choice: they establish the playing field on which choices can be made” (p. 191).If all this makes On Dialogue sound like a congeries, in some respects it is, except that the force of Grudin’s discussion of “dialogic thinking” carries through the entire book and makes the whole cohere in a way that satisfies even when some of the parts occasionally begin to bewilder. His title may call to mind the 1980s literary critical trend spun off by the English translation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination (1981), but Grudin’s notions about dialogue are grounded more in Plato, Martin Buber and Hans-Georg Gadamer than in Bakhtin. His sense of dialogue is personal and transformative as much [End Page 182] as it is critical and interpretive. In fact, Grudin’s subtitle is no throwaway. His dialogic demonstrations, as they find their literary form, are the offspring of Michel de Montaigne’s Essays, as well as being firmly grounded in the writing of other Renaissance humanists such as Erasmus and Rabelais. In a book as multifarious as this, there will be many interesting (and a few not so interesting) loose ends. Grudin acknowledges this in chapters that sometimes end with a... (shrink)

‘Computational thinking’ (CT) is highlighted in research literature, societal debates, and educational policies alike as being of prime significance in the 21st century. It is currently being introduced into K–12 (primary and secondary education) curricula around the world. However, there is no consensus on what exactly CT consists of, which skills it involves, and how it relates to programming. This article pinpoints four competing claims as to what constitutes the defining traits of CT. For each of the four claims, inherent (...) philosophical presuppositions are identified concerning the nature of thinking, problem-solving, and human–computer relationships. It is argued that most of these philosophical presuppositions are very similar to ones that Hubert Dreyfus and Donald Schön addressed forty to fifty years ago. Therefore, claims about the power of CT raise old discussions in a new disguise. Dreyfus and Schön argued that the presuppositions were wrong. Do their arguments hold and thus defeat contemporary claims about CT? Alternatively, has the technological development since the time of their writings proven them wrong? This article argues that it is necessary to heed the arguments of Dreyfus, Schön, and—later—Bent Flyvbjerg to ensure that CT curricula are built in accord with the value-rational nature of human practice, rather than on misconceived rationalizations of problem-solving, computer use, and computational aspects in the world. However, the pervasive integration of information technology in today's world raises new issues concerning human–machine collaborations that sidetrack the arguments of Dreyfus and Schön. A revised view of CT is required which focusses on articulating how humans can design for, partake in, and critically appraise human–machine collaborations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading and Writing PlatoCharles L. GriswoldThe Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues, by Ruby Blondell; 452 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, $55.00Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and Myth in theSymposium, by Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan; 266 pp. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004, $25.00Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato, by Drew Hyland; ix & 202 pp. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, (...) $44.00The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics, by Debra Nails; 414 pp. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002, $75.00.Why did Plato write dialogues? How should his dialogues be read (does the literary form matter, for example, to our getting at the heart of what Plato is saying)? These questions are now familiar in contemporary Plato scholarship, and their answers—which undoubtedly are interconnected—are the subject of lively and fascinating exploration. Any doubt that Platonic studies flourishes would quickly be put to rest by the four books under review here.It was once thought that attention to the "dramatic dimension" of Plato's literary-philosophical productions was the province of two much despised schools of thought: "the Straussians," and "the Continentals." The first of these was viewed as advocating a dangerous combination of esotericism (the idea that somehow Plato's meaning is not on the surface of the dialogues, but concealed in them, as though they were a cryptogram), elitism (the idea that the true Plato is only available to [End Page 205] "the few"—such as the Straussians, according to themselves anyhow), and unphilosophical and dilettantish meanderings about this or that literarily cast "teaching." Straussian hermeneutics was thought to open the way to unprincipled appeals to irony whenever it suited the interpreter, so that any text could end up saying pretty much whatever the interpreter wished for it to say, including the opposite of what the surface of the dialogue appeared to say. And further, it was thought (perhaps in a manner at odds with the "unprincipled interpretation" charge) that the Straussians' mode of "taking into account" the dramatic context—and in particular their contextualization of claims made in the dialogues such that this or that claim gets "explained" as a rhetorical gesture addressed by character X to character Y in context Z, a gesture whose content and validity, so to speak, are limited to that exchange—robs the dialogue of its philosophical content. Hence the worry that Straussian hermeneutics leads to skepticism about the possibility of philosophy itself—philosophy understood precisely in the way that it is regularly spoken of in the Platonic dialogues, namely as the effort to transcend perspective and partiality and to grasp through argument the essence of the matter as such. To cap it off, there is the background suspicion that Straussians are politically conservative, in a way that is somehow connected with their interpretation of Plato.There is more than a kernel of truth in the view that Straussians have insisted on the hermeneutic importance of the dialogue form, taking their cue from Strauss's own remarks in such texts as The City and Man. He did argue that Plato's meaning is not on the surface (and thus in some sense is esoteric), that it was intended by Plato to be available to "the few" while not debunking the beliefs of "the many," and that Plato is an ironist. There is also warrant for the worries about unprincipled interpretation, as well as about the reduction of philosophy to a sort of literary sensibility substituting for genuine philosophical argument (where, after all, are Strauss's arguments for any philosophical position, whether or not about a Platonic "teaching"?). And it is by and large true, so far as I can tell, that his self-identified followers are politically conservative (in the contemporary American sense), and in a way somehow tied to their interpretation of Plato.I myself find Strauss's interpretation of Plato to be deeply problematic both in its substance and its method (I put aside the issue of the political conservatism of Strauss's followers, a "teaching" I also find objectionable). And while I join the authors of the four... (shrink)

First published in 1967, _Writing and Difference_, a collection of Jacques Derrida's essays written between 1959 and 1966, has become a landmark of contemporary French thought. In it we find Derrida at work on his systematic deconstruction of Western metaphysics. The book's first half, which includes the celebrated essay on Descartes and Foucault, shows the development of Derrida's method of deconstruction. In these essays, Derrida demonstrates the traditional nature of some purportedly nontraditional currents of modern thought—one of his main targets (...) being the way in which "structuralism" unwittingly repeats metaphysical concepts in its use of linguistic models. The second half of the book contains some of Derrida's most compelling analyses of why and how metaphysical thinking must exclude writing from its conception of language, finally showing metaphysics to be constituted by this exclusion. These essays on Artaud, Freud, Bataille, Hegel, and Lévi-Strauss have served as introductions to Derrida's notions of writing and _différence_—the untranslatable formulation of a nonmetaphysical "concept" that does not exclude writing—for almost a generation of students of literature, philosophy, and psychoanalysis. _Writing and Difference_ reveals the unacknowledged program that makes thought itself possible. In analyzing the contradictions inherent in this program, Derrida foes on to develop new ways of thinking, reading, and writing,—new ways based on the most complete and rigorous understanding of the old ways. Scholars and students from all disciplines will find _Writing and Difference_ an excellent introduction to perhaps the most challenging of contemporary French thinkers—challenging because Derrida questions thought as we know it. (shrink)

Philosophers like to talk about propositions. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps the most common is that philosophers are sometimes more interested in the content of a thought or utterance than in the particular sentence or utterance that might express it on some occasion. Propositions are offered as these contents.

It is a platitude that when we reason, we often take things for granted, sometimes even justifiably so. The chemist might reason from the fact that a substance turns litmus paper red to that substance being an acid. In so doing, they take for granted, reasonably enough, that this test for acidity is valid. We ordinarily reason from things looking a certain way to their being that way. We take for granted, reasonably enough, that things are as they look Although (...) it is a platitude that we often take things for granted when we reason—whether justifiably or not—one might think that we do not have to. In fact, it is a natural expectation that were we not pressed by time, lack of energy or focus, we could always in principle make explicit in the form of premises every single presupposition we make in the course of our reasoning. In other words, it is natural to expect it to be true that presuppositionless reasoning is possible. In this essay, I argue that it is false: presuppositionless reasoning is impossible. Indeed, I think this is one of the lessons of a long-standing paradox about inference and reasoning known as Lewis Carroll’s (1985) regress of the premises. Many philosophers agree that Carroll’s regress teaches us something foundational about reasoning. I part ways about what it is that it teaches us. What it teaches us is that the structure of reasoning is constitutively presuppositional. (shrink)

Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of ‘Voraussetzung’. On Frege’s view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely ‘illuminate’ a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially (...) tied to names. (shrink)

A seminal figure in the philosophy of history, culture, and language, Johann Gottfried Herder also produced some of the most important and original works in the history of aesthetic theory. A student of Kant, he spent much of his life striving to reconcile the opposing poles of Enlightenment thought represented by his early mentors. His ideas influenced Hegel, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Dilthey, J. S. Mill, and Goethe. This book presents most of Herder's important writings on aesthetics, including the main sections of (...) one of his major untranslated works, Kritische Wälder. These notes, essays, and treatises, the majority of which appear here in English for the first time, show this idiosyncratic thinker both deeply rooted in the controversies of his day and pointing the way to future developments in aesthetics. Chosen to reflect the extent and diversity of Herder's concerns, the texts cover such topics as the psychology and physiology of aesthetic perception, the classification of the arts, taste, Shakespeare, the classical tradition, and the relationship between art and morality. Few thinkers have reflected so sensitively and productively on the cultural, historical, anthropological, ethical, and theological dimensions of art and the creative process. With this book, the importance of aesthetics to the evolution and texture of Herder's own thought, as well as his profound contribution to that discipline, comes fully into view. (shrink)

Philosophers like to talk about propositions. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps the most common is that philosophers are sometimes more interested in the content of a thought or utterance than in the particular sentence or utterance that might express it on some occasion. Propositions are offered as these contents.

A seminal figure in the philosophy of history, culture, and language, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) also produced some of the most important and original works in the history of aesthetic theory. A student of Kant, he spent much of his life striving to reconcile the opposing poles of Enlightenment thought represented by his early mentors. His ideas influenced Hegel, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Dilthey, J. S. Mill, and Goethe. This book presents most of Herder's important writings on aesthetics, including the main sections (...) of one of his major untranslated works, Kritische Wälder (Critical Forests). These notes, essays, and treatises, the majority of which appear here in English for the first time, show this idiosyncratic thinker both deeply rooted in the controversies of his day and pointing the way to future developments in aesthetics. Chosen to reflect the extent and diversity of Herder's concerns, the texts cover such topics as the psychology and physiology of aesthetic perception, the classification of the arts, taste, Shakespeare, the classical tradition, and the relationship between art and morality. Few thinkers have reflected so sensitively and productively on the cultural, historical, anthropological, ethical, and theological dimensions of art and the creative process. With this book, the importance of aesthetics to the evolution and texture of Herder's own thought, as well as his profound contribution to that discipline, comes fully into view. (shrink)

Could it ever be right to say that a language---as opposed to a speaker of the language---makes, or presupposes or somehow commits itself to certain claims? Such as that certain kinds of objects exist, or that things are a certain way? It can be tempting to think not, to think that languages are just the neutral media through which speakers make claims. Yet certain, surprisingly diverse, phenomena---analyticity, racial epithets, object-involving direct reference, arithmetic, and semantic paradoxes like the Liar---have pushed philosophers (...) towards views according to which languages can have presuppositions or commitments of their own---to things like the existence of numbers, the marital status of bachelors, the existence of water, and even to contradictions or morally abhorrent views. In this paper I want to present some recent data from linguistics that supports a less commonly discussed, and rather surprising version of this idea: namely that English presupposes the existence of locations or places. In section one I do some work to clarify what this claim could possibly mean by identifying some central ways in which languages have been thought to presuppose various things about the world. In section two I present the core of the linguistic data and theory from the work of Susan Rothstein. In section three I compare it to some older work by David Kaplan, arguing that the significance of the new results is greater for the issue at hand, and then in the final section I examine the philosophical significance of this work. One might attempt to draw quite impressive conclusions: such as that the existence of space is analytic, and hence a priori. I will argue that such a conclusion here would be over hasty, and that what we really have is just a surprising fact about our not-so-neutral natural language. (shrink)

In 1828, G. W. F. Hegel published a critical review of Johann Georg Hamann, a retrospective of the life and works of one of Germany’s most enigmatic and challenging thinkers and writers. While Hegel’s review had enjoyed a central place in Hamann studies since its appearance, Hegel on Hamann is the first English translation of the important work. Philosophers, theologians, and literary critics welcome Anderson’s stunning translation since Hamann is gaining renewed attention, not only as a key figure of German (...) intellectual history, but also as an early forerunner of postmodern thought. Relationships between Enlightenment, Counter Enlightenment, and Idealism come to the fore as Hegel reflects on Hamann’s critiques of his contemporaries Immanuel Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, J. G. Herder, and F. H. Jacobi. Hegel on Hamann also includes an introduction to Hegel’s review by Anderson, as well as an essay on the role of friendship in Hamann’s life, in Hegel’s thought, and in German intellectual culture more broadly. Rounding out the volume are its extensive annotations and bibliography, which facilitate further study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy in English and German. This book is essential both for readers of Hegel or Hamann and for those interested in the history of German thought, the philosophy of religion, language and hermeneutics, or friendship as a philosophical category. (shrink)

This article deals with Plato's ways of writing. Plato's writing scintillates, most of them, if not all. However, this depends on whether we take the letters to be genuine—of what comes down to us from Plato's hand is in the dialogue form, somehow or other. But should we speak of “the” Platonic dialogue form? After all, the dialogues come in all sorts of different forms: some are dramatic, others merely formalized discussion; some are in direct speech, others narrated (...) ; some seem to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, whereas others begin, or end, in the middle of things. In almost all the dialogues, people talk about big abstract questions: the nature of reality, truth, virtue and knowledge. These conversations come in all sorts of shapes and sizes, but they are often conducted by question and answer, by one-person asking questions to one another. (shrink)

A seminal figure in the philosophy of history, culture, and language, Johann Gottfried Herder also produced some of the most important and original works in the history of aesthetic theory. A student of Kant, he spent much of his life striving to reconcile the opposing poles of Enlightenment thought represented by his early mentors. His ideas influenced Hegel, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Dilthey, J. S. Mill, and Goethe. This book presents most of Herder's important writings on aesthetics, including the main sections of (...) one of his major untranslated works, Kritische Wälder. These notes, essays, and treatises, the majority of which appear here in English for the first time, show this idiosyncratic thinker both deeply rooted in the controversies of his day and pointing the way to future developments in aesthetics. Chosen to reflect the extent and diversity of Herder's concerns, the texts cover such topics as the psychology and physiology of aesthetic perception, the classification of the arts, taste, Shakespeare, the classical tradition, and the relationship between art and morality. Few thinkers have reflected so sensitively and productively on the cultural, historical, anthropological, ethical, and theological dimensions of art and the creative process. With this book, the importance of aesthetics to the evolution and texture of Herder's own thought, as well as his profound contribution to that discipline, comes fully into view. (shrink)

Never-before-published writing from a key twentieth-century philosopher. In 1962, Reiner Schürmann began studying at the Dominican school of theology Le Saulchoir, outside Paris. That experience radically shaped his life and work, enabling him to begin to develop many of the ideas for which he would later be known: letting be, life without why, ontological anarchy, and the tragic double bind. Ways of Releasement contains never-before-published material from Schürmann's early period as well as a report Schürmann wrote about his (...) encounter with Heidegger; a précis of his autobiographical novel, Origins; and translations and new editions of later groundbreaking essays. Ways of Releasement concludes with an extensive afterword setting Schürmann's writings in the context of his thinking and life. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen's Logic of Pure Knowledge and G. W. F. Hegel's Science of Logic each use in their way the means of thought of negation and contradiction to unfold the philosophical dynamic: a fragile interplay between self-endangerment and self-preservation of thought. Here, the proximity and difference of the two authors are extended. The proximity lies in methodological negativism. The difference is in the significance of the principle of continuity. According to Cohen and Hegel as well, thinking proceeds exclusively, as Kant (...) called it, synthetically. The exclusion of contradiction, limited to analytical judgments, has only marginal significance. But the commonality does not eliminate the differences. As Hegel puts it, contradiction is a principle of mediation and finally results in "self-dissolution"; it carries within itself a direction of logical "reconciliation." Per Cohen, contradiction is a principle of "annihilation" of approaches to a determination that threatens any form of "identity." The turn Hegel put in contradiction itself, regarding in it a unity of positivity and negativity, has no direct counterpart in Cohen. Nevertheless, for him, too, the "judgment of contradiction" becomes the active basis of all cognitive thought. By exercising a contradiction-destroying "activity," the judgment of contradiction "protects," indeed "generates," the real possibility of cognition. The annihilation of the non-identical sets free the fundamental "judgment of origin" with which cognition finds its beginning. The principle of continuity taken over from Leibniz corresponds to it. Just this principle has now again no direct correspondence with Hegel. (shrink)

Writing philosophy well is an essential skill in our discipline. Philosophical writing must aim for clarity, precision, and rigor, but in doing so, it can often wind up dry, long-winded and boring. It can take many drafts to produce a paper that is suitable for publication in a journal, and many aspiring (and accomplished!) academic philosophers find the process of writing arduous and frustrating. Still, some people make it look easy – if you’ve read anything by Alan (...) Hájek, you’ve probably noticed his breezy style that effortlessly communicates complex ideas in simple terms. His concise and witty prose makes even formal epistemology, a notoriously complicated, math-heavy subject, accessible and engaging to readers. However, while it might look effortless, Hájek’s spirited style is in fact born out of deep and thoughtful engagement with the craft of writing. His motto is: “Work hard for your readers, so that they don’t have to.” Hájek’s approach is decidedly anti-genius: he believes that having good ideas and communicating them well can be taught, and he has devoted considerable energy to helping his graduate students improve their writing. He has written multiple articles about philosophical creativity, as well as an unpublished lengthy manuscript on the mechanics of writing. I have benefited myself from his advice – at least I believe I have, readers may judge for themselves. My aim in this article is to share a few of his insights that I have found most helpful for myself and for my students. I won’t try to summarize all of Hájek’s advice, and I also don’t claim that all of this is totally new. Rather, I will offer a small collection of greatest hits. I will cover eight aspects of philosophical writing, and for each one, I will explain the basic idea, and then discuss some ways of implementing it for oneself and one’s students. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody (...) 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them. (shrink)

Arthur Danto believed that “style has to be expressed immediately and spontaneously.” Danto writes that “the question of when is a thing an artwork becomes one with the question of when is an interpretation of a thing an artistic interpretation”. His extensive art criticism focuses, then, on the way artworks are about. The presence of a metaphor and the demand for interpretation are insufficient to draw the demarcation line between art and not‐art. A work of art ought to be (...) “a piece of visual thought”. Danto's own style was an invitation, almost intimate, to engage his enticing and entertaining way of thinking. His writing creates the impression that he is speaking and simply registering his thoughts and imaginings as they come. (shrink)

Platonic Writings/platonic Readings is a collection of original essays and exchanges devoted to an aspect of Platonic philosophy that has received little attention in the secondary literature: Plato's exclusive reliance on the dialogue as the preferred format for written philosophy. Charles Griswold, the editor of the collection, has solicited essays that "explore two questions about Plato's dialogues: first, 'why did Plato write dialogues?' and second, 'how ought we to read Plato's dialogues?'". As Griswold explains, the assembled authors believe that (...) Plato's reliance on dialogues is neither arbitrary nor purely rhetorical: "The presupposition of this book is that serious consideration of the twin problems of interpretation and of Plato's reasons for writing dialogues is essential to a successful understanding of his work". (shrink)

“Racism” is the name given to a type of behavior which consists in the display of contempt or aggressiveness toward other people on account of physical differences between them and oneself. It should be noted that this definition does not contain the word “race,” and this observation leads us to the first surprise in this area which contains many: whereas racism is a well-attested social phenomenon, “race” itself does not exist! Or, to put it more clearly: there are a great (...) number of physical differences among human groups, but these differences cannot be superimposed; we obtain completely divergent subdivisions of the human species according to whether we base our description of the “races” on an analysis of their epidermis or their blood types, their genetic heritages or their bone structures. For contemporary biology, the concept of “race” is therefore useless. This fact has no influence, however, on racist behavior: to justify their contempt or aggressiveness, racists invoke not scientific analyses but the most superficial and striking of physical characteristics —namely, differences in skin color, pilosity, and body structure.Thus, it is with good cause that the word “race” was placed in quotes in the title of this issue: “races” do not exist. I am less sure, however, that all the contributors managed to avoid postulating the existence, behind this word as behind most words, of a thing. In his introduction Gates remarks that “race, in these usages, pretends to be an objective term of classification, when in fact it is a dangerous trope,” and he goes on to describe as follows the goal of the special issue: “to deconstruct, if you will, the ideas of difference inscribed in the trope of race, to explicate discourse itself in order to reveal the hidden relations of power and knowledge inherent in popular and academic usages of ‘race’ ” . Up to a point, I agree with him, even if I cannot help pointing out the insistent allusions to certain contemporary critical theories —allusions which furnish proof that the author of these lines possesses a particular knowledge and thereby sets up a particular power relationship between himself and the reader. This, however, is not the problem. The problem arises on page 15, when the same author declares, “We must, I believe, analyze the ways in which writing relates to race, how attitudes toward racial differences generate and structure literary texts by us and about us.” What bothers me about this sentence is not so much that “generate” and “structure” allude to yet another critical theory as that its author seems to be reinstating what he himself referred to as the “dangerous trope” of “race”: if “racial differences” do not exist, how can they possibly influence literary texts? Tzvetan Todorov works at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. His most recent book in translation is The Conquest of America . Criticism of Criticism is forthcoming. Loulou Mack is a free-lance writer and translator living in Paris. (shrink)

This paper presents problems for Stalnaker’s common ground theory of presupposition. Stalnaker (Linguist and Philos 25:701–721, 2002) proposes a 2-stage process of utterance interpretation: presupposed content is added to the common ground prior to acceptance/rejection of the utterance as a whole. But this revision makes presupposition difficult to distinguish from assertion. A more fundamental problem is that the common ground theory rests on a faulty theory of assertion—that the essence of assertion is to present the content of an utterance as (...) new information. Many examples are presented of utterances which are felicitous but not informative in this way. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the rational requirements for suspended judgment, or what suspending judgment about a question rationally commits one to. It shows that two purported rational requirements for suspended judgment cannot both be true at the same time, at least when the entailment relation between questions is understood a certain way. The first one says that one is rationally required to suspend judgment about those questions that are entailed by the questions that one already suspends judgment (...) about. The second one says that one is rationally required to believe the presuppositions of the questions one suspends judgment about. Two plausible solutions to the problem are discussed. One of them explicates the relation of entailment between questions in an alternative manner, and the other one rejects the presupposition requirement. Either way, a closure requirement for suspended judgment can be maintained which is analogous to the closure requirement for belief. Whereas belief is ideally closed under entailment between propositions, suspended judgment is ideally closed under entailment between questions. (shrink)

A book on this topic is long overdue. It is high time that a competent Hegel scholar recognized and assessed the danger posed to Hegel’s whole system by the skeptical tradition, argued that Hegel’s Jena writings, culminating in the Phenomenology, are primarily works of epistemology rather than metaphysics, examined Hegel’s own views on ancient and modern skepticism, identified and criticized Hegel’s own strategies for defending his thought against the skeptical threat, and took Hegel seriously as an epistemologist. Forster does (...) all this and more, and does it very well. (shrink)

This article begins by wondering how the writer’s transformation into motherhood affects her practice of reading, writing and research: how maternities are made academic. Specifically, this article is interested in thinking through lactating breasts, as a particularly complex and potentially subversive ‘performance’ of maternity. In addition, this article reframes ‘maternal thinking’ through 1990s theories of embodiment and corporeality, and asks how embodied practices like breastfeeding might be theorized, as well as how ‘embodied theory’ might be practised. In looking at (...) various cultural texts about breasts and breastfeeding, the article is scripted into a series of connective and reflexive scenes around performance, space, language and knowledge, coming to rest in the imaginative project of an epistemology of breasts. It sets reflexive accounts of lived experience alongside theoretical reflections to create a dynamic and thoughtful reading of breasts, entwining personal and public discourses, maternal and academic writing, theorizing and cultural practices. (shrink)

In researching presuppositions dealing with logic and dynamic of belief we distinguish two related parts. The first part refers to presuppositions and logic, which is not necessarily involved with intentional operators. We are primarily concerned with classical, free and presuppositonal logic. Here, we practice a well known Strawson’s approach to the problem of presupposition in relation to classical logic. Further on in this work, free logic is used, especially Van Fraassen’s research of the role of presupposition in supervaluations (...) logical systems. At the end of the first part, presuppositional logic, advocated by S.K. Thomason, is taken into consideration. The second part refers to the presuppositions in relation to the logic of the dynamics of belief. Here the logic of belief change is taken into consideration and other epistemic notions with immanent mechanism for the presentation of the dynamics. Three representative and dominant approaches are evaluated. First, we deal with new, less classical, situation semantics. Besides Strawson’s theory, the second theory is the theory of the belief change, developed by Alchourron, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM theory). At the end, the oldest, universal, and dominant approach is used, recognized as Hintikka’s approach to the analysis of epistemic notions. (shrink)

This article discusses the representation of AIDS in Guibert's posthumously published novel Le Paradis. The novel is situated in relation to Guibert's better known previous AIDS writings. The article proposes that Guibert's AIDS works fall in to three related categories: writings about other peoples' AIDS; autobiographical writings about AIDS, and, in the third, terminal stage in which Le Paradis fits, writing AIDS. As such the article suggests that Le Paradis manages to reflect and communicate some of the (...) trauma of living with AIDS by specifically trying not to write about it. The article raises issues related to constructions of sexualized and AIDS identities in fiction, and presents the novel as a form which represents a loss of self. The novel, it is argued, becomes a self-mourning for a healthy past which is memorialized in a fictional present, itself always-already haunted by the nostalgia for a lost future. (shrink)

The so-called “No Threat” solutions claim that the epistemic factors that the live sceptic claims defeat our claims to knowledge are too feeble to mount a threat. On the face of it, the epistemic factors the live sceptic says defeat our chances at knowledge make it look like the sceptical hypotheses are about to ruin our chances at knowledge, but this is an illusion. This chapter presents and evaluates eight such strategies, four of which examine the relation (...) of philosophy to common sense. (shrink)

P. F. Strawson famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like “The present King of France is bald”. This paper defends a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony‐based way for an audience to learn about the world.

Merleau-Ponty and Derrida articulate two overlapping but divergent ways of thinking about differentiation, ecart and differance. This volume represents the viewpoints of fifteen leading North American scholars working in the fields of Continental philosophy, phenomenology, and postmodernism. In essays written expressly for this volume, these scholars address the matrix of thought underlying contemporary responses to postmodernism at large and deconstructionism in particular: identity and difference, community and alterity, self and other, metaphysics and its closure, language and its beyond, signification (...) and referentiality. (shrink)

Philosophy lecturer and essayist Gary Jason tackles timely issues from education reform to the Arab Spring in his new anthology Disturbing Thoughts: Unorthodox Writings on Timely Issues. Disturbing Thoughts collects more than 160 political and social commentary essays published between 2010 and 2012. Among the many topics addressed are environmentalism, public employee pensions, education, and political reform. Today's headlines are filled with discussion on the growing dysfunction of unfunded pension benefits, the debate over immigration, and concerns about the shale (...) industry. Whatever the topic, Jason doesn't shy away from offering his opinion, asking, for instance, how could we allow in many more immigrants legally without causing financial strain. Disturbing Thoughts arrives as a follow-up to Jason's 2011 anthology, Dangerous Thoughts, which collected a similarly eclectic set of essays written between 1979 and 2010. His most recent articles include pieces published in Liberty, American Thinker, The Orange County Register, The Washington Times, and The American. Jason comes to issues from the classical liberal position-albeit with an unusual perspective that sets him apart from most other political commentators. Whether you agree or not, his views are sure to keep readers thinking. (shrink)

Around 1800, print culture became a particularly rich source for metaphors about thinking as well as writing, nowhere more so than in the German tradition of _Dichter und Denker_. Goethe, Jean Paul, and Hegel used the _preface_ in order to reflect on the problems of writing itself, and its interpretation. If Sterne teaches us that a material book enables mind games as much as it gives expression to them, the Germans made these games more theoretical still. Weaving (...) in authors from Antiquity to Agamben, Williams shows how European–and, above all, German–Romanticism was a watershed in the history of the preface. The playful, paradoxical strategies that Romantic writers invented are later played out in continental philosophy, and in post-Structuralist literature. The preface is a prompt for playful thinking with texts, as much as it is conventionally the prosaic product of such an exercise. (shrink)

This is a much-needed reissue of the standard English translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, originally published in 1970. The Philosophy of Nature is the second part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, all of which is now available in English from OUP (Part I being his Logic, Part III being his Philosophy of Mind). Hegel's aim in this work is to interpret the varied phenomena of Nature from the standpoint of a dialectical logic. Those who still think of (...) Hegel as a merely a priori philosopher will here find abundant evidence that he was keenly interested in and very well informed about empirical science. The Philosophy of Nature is integral to his philosophical system and deserves the most serious attention. Students and scholars of Hegel and the history of European philosophy will welcome the availability of this important text, which also includes a translation of Hegel's Zusatze or lecture notes. (shrink)

In his Aesthetics Hegel gives full expression to his seminal theory of art. He surveys the history of art from ancient India, Egypt, and Greece through to the Romantic movement of his own time, criticizes major works, and probes their meaning and significance; his rich array of examples gives broad scope for his judgement and makes vivid his exposition of his theory. The substantial Introduction is Hegel's best exposition of his general philosophy of art, and provides the ideal way into (...) his Aesthetics. In Part I he considers the general nature of art: he distinguishes art, as a spiritual experience, from religion and philosophy; he discusses the beauty of art and differentiates it from the beauty of nature; and he examines artistic genius and originality. Part II provides a sort of history of art, divded into three periods called Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic. Part III deals individually with architecture, scuplture, painting, music, and literature. (shrink)

This book has the virtue of sketching what might seem the implications of a Gricean theory of meaning. Mr. Landsman explicitly accepts the psychologism of Grice’s approach: the attempt to explain linguistic meaning by nonlinguistic, psychological notions, i.e., speaker’s intention that hearers have certain beliefs, etc. What turns out universal are actions, of which linguistic actions are a non-basic kind. Landsman is to be complimented for emphasizing that a Gricean account is psychologistic and that it loosely implies non-linguistic universals of (...) action, which are to provide the principles of individuation for beliefs, intentions, propositions, sayings, etc., which are the "connate accusatives," or adverbials, of action universals. He does not, I think, do much to rid Grice’s account of its fundamental difficulty: viz., that what is to do the explaining seems less clear and less well individuated than what it is to explain. It does not help much to write: "I do not wish to deny that, as a matter of fact, people often think in words. This means that a factual condition of having certain thoughts is the mastery of speech. Linguistic conventions thus may constitute causal conditions of certain intentional states. What I am claiming is that the notion of a convention does not enter into our concept of an intentional state." It is not sufficiently clear what the difference between mere "causal conditions" and "logical conditions" is supposed to be. Some might say that the notion of thought presupposes the notion of logic and that logic, unless we are to mix it with empirical psychology and talk of "laws of thought," presupposes the notion of language. Unfortunately, Landsman has little to say about the criticisms that have been made of Grice’s theory, mentioning Ziff’s criticisms in a brief aside and not so much as mentioning John Searle’s attempt to improve Grice’s theory of meaning. Also Landsman has nothing to say about recent and closely related work in linguistic theory: e.g., 1) though Landsman maintains that all ordinary speakings are performative actions, he has nothing to say about whether or not there is any relevance, and if so what, in J. R. Ross’ fairly recent claims to the effect that all sentences, in their syntactic deep structure, begin with a general performative verb coupled with the speaker’s pronoun; 2) much of what Landsman says relates to the distinction between the pragmatics and semantics of language, and to the success of Davidsonians and "generative semanticists" in their equation of deep syntax and logical form, but Landsman does not explain what his position comes to in such terms, nor does he explain why he does not have to explain. These last points are more a plea for catholicism in talking about meaning than a criticism of Landsman’s able exposition. The second half of this book consists largely of two papers: on the indeterminancy of translation and on abstract particulars and passages from The Problem of Universals, which Landsman edited.—R. B. (shrink)