Alongside the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt School, West Germany was also home to another influential Marxist current known as the Marburg School. In this volume, Marburg disciple Lothar Peter traces the school's history and situates it in the political discourse and developments of its time. The renowned political scientist Wolfgang Abendroth plays a large role, but unlike most histories of the Marburg School Peter also takes the sociologists Werner Hofmann and Heinz Maus (...) into account as well as their many students and successors. They were united by the conviction that teaching and scholarship must necessarily be tied to the practical goal of transforming society - an approach that met with considerable opposition in the harshly anti-Communist atmosphere of the period. (shrink)

In 1912, Ernst Cassirer contributed to the special issue of the Kant-Studien that honored Hermann Cohen's retirement—his mentor and teacher, and the recognized founding father of the so-called 'Marburg school' of Neo-Kantianism. In the context of an otherwise rather conventional presentation of Cohen's interpretation of Kant, Cassirer made a remark that is initially surprising. It is “anything but accurate,” he wrote, to regard Cohen's philosophy as focused “exclusively on the mathematical theory of nature,” as is usually done. (...) A reconstruction of the genesis of Cohen's thought, Cassirer continued, would already refute this interpretation. Actually, “[t]he... (shrink)

Widmer sheds light on a neglected aspect of the Western philosophical tradition. Following an era of Hegelianism, the members of the neo-Kantian "Marburg School," such as Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, Rudolf Stammler, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer defended socialism or left-wing ideals on Kantian principles. In doing so, Widmer breaks with two mistaken assumptions. First, Widmer demonstrates that the left-Hegelian and Marxist traditions were not the only significant philosophical sources of socialist critique in nineteenth-century Germany, as the (...) left-Kantians identified problems of normativity that the left-Hegelians could not adequately address. Second, Widmer challenges the prevailing assumption that the political philosophies developed in the Marburg School can be comprehensively characterized as a unified school of "ethical socialism." By showing that they varied fundamentally regarding their political views and their philosophical foundations of socialism, Widmer fills a gap in the studies of neo-Kantianism that is long overdue. (shrink)

Filling a gap in scholarship on 19th- and 20th-century religious thought, this book discusses the philosophy and theology of the influential Marburg School in Germany before 1914, focusing on the writings of Hermann Cohen, its leader, and on the Ritschlian theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth's teacher. In addition, Fisher examines Barth's earliest writings and clarifies the little-known liberal phase of Barth's theology.

After the completion of I. Kant’s “Copernican” turn in metaphysics, all subsequent European philosophy to one degree or another was under his influence. The purpose of the article is to consider the reception and transformation of the Kantian theoretical philosophy by the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. It is necessary to analyze the reasons for H. Cohen's and P. Natorp’s interpretation of Kant's criticism. To do this, one should consider (i) internalist and (ii) externalist factors in the (...) formation of the Marburg School. Neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, emerged as a response to materialism, naturalism, and post-Kantian German idealism. In addition, the Marburg School was strongly influenced by the change in the scientific paradigm in mathematical natural science at the end of the 19th century. The justification by the Marburgers of Kant’s a priori doctrine presupposed thematization, first of all, of: a) purity of thought; b) systematic unity of thought and experience; c) the orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; d) transcendental method. As a result, the Marburg School interpreted the Kantian concept of the unity of consciousness; abandoned the principle of synthetic (real) unity of consciousness in favor of systematic (logical) unity; substantiated the purity of scientific thinking; put forward the requirement of orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; developed the concept of the origin of thinking (Ursprung); abandoned the idea of “givenness” of the subject of knowledge and proved its “assignment”; changed the understanding of the essence and functions of the transcendental method; put forward the concept of thinking as “generation” (“production”); formulated a new understanding a priori. The changes that took place in the 19th century in philosophy, mathematical natural science and mathematical sciences led to a sharp activation of constructivism. It can be concluded that Kant’s epistemological paradigm was realistic constructivism. Pure constructivism became the paradigm of the Marburg School. (shrink)

Sebastian Luft presents and defends the philosophy of culture championed by the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. Following a historical trajectory from Hermann Cohen to Paul Natorp and through to Ernst Cassirer, this book makes a systematic case for the viability and attractiveness of a philosophical culture in a transcendental vein, in the manner in which the Marburgers intended to broaden Kant's approach.

This article provides the first English translation of Tanabe’s early essay, “The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools”. The key notion that the young Tanabe seeks to define in relation to his detailed analyses of contemporary Neo-Kantian epistemology is the notion of “pure experience” presented in Nishida’s philosophy. The general theory of epistemology shared among the thinkers from these two prominent schools of philosophy in early 20 th century Germany aimed (...) to eliminate the empirical residues in Kant’s theory of knowledge while opposing naïve empiricism and the uncritical methodology of positive science. Their “logicistic” approach, according to Tanabe, seems to contradict Nishida’s notion of pure experience, for it cannot allow any vestige of empiricism in its systematic framework, which is specifically designed to ground scientific knowledge. Yet given that the Neo-Kantian configuration of epistemology does not create the object of knowledge, it must face sensation or representational content as its limiting instance. Thus, to ground a Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge while taking account of this limit of logicism involves explaining their understanding of the unity of subject and object in human knowing. For this, Tanabe argues, recourse to Nishida’s notion of pure experience is indispensable. (shrink)

Many readers of this review will be aware that Karl Barth, like Rudolf Bultmann, was a student of Wilhelm Herrmann and that Barth was both indebted to and critical of aspects of Herrmann's thought. Fewer, however, will have much familiarity with the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism and its influence on the thought of Herrmann and Barth. This study is intended to fill that gap. During the time that Herrmann taught at Marburg, the theological school changed from (...) a rather provincial academic setting to an international center with such distinguished teachers as Weiss, Jülicher, and Otto. At the same time the Marburg philosophical faculty became one of the leading centers for the study of Neo-Kantianism and counted among its leading scholars Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. Although Fisher believes that a case could be made for showing an enduring influence of the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophy on Barth's theology, it is his intent in this book to trace the influence of this school on Barth's earliest theology, that written during the brief period that he was a pastor in Geneva immediately following his theological studies at Marburg, and before his break with theological liberalism. The first two chapters of the book are devoted to a study of Marburg Neo-Kantianism with particular reference to Cohen and Natorp, who tried to make a place for religion within the confines of a way of thinking that tended to limit knowledge claims to three spheres, logico-scientific, ethical, and aesthetic. Initially Cohen reduced religion to ethics but later sought to make a special place for religion. Natorp proposed a religion without God in which religious feeling was identified with the hidden psychic motivation of all human and cognitive striving. Herrmann, who is discussed in the third chapter, regarded his own work as complementary to Cohen and Natorp and sought to mediate between knowledge of the world represented by the Marburg philosophers and the Protestant tradition of Christian faith. Following the discussion of Neo-Kantianism and Herrmann, Fischer provides an extended analysis of Barth's early work, including two unpublished manuscripts, showing the influence of the Marburg philosophers on Barth through Herrmann and at times directly through Barth's study of the works of Cohen and Natorp. (shrink)

This paper looks at the ways in which Mikhail Bakhtin had appropriated the ideas of Kant and of the Marburg neo-Kantian school. While Bakhtin was greatly indebted to Kantian philosophy, and is known to have referred to himself as a neo-Kantian, he rejects the main tenets of neo-Kantianism. Instead, Bakhtin offers a substantial re-interpretation of Kantian thought. His frequent borrowings from neo-Kantian philosophers (Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and others) also follow a distinctive pattern of appropriation, whereby blocks (...) of interconnected ideas are removed from their original context, and made to serve Bakhtin’s own—substantially different—philosophical purposes in the context of his own thought. Bakhtin’s thought thus remains original even as he is borrowing ideas from others. (shrink)

Introduction "reading a mute history": Ernst Cassirer, the Marburg School and the crises of modern Germany -- The Marburg School and the politics of science in Germany -- The twentieth-century conflict of the faculties: the Marburg School and the reform of the sciences -- Cassirer and the Marburg School in the administrative and political context of the Kaiserreich -- "The supreme principles of knowledge": Cassirer's transformation of the tenets of Cohen's infinitesimal method (...) (1882) and system of philosophy (1902-1912) -- Critical science and modernity -- Leibniz and the foundation of critical science: Leibniz's system in its scientific foundations -- Science and history in Cassirer"s substance and function -- Liberal democracy and law -- Liberalism and the conflict of forms: the knowledge problem (1906-1940) and freedom and form -- Law as science and the "coming-into-being" of natural right in Cohen, Cassirer and Kelsen -- Conclusion critical science, the future of humanity and the riddle of an essay on man. (shrink)

This paper sketches the antilogism of Christine Ladd-Franklin and historical advancement about antilogism, mainly constructs an axiomatic system Atl based on first-order logic with equality and the wholly-exclusion and not-wholly-exclusion relations abstracted from the algebra of Ladd-Franklin, with soundness and completeness of Atl proved, providing a simple and convenient tool on syllogistic reasoning. Atl depicts the empty class and the whole class differently from normal set theories, e.g. ZFC, revealing another perspective on sets and set theories. Two series of Dotterer (...) and the theorem proved by Russinoff are re-characterized in antilogistic formulas corresponding to the square of opposition and twenty-four moods of syllogism. Then the restricted equivalence between two forms of antilogism and minimal inconsistency is built up, implying the internal connection between antilogisms and minimal inconsistency and leaving two related conjectures not proved. Besides, this paper provides a new explanation for the reason why contrariety, subcontrariety, and subalternation and the nine special moods require the non-empty assumption. (shrink)

Analyzes the philosophical ideas of two famous neo-Kantian philosophers, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, who worked together in the Marburger Schule research institute from 1880 to 1912. In volume 1, mentions differences of opinion between them, partly due to Cohen's Jewishness, noting that Cohen resented the prevalence of antisemitism and discrimination. Cohen felt that Natorp's opposition to his ideas was motivated by antisemitism. The second volume is a collection of documents and correspondence between the two and others, where antisemitism is (...) frequently mentioned (see the index). (shrink)

This report of the roundtable that took place on 25 November 2021 at The Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia attempts to explain the obvious growth of interest in Neo-Kantian philosophy in general and the philosophy of the head of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, in particular. In their contributions, the participants in the discussion demonstrated that the current interest in Neo-Kantianism does not solely or even largely have to do with the history of (...) class='Hi'>philosophy but rather with the relevance of many of the ideas of Marburg Neo-Kantianism for the modern theory of cognition, the philosophy of culture, ethics and the philosophy of religion. The course of the discussion highlighted the relevance of Cohen’s theory of cognition based on logic and rationality. The main outcome of the discussion was the conviction that the potential of many of Cohen’s ideas has yet to be fully tapped and there are grounds for considering them to be heralds of a new philosophy which, in many of its features, is only maturing. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to an overview of Cassirer’s work both as historian of philosophy and historian of science. Indeed, the “intelletcual cooperation” between history of philosophy and history of science represents an essential feature of Cassirer’s style of philosophizing: while the roots of a wide exploration stretching from Renaissance thought to modern physics go back to the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, the results of a similar cross-fertilization of research fields have deeply contributed to shaping (...) new standards of inquiry. Cassirer’s relationship with the Warburg milieu in Hamburg and late in his life with the American intellectual scenario are surely worthy of closer investigation. Distinguished scholars such as Meyerson, Brunschvicg, Burtt, Koyré, Metzger, Lovejoy, Kristeller, have disussed, appreciated, critizised Cassirer’s still today fascinating studies devoted to Pico della Mirandola, Galileo, Newton, Leibniz, to mention but a few. To explore some of these aspects focusing both on affinities and differences within a cosmpolitian intellectual community can provide a better understanding of philosophy and history of science in the first half of 20th century. Cassirer’s legacy requires, therefore, a new assessment. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the assumption that Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason is a transcendental analysis of experience. In order to do this, I will consider the conception of transcendental analysis that Marburg Neo-Kantianism powerfully introduced into Kant interpretation. I shall first develop a general model of transcendental analysis in the Marburg sense. I shall then ask whether this is a suitable model for the interpretation of the first Critique. Kant’s distinction between the (...) analytic and synthetic method in the Prolegomena seems to contradict this, given that it is a distinction between two different mathematical methods of demonstration. However, I shall argue that any such reading is incompatible with the Critique, and that transcendental analysis is indeed a legitimate interpretative model for understanding Kant. I shall finally turn to Strawson’s conception of descriptive metaphysics, which has strong affinities to Kant and the Marburg school. Most importantly, Strawson helps us to understand three significant aims at which transcendental analysis is directed. Finally, comparing transcendental analysis to dominant conceptions of analysis in philosophy, I shall argue that it constitutes a variety of philosophical analysis sui generis. (shrink)

The article explores the influence of Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy on a prominent philosopher and educator, Yevhen Vasyliovych Spektorskyi’s (1875–1951) views regarding the nature and methodology of social sciences. First, it explores Spektorskyi’s consideration of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as a philosopher of science, emphasizing the critical aspect of his philosophy and its significant prospects for ethics and social philosophy. Next, it investigates how Spektorskyi became acquainted with and was influenced by Neo-Kantian philosophy, especially the Marburg (...) school. The main problem through the lens of which Spektorskyi analyzed their achievements was the idea of “pure” ethics as a firm foundation for social science, while criticizing Herman Cohen (1842–1918) for claiming this foundation to lie in jurisprudence. Despite being an adherent of the Baden school, Bohdan Kistiakivskyi (1868–1920) presented views that were quite similar to Spektorskyi’s regarding the exceptional status and methods of social science. The emphasis on logical procedures and the need for rational discussion allows us to draw a parallel between Spektorskyi and the development of Kantian ideas in the 20th-century communicative philosophy. The justification of the “moral” sciences led Spektorskyi to criticize the Baden Neo-Kantians, advocating for the moral nature of social sciences and their importance in constructing social reality. The project of rational social science aimed at governance and politics is reminiscent of Kant’s “anthroponomy”. (shrink)

This article demonstrates the importance of making explicit different conceptions of movement for the philosophy of sport. In addition to the mechanistic and the Aristotelian approaches, this article presents a third, underexplored view of movement, namely that of Lucretius as interpreted by Karl Marx and Michel Serres. By exploring the similarities between Marx’s motion of repulsion and Serres’s turbulent flux, it will be argued that a Lucretian view offers a philosophy of movement that uniquely does not rely on (...) stasis. This Lucretian perspective is illustrated through Serres’s elaborations on the body and sport. It is concluded that sport is not primarily a rational, rule-guided practice but arises from moving and sensuous bodies that are always deviating from their standard trajectory. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Ursprung und Einheit -- Bd. 2. Der Marburger Neukantianismus in Quellen.

The primary goal of this paper is not to argue for the “influence” of Cassirer, but rather to make known the reception of Cassirer in Japanese philosophy, illustrate the interconnection between Cassirer’s critique of culture and that of Japanese philosophy, and hopefully spark interest in what might be a fruitful dialog between Cassirer scholars and those working in Japanese philosophy. Historically, the paper defines Japanese philosophy and makes known its engagement with Western philosophy and the (...) Marburg school of neo-Kantianism and its project of a critique of culture during its own self-development. Systematically, the paper points to the possible interconnection between Cassirer’s critique of culture and that of Japanese philosophy and makes the case for a mutually productive dialog between Cassirer scholars and those working in Japanese philosophy. Implicitly, the paper attempted to show that an engagement with Japanese philosophy from the perspective of a critique of culture forces us to question the Western dichotomy between philosophy and religion and the importance of this for the further development of a non-Eurocentric critique of culture. And by extension, that a critique of culture must be cognitive of the historicity of the culture from which it speaks. (shrink)

One of the greatest philosophical disputes in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century concerned the value of life. Following Arthur Schopenhauer, numerous philosophers sought to defend the provocative view that life is not worth living. A persistent objection to pessimism is that it is not really a philosophical theory at all, but rather a psychological state; a mood or disposition which is the product of socio-economic circumstance. A developed and influential version of this view was advanced in (...) the 1870s by the English psychologist James Sully. Yet, as important as Sully's critique was for the pessimism dispute, it has been almost entirely overlooked in the history of philosophy. With some growing recent attention to nineteenth-century pessimism, this paper aims to reconstruct Sully's view, and what I argue is his primary argument for it in terms of the best explanation for an alleged historical correlation between pessimistic belief and social hardship in the form of frustrated ideals. The paper then presents and analyses some challenges to this argument, some of which are argued to have been at least partially anticipated in the nineteenth-century by the likes of Schopenhauer and Olga Plümacher. (shrink)

In modern philosophy, the status of the concept of the thing-in-itself and the history of its origin and transformation are being conceptualized. This article examines the conceptual shift that happened to the notion of the thing-in-itself in XIX century philosophy, because this notion still remains important in the context of the possibility of having knowledge about reality and the status of reality itself. The rethinking of the thing-in-itself in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and neo-Kantianism of the (...) Marburg school (Cohen, Cassirer, Natorp) is considered. A comparative analysis of the works of all these authors allows us to say that the primary orientation of all these authors is to the specific elimination of the concept of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself outside Kantian philosophy went through changes connected with an attempt to get rid of it or to define it in a non-contradictory (because the transcendent form of thing-in-itself gives us a contradiction) way for transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

The philosophy of religion as presented by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, the founders and main representatives of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, is an important and at the same time controversial part of their philosophical systems. The discussion around the problems of religion began within the Marburg School and still continues among those who study that School. The reason for this is that “fitting” philosophical thinking about the phenomenon of religion into the classical (...) triad of any system of philosophy, i. e. effectively formulating that phenomenon in logical concepts, ethical postulates and aesthetic principles touched the very foundations of that system. Drawing mainly on the rough notes and correspondence of Cohen and Natorp I argue that, in spite of internal and quite important differences over the problems of religion and its place in philosophical constructions, Cohen and Natorp, first, retained their commitment to critical idealism and remained loyal to their philosophical school to the end and, second, followed the principle of mutual respect, preserving their professional and human sympathy for each other. Besides, I substantiate my assertion that Marburg Neo-Kantians had different concepts of the special place of religion in the system of philosophy. The specific nature of this difference warrants the discussion not only of the boundary of reason and rationality but adds new dimensions to that boundary, filling it with content and thus broadening the very sphere of critical idealism. In the course of the discussion of the problems of religion, Paul Natorp and Hermann Cohen stake a claim to projects for the serious transformation of philosophy which they tried to implement in their later works. (shrink)

Ces études voudraient inviter le public francophone à la découverte de la philosophie de l'école de Marbourg et de son apport au site pratique de la philosophie. La réflexion morale, juridique et politique s'est trouvée fort enrichie par les écrits de Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen et Paul Natorp. Ernst Cassirer a poursuivi la réflexion de ses maîtres en théorie de la connaissance, mais aussi dans le site pratique, ici dominé par un socialisme d'inspiration kantienne.

Volume 18, Issue 2, May 2024, Page 123-125.

The article analyses systematically and historically the specific idea of transcendentalism developed in the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. The unique line of the Marburg’s School interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy consists in contrasting critical and dogmatic understandings of basic philosophical concepts. This line is characteristic of the Marburg School idealism, and it perfectly grasps Ernst Cassirer’s peculiar understanding of philosophy—as “the critique of knowledge.” The main thesis of this paper is the following (...) one: the critical method understood as the method of searching for fundamental principles and conditions of possibility of objectiveness is a basic tool of analysis and investigations carried out by Cassirer. (shrink)

We seek to elucidate the philosophical context in which one of the most important conceptual transformations of modern mathematics took place, namely the so-called revolution in rigor in infinitesimal calculus and mathematical analysis. Some of the protagonists of the said revolution were Cauchy, Cantor, Dedekind,and Weierstrass. The dominant current of philosophy in Germany at the time was neo-Kantianism. Among its various currents, the Marburg school (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer, and others) was the one most interested in matters scientific (...) and mathematical. Our main thesis is that Marburg neo-Kantian philosophy formulated a sophisticated position towards the problems raised by the concepts of limits and infinitesimals. The Marburg school neither clung to the traditional approach of logically and metaphysically dubious infinitesimals, nor whiggishly subscribed to the new orthodoxy of the “great triumvirate” of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass that declared infinitesimals conceptus nongrati in mathematical discourse. Rather, following Cohen’s lead, the Marburg philosophers sought to clarify Leibniz’s principle of continuity, and to exploit it in making sense of infinitesimals and related concepts. (shrink)

In this volume, Maher contextualizes the work of a group of contemporary analytic philosophers—The Pittsburgh School—whose work is characterized by an interest in the history of philosophy and a commitment to normative functionalism, or the insight that to identify something as a manifestation of conceptual capacities is to place it in a space of norms. Wilfrid Sellars claimed that humans are distinctive because they occupy a norm-governed "space of reasons." Along with Sellars, Robert Brandom and John McDowell have (...) tried to work out the implications of that idea for understanding knowledge, thought, norms, language, and intentional action. The aim of this book is to introduce their shared views on those topics, while also charting a few key disputes between them. (shrink)

What is commonly known as neo-Kantianism is in fact a philosophical movement comprising many philosophers and different approaches. This movement established itself in the 1870s and dominated the philosophical developments and debates until the 1930s. The label ‘neo-Kantianism’ or ‘critical philosophy’ is unanimously and unquestionably applied to the Marburg School—whose main representatives are Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer—and the Southwest German School, also called the Baden School or Heidelberg School—whose protagonists are Wilhelm (...) Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, Jonas Cohn and Bruno Bauch. Although these two schools represent what may be called the main theories of neo-Kantian philosophy, there has always been discussion about the main features of neo-Kantianism and the philosophers fitting this label. Even the view that the Marburg and the Southwest German Schools are the essential r .. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy. Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly. The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both sides in (...) this debate. I try to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not justify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions. (shrink)

Ernst Cassirer was the last of the major exponents of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. This book presents his philosophy of science in the context of the developments in the physical sciences in this century. Cassirer's call for a redefinition of the «concept of substance» is critically evaluated in terms of the meanings of such terms as «laws, » «theories, » and «causality» as used in the sciences. By treating the sciences as one of the Symbolic Forms, (...) this book establishes the relevancy of the critical philosophy of Kant to an understanding of the recent history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

A basic thesis of Neokantian epistemology and philosophy of science contends that the knowing subject and the object to be known are only abstractions. What really exists, is the relation between both. For the elucidation of this “knowledge relation ("Erkenntnisrelation") the Neokantians of the Marburg school used a variety of mathematical metaphors. In this con-tribution I reconsider some of these metaphors proposed by Paul Natorp, who was one of the leading members of the Marburg school. (...) It is shown that Natorp's metaphors are not unrelated to those used in some currents of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

• This paper consists of 3 pages. Please ensure that you have them all. • This paper divides into four sections. Please answer all sections. • Section A is a compulsory section. Answer all questions in this section. • Section B you have a choice: EITHER do Part I OR do Part II. • Section C is a compulsory section. Answer all questions in this section. • Section D you have a choice: answer ONE of the questions.

This paper deals with Natorp’s version of the Marburg mathematical philosophy of science characterized by the following three features: The core of Natorp’s mathematical philosophy of science is contained in his “knowledge equation” that may be considered as a mathematical model of the “transcendental method” conceived by Natorp as the essence of the Marburg Neo-Kantianism. For Natorp, the object of knowledge was an infinite task. This can be elucidated in two different ways: Carnap, in the Aufbau, (...) contended that this endeavor can be divided into two distinct parts, namely, a finite “constitution” of the object of knowledge and an infinite incompletable empirical description. In contrast, and more in the original spirit of Cohen and Natorp, the physicist and philosopher Margenau in The Nature of Physical Reality (Margenau. 1950) conceived the infinity of this “Aufgabe” as an infinite dialectical process, in which relative “data” and “conceptual constructs” determine each other. This dialectical process eliminates the dichotomy between Anschauung and Begriff that distinguished the Marburg Neo-Kantianism from Kantian orthodoxy, namely, the abandonment of the difference between intuition and concept. Finally, the paper deals with the non-Archimedean geometrical systems that played a central role in Natorp’s defence of Cohen’s “infinitesimal” metaphysics. (shrink)

Friedrich Albert Lange is usually regarded as a representative of physiological neo-Kantianism or as a forerunner of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. In this paper I try to reconstruct Lange’s theory of values to argue that his philosophy is better framed as an intermediate point in the development of the two-world theory (facts/values) between Hermann Lotze and Southwestern neo-Kantianism.

Le regain d'interet pour la philosophie kantienne est ne en Allemagne vers 1860 et provient essentiellement d'un declin de l'idealisme hegelien, d'une reaction au materialisme, et d'un climat politique qui favorise un abandon des questions morales et politiques pour retourner a des problemes theoriques. De sorte que ce qui caracterise tous les neokantiens est leur volonte de redonner a la philosophie son statut scientifique au titre de theorie de la connaissance. Mais comment construire cette theorie de la connaissance est une (...) question qui donne lieu a des oppositions entre des auteurs qui se reclament pourtant tous de Kant. Or c'est precisement la subtilite des differences entre les ecoles de Heidelberg, de Marbourg, ou encore entre les pensees de Cohen, de Natorp, de Lask ou de Rickert, que nous permet de saisir cet ouvrage en nous offrant un eclairage essentiel. (shrink)

In A Parting of the Ways Michael Friedman proposed to conceive the contemporary divide between analytic philosophy (AP) and continental philosophy (CP) as the outcome of the bifurcation between the Neokantians of Heidelbarg and Marburg. According to Friedman, Carnap can be characterized as the executor of the Marburg school, while Heidegger is to be considered as the heir of the Southwest Neokantianism. In this paper it is argued that Carnap was much closer to the Southwest (...) Neokantianism than usually recognized. To some extent, Carnap’s project in the Aufbau may be described as an attempt to modernize the Neokantian approach of the Southwest school with the help of modern relational logic. This entails that Carnap cannot be lined so easily with the Marburg school as Friedman assumes. (shrink)