Cet ouvrage est un essai, philosophique, théologique et spirituel à la fois. Il prolonge le sillage de la Christologie idéaliste (Desclée, 1986) et du Christ de la philosophie (Le Cerf, 1990). La Semaine Sainte, réduite en fait au Triduum pascal, est pour maints philosophes, croyants et non croyants, l'objet d'une réflexion intense, rattachée à un drame éternel. Elle suscite une méditation discontinue et pathétique sur l'agonie et la séparation, l'amour et la souffrance, le péché, le mal et la (...) mort la mémoire et le temps de ce monde, tous grands thèmes métaphysiques. Elle engendre l'idée d'une philosophia Crucis. Chacune des trois journées sacrées a sa physionomie propre, mais un miroir unique dans la Sainte Face du Fils de l'Homme. Quelle sera la " moisson "? Le lecteur en jugera par lui-même, assurément; mais l'auteur estime devoir prévenir dès son " Liminaire " qu'elle sera pauvre! Hegel est là bien sûr, comme " l'incontournable " omniprésent; mais aussi, d'un côté, Erasme et Pascal et de l'autre, Feuerbach, Marx et surtout Nietzsche... Schleiermacher aussi, " insinuant cauteleux et disert " et encore Léon Chestov, " cet apatride de la foi chrétienne ", jusqu'à Bernanos, " interprété par H. Urs von Balthasar ", en compagnie de Blondel, Fessard et de dix autres... Autant le dire par conséquent : si la moisson doit de fait s'avérer peu abondante, ce n'est pas que les ouvriers aient été tellement peu nombreux. - (J. Doré, dans sa Présentation.). Ajoutons que la richesse, au demeurant objectivement manifeste et incontestable de cette moisson que la modestie de l'auteur estime " pauvre " consiste d'abord dans sa qualité. (shrink)

Ce livre est la relation d'un parcours - celui de Benny Lévy - à travers la voix de sa femme Léo, un itinéraire où les exigences de la pensée et les gestes quotidiens s'ajustent au plus près, alliant à l'extrême rigueur un généreux amour de la vie.« Dans la lumière sans complaisance des matins de Jérusalem, trois stations?: la maison, la maison de prière, la maison d'étude. Le soir, une fois par semaine, détour par le lieu d'enseignement où un (...) public bariolé, passionné, vient écouter le petit homme en noir. Simplicité des rythmes, transparence des jours, soi rassemblé. À Jérusalem, aucun mystère, pas de recoins obscurs grouillant de projections fantasmatiques. Mais ailleurs?? En d'autres temps??Le chef révolutionnaire sans nom, à l'existence improbable, en tout cas invisible, pouvait-il vraiment du chaos des faits et des discours faire émerger une vision et une visée claires??Il eut des maîtres. Côté philosophie, il se réfère à Sartre, Althusser et Lévinas. Côté sagesse d'Israël, il a été enseigné par un cabaliste ashkénaze, un rav français d'origine marocaine, un Yérouchalmi d'ascendance lituanienne. Enfin, au cour de l'énigme, quel lien entre ce tout jeune Juif arrivé d'Égypte, pathétique et ardent, en quête acharnée d'assimilation, et la fille du faubourg Saint-Antoine, placide, rigolote par parti pris, qui portait encore vivaces les traces des villes juives de Pologne?? Étrange rencontre. Plus étrange encore, la constance malgré les turbulences. ». (shrink)

For several centuries prior to the founding of the Theosophical Society in 1875, individual 'theosophers' in Britain and Europe were quietly in touch with one another all seekers of the inward way. Theosophic Correspondence (1792 1797) is a series of inspiring letters, personal and philosophic, exchanged during the climactic days of the French Revolution between Kirchberger, member of the Sovereign Council at Berne, Switzerland, and Saint-Martin, whom Kirchberger regarded as 'the most eminent writer . . . and most profound of (...) his age'. (shrink)

In this new translation the brilliant and impassioned descriptions of Augustine's colourful early life are conveyed to the English reader with accuracy and art. Augustine tells of his wrestlings to master his sexual drive, his rare ascent from a humble Algerian farm to the edge of the corridors of high power at the imperial court of Milan, and his renunciation of secular ambition and marriage as he recovered the faith that his mother had taught him. It was in a Milan (...) garden that Augustine finally achieved the act of will to Christian conversion, which he compared to a lazy man in bed finally deciding it is time to get up and face the day. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show how focusing (...) on attention not only allows us to defuse that dilemma, but also helps to substantiate accounts of what goes wrong in cases of doxastic wronging. (shrink)

Our evidential environments are reflections of our social contexts. This is important because the evidence we encounter influences the beliefs we form. But, traditional epistemologists have paid little attention to the generation of this evidential environment, assuming that it is irrelevant to epistemic normativity. This assumption, I argue, is dangerous. Idealizing away the evidential environment obscures the ways that our social contexts distort its contents. Such social distortion can lead to evidential oppression, an epistemic injustice arising from the ubiquity of (...) ideologically-inflected portrayals of oppressed social groups. In some cases, this distortion can be so pervasive as to create a skeptical pothole in agents' epistemic environments---a limited region in which a skeptical scenario obtains. The skeptical challenge of social distortion is important because it suggests that prejudice and irrationality alone may not be enough to explain many harmful beliefs. Where justified belief is merely a matter of responding well to one's evidence, the ubiquity of ideologically-inflected evidence may impel a matching doxastic state, even for exemplary epistemic agents. Nevertheless, there is an asymmetry in blameworthiness between the Cartesian victim and someone laboring under evidential oppression. This asymmetry reveals the need for distinctively non-ideal epistemic norms. I offer a characterization of one such norm: the internalist practice of self-stewardship. (shrink)

‘Feminist logic’ may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance (...) logic. Plumwood's work serves as our primary case study as we turn to the project of considering three different ways we might understand her argument and revisionist arguments like it: as a priori theorizing, as ameliorative conceptual engineering, or as instances of anti-exceptionalist approaches to logic. After arguing that the anti-exceptionalist approach seems to provide the most promising means of understanding the kind of project undertaken in a feminist challenge to classical logic, we briefly address the consequences that this might have for logic instruction. Here, we argue for the perhaps unexpected conclusion that feminist programs ought to offer more, not less, instruction in logic for those who take interest. (shrink)

It has been pointed out that Gettier case scenarios have deviant realizations and that deviant realizations raise a difficulty for the logical analysis of thought experiments. Grundmann and Horvath have shown that it is possible to rule out deviant realizations by suitably modifying the scenario of a Gettier-style thought experiment. They hypothesize further that the enriched scenario corresponds to the way expert epistemologists implicitly interpret the original one. However, no precise account of this implicit enrichment is offered, which makes the (...) proposal somewhat ad hoc. Drawing on pragmatic theory, I argue that the content of Grundmann and Horvath’s modified scenario corresponds to the default interpretation of the original scenario and that epistemological expertise is not required to access the deviance-proof interpretation. This Default Interpretation proposal offers thus a more general and independently motivated solution to the Problem of Deviant Realizations. (shrink)

Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing (...) literature and sketching avenues for future investigation. It also argues for a reorientation of epistemology itself. This argument is the focus of Section 1. Section 2 briefly reviews philosophical accounts of attention, Section 3 focuses on issues in traditional, individualistic epistemology, and Section 4 turns to social epistemology. (shrink)

How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being Black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. For this reason, many regard standpoint theory as being out (...) of step with epistemology more broadly. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. This account serves as the foundation for developing a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic. (shrink)

Présente le parcours philosophique de Merleau-Ponty tant dans sa formation que dans ses objectifs. Ses références : Descartes, Leibniz, Gabriel Marcel. Ses concepts opératoires : le concret, l'incarnation, l'intentionnalité, les chiasmes.

A entrevista concedida por Emmanuel de Saint Aubert a Silvana de Souza Ramos e a Iracy Ferreira dos Santos Junior aborda a história e o papel dos Arquivos Husserl de Paris para o fomento da pesquisa multidisciplinar em fenomenologia. O pensador esclarece qual foi o contato de Merleau-Ponty com os manuscritos de Husserl, e que tipo de leitura, situada e complicada, ele realizou não apenas desses manuscritos, mas da obra de Husserl como um todo. Esse aspecto é particularmente importante para (...) os estudos de filosofia francesa contemporânea porque Merleau-Ponty foi um dos grandes responsáveis pela introdução de Husserl no pensamento francês. Tal esclarecimento permite mostrar a originalidade da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, pois revela que o autor não era um exegeta de Husserl, mas um pesquisador inquieto e multifacetado, engajado nos debates intelectuais e políticos de sua época. Se ele não pode ser reduzido à figura de um mero leitor de Husserl, tampouco sua ontologia tardia pode ser resumida à influência de Heidegger. Debruçado sobre os manuscritos deixados inacabados por Merleau-Ponty em função de sua morte prematura, os quais eram um esboço de um novo livro, Saint Aubert realizou um minucioso trabalho de pesquisa dos usos que Merleau-Ponty faz de termos centrais de sua ontologia – chair, Leib, empiétement, quiasma – mostrando que eles não traduzem ou expressam literalmente conceitos provenientes de Husserl ou de Heidegger, pelo contrário, esses termos ganham uma gama de sentido multifacetada nos escritos de Merleau-Ponty, alimentando-se de suas leituras e meditações filosóficas, mas também de sua cultura científica e literária, e de suas preocupações éticas e políticas. A pesquisa de Saint Aubert, dedicada à interpretação dos chamados “inéditos” de Merleau-Ponty, resultou na publicação de cinco livros, pelas edições Vrin, todos eles guiados por uma leitura genética transversal da obra merleau-pontiana. Além disso, Saint Aubert, com a ajuda de outros pesquisadores e pesquisadoras, publicou, com apurado cuidado editorial, vários volumes com os manuscritos de Merleau-Ponty. Esse material, disponível de modo organizado e situado, é de uma riqueza incomparável, e permite dimensionar de modo mais preciso o papel de Merleau-Ponty no pensamento contemporâneo, além de iluminar o sentido de seu projeto ontológico. (shrink)

Virtue signaling—using public moral discourse to enhance one’s moral reputation—is a familiar concept. But, what about profile pictures framed by “Vaccines work!”? Or memes posted to anti-vaccine groups echoing the group’s view that “Only sheep believe Big Pharma!”? These actions don’t express moral views—both claims are empirical (if imprecise). Nevertheless, they serve a similar purpose: to influence the judgments of their audience. But, where rainbow profiles guide their audience to view the agent as morally good, these acts guide their audience (...) to view the agent as epistemically good. They are instances of epistemic virtue signaling. The first goal of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic virtue signaling. I argue that epistemic virtue signaling occurs through both behavioral and propositional signals, and serves purposes similar to those of moral virtue signaling across a wide variety of discourses. The second is to show that there is much work for this concept to do. In particular, this concept illuminates a double bind faced by those who suffer from and seek to overcome testimonial injustice. I close by demonstrating how this double bind arises in the dissolution of medical autonomy, focusing on the care gap faced by pregnant women of color in the United States today, as compared with their white counterparts. (shrink)

Experimental science and the philosophy of nature, by R.A. Kocourek.--The problem of motion, by R.A. Kocourek.--The principles of nature, by St. Thomas Aquinas.--The Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on Books I-II of The physics of Aristotle.--The reason for an introduction to the philosophy of nature.--Outline of the physical works of Aristotle.--Outline of the Commentary on Book I.

Le projet d’une apologétique que Blondel concrétise en 1913 dans Comment réaliser l’apologétique intégrale ? s’inscrit dans un contexte culturel français particulièrement riche et, de ce fait, complexe. Il est aussi marqué par un événement particulièrement grave, le décret romain du 5 mai 1913 suspendant les Annales de philosophie chrétienne dirigées par le P. Laberthonnière avec la collaboration de Blondel. L’auteur explicite d’abord le contexte de l’intervention de Blondel en 1913, contexte où les événements littéraires ont une grande part, mais (...) où les incidences politiques marquées d’anticléricalisme, ne sont pas négligeables. C’est dans ce contexte que paraît l’ouvrage de Blondel qui veut montrer que le Catholicisme est un fait qui s’impose inévitablement, le point de vue de l’interlocuteur étant primordial dans ses exigences de raison et la variété de ses objections. Fondamentalement, la tâche de l’apologiste est de répondre aux questions difficiles que se pose l’homme qui pense. L’importance de l’ouvrage de Blondel, qui tient aux prolégomènes qu’il expose, provoquera paradoxalement de nombreux malentendus dont l’auteur expose les principaux, permettant de rétablir l’originalité et la force du projet blondélien.The project of an apologetics that Blondel put together in 1913 in How to realise the integral apologetics ? fits into a French cultural context especially rich and, for this reason, complex. It is also marked by a particularly serious event, the Roman decree of May 5, 1913, suspending the Annales de philosophie chrétienne directed by Father Laberthonnière with Blondel’s collaboration. The author first describes the context of Blondel’s intervention in 1913, a context where literary events play a big part, but where political incidents, marked by anticlericalism, are not negligible. It is in this context that the work of Blondel appears. He wants to show that Catholicism is a fact that imposes itself inevitably, the point of view of the interlocutor being primordial in his demands of reason and the variety of his objections. Fundamentally, the work of the apologist is to answer the difficult questions that arise to the person who reflects. The importance of Blondel’s work, which is based on the prolegomena that he expounds, will paradoxically provoke many misunderstandings, of which the author exposes the principle ones, but allows the originality and power of Blondel’s project to be restored. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning attributed to the national group as an entry point into how boundaries between the in-group and the out-group are formed. To do so, it focuses on the representation of the past of the group, taken as a symbolic resource able to produce a raison d’être for national groups, and does so within a dialogical framework. Using the transcripts of the French parliamentary debates on immigration from 2006, it proposes a qualitative analysis of collective narratives of (...) the past along three axes: 1) what meaning do they give to the nation, 2) how is such a meaning produced, and 3) how do the stories told by different groups reply or relate to one another. By identifying the main narratives found in the data and how they relate to each other – within and between groups – it proposes to see collective memory as itself the product of symbolisation processes and, therefore, as a cultural tool especially powerful to produce meaning about the present. This paper also argues that collective memory is a situated construction negotiated with – or contested by – others, made possible by the presence of common historical benchmarks to which different meanings may however be attributed. Finally, it proposes to understand “immigration talk” as potentially the product of the identity questions faced by the national group, rather than the other way around. (shrink)

On Power (De Potentia) is one of Aquinas's ''Disputed Questions'' (a systematic series of discussions of specific theological topics). It is a text which anyone with a serious interest in Aquinas's thinking will need to read. There is, however, no English translation of the De Potentia currently in print. Fr. Richard Regan has produced this abridgement, which passes over some of the full text while retaining what seems most important when it comes to following the flow of Aquinas's thought.

These new translations of two treatises dealing with the possibility and nature of knowledge in the face of skeptical challenges are the first to be rendered from the Latin critical edition, the first to be made specifically with a philosophical audience in mind, and the first to be translated by a scholar with expertise in both modern epistemology and philosophy of language.

Joint actions typically involve a sense of togetherness that has a distinctive phenomenological component. While it has been hypothesized that group size, hierarchical structure, division of labour, and expertise impact agents’ phenomenology during joint actions, the studies conducted so far have mostly involved dyads performing simple actions. We explore in this study the complex case of collectively improvised musical performances, focusing particularly on the way group size and interactional patterns modulate the phenomenology of joint action. We recorded two expert improvisation (...) ensembles of contrasting sizes (16 vs 4 musicians) and collected data about their musical behaviour, as well as reports about five aspects of their phenomenology (sense of agency, agentive identity, integration, dependence, reflexivity) and about their musical intentions. Our overall data enabled us to assess how those five phenomenological dimensions related to one another during jointly improvised performances. They also show how such phenomenology varied with the way improvisers dynamically related to one another throughout the performance. Finally, we observe that group size strongly altered the phenomenology of improvisers who otherwise shared many characteristics (high expertise, similar aesthetic preferences, etc.). Our study thus sheds light on the interactional and structural parameters that shape and modulate our felt experience when acting together, and thereby highlights the importance of pluralism for studying the phenomenology of joint action. (shrink)

Pierre Saint-Germier | : Nous discutons la thèse, acceptée par de nombreux théoriciens des intuitions rationnelles, selon laquelle ces dernières s’accompagnent d’une apparence de nécessité. L’existence d’intuitions rationnelles ayant pour objet des propositions contingentes jette un doute sur l’adéquation de cette thèse. Le problème peut trouver une solution dans le cadre d’une théorie faillibiliste des intuitions rationnelles, pourvu que l’on admette des illusions modales inéliminables. En nous appuyant sur une explication bidimensionnelle de l’a priori contingent, nous défendons une solution différente (...) consistant à reconsidérer le contenu des apparences associées aux intuitions rationnelles : ce que l’on pourrait prendre pour des apparences de nécessité n’est autre qu’une manifestation de leur caractère a priori. | : We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status. (shrink)

t. 1. Des erreurs et de la vérité.--Ode sur l'origine.--Stances sur l'origine.

In this article, we first present the platform and the Dislog language, designed for discourse analysis with a logic and linguistic perspective. The platform has now reached a certain level of maturity which allows the recognition of a large diversity of discourse structures including general-purpose rhetorical structures as well as domain-specific discourse structures. The Dislog language is based on linguistic considerations and includes knowledge access and inference capabilities. Functionalities of the language are presented together with a method for writing discourse (...) analysis rules. Efficiency and portability of the system over domains and languages are investigated to conclude this first part. In a second part, we analyse the different types of arguments found in several document genres, most notably: procedures, didactic texts and requirements. Arguments form a large class of discourse relations. A generic and frequently encountered form emerges from our analysis: ?reasons for conclusion? which constitutes a homogeneous family of arguments from a language, functional and conceptual point of view. This family can be viewed as a kind of proto-argument. We then elaborate its linguistic structure and show how it is implemented in . We then investigate the cooperation between explanation and arguments, in particular in didactic texts where they are particularly rich and elaborated. This article ends with a prospective section that develops current and potential uses of this work and how it can be extended to the recognition of other forms of arguments. (shrink)

Idealization is a necessity. Stripping away levels of complexity makes questions tractable, focuses our attention, and lets us develop comprehensible, testable models. Applying such models, however, requires care and attention to how the idealizations incorporated into their development affect their predictions. In epistemology, we tend to focus on idealizations concerning individual agents' capacities, such as memory, mathematical ability, and so on, when addressing this concern. By contrast, this dissertation focuses on social idealizations, particularly those pertaining to salient social categories like (...) race, sex, and gender. In Chapter II, Privilege and Superiority, we begin with standpoint epistemology, one of the earliest efforts to grapple with the ways that social structures affect our epistemic lives. I argue that, if we interpret standpoint epistemologists' claims as hypotheses about the ways that our social positions affect access to evidence, we can fruitfully employ recent developments in evidence logic to study the consequences. I lay the groundwork for this project, developing a model based on neighborhood semantics for modal logic. Adapting this framework to standpoint epistemology helps to clarify the meaning of terms like "epistemic privilege" and "superior knowledge" and to elucidate the differences between various accounts of standpoint epistemology. I also address a longstanding criticism of these views: Longino's (1990) bias paradox, which suggests that there is no objective position from which to judge the goodness of a particular standpoint. Chapter III, Evidence in a Non-Ideal World, turns to the broader social context, looking at how ideology affects the availability of evidence. Throughout the chapter, I take the formation, justification, and maintenance of racist, sexist, and otherwise oppressive beliefs as a central case. I argue that these beliefs are, at least sometimes, formed as a result of evidential distortion, a structural feature of our epistemic contexts that skews readily available evidence in favor of dominant ideologies. Because they are formed this way, such beliefs will appear justified on prominent accounts of justification, both internalist and externalist. As a result, epistemic norms that fail to account for such non-ideal conditions will deliver verdicts that are not only counter-intuitive, but also morally unpalatable. This, I argue, reveals a kind of structural epistemic injustice, especially where oppressive ideology is involved and suggests the need for epistemic norms that are sensitive to agents' social contexts. Much of the discussion in Chapters II and III depends on social categories like race and gender, arguing that they have a distinctive influence on our epistemic lives. In Chapter IV, I Know You Are, But What Am I?, my co-author and I focus on social categories themselves, distinguishing between self-identity, social identity, and social role. We self-identify as gay or straight, men or women, couch-potatoes or gym rats. Sometimes, these identities affect our social roles---the way we are perceived and treated by others---and sometimes they do not. This relationship between our internal identities and our preferred public perceptions begs for explanation. On our account, this relationship is captured by what we refer to as 'social identity'---roughly, internal identities made available to others. We argue that this account of social identity plays an illuminating role in structural explanation of discrimination and individual behavior, dissolves puzzles surrounding the phenomenon of 'passing', and explains certain moral and political obligations toward individuals. (shrink)