This paper analyzes the influence of J. Derrida’s philosophy on the early thought of French phenomenologist M. Richir. Main texts for the analysis are Derrida’s report « La Différance » and the article « Le Rien Enroulé » by Richir. The author stresses their deep figurative and substantive interconnectedness. Thus, Richir borrows from Derrida a number of key philosophical figures, including the figure of différance itself, and applies them to phenomenological landscape through the “first-person” narrative. Having examined the correlation between (...) Derrida’s figures of différance and Richir’s phenomenalization, the author concludes that Richir, influenced by the impersonal figure of différance, leads his “first-person” narrative in an attempt to take it beyond the limits of classical phenomenological discourse. Moreover, the author finds preconditions for Richir’s introduction of one of his early key concepts “nothing” (rien) in the text of Derrida’s « La Différance ». The main thesis of this research is: Richir borrows Derrida’s understanding of consciousness and performs phenomenological description from its perspective. The paper considers Derrida’s text as a key to understanding Richir’s article « Le Rien Enroulé » and, as a result, the key to his early philosophy in general. (shrink)

This article examines Derrida's critique of Hegel. It argues that there are two key issues that Derrida misunderstands in Hegel's thought: first, Hegel's response to the concept-intuition dichotomy that plagued Kant's critical thought; second, that Hegel's notions of reason and the dialectic, when they are conceived non-metaphysically, are not tools employed to subsume differences but are, like Derrida's différance , fundamentally concerned with thought's instability. The article shows the way in which Derrida develops the notion of singularity by an examination (...) of the discussion of responsibility in his later writings. It is argued that the way that Hegel and Derrida consider the notion of singularity is a much better marker for distinguishing these two thinkers than Derrida's own interpretation of Hegel. Key Words: Jacques Derrida • dialectic • differance • G. W. F. Hegel • normativity • reason • responsibility • singularity. (shrink)

This essay shows that Derrida's discussion of "Differance," is remarkably parallel to Plato's discussion of Difference in the Parmenides. Plato's presentation of "Parmenides'" discussion of generation from a One which Is is a version of Derrida's preconceptual spacing. Derrida's implicit reference to Plato both interprets Plato and explains the obscure features of "Differance." Derrida's paradoxical remarks about Differance are very like what Plato implies about Difference. Derrida's Differance addresses the puzzle that concepts are required to construct (...) the beings in a plurality of objects, but concepts cannot differentiate unless there is already a plurality of objects. Plato's version of the same problem is a notational variant of Derrida's Husserlian dilemma. Derrida, following Davidson, is not only skeptical about the project of founding metaphysics on simple entities, but also holds that necessity has no foundation in the "world." Plato, on the other hand, retains the idea that necessity has an objective basis in the self-evident truths of mereology. (shrink)

Dilin dolayımından geçen hukuk, tüm spekülatif doğasına karşın, temelde adalet idesine ulaşmada bir yolda olma hali olarak düşünülebilir. Bu yolda olma halinde, postmodern hukuk anlayışları, sabit anlamlara/kavramlara sahip kategorilerle iş gören, soyut ve genel olan modern hukuk anlayışları kapsamında adalet idesine ulaşmanın imkânsız olduğunu düşünürler. Dolayısıyla bu yolda onların öncelikli amacı, adaleti soyut kurallardan sıyırmak ve onu kurallara dirençli bir hale getirmek üzere devreye sokmaktır. Postmodern hukuk anlayışları genelde bunu gerçekleştirmek üzere, dilsel bir işlem olan yapıbozuma yönelirler ve söz konusu (...) hukuki normlara/kategorilere özgü olan kavramsal/anlamsal karşıtlıkları ortaya koymayı amaçlarlar. Bunun temel amacı, bu karşıtlıklardan sadece bir anlamın keyfi olarak merkeze alındığını gösterebilmektir. Yapıbozumla yakından ilişkili olan différance ise, dilsel oyunu mümkün kılan bir zemin olarak, dilin anlamı erteleyen yapısına işaret eden bir kavramdır. Différance’ın sahip olduğu hem anlamsal ayrıma, aynı olmamaya, farka karşılık gelen anlamlarının, hem de anlamsal gecikmeye, ertelemeye, yedeklemeye karşılık gelen anlamlarının yakalanabileceği tek yer bağlamsallıktır. Çalışmamız, postmodernizmde karşımıza çıkan bu iki anahtar kavramı açık kıldıktan sonra, hukuku onlarla birlikte düşünmeyi ve böylece postmodern olarak kabul edilebilecek olan bir hukuk anlayışı içinde onların adalet idesine ulaşmada sundukları ve sunabilecekleri imkânları ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

In this paper, in the first place, I aim to enquire into Bernard Stiegler’s critical appropriation of his mentor Jacques Derrida’s notion of différance, emphasizing how Stiegler’s philosophy of technology stems from an original interpretation of the main tenets of deconstruction. From this perspective, I will investigate Stiegler’s definition of technology as tertiary retention, i.e., exosomatized, artificial memory interrelating with biological memory, testing its hermeneutic strengths as well as possible weaknesses. In the second place, I aim to contrast Stiegler’s understanding (...) of technology with the concept of multistability brought forward by postphenomenological philosophies of technology such as those elaborated by Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek. This investigation will enable me to submit that Stiegler’s approach represents a peculiar and innovative way to conceive of technology. On the one hand, indeed, it does not seem to fall prey to the criticisms raised by postphenomenology against traditional philosophies of technology such as Martin Heidegger’s or Jacques Ellul’s, deemed to be overly deterministic, abstract and pessimistic in their understanding of technology. On the other, it retains important methodological precautions from deconstruction, thereby pointing at some possible blind spots of postphenomenology, especially concerning the vexed question of the empirical-transcendental divide, which Stiegler aims to develop beyond both Derrida’s and postphenomenology’s stances. (shrink)

This paper intends to verify the extent and effectiveness of the transforming appropriation of the Derridean concept of ‘differance’ by Stiegler with respect to the problems that, according to Stiegler, make this creative critical operation necessary; in particular with respect to the most recent question concerning the possibility of thinking about and putting into practice a ‘neganthropological différance’ capable of facing the ecological crisis that today seems to threaten the very existence of life on earth. The paper goes back (...) to Technics and Time 1. to analyze the distinction between ‘vital difference’ and ‘noetic difference’ that constitutes the condition of possibility of the ‘neganthropological différance.’ In this perspective, the distinction proposed by Stiegler seems to re-propose the hierarchically oriented oppositional structure that characterizes metaphysical thought and in particular the opposition between man and animal, attributing to the human being the ability to free himself from the constraints of his biological-natural condition. Finally, the paper attempts to account for the repercussions of this approach on the very possibility of an effective response to the ecological crisis, concluding with a provocation regarding the role that theory can and must play with regard to such an urgent and far-reaching problem. (shrink)

The doctrine of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche is an essentially ecstatic doctrine. It is also strangely incommunicable. Here the ecstasy that reveals singularizes. The essential revelation closes the one to whom it is given in his own singularity ; only a singularity opens to the abysses and the Dionysian truth. Heidegger could then see in it an ontological doctrine. And an authentifying-singularizing-doctrine. Not, though, the same as his own. For Heidegger could suggest that the time horizon in which this doctrine (...) conceives Being in its Becoming-the "deep eternity"-is in fact not a deep structure of time, but the linear time of an eternity of instants. Eternity is not deep. In addition the subject of the Nietzschean ecstasy-which longs for eternity- cannot appropriate itself, cannot become a whole, cannot really achieve singular existence. Are these Heideggerian thoughts criticisms of the Nietzschean experience? Is the deep ontological truth to be then sought elsewhere? Is the wholeness of one's own life- the essence of this existence- to be then sought in another experience of the time-horizon of Being? Or else do these Heideggerian observations not rather point to another structure of the thought involved-something like a surface thought? And to another structure of the one smitten by this thought-a singularity that exists only in a circle of continuous metamorphoses? Some deconstructive work by Derrida encourages us to look in this direction. (shrink)

To contemplate writing a comparison of aspects of the philosophical works of Śaṅkara, a major philosophical figure in India of the eight or ninth centuries, and Jacques Derrida, a so-called postmodernist thinker, gives a writer reason to pause and to consider moving forward with caution. A writer must proceed cautiously because writing is a risky endeavor, according to Derrida, who also perceives it as a violent exercise because language is more primary than writing in the sense that it is not (...) possible to inquire about the origin of language because we already exist within it, and we cannot get outside of language to examine its origin.1 From another Derridean perspective within the context of interpreting Plato .. (shrink)

This essay shows that Derrida’s discussion of “Differance,” is remarkably parallel to Plato’s discussion of Difference in the Parmenides. Plato’s presentation of “Parmenides’” discussion of generation from a One which Is is a version of Derrida’s preconceptual spacing. Derrida’s implicit reference to Plato both interprets Plato and explains the obscure features of “Differance.” Derrida’s paradoxical remarks about Differance are very like what Plato implies about Difference.Derrida’s Differance addresses the puzzle that concepts are required to construct the (...) beings in a plurality of objects, but concepts cannot differentiate unless there is already a plurality of objects. Plato’s version of the same problem is a notational variant of Derrida’s Husserlian dilemma.Derrida, following Davidson, is not only skeptical about the project of founding metaphysics on simple entities, but also holds that necessity has no foundation in the “world.” Plato, on the other hand, retains the idea that necessity has an objective basis in the self-evident truths of mereology. (shrink)

This essay shows that Derrida's discussion of "Differance," is remarkably parallel to Plato's discussion of Difference in the Parmenides. Plato's presentation of "Parmenides'" discussion of generation from a One which Is is a version of Derrida's preconceptual spacing. Derrida's implicit reference to Plato both interprets Plato and explains the obscure features of "Differance." Derrida's paradoxical remarks about Differance are very like what Plato implies about Difference. Derrida's Differance addresses the puzzle that concepts are required to construct (...) the beings in a plurality of objects, but concepts cannot differentiate unless there is already a plurality of objects. Plato's version of the same problem is a notational variant of Derrida's Husserlian dilemma. Derrida, following Davidson, is not only skeptical about the project of founding metaphysics on simple entities, but also holds that necessity has no foundation in the "world." Plato, on the other hand, retains the idea that necessity has an objective basis in the self-evident truths of mereology. (shrink)

Through a re-articulation of Derridean différance, Bernard Stiegler claims that the human is defined by an originary default that displaces all psychic and social life onto technical supplements. His philosophy of technics re-articulates the logic of the supplement as concerning both human reflexivity and its supports, and the history of the différance of life itself. This has been criticised for reducing Derrida's work to a metaphysics of presence, and for instituting a humanism of the relation to the inorganic. By refuting (...) these claims, this article will show that Stiegler's doubling of différance enables him to articulate the human as constituted by both the individuation characteristic of ‘life’, and that of a technical, psychic, and collective individuation. Putting forward a reading of the logic of the trace in life, and emphasising the aspects of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem that Stiegler uses in his reading of Derrida, I will demonstrate that the political stakes of adaption and adoption in his Noopolitics require this re-articulation of différance. Technics shapes the human future, arising from this differential mutation; marking the invention of the human as the site of the political. (shrink)

In inquiring into the nature of deconstruction in Derrida we see that it hides an opposite aspect of onto‐generative emergence as stated in the wording of the Yijing. What is hidden is the movement of difference‐making and generalizing repetition by way of certain presupposed reality. In examining Derrida's notion “différance” , his contrast between an ontology of presence and a philosophy of absence, in explaining the origin of meaning à la de Saussure, has transformed into the polaristic structure of all (...) differences, whether it be in language or in things. The Saussurian distinction between the signifier and the signified no doubt reflects this polarity but not reveals an underlying transcendent‐immanent principle called “différance,” or, the dao 道 in Chinese philosophy. This “difference” in language leads to ramification of meanings which could be self‐deconstructive such as the extended use of the word “spirit” demonstrates. (shrink)

It is in 1965 that, as well known, Derrida publishes in Tel Quel one of his most important writings on Antonin Artaud : La parole soufflée. In what follow, however, the deep meaning of such an essay is not immediately related to the specifically Artaudian questions it arises, but to the fact that Derrida’s most famous neologism – différance – makes between its pages (for three times) the first appearance. It is in any case important to keep in mind the (...) distinction between its two different ed... (shrink)

This chapter undertakes a serious reflection on the question of Derrida's obscurity, based on a close reading of one of his most important texts, the 1967 essay, “La différance.” The procedure is to tease out what Derrida is saying, often paragraph by paragraph or even sentence by sentence, posing questions about how to read particular passages, with a view to seeing in what ways Derrida's essay falls into obscurity. Derrida's sometimes replaces argument with puns and other forms of linguistic play, (...) and he often assumes the reader's acquaintance with Lacan, Heidegger, and other difficult thinkers. Derrida's “semantic analysis” of différance is, quite lucid and suggests an interesting argument from the essentially differential nature of linguistic meaning to the untenability of metaphysical claims about the fundamental role of presence and subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper attempts to elucidate on Jacques Derrida’s concept of deconstruction and its difficult elements, viz., differance, dissemination, destinerrance, and geocatasthrophe. These basic ideas need elaboration for their proper understanding. Once successfully achieved, then here lies the significance of this paper.

This article provides, through a discussion of the work of Jacques Derrida, an examination of the philosophical basis of postmodernism. The first section identifies and explains the positive claims of postmodernism, including the key claim that all identities, presences, etc. depend for their existence on something which is absent and different from themselves. The second section further illustrates the positive claims through an analysis of Derrida's "deconstructionist" reading of Plato. The final section raises a number of critical problems for postmodernism: (...) that it confuses aesthetics with metaphysics; that it mistakes assertion for argument in philosophy; that it is guilty of relativism; and that it is self-contradictory. -/- . (shrink)

In Of Grammatology, Derrida discusses Leroi-Gourhan in relating différance to memory, the ‘program’, and the history of life. In Technics and Time, 1, Stiegler argues that Derrida failed to draw all the philosophical implications of linking différance to the questions of life and retention. Derrida returned to the life sciences in 1975, in a seminar not published in its entirety until 2019. There, Derrida attempts to deconstruct the geneticist François Jacob's account of the ‘logic of life’, but Derrida's analysis of (...) different kinds of memory and programs seems confused, suggesting that the Derridean text remains haunted by the deficiencies of his earlier reading of Leroi-Gourhan. Later in the seminar, Derrida shows foresight concerning the problems arising from seeing the genetic molecule as akin to a computer program, despite Jacob making this link via Schrödinger and Wiener's discussions of negentropy. When Derrida turns to a reading of Freud and libidinal energy, however, he ‘assumes’ a reading of Laplanche but ignores the latter's critique of Freud's own preoccupations with the second law of thermodynamics. The limitations of Derrida's attempts to bring deconstruction together with scientific understanding expose the need for the kind of ‘organological’ and ‘neganthropological’ approach that Stiegler will ultimately pursue. (shrink)

This experimental article claims that relatively recent trends in Western philosophy provide a much more open approach to philosophies originating in nonwestern traditions, including the Chinese, than found in most mainstream Western philosophy. More specifically, I argue that a slightly modified version of Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance offers a hermeneutic parallel to native Chinese philosophical approaches to interpretation. These converge in the view that Western and Chinese philosophies cannot be reduced to the other in conceptual terms and that a (...) finalized meaning or interpretation of each is a priori unattainable, thus providing a future opening for – and even integration of – a Chinese-Western dialogue in global philosophy and ethics.*. (shrink)

In the advent of communication, Derrida finds that meaning through signification carries with it the possibility of mis-communication in which the intended meaning behind the text becomes undecidable and inevitably polysemic in its transference. In a short, yet fecund essay “Signature Event Context,” Derrida tackles the problem of communication and the supposed claim of the classical notion of writing’s conception of virtual permanence within the text. The classical notion of writing claims that writing as a medium or a species of (...) communication implies that the transference of meaning is conducted in a homogenous fashion. In the absence, of the author who has abandoned the fleeting singular instance of inscription, the text, according to the classical notion of writing, must be able to transfer meaning within the interplay of the text itself, for if it fails to do so, writing would cease to become useful in its intention to transfer meaning. (shrink)

My article is a rejoinder to Gert Biesta’s, ‘“This is My Truth, Tell Me Yours”. Deconstructive pragmatism as a philosophy of education.’ Biesta attempts to place Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction in ‘the very heart’ of John Dewey’s pragmatism. My article strives to impress Deweyan pragmatism in the heart of Derridian deconstruction. It does so by offering Dewey’s denotative, naturalistic, empirical perspectivalism as an alternative to Derrida’s anti-empirical quasi-transcendentalism for understanding otherness and difference. The first section of my article shows Biesta offers (...) a catastrophically mistaken and confused argument. The second section imprints Deweyan pragmatism in the heart of Derrida’s deconstruction. Dewey specifically makes philosophical use of a version of the genetic method he calls the ‘empirical denotative method’ to trace the exclusions as well as the inclusions of our perspectival selections driven by our finite embodied needs, interest, desires, and purposes. We may derive the trace of quasi-transcendental différance from the trace of empirically perspectival inclusions and exclusions. Specifically, différance is a reified hypostatic abstraction. Next, I respond to Biesta’s claim that since the metaphysics of presence still entangles Dewey, he cannot appreciate the fact that presence depends on absence. Actually, presence in Dewey always depends on absence. Finally, we will find that Biesta’s own deconstructive pragmatism flounders on his commitment to self-refuting relativism. (shrink)

Who/what can be had at an ontological discount? By grasping the “anitrelationality” and “dismediation” of social relations by capital’s system of accounts, we discern not only the epistemicide and the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic by capital, we shed new light on racial abstraction and gender abstraction. We grasp in “the coloniality of race and gender” the logistics of abstraction that at once code the social factory and give rise to what I have called the derivative condition—a condition in which the (...) multiple forms of being, when dissolved in and as executable information, are functionalized as contingent claims on the value-form by means of “the world computer.” When we say that semiotic processes are metapragmatically put under economic and informatic pressure, we are also saying that the datafication expresses more than a simple analogy to the commodity form by assigning numbers to qualities. Rather, datafication appears as the preeminent mechanism for the commodification of sociality, and thus also encodes access to social currency. Femicide and the ritual violence of parastate cartels of “gore capitalism” can be seen as alternative means of issuing derivative (soft) currencies by imposing extrajudicial if equally violent systems of account. (shrink)

This article casts light on Marc Richir’s remarkable and yet poorly known interpretation of the analyses of animality that Martin Heidegger develops in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude and Solitude. It shows that this interpretation unfolds as a two‑step critical revision of Heidegger’s analyses within the framework of Richir’s neo‑phenomenological project. On the one hand, Richir aims to offer the “right” interpretation of the cybernetic and grammatological history of life told by Jacques Derrida, by measuring it against Heidegger’s (...) theory of the organism. On the other hand, Richir rewrites the limits of Heidegger’s conception of animality in light of the overview of contemporary ethological research provided by Konrad Lorenz. (shrink)

My purpose here is to compare, contrast, and critically reflect on two critiques of simple immediacy, Hegel’s and Derrida’s. The Hegelian critique occurs in the chapter on sense certainty in The Phenomenology of Spirit; the Derridean in the criticism of proper names in Glas. These texts will be my primary sources and points of reference. When necessary, however, I will use other texts as supplements. After an account of the two critiques, I will then consider similarities, differences, Hegel’s and Derrida’s (...) reflections on the differences, and reflections on all of the above. What will emerge as a result of the encounter is the notion of chastened, fallibilistic dialectic and mediation: I learn from Derrida’s philosophically significant reflection but give a qualified nod to Hegel on the basic methodological, epistemological, and metaphysical issues. Metaphysics still remains actual and possible, but it is a humble metaphysics, aware of its own limits and roots in a life world of experience and language that can never be totally thematized. (shrink)