In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison argues that Kant’s theoretical treatment of the self presents both an incoherent “official view” and a coherent “alternative view.” In this paper, I argue that Kant’s genuine position on the self can be reconstructed as a coherent unity by examining the flaws in Allison’s analysis. It is shown that Allison’s objections to Kant’s official view are based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions and unjustified conceptual identifications. Allison’s own dual-aspect view of the transcendental distinction between phenomena (...) and noumena is used to correct these misconceptions. Thus, the official view as described by Allison is not Kant’s genuine position. Rather, it is shown that Kant treats the noumenal self as the ground or support of the activity of thinking and the subject of apperception, and that this grounding function is essential to Kant’s view but overlooked by Allison’s analysis. (shrink)

Kant's views of human animality are consistent with his belief in human freedom.

The political writings of Kant and of Hegel present two contrasts, whose connection and explanation have never been adequately explored. The first contrast is in respect of the quality of their discussions of ‘home’ politics—in Kant's language, the ‘problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution’. Here Hegel shines. However much one may dislike the tone of voice, the vocabulary, the style and the arrangement of its arguments, his Philosophy of Right , especially when supplemented by his more topical political (...) writings, presents an array of dicta, judgments and arguments of notable penetration, balance and prescience. Consider for instance his account of the very different political functions of free associations and of representative bodies, and his perception of the symbolic—but crucially symbolic—role of head of state. On these, as on many other issues, Hegel's views deserve the credit that has of late begun to be restored to them. Whatever his philosophical failings, he had a remarkable sense of the key junctures of different strands in the life of politics; so that, although the kind of state he describes and admires retains little practical relevance today, his exposition of it remains a valuable training-ground in political appreciation. By contrast Kant's philosophy of the state, as we find it in Part II of his Philosophy of Right , in Part II of Theory and Practice and in Appendices I and II of Perpetual Peace , is at first sight little more than an academic exercise. It amounts to a restatement, in dehistoricized terms and in accordance with Kant's rationalist theory of morals, of Rousseau's central political teachings, viz. that an original, unanimous, unrescindable contract explains political allegiance, and that the idea of a General Will is a sufficient criterion of political justice within the state. From these two basic positions Kant develops a theory of civic obedience far more restrictive than that of Rousseau or indeed than that of Hobbes. Throughout, Kant accepts—in the spirit which one might accord to revelation—Rousseau's assumptions that government can be confined to issues that fall under a General Will, and that such a Will can be ‘found’ for the resolution of every political issue, so that honest men need never disagree about what the General Will is. But to say this is to say that Kant's concern with home politics is little more than academic. (shrink)

This article will probe into Kant’s viewpoints about parent-child relationship so as to demonstrate that they are inspiring on the one hand—for example on dealing with the relationship as that pertinent to the thing in itself, but on the other hand, there are many flaws. His strategy on avoiding the difficulty of creating by man a being endowed with freedom depends merely on an one-sided comprehension of time, because according to Kant himself, there is a difference as to the time (...) between sensual forms of intuition and expressive form of transcendental imagination. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant gives a profound enunciation with respect to the two and the latter is related to free causality and categorical imperative in his moral philosophy. Once it refers to the rights of a being endowed with freedom and the time it requires to maintain them, it is problematic to assert that the creation of such beings is not concerned with, in any sense whatsoever, time and the sensual, mortal body. What is more, Kant failed to take into full consideration that parents are also beings endowed with freedom whose rights to the child are not totally dependent on the latter’s inherent rights but on their own inherent basis. Granting parents too few natural rights, Kant on the other hand allocates them too much obligations in that the parent-child relation is unbalanced in his field of view. Thirdly, he gives no consideration as to whether or not the empirical process of rearing children itself can also create some rights, which nevertheless, should be taken into account when temporal elements can be found from the very original parent-child relationship. (shrink)

I clarify Kant's classification of duties and criticize the apocryphal tradition that, according to Kant, perfect duties trump imperfect duties. I then use Kant's view to argue that judges who believe that an action is immoral and should be illegal need not set aside their beliefs in order to comply with binding precedents that permit the action. The same view of morality that causes some people to oppose certain actions, including abortion, requires lower–court judges to comply with binding (...) precedents. Therefore, someone's opposition to legal abortion, by itself, does not justify opposing that person's nomination to a lower court. (shrink)

The subject matter of Ward’s book is Kant’s view of the nature of morality. Its object is to show that there is a development in Kant’s view, not only from the precritical to the critical stage of his thought, but also within the critical stage of his thought. The occasion for writing this book, it should be noted, is the prevalence of "verdicts" regarding Kant’s view of the nature of morality formed by British scholars on the basis of an acquaintance (...) of only the major critical works of Kant. According to Ward, an adequate understanding of Kant’s view of the nature of morality can come only from a reading of all of Kant’s works, most especially from a reading of his final, posthumously published, notes. In these notes, Kant equates God with practical reason. The significance of this equation is that it finally provides a stable solution to the problem of the foundations of morality, a problem which had occupied Kant since the beginning of his philosophical career. Kant’s precritical works, as well as the critiques, provide only unstable solutions. In his pre-critical works, Kant oscillates between seeking the foundations in knowledge and feeling. In his critiques, Kant seems to find a stable solution by conceiving reason as the source of principles, both theoretical and practical. The instability of this solution lies in the fact that Kant retains, along with the formal principles, a morality the source of which is religion. In the critiques, however, Kant is unable to conceive religion as anything more than a supplement to morality. Not until his final notes, Ward argues, does Kant recognize this instability and rectify it by giving religion an integral place in his conception of morality.—W. A. S. (shrink)

In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison argues that Kant’s theoretical treatment of the self presents both an incoherent “official view” and a coherent “alternative view.” In this paper, I argue that Kant’s genuine position on the self can be reconstructed as a coherent unity by examining the flaws in Allison’s analysis. It is shown that Allison’s objections to Kant’s official view are based on unwarranted metaphysical assumptions and unjustified conceptual identifications. Allison’s own dual-aspect view of the transcendental distinction between phenomena (...) and noumena is used to correct these misconceptions. Thus, the official view as described by Allison is not Kant’s genuine position. Rather, it is shown that Kant treats the noumenal self as the ground or support of the activity of thinking and the subject of apperception, and that this grounding function is essential to Kant’s view but overlooked by Allison’s analysis. (shrink)

Kant's arguments for the synthetic a priori status of geometry are generally taken to have been refuted by the development of non-Euclidean geometries. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that, on the contrary, the development of non-Euclidean geometry has confirmed Kant's views, for since a demonstration of the consistency of non-Euclidean geometry depends on a demonstration of its equi-consistency with Euclidean geometry, one need only show that the axioms of Euclidean geometry have 'intuitive content' in order to (...) show that both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry are bodies of synthetic a priori truths. Michael Friedman has argued that this defence presumes a polyadic conception of logic that was foreign to Kant. According to Friedman, Kant held that geometrical reasoning itself relies essentially on intuition, and that this precludes the very possibility of non-Euclidean geometry. While Friedman's characterization of Kant's views on geometrical reasoning is correct, I argue that Friedman's conclusion that non-Euclidean geometries are logically impossible for Kant is not. I argue that Kant is best understood as a proto-constructivist and that modern constructive axiomatizations (unlike Hilbert-style axiomatizations) of both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry capture Kant's views on the essentially constructive nature of geometrical reasoning well. (shrink)

Kant's Foundation of Ethics, translated by Leo Rauch, includes "What is Enlightenment?" and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. These unabridged works, in contemporary English with oral interpretation, articulate the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical world view. Taken together, these works challenge all free people to think about the requirements for self-determination, both in our individual lives and in our public and private institutions.

3. One of the most striking features of Kant’s epistemology is his insistence on the need for a sharp distinction between sensibility and understanding. “Our knowledge,” he tells us, “springs from two fundamental sources of mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations, the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations. Intuitions and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge….” In spite of this radical difference in role, both sensibility and understanding are construed (...) as, in a broad and ill-defined sense, faculties of representation. It is this, perhaps, which leads him to suggest that they may “spring from a common, but to us unknown, root.”. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the following threefold question: first, is there a genuine problem of grounding aesthetic judgement in testimony? Second, if there is such a problem, what exactly is its nature? And lastly, can Kant help us get clearer on the problem? Following Kant, I argue that the problem with aesthetic testimony is explained by norms that govern what it takes to judge a beautiful object aesthetically, rather than theoretically or practically, not by norms that govern what it (...) takes to judge aesthetically with a sufficient epistemic basis rather than without it. I thus propose a normative and aesthetic approach to testimony. (shrink)

In his recent article, “Beauty and Utility in Kant’s Aesthetics: The Origins of Adherent Beauty,” Robert Clewis aims to offer a fresh perspective on Kant’s views on the relation between beauty and utility. While, admittedly, a fresh approach is hard to come by, given the extensive treatment of the topic, Clewis thinks that a study of its historical context and origins might give us the needed edge. The most interesting and novel aspect of Clewis’s discussion is his detailed treatment (...) of Kant’s changing use of the term “selbstständig” (which in general means “independent,” “self-standing,” “stable,” “lasting,” “self-subsisting”). In the process of tackling the more general question as to what kind of eighteenth-century model of beauty-utility relation Kant proposes, Clewis addresses other issues, such as the seeming inconsistency between Kant’s earlier and later views on free and purpose-based beauty. As noted in the editor’s footnote of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU), while Kant uses the term “selbstständig,” in his precritical period to refer to “purpose-based beauty” (what he calls in the KU adherent or dependent beauty), he uses the same term to denote free beauty (independent beauty, that is to say) in the KU.1 Clewis argues that even though Kant uses the same term to refer to both dependent and independent beauty, albeit in different periods of his life, this switch in the application of the term is not caused by a change in the meaning of the term from Kant’s perspective, but a change in Kant’s views concerning the status of free beauty. I agree with Clewis that Kant did not change his mind about the meaning of the term “selbstständig.” Nevertheless, I disagree with the line Clewis pursues.I will argue that Clewis’s mistake lies in thinking that, throughout his career, Kant endorsed what he calls the “blocking-unifi cationist” view on the relation between beauty and utility (“beauty and perfection/utility are distinct concepts yet can be united or unifi ed” (2018, p. 309)). As I will show, this mistake results in an inconsistent story about Kant’s aesthetics as well as an inconsistency within Clewis’ own argument. I will try to articulate a more consistent story about the development of Kant’s ideas on aesthetics in general and his ideas on adherent beauty in particular by proposing that, contra Clewis, earlier Kant subscribed to what Clewis calls the “containment” account (beauty is a form of perfection) while the later Kant changed his mind (having given up on rationalism) and came to defend a version of “blocking-unificationist” view. (shrink)

This paper takes on the broad theme of the relation between legality and morality in Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy. It aims, more specifically, at a clarification of Kant's views on obedience and enjoyment. I claim that Kant's statements in his later writings, especially in the Metaphysics of Morals, of the obligation of citizens of a state to subject themselves unconditionally to the sovereign in power, must be seen in connection with his earlier moral writings in order (...) to maintain a proper Kantian conception of the relation between legality and morality. To this end, Kant's use of the concept of enjoyment is instructive, and looking at it closely makes it possible to spell out why obedience in itself does not suffice for a moral existence. Subjecting ourselves to the prescriptions of positive law might actually function as a way of escaping the insatiable demands of the moral law. In this case, the positive law not only sustains our enjoyment (by securing basic liberties), but also comes to function as an object of enjoyment itself. (shrink)

In exact epistemology Immanuel Kant’s statement on the priority of application of cognitive faculties is detailed as an intellectual process. Empirical regularities of the JSM–method of automated support for research are synthetic a posteriori judgements. Theoretical intelligence is primary, and its aspects are understanding (Verstand) and mind (Gemüt). The conditions of possible experience in Kant’s sense are implemented in the JSM–method of ASR in intelligent systems. And the JSM–method itself is the transcendental logic of artificial intelligence using two theories of (...) truth, the coherence theory and the correspondence theory. Exact epistemology, which is exact neo-Kantianism, can be naturally considered as a reflection of information society culture on its civilizational (technological) aspects. (shrink)

Kant's Foundation of Ethics, translated by Leo Rauch, includes "What is Enlightenment?" and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. These unabridged works, in contemporary English with oral interpretation, articulate the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical world view. Taken together, these works challenge all free people to think about the requirements for self-determination, both in our individual lives and in our public and private institutions.

Kant's views on revolution are notoriously paradoxical: on the one hand he appears to condemn all instances of revolution, but on the other he expresses enthusiasm for the French Revolution and other revolutionary acts. I argue that we can reconcile Kant’s views on revolution by examining instances when an individual is under a moral obligation to revolt. First, I show how Kant reconciles his position on the French Revolution with his position on revolution in general. His answer, (...) however, raises additional questions involving revolution in relation to his overall philosophical theory. Next, I present what is generally understood to be Kant’s philosophy on revolution, and Christine Korsgaard’s analysis using this traditional understanding to reconcile his seemingly contradictory views. After critiquing her position, I present my own analysis of Kant’s philosophy, and show how this apparent paradox can be resolved by examining an individual’s overriding moral obligation to leave the state of nature and establish civil society. (shrink)

The paper elaborates the theory of imagination in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment. From the first Critique to the third Critique, the imagination emerges under different titles such as reproductive, productive or transcendental imagination. The paper shall try to decide whether its functions suggested in the first Critique and its performance in the third Critique are contradictory or developmental with respect to Kant's critical philosophy. Thus, it will examine of the power and the (...) scope of the imagination in the first Critique and of its status and performance in the third Critique. El artículo discute la teoría de la imaginación en la Crítica de la razón pura y la Crítica del juicio de Immanuel Kant. Desde la primera Crítica y hasta la tercera, la imaginación recibe diferentes calificativos, tales como imaginación reproductiva, productiva o trascendental. El trabajo intenta determinar si las funciones de la imaginación sugeridas en la primera Crítica y su papel en la tercera Crítica son contradictorias o si implican más bien un desarrollo respecto de la filosofía crítica de Kant. Para ello, se examina el poder y el alcance de la imaginación en la primera Crítica y su estatus y papel en la tercera. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Kant’s notorious claim that psychology cannot become a science “properly so-called”. Contrary to widespread opinion, he does not hold any of the following three implausible views: psychological phenomena cannot be mathematized, they cannot be explained in by reference to mathematical causal laws, and they cannot be dealt with in causal terms at all. Instead of claiming something about psychological phenomena, Kant argues against a specific conception of psychology: the then popular introspective psychologies. Only this reading explains (...) why he is also concerned with the possibility of psychological experiments, and it does justice to how he himself treats phenomena of thinking, willing, and so on. (shrink)

인공지능에 인격의 지위를 부여할 수 있는지에 대한 찬반 논쟁에서, 인격에 대한 칸트의 관점이 종종 인용된다. 인공지능에 인격을 부여할 수 있는지에 대한 찬성 입장과 반대 입장 사이에 여러 상이한 주장들이 발견되는 한편, 양측은 종종 인격에 대한 칸트의 관점에 따르면 인공지능에는 인격이 부여될 수 없다는 해석을 공통적으로 받아들인다. 인공지능에 인격의 지위를 부여하는 것에 반대하는 입장에서는 칸트 철학에 대한 그러한 해석을 인공지능 일반에 인격의 지위를 부여해서는 안 된다는 주장을 뒷받침하는 철학적 논거 중 하나로 활용하는 반면, 인공지능에 인격의 지위를 부여하는 것에 찬성하는 입장에서는 칸트 (...) 철학에 대한 그러한 해석을 극복해야 할 인간 중심주의적 편견을 보여주는 한 사례로 활용한다. 본 논문은 찬반 양측이 종종 공유하는 해당 해석의 한계를 지적하고, 인격에 대한 칸트의 관점이 인공지능에 인격을 부여할 수 있는지의 문제에 어떠한 시사점을 줄 수 있는지에 대해 논의한다. 해당 해석은 특정 분야의 문제 해결을 위해서만 활용될 수 있는 약 인공지능에 적용되는 경우 어느 정도 설득력이 있으나, 이성적 사유와 도덕적 행위를 수행할 수 있을 것으로 상상되는 강 인공지능까지 논의의 범위에 포함되는 경우 문제적이다. 해당 해석은 칸트가 인격을 이성적 사유와 도덕적 행위의 가능성을 뒷받침하는 표상으로 제시할 뿐, 인격의 표상이 적용될 수 있는 실제 존재자의 범위에 대한 객관적 지식을 주장하지 않는다는 점을 종종 간과한다. 칸트는 인격에 대한 객관적 지식이 성립될 수 없다고 주장하므로, 인격에 대한 칸트의 관점은 인격적 존재자를 인간종의 범위 안으로 국한시키는 인간 중심주의와는 거리가 멀며, 이성적 사유와 도덕적 행위를 수행할 수 있을 것으로 상상되는 강인공지능의 출현 가능성을 부정할 논거로 활용되기 어렵다. (shrink)

This book explores Kant's views on the concept of God and on the attempt to demonstrate God's existence as a means of understanding Kant's work as a whole and of achieving a proper appreciation of the contents of Kant's moral faith.

According to Kant, the division of the categories “is not the result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at haphazard,” but is derived from the “complete” classification of judgments developed by traditional logic. However, the sorts of judgments that he enumerates in his table of judgments are not all ones that traditional logic has dealt with; consequently, we must say that he chose the sorts of judgments in question with a certain intention. Besides, we know that his choice of (...) judgments and categories is strongly influenced by certain views of natural science that he fully accepts. For this reason, his argumentations are sometimes seriously inconsistent. As to Kant’s argumentations of categories, many problems have already been pointed out, but in this paper, I take up the categories of quantity and quality once more, and make clear his argumentations’ hidden logic and its distortion from the point of view of the history of logic and natural science. First, I confirm that there are non-negligible problems in his explanation to the effect that his derivation of the categories of quantity and quality is based on the quantity and quality of judgments. Next, I reconsider the meaning of his treating the categories of quantity and quality as pure concepts of the understanding. Finally, I conclude that by having recourse to the categories of quantity and quality Kant tried unjustly to apriorize the distinction between the “extensive magnitude” and “intensive magnitude” that has a long formational history since Aristotle. (shrink)

Among scholars, how to interpret and evaluate Kant’s rejection of diabolical evil remains controversial. This article has two aims. First, I will examine all six forms of diabolical evil either discussed by Kant or implicitly contained in his texts, thereby demonstrating the reasons why each of these forms must be rejected within his framework. The conclusion of this text analysis is that the extremity of human evil for Kant is quasi-diabolical Willkür which does evil for the sake of self-assertion. Second, (...) I will offer a moderate defense of Kant’s view of diabolical evil as a whole. On the one hand, the legitimacy of Kant’s rejection of both diabolical Wille and full-fledged diabolical Willkür can be confirmed within his theory of practical freedom. On the other hand, faced with the possibility of ‘occasionally doing evil qua evil’, a critical defense of Kant’s moral psychology can be established, i.e. a defense that casts doubt on the distinguishability between ‘doing evil for the sake of self-assertion’ and ‘doing evil qua evil’. (shrink)

James Van Cleve provides an analysis of Kant’s view of secondary qualities in response to Hilary Putnam’s claim that Kant holds that “all qualities are secondary qualities.” Van Cleve proposes that we modify the thesis Putnam attributes to Kant in order to arrive at an explanation of both primary and secondary qualities that Kant would endorse. I argue that there is a serious flaw in Van Cleve’s characterization of Putnam’s thesis, namely that there is no significant difference between Putnam’s reading (...) of Kant and Van Cleve’s, and I attribute the problem to equivocal senses of ‘primary qualities’, ‘secondary qualities’ and ‘mind dependent’. (shrink)

This dissertation takes the form of three papers. Each one can be read on its own, and I present them here in a format that lends itself to such reading. However, they also center around a common topic: how Immanuel Kant conceives of immorality and how this theory informs his understanding of morality. In the first paper, I argue that Kant does not think immorality in human beings is always interpersonally arrogant, focusing in particular on what Kant means by “self-conceit.” (...) I argue that self-conceit is a happiness-emphasizing conception of self, in which one overvalues the inclinations. When life goes well, this self-conception and the standard of assessment it implies do lead to the opinion that one is worth more than others. When life goes badly, however, they lead to the opposite misunderstanding. In the second paper, I address another motivation for the claim that Kant thought interpersonal arrogance was the central moral problem for human beings: Kant’s theory of happiness. Kant held that human beings are competitive, as can be seen in several of his doctrines about how human beings conceive of and pursue happiness. I show how Kant explains this competitive bent in human nature while maintaining the thesis that human beings are interested in happiness only because it promises to be satisfying. I argue that Kant’s understanding of human rationality and of human interdependence result in competitiveness without the assumption that human beings are arrogant. In the third paper, I turn to Kant’s theory of self-respect, using my understanding of Kant on immorality and arrogance to explain the importance of self-respect in his moral theory. I argue that self-respect is significant specifically because it is a way of valuing oneself that acknowledges the disharmony between one’s desire for happiness and one’s commitment to morality. (shrink)

Few if any of Kant’s critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled ‘the Moral World View’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to ‘the moral world view’. I concentrate on five of Hegel’s main objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics. First, Kant’s problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) (...) is contrived. Kant denies that there is any inherent connection between acting rightly and being happy, but his denial depends on his defining happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations, rather than in terms of achieving ends in general. Second, Kant’s view of moral motivation is contrived; he ultimately admits that we cannot resolve to act without taking inclinations into account. (We cannot resolve to act apart from the matter of our maxim.) Third, Kant’s idea about perfecting our virtue in an infinite progress is incoherent. Kant defines virtue, and evidence of virtue, in terms of overcoming inclinations. Inclinations die with the body. Therefore there can be neither virtue nor evidence of virtue after death. Fourth, Kant’s view of the autonomy of moral agency is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kant’s moral principles cannot be put into practice in concrete circumstances because he supplies inadequate guidance for classifying acts. I conclude that Hegel’s objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics are sound, and I show that the problems Hegel raised against Kant’s account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current, since they have not been resolved, e.g., by Onora O’Neill’s Constructions of Reason. (shrink)

In his writings and theories, Kant refers to three imaginations, each of which has a clear definition and a recognized purpose, and which can be considered in their ability for general synthesis. three types of imagination are productive, reproductive, and creative.Based on the method of transcendental analysis, it is shown that there are necessary conditions in the relationship between imagination and ethics. In the first transcendental analysis, it was found that the necessary condition for the moral action of goodwill and (...) the necessary condition for the realization of goodwill is creative imagination. In the second analysis, it was concluded that the necessary condition for the realization of the absolute is the power of imaginative imagination, and in another statement, it was concluded that the necessary condition for the Categorical imperative is the imagination. In the third analysis, it was found that the Categorical imperative is the possibility of the absolute possibility of using the imagination by a thought experiment.Based on the Deductive method, three Deductives were obtained. In the first philosophical Deductive conclusion, it was concluded that for moral education, one must cultivate the imagination. In the second Deductive conclusion was reached that for empathy or any kind of moral education in the sense of the Categorical imperative, one must cultivate imagination. In the third Deductive conclusion, it was concluded that the method of thought experimentation should be used to cultivate the imagination for moral education (moral imagination). (shrink)

Kant's views on sex and marriage deserve the renewed attention of political scientists for three reasons. First, Kant's theory of marriage was shaped by his engagement with Rousseau's political thought and especially his Social Contract—a key if unappreciated side of his engagement with Rousseau. Second, Kant's application of Rousseau's political theory to marriage suggests an egalitarian view of marriage's nature and function that helpfully illuminates marriage's role in a liberal society of free and equal persons. Third, (...) in appropriating Rousseau's egalitarianism for his theory of marriage, Kant transfers his foundational concern with equality from the public to the private sphere: a move that suggests liberal political institutions require more than mere commitment to procedural neutrality for their perpetuation but require also a commitment to equality best cultivated by certain types of private associations and personal relationships. (shrink)

The paper argues that, as opposed to giving abstract descriptions of cognitive mechanisms, numerous emergence like positions, in senses opposed to mechanism, are found in Kant's various works.

This book is a thorough study of the question posed by Kant, For what can a human being rationally hope? It offers a detailed commentary on Kant's seminal work, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as well as an original development of the logic of three of Kant's basic ideas: ambivalence, ignorance, and hope. Sophisticated analytic techniques, including symbolic logic, are applied to this conceptual matrix. The result is a striking case for the transformation of world society (...) into a Kingdom of Ends of individuals and a peaceful League of Nations. (shrink)

: Kant's 'argument from geometry' is usually interpreted to be a regressive transcendental argument in support of the claim that we have a pure intuition of space. In this paper I defend an alternative interpretation of this argument according to which it is rather a progressive synthetic argument meant to identify and establish the essential role of pure spatial intuition in geometric cognition. In the course of reinterpreting the 'argument from geometry' I reassess the arguments of the Aesthetic and (...) illustrate the origin of Kant's view of the role of pure intuition in geometry. (shrink)

The starting point of my study is Kant’s remark to the effect that Garve in his treatise on the connection between morality and politics presents arguments in defence of unjust principles. Recognition of these principles is, according to Kant, an inadvisable concession to those who are inclined to abuse it. I interpret this judgement by making a detailed comparison of the texts of the two treatises. I demonstrate that Garve’s work is an eclectic attempt to combine in one concept the (...) lessons of historical experience with the ideas drawn from British empiricism and German rationalism. These ideas were criticised by Kant in his “critical” period. There is a consensus among researchers that Garve condoned the expansionist policy of Frederick II of Prussia, totally denied that legality in international relations was possible and in general deserved the reputation of an conservative. From that point of view the key values for Garve were the security and well-being of the state. I offer an alternative interpretation of Garve’s position because I believe that the value of political stability plays an important role in it. Such an interpretation makes it possible to treat Garve’s narrative as it was assessed by Kant, i.e. as a concession to the common principles of political practice as a result of a failure to find the guiding theory. My study has established that the role of Garve’s work in the writing of Kant’s treatise Toward Perpetual Peace was more significant than Kant’s own words suggest. Besides, I show that it was under Garve’s influence that Kant turned to the problem of excessive complexity of the principles involved in the search for concrete political decisions. Garve obviously laments this complexity and yet makes these principles still more complex. Kant offers a simpler solution of the problem on the basis of his theory of morals and right. (shrink)

Kant's views about mathematics were controversial in his own time, and they have inspired or infuriated thinkers ever since. Though specific Kantian doctrines fell into disrepute earlier in this century, the past twenty-five years have seen a surge of interest in and respect for Kant's philosophy of mathematics among both Kant scholars and philosophers of mathematics. The present volume includes the classic papers from the 1960s and 1970s which spared this renaissance of interest, together with updated postscripts (...) by their authors. It also includes the most important recent work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics. The essays bring to bear a wealth of detailed Kantian scholarship, together with powerful new interpretative tools drawn from modern mathematics, logic and philosophy. The cumulative effect of this collection upon the reader will be a deeper understanding of the centrality of mathematics in all aspects of Kant's thought and a renewed respect for the power of Kant's thinking about mathematics. The essays contained in this volume will set the agenda for further work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics for some time to come. (shrink)