This paper suggests that the practice of anamnesis—the taking of a patient history in preparation for making a diagnosis, as well as the related form of investigation, historia—offers a way to understand the role of medical collections in generating medical knowledge. Anamnesis derives from ancient Greek “recollecting” or “opening of memory,” and “taking a history” from historia, an ancient and early modern epistemic practice of gathering empirical observations from the past and present. Doctors and medical researchers perform, this (...) paper argues, a form of anamnesis when they access collections—of pathological organs, experimental animals, diagnostic slides, samples, and data—and the collections may in turn be seen as constituting institutional and disciplinary memories. It moreover shows that doctors and medical researchers in their work with collections negotiate two ways of organizing observations that are also present in an anamnesis. One way clusters and classifies observations, while the other traces developments and requires significant past observations to understand the present. This double nature plays out in different ways in different historical collections. Last, the paper itself may also be seen as performing an anamnesis: looking for patterns and tracing a development in medical history. It “opens the memory” of medical collection practices, and shows that medicine is past-heavy and that the past plays a central role in modern biomedicine. Anamnesis is thus used as a historiographical stance that seeks to understand present practices of generating knowledge about diseases through an inquiry into the past. (shrink)

Anamnesis (Swiatlo Dnia) was written as an aftermath of a six-day performative installation at the twelfth-century castle in Trancoso, Portugal with the participation of local women and men, mainly farmers. It was written concurrently while working on the editing of the video and the sound, which I filmed and recorded on site (or, as I think of it, layering of images, sounds and different time paths). The text addresses the act of drawing as related to speech, mark, trace, scripture, (...) presence and absence as it elaborates on the notion of gesture across the media and time. The vital connections between the performative act of drawing and the desire to mark since time immemorial and the contemporary virtual and cinematic mediums are crucial to the notion of anamnesis in both the physical installation in real time with performative inhabitation of space and in the virtual and altered memory of that occurrence in the resulting video piece. (shrink)

The original article, which first appeared in Norwegian, is a detailed study of anamnesis or recollection in Plato and Aristotle. It discusses, first, how recollection is relevant for the understanding of central aspects of the philosophy of Aristotle, and then discusses how the “regained” Platonic-Aristotelian concept of anamnesis can be related to current methodological challenges in modern social research. After having received feedback on the original article from David Bloch, who has recently translated and commented the Aristotelian text (...) “On memory and recollection”, I have decided to rewrite it in English and publish it here. (shrink)

This article examines the theory of recollection in Plato's Meno and attempts to unravel some long-standing puzzles about it. What are the prenatal objects of the soul's vision? What are the post-natal objects of the soul's recollection? What is innate in the Meno? Why does Socrates (prima facie) suggest that both knowledge and true opinion are innate? The article pays particular attention to the ana- prefix in the verbs aneuriskô, anakineô and analambanô, and suggests that they are used for two (...) distinct stages of recollection: a phenomenological stage of ‘finding again’ or ‘awakening’ our innate content, which Plato calls doxa, and an epistemic stage of ‘getting it back’ as epistêmê. Thinking of the verbs with this ‘back/again’ sense of the ana- prefix (instead of as ‘up’, in the common translation of analambanô as ‘take up’) allows us to understand why Plato would simultaneously imply that our souls had prenatal epistêmê, have post-natal innate true opinion and have the potential to analambanein epistêmê. He is not talking about ‘taking up’ epistêmê that he also calls doxa, but about ‘getting back’ the epistêmê we had prenatally. The article concludes with an examination of what this innate content is, suggesting that it is a type of ‘principle’ and ‘essential’ mental content. (shrink)

2. The Meno offers a dramatic demonstration of the validity of the first argument put forward for Anamnesis and the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.

There are two basic ways in which the phenomenon of learning is explicated in the Platonic dialogues: First, by means of an analogy with vision, and second, by arguing that the acquisition of knowledge is really anamnesis. The analogy with vision is the more common of the two and occurs throughout the dialogues. The passage in the Republic comparing the sun and the good is the best known instance of this approach to the clarification of learning. The basic point (...) of this explication is that the mind, like the eye, in order to discover truth must be turned in the right direction and be trained to apprehend and distinguish the characters of the objects it beholds. In this context, the acquisition of knowledge is clearly a discovery of that which was not previously known, just as the man who escapes from the cave sees what he had not previously seen, and at the end of the ascent of the heavenly ladder one “begins to see” what he has not seen before. (shrink)

No encontro intercultural e inter-religioso não se converte cada interlocutor à cultura e religiosidade alheia, mas abrem-se ambos à escuta (anamnesis originária) do Mistério que garante a autenticidade da própria vivência espiritual. O resultado deste processo é a transformação das duas religiosidades que se fecundam mutuamente, passando por um caminho de autocrítica, diálogo e práxis em comum. A teologia católica deveria estar preparada para aproveitar este desafio do pluralismo religioso interactivo e deixar-se transformar; mas, para isso, teria que avançar (...) mais na linha de renovação e revisão hermenêutica levada a cabo na segunda metade do século passado. In the inter-cultural and inter-religious encounter, each partner does not make a conversion into the other culture and religiosity. What happens is an opening (original anamnesis) by both of them toward the Mystery that guarantees the authenticity of their own spiritual experience. The result of this process is the transformation of both styles of religiosity that fertilize each other through an interchange of dialogue, self-criticism and common praxis. Catholic theology should be ready to make the most out of this challenge from the interactive religious pluralism and let oneself be transformed. In order to be able to achieve such transformation, Catholic theology should keep improving the hermeneutical turn achieved during the second half of the last century. (shrink)

Volume 6 of The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin offers the first translation of the full German text of Anamnesis published in 1966.

Volume 6 of _The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin_ offers the first translation of the full German text of _Anamnesis_ published in 1966. The previous English edition, translated by Gerhart Niemeyer, focused largely on the sections of _Anamnesis_ dealing directly with Voegelin's philosophy of consciousness. It omitted some of the extensive historical studies on which the philosophy of consciousness was based. To properly understand Voegelin's work, however, it is essential to give equal weight to the empirical as well as the (...) philosophical aspects. This complete version of _Anamnesis_ captures the full integrity of his vision. It is at once scientific, in the sense of fidelity to the demands of historiographic scholarship, and philosophical, in exploring the significance of the texts for the meaning of human existence in society and history. _Anamnesis_ is a pivotal work within Voegelin's intellectual odyssey. Alone among Voegelin's books, it reveals an author looking back and taking stock of his growth rather than customarily forging ahead into new regions and new problems. This critical work is both a recollection of Voegelin's own development, reaching back even to his infant memories, and a demonstration of the anamnetic method as applied to a wide range of historically remembered materials. Written as more than just a collection of essays, _Anamnesis_ is the volume in which Voegelin works out for himself the reconceptualization of what _Order and History,_ and by definition his central philosophical approach, is going to be. By revisiting his previous work—a departure from Voegelin's usual scholarly habits—he found at last the literary form for the kind of empirical philosophical meditation that had long absorbed his labors. Parts I and III contain biographical and meditative reflections written by Voegelin in 1943 and 1965, respectively. The first part details the breakthrough by which Voegelin recovered consciousness from the current theories of consciousness. Part III begins as a rethinking of the Aristotelian exegesis of consciousness, and then expands into new areas of awareness that had not come within the knowledge of classic philosophy. Between these two meditative selections are eight studies that demonstrate how the historical phenomena of order gave rise to the type of analysis which culminates in the meditative exploration of consciousness. (shrink)

The belief in innate knowledge has a history almost as long as that of philosophy itself. In our own century it has been propounded in a linguistic context by Chomsky, who sees himself as the heir to a tradition including such philosophers as Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz. But the ancestor of all these is, of course, Plato's theory of recollection or anamnesis. This stands out as unique among all other innatist theses not simply because it was the (...) first, but also because it is in some respects the strangest: Plato proposed not just a theory of innate knowledge, but of forgotten knowledge, and this, of course, goes hand in hand with his interest in the pre-existence of the soul. But my concern here is with another difference that makes Plato's theory unique, though it is not as clear as the previous one: in fact it has been for the most part over-looked by commentators and scholars. I wish to argue that while other theories of innate knowledge or ideas hold that much of what is innate in us is realized automatically and with ease, be it knowledge of moral principles, the idea of cause and effect or linguistic competence, anamnesis is concerned only with the attainment of hard philosophical knowledge, which most of us never reach. (shrink)

In the Meno, Phaedo, and Phaedrus, Plato outlines the controversial thesis of a priori knowledge that all learning is a form of recollection—anamnesis. He uses this as an argument for the immortality of the soul via reincarnation. Because of this latter claim, the thesis is widely mocked by contemporary evolutionarily-informed materialists. But we can safely reject the metaphysical claim without abandoning the insight of the epistemological one. And indeed, modern evolutionary theory can explain how learning—at least of the sort (...) that depends on certain a priori concepts—can be a kind of recollection. Through this metaphor, natural selection is a process by which information about the world is transmitted across time. When we learn by reasoning about a priori knowledge, then, we in an important sense rely on information in our genomes—if not our souls—information acquired by the process of natural selection—if not conscious acquisition. Thinking of a priori knowledge with the metaphor of anamnesis elucidates two essential features of the relationship between epistemology and ontology. First, it emphasizes that there is necessarily a time-delay between our a priori knowledge and the universe to which it bears a relationship, if any. Second, it clarifies that a priori knowledge is knowledge that enhances reproductive fitness—which could well be because it reflects ontology faithfully, but could as easily be a kind of innate nominalism. (shrink)

Environmentalists often recount tales of recent extinctions in the form of an allegory of human moral failings. But such allegories install an instrumental relation to the past’s inhabitants, using them to carry moralistic messages. Taking the passenger pigeon as a case in point, I argue for a different, ethical relation to the past’s inhabitants that conserves something of the wonder and “strangeness of the Other.” What Walter Benjamin refers to as the “redemptive moment” sparks a recognition of the Other that (...) allows us to engage in heartfelt mourning for them, rather than falling into the repetitive self-absorption characteristic of Freudian melancholy. This redemptive moment changes forever our relations to the world around us. (shrink)

The heristic argument with which Meno questions the possibility of inquiry and knowledge is tackled by Socrates through the reference to an archaic and religious doctrine, according to which the soul is immortal and has seen all things. Through this reference Socrates actually wants to affirm the affinity between the soul and the world of forms. So behind the myth of the prenatal vision of forms by the soul Plato intends to assert the ontological condition of the soul, that is, (...) its affinity to forms. (shrink)

We assess St. Paul's account of kenōsis in Philippians 2:5–8 from a neurophenomenological horizon. We argue that kenōsis is not primarily a unique event but belongs to a class of experiences that could be called kenotic and are, at least in principle, to some degree accessible to all human beings. These experiences can be well analyzed, making use of both a phenomenological approach and the cognitive neuroscience of altered states of consciousness. We argue that kenotic experiences are ecstatic, in that (...) they involve—both phenomenologically and neurologically—one's "stepping out of" his/her self and history. This seemingly impossible task of stepping out has led to the understanding of kenōsis as a unique event. We conclude that kenotic experiences are continuous with common, everyday experiences of the self's intimate communion with everything that exists. This means that kenotic Christology does not necessarily have to rest solely on the scriptures but can also be arrived at by way of the worldly experiences of actual, living persons. (shrink)

Many scholars view artworks as the products of cultural history and arbitrary institutional conventions. Others construe art as the result of psychological mechanisms internal to the organism. These historical and psychological approaches are often viewed as foes rather than friends. Is it possible to combine these two approaches in a unified analysis of the perception and consciousness of artworks? I defend a positive answer to this question and propose a psycho-historical theory, which argues that artworks are historical and material artefacts (...) designed to prompt mental activities and elicit the conscious experience of aesthetic worlds. My argument suggests that the material components of artworks--termed their `material substrata'--are crucial mediators between historical contexts and the mental activities elicited by the perception of artworks. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur develops his phenomenological-hermeneutical theory of memory in his seminal Memory, History, Forgetting, and several preliminary studies to his monumental book.[1] As its title indicates, the monograph treats memory in conjunction with forgetting and history, placed within a wider horizon of what could be termed an ethics of forgiving. For the purpose of this article I will focus on the problems of memory and forgetting, ignoring history for the most part. Similarly, I do not explicitly deal with the more (...) specific issue of collective memory, which marks a transitional step from a proper phenomenology of memory to the epistemological problems of history and historiography. Even though the three main objects of Ricœur’s study are firmly interlinked, leaving aside history does not impinge on its general line of thought since the most fundamental problems of Ricœur’s discussion on history are imported from his discussion on memory, most notably that of the Greek eikon – representation. Rather than to engage in a wide-ranging ethical discourse, my aim is to focus on a more basic critique of Ricœur’s understanding of narrative, and the role he assigns to it in his theory of memory. -/- I argue that Ricœur’s Aristotelean-structuralist notion of narrative runs into problems when confronted with narratives which do not comply with its notions of order and synthesis. In addition, despite its pervasiveness in his theory, narrative is not adequately scrutinized by Ricœur. That my critique implies severe consequences for his ethics should become obvious, even though an analysis of what exactly these consequences entail must remain outside of this study. For the purpose of this article, it is enough to know these two points: first, that Ricœur’s theory of memory and forgetting is constitutive for his theory of history, which in turn functions as a critical remedy to our often unreliable memories; and second, that this dialectical relation between memory and history is situated within an ethical horizon. (shrink)

Diese Untersuchung wendet sich gegen die verbreitete Interpretationstendenz, Platons Anamnesislehre als Lehre von einer Art gelingender Identifikation auszulegen. Dabei wird behauptet, Platon habe geglaubt, der Mensch besitze auf eine mythisch unerklärliche Weise die Begriffe aller Dinge apriori in sich und brauche sich beim Anblick eines konkreten Einzeldings nur an diesen vorgeburtlichen Besitz zu erinnern, um dieses Ding begrifflich richtig zu identifizieren. Durch eine sorgfältige, dem Wortlaut im einzelnen folgende Interpretation zeigt Lee, daß der Mensch nach Platon lediglich in der Lage (...) ist, die allgemeinen Kriterien und Prinzipien des Denkens analytisch aufzudecken. Erst die methodische Erschließung und Anwendung dieser - apriorischen, d.h. in jeder Erfahrung vorausgesetzten - Kriterien ermöglicht ein Fortschreiten des Erkennens auch in Bezug auf Einzeldinge. Die Anamnesislehre erweist sich dadurch als eine immer noch bedenkenswerte kritische Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Sicherheit des Erkennens. (shrink)

Very few writers have had such an impact on their culture as Alexander Solzhenitsyn on Soviet society in the ‘60s and ‘70s Recently published documents from the KGB archives show the problem he posed to the Soviet leadership—not because he was the only one to point out the massive falsehood and injustice of Soviet society but primarily due to the scathing power of his artistic diagnosis. Many of Solzhenitsyn’s writings in fictional, autobiographical, and publicistic genres can helpfully be understood in (...) terms of Plato’s struggle in the Athens of his day for a “remembering” or anamnesis of what it is to be a human being, a human society, and the cosmos as transparent for divinity. That struggle, even though Plato doesn’t use the word “amnesia”, was against the refusal to remember. The Austrian writer Heimito von Doderer called that refusal the Apperzeptionsverweigerung or refusal to perceive. Here we’ll explore Solzhenitsyn’s work in terms of his struggle to remember over against the ideological “refusal to perceive” in the three fundamental dimensions of personal, social and historical existence. Solzhenitsyn expands Mikhail Bakhtin’s understanding of “polyphonic” characterization as a key technique for articulating his diagnosis of Soviet totalitarianism. The discussion will instantiate what can be seen as his understanding of personal amnesia and anamnesis in Cancer Ward, his exploration of social amnesia and anamnesis in In the First Circle, and his treatment of historical amnesia and anamnesis in The Red Wheel and The Gulag Archipelago. (shrink)

In 1969 the American avant-garde filmmaker Ken Jacobs gained wide recognition with a two-hour long interpretation of a 1905 silent short film. Ever since, the artist has kept on revisiting the same material, each time with a different technological approach. Originally hailed as a prime example of structural filmmaking, Jacobs’ more recent variations on the theme of Tom Tom the Piper’s Son beg for a broader understanding of his methods and the meanings implied. To gain a deeper insight in this (...) on-going mise-en-abyme, this essay expands comments by the artist himself with concepts taken from animation, media-archaeology and Warburg’s Mnemosyne atlas. Rereading a filmic text with minute attention, remediating it from an analogue to an electronic format, and reanimating the original action by adding a variety of intervals: all Jacobs’ strategies are aimed at demonstrating the afterlife of Tom Tom in a contemporary cultural context. (shrink)

Pierre Bourdieu's work on literature has frequently been criticized for its perceived failure to attend to the specificities of literary form. This article argues that, in fact, literary form plays an important role in Bourdieu's theorizations of literature, or rather, that form is called upon to play a range of different, potentially conflicting roles. Through close readings of both The Rules of Art and the 1975 essay ‘L'Invention de la vie d'artiste’, the article seeks to clarify the different roles Bourdieu (...) attributes to literary form, as that which both conceals and reveals ‘repressed’, ‘incorporated’ or ‘unconscious’ social realities. It will examine Bourdieu's contention that the literary work functions analogously to the Freudian dreamwork in this respect, and will question how appropriate or convincing that analogy proves to be. (shrink)

Socratic philosophy represents a long-standing tradition within philosophy that understands the journey to truth in terms of the traveler's innate capacity. Anamnesis, maieutics, and elenchus each confirm that truth is not utterly foreign but is instead always within my possession or grasp. Other people, to the extent that they participate in my philosophical exploration, serve only to enable my capabilities or potential. They are not teachers to me. Nor would I need them, since I am always already in the (...) neighborhood of truth. ;Emmanuel Levinas's description of the "face to face" encounter between people challenges the adequacy of this model. Another person is not simply a midwife who leads me to a recovery of truth that was always within me or within my domain. Rather, the Other comes to me from a dimension of height or transcendence and teaches me. By this teaching Levinas means that I, as one who might claim truth for myself, find myself put into question. Before the Other I discover that my claims to knowledge are inadequate, even unjust, insofar as the Other exceeds, and thereby resists, my comprehensive claim on the world. The Other, in other words, reveals the naivete and the dogmatism characteristic of my familiar world, and puts me on a new and unforseen path to truth. ;This dissertation, by way of an explication of the category of transcendence, examines how the autonomous world of Socratic maieutics is transformed by the teaching encounter with another person into a heteronomous world. Heteronomy suggests my answerability to an order beyond the resources of anamnesis. This answerability, which Levinas describes as my responsibility to the Other, demands that we re-examine language not in terms of its systematicity or thematic capability but as the condition for all speaking whatsoever, i.e., my being called into communication. The word of the Other signifies a transcendent domain, a domain beyond my familiar world. It also makes possible a sincere life lived to the Other. (shrink)

The objective of the article is to recall the European philosophical basis of the philosophical culture, inextricably connected with ancient Greece and its language. Plato’s philosophy is in the very core of the culture and its salient component is the doctrine of anamnesis. The elements of the doctrine are dispersed in numerous dialogues, particularly in Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, therefore they are given more attention. Platonic reflection on anamnesis is related to his view on the soul whose development is (...) associated with the process of cognizing, being essentially tantamount to recalling of what the soul saw before its imprisonment in the body. The role of myth in Plato’s philosophy, as well as in European culture as a whole, has been discussed, along with the main subject. On the background of the Platonic thought, examples of its reception in Polish Renaissance philosophy and in the poetry of the Romantic period has been presented. (shrink)

This commentary on Edwin Carels’ essay “Revisiting Tom Tom: Performative anamnesis and autonomous vision in Ken Jacobs’ appropriations of Tom Tom the Piper’s Son” broadens up the media-archaeological framework in which Carels places his text. Notions such as Huhtamo’s topos and Zielinski’s “deep time” are brought into the discussion in order to point out the difficulty to see what there is to see and to question the position of the viewer in front of experimental films like Tom Tom the (...) Piper’s Son and its remakes. (shrink)