First published in 1975 and still without equal, The Human Experience of Time provides a thorough review of the concept of time in the Western philosophic tradition. Encompassing a wide range of writings, from the Book of Genesis and the classical thinkers to the work of such twentieth-century philosophers as Collingwood and McKeon, all with introductory essays by the editor, this classic anthology offers a synoptic view of the changing philosophic notions of time.

Research has demonstrated that how teachers spend their time is an important educational issue. In this paper it is argued that there is a good case for examining teachers’ personal and professional time simultaneously in order to enhance the quality of teaching, learning and teachers’ lives.

In Ennead III.7.11--13, Plotinus describes the genesis of time, and time's nature as the life of soul, and the moving image of eternity. In this dissertation, Ennead III.7.11--13 was read, using an exegetical method, which comprised, raising questions, and answering them, in strictly Plotinian terms, by contemplating the pieces that best fit into these puzzles. Some answers discovered were as follows. ;Before its appearance, time exists as the seed of time in Intellect. This is a state (...) of rest because of its relative unity, its participation in the genus rest, and its absence of tolma. Time's genesis comprises an eternal manifestation of a change of identity from seed to actualization. Time is generated in four logical steps. Soul becomes diluted upon its generative acts, mainly because of tolma. Soul has a far richer contemplation of Intellect underlying its genesis of the sensibles, than that underlying its genesis of time. ;Soul undergoes ontological loss in its generation of time and the sensible universe. Beginning with tolma, and the desires for autonomy unleashed by tolma, soul's multiplicity is enhanced. Yet this multiplicity is also tempered by soul's unquiet power's glance of aspiration towards Intellect. This glance is the contemplation, which fecundates soul's generation of time. Soul's power is its strength, but the unquietness of this power can indicate ontological loss. Tolma in soul incurs evil, because tolma thwarts soul from contemplating Intellect. ;The genus-species structure of soul is involved in the generation and omnipresence of time, through the actualization of the genus in its species. Time is ideally omnipresent when time is kairos. Soul is immortal and impassible, and it is only soul's activity and progeny, which are temporal. Time is the life of soul, insofar as movement is predicated of this life at three levels: the logical, the perceptible, and the spatial. Time itself is a poorer life than eternity, time itself is not alive, and yet, time is not unreal. Time is a moving image of eternity through the common predicates applied to both, which are their shared characteristics, defining the essence of the image that time constitutes. (shrink)

RESUMEN El mundo moderno creó un régimen temporal de horarios, presiones, exigencias de efectividad, rendimientos, etc., que somete a los individuos a procesos de alienación, pero esa lógica temporal no ha sido suficientemente politizada ni se ha llegado a ver qué pasa con nuestra experiencia de tiempo. La lógica temporal de la modernidad parece natural. El propósito de este artículo es volver sobre la realidad del tiempo. Aquí nos apoyamos en un primer momento en el proyecto crítico de Hartmut Rosa (...) y lo conectamos con una consideración del tiempo que debemos buscar en otros autores, presuntamente ajenos a la teoría crítica, a saber, Heidegger y Gadamer. ABSTRACT The modern world created a temporal regime of schedules, pressures, demands of efficiency, performances, etc., that submits individuals to processes of alienation, but that temporal logic has not been politicized neither has it been seen what happens with our experience of the time. The logic of time in modernity seems natural. The purpose of this article is to return to the reality of the time. Here we support in a first moment in the critical project of Hartmut Rosa and we connect it with a consideration of the time that we must look for in other authors, supposedly foreign to the critical theory, namely Heidegger and Gadamer. (shrink)

Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this (...) topic. Instead, a largely schematic examination of the main options is conducted, with a view to determining the most promising avenues for further investigation. (shrink)

Bergson’s influential discussion of durée—the concept at the heart of his dynamic view of time’s reality—emerges from an inquiry into the nature of temporal experience. In this chapter, I outline Bergson’s view of the non-inferential or immediate experience of time, and mark out the place of durée within his account. I underscore the relation between Bergson’s controversial argument concerning number and his view of temporal experience, and contrast Bergson’s notion of ‘immediate experience’ with immediacy (...) as typically understood in contemporary thought. Bergson’s view of the experience of time, I suggest, is a dual-aspect theory in which durée is accorded a fundamental role in relation to the temporal properties of succession, intervals, and simultaneity. (shrink)

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time—the so‐called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non‐causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate (...) for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. (shrink)

In this introduction to contemporary conceptions of time and change, I investigate what our experience of time, that is, our experience of change, seems to be and ask whether or not we can say that how it seems could match the reality. My conclusion is that more recent contemporary conceptions of time can do this but that more intuitive or traditional conceptions cannot. Thus, the more contemporary conceptions are preferable for research into time consciousness.

In the early decades of the twentieth century the experience of time as crisis became the catalyst for a fundamental reorientation in the relationship between historical materialism and idealism, leading to the rejection of simplistic mechanical concepts of historical time. This reorientation represents a turning point in the history of European ideas, clearly evident in the work of two major thinkers of this period, usually associated with opposing political ideologies: the Marxist theorist Walter Benjamin and the liberal (...) philosopher Benedetto Croce. Based on a conceptual framework borrowed partly from Reinhart Koselleck, this article explains how the experience of acute crisis led both thinkers to develop a new understanding of historical time, which shows surprising parallels. Both authors used the reorientation in the relationship between idealism and materialism to criticize positivist approaches to the analysis of historical change and to reject deterministic accounts of the future. (shrink)

Kant officially argues that the role of the representation of time in the synthetic a priori judgments of arithmetic and the general theory of motion implies that time must be an a priori condition...

Presentists have typically argued that the Block View is incapable of explaining our experience of time. In this paper I argue that the phenomenology of our experience of time is, on the contrary, against presentism. My argument is based on a dilemma: presentists must either assume that the metaphysical present has no temporal extension, or that it is temporally extended. The former horn leads to phenomenological problems. The latter renders presentism metaphysically incoherent, unless one posits a (...) discrete present that, however, suffers from the same difficulties that the instantaneous present is prone to. After introducing the main phenomenological models of our experience of time that are discussed in the literature, I show that none of them favors presentism. I conclude by arguing that if even the phenomenology of time sides against presentism, the latter metaphysical theory has no scientific evidence in its favor and ought to be dropped. (shrink)

In this thesis, I examine the metaphysical debate between the A-theory and the B-theory of time, first by elaborating upon its proper characterization, and then by examining the sorts of evidence that are often thought to be germane to it. This debate, as I see it, is about whether or not time passes in any objective sense: the A-theory holds that it does, while the B-theory holds that it does not. I identify two opposing conceptions of time—that (...) of the “time of ordinary experience” on one hand, and that of “scientific time” on the other—and argue that the tension between them is the driving force behind this debate. I then examine two aspects of “evidence” from the time of ordinary experience: the phenomenological experience of time and the linguistic experience of time. It is often supposed, by both A- and B-theorists alike, that these sorts of evidence lend credence to the A-theory of time, since ordinary experience suggests that time passes. I hope to discredit this presumption, and so challenge the very framework in which this debate is so often carried out. In particular, by closely examining both of these kinds of experience—phenomenological and linguistic—in turn, I hope to provide a partial argument to the effect that the ordinary experience of time as a whole does not favour the A-theory over the B-theory of time. In the case of the phenomenological evidence, this is because the A-theory is just as inconsistent with such evidence as is the B-theory of time; in the case of the linguistic evidence, this is because the B-theory is equally consistent with such evidence as is the A-theory of time, particularly once it is revealed that a certain key assumption is tacitly accepted by both sides of the debate. Because of the popularity of the claim that the ordinary experience of time favours the A-theory, I take this conclusion to be something of a modest defence for the B-theory of time. (shrink)

Background The international health workforce crisis had led to an increasing shortage of nurses, which has substantial implications for the quality of patient care. This shortage potentially results in nurse-perceived time pressure, which can be particularly challenging for nurses who provide care for older persons. Objective This study aimed to show how geriatric nurses experience working under time pressure, perceive its impact on care and deal with time pressure in daily care. Research design A qualitative descriptive (...) interview design was used. Participants and research context Purposive sampling led to the inclusion of 11 nurses from three geriatric nursing wards in two general hospitals in Flanders (Belgium). Data were collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews and analysed using the QUAGOL (Qualitative Analysis Guide of Leuven). Ethical considerations The study protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University Hospitals Leuven (Ethics committee of the University Hospitals Leuven). Findings In all interviews, time pressure was described as ubiquitous in the daily care of older persons. A sense of failure in providing care was the common thread in many interviews. Nurses felt compelled to ‘reduce’ good-quality care to basic care by focusing on the physical and visible aspects of care. Nevertheless, personal experiences with time pressure and strategies to cope with it differed among the interviewees. These variations were related to the working environment and the nurses themselves. They underscored the importance of nurses’ perspectives for a good understanding of the phenomenon of time pressure. Discussion and conclusion Working under time pressure in the care of older persons leads to various important challenges for nursing ethics. The findings show that providing care that promotes the human dignity of older persons in busy working environments in which care is rationed is an important ethical challenge. As such, our study offers a baseline for further research and discussion on how to support nurses working under time pressure. (shrink)

In this book, Richard Fenn looks at the way in which we experience time in secular societies. In Fenn's view, secularization is virtually synonymous with individualism. Although it is often the Church that decries modern individualism, he says, it is in fact the Church that created it, by its demystification of the universe, its insistence on individual self-discipline, and its intensification of individual responsibility for the use of time. The result was a profound change in the way (...) in which time is experienced by the individual. Fenn offers a probing exploration of our modern experience of time, as expressed in such phrases as 'wasting time' and 'making up for lost time'. He is particularly interested in the idea and experience of waiting, which he believes to be a defining characteristic of modern life. (shrink)

To fight against the spread of the coronavirus disease, more than 3 billion people in the world have been confined indoors. Although lockdown is an efficient solution, it has had various psychological consequences that have not yet been fully measured. During the lockdown period in France, we conducted two surveys on two large panels of participants to examine how the lockdown disrupted their relationship with time and what this change in their experiences of time means. Numerous questions were (...) asked about the experience of time but also the nature of life during the lockdown: the emotions felt, boredom, the activities performed, sleep quality, and the daily rhythm. The participants also completed a series of self-reported scales used to assess depression, anxiety, and impulsivity. The results showed that time seemed to pass more slowly during the lockdown compared to before. This feeling of a slowing down of time has little to do with living conditions during the lockdown and individual psychological characteristics. The main predictor of this time experience was boredom and partly mediated by the lack of activity. The feeling of being less happy and the presence of sleep disturbance also explained this specific experience of time albeit to a lesser extent. (shrink)

Encountering the Past within the Present: Modern Experiences of Time examines different encounters with the past from within the present – whether as commemoration, nostalgia, silence, ghostly haunting or combinations thereof. Taking its cue from Hannah Arendt’s definition of the present as a time span lying between past and future, I reflect on the old philosophical question of how to live the good life – not only with others who are physically with us but also with those whose (...) presence is ghostly and liminal. While tradition may no longer command the same authority as it did in antiquity or the middle ages, individuals are by no means severed from the past. Rather, nostalgic longing for bygone times and traumatic preoccupation with painful historical events demonstrate the vitality of the past within the present. Divided into three parts, chapters examine ways in which the legacies of World War II, the Holocaust and communism have been remembered after 1945 and 1989. Maintaining a sustained reflection on the nexus of memory, modernity and time in tandem with ancient questions of responsibility for one another and the world, the volume contributes to the growing field of memory studies from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of the experience of time when living with severe incurable disease. A phenomenological and philosophical approach of description and deciphering were used. In our modern health care system there is an on-going focus on utilizing and recording the use of time, but less focus on the patient’s experience of time, which highlights the need to explore the patients’ experiences, particularly when life is vulnerable and (...) time is limited. The empirical data consisted of 26 open-ended interviews with 23 participants receiving palliative care at home, in hospital or in a nursing home in Norway. The theoretical frameworks used are mainly based upon K. Martinsens philosophy of care, K. E. Løgstrup phenomenological philosophy, in addition to C. Saunders’ hospice philosophy, L. Feigenberg’s thanatology and U. Qvarnström’s research exploring patient’s reactions to impending death. Experience of time is described as being a movement that moves the individual towards death in the field of opposites, and deciphered to be a universal, but a typical and unique experience emerging through three integrated levels: Sense of time; where time is described as a movement that is proceeding at varying speeds. Relate totime; where the awareness of limited life changes the understanding of time to be more existential. Being in time; where limited time seems to clarify the basic living conditions and phenomena of life. The existence of life when the prospect of death is present is characterized by emotional swings that move within polarizing dimensions which is reflected in the experience of time illustrated as the moves of the pendulum in a grandfather clock. The diversity of the experience of time is oscillating between going fast or slow, being busy or calm, being unpredictable but predictable, safe or unsafe and between being good or bad, depending on the embodied situation of the individual. (shrink)

"How do we experience time? What do we use to experience it?In a series of remarkable experiments, Robert Ornstein shows that it is difficult to maintain an “inner clock” explanation of the experience".

Psychopathology in children cannot be understood without considering developmental processes and transactional relationships, particularly the relationship with caregivers. Time-limited intersubjective child psychotherapy is a developmental and transactional approach aimed at helping children and caregivers get back on healthier developmental trajectories. Core developmental processes, such as self-other-regulation and affect integration, are considered particularly important for healthy function and transactions with caregivers and contexts. Therefore, TIC seeks to strengthen core developmental processes in the child and the caregivers’ ability to scaffold the (...) child’s development. This is achieved through parallel child therapy and parent sessions. The current study is a qualitative study of parents’ experiences of change after TIC. The study explores parents’ perception of change in their child, themselves, and their transactions, and what they experienced as helpful in therapy.Materials and MethodsNine semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with parents of nine children aged 9–12 years with internalizing difficulties after completing TIC. The data were analyzed with thematic analysis.ResultsThe parents described positive changes in the children’s ability to understand, regulate and express themselves. The parents also described positive changes in their parenting, and for all nine children the parents reported positive changes in the transactions between themselves and the child. Most parents saw the parallel child and parental sessions as particularly important, while several parents mentioned play and the therapeutic focus.DiscussionParents’ description of changes after TIC indicate that the parents perceived their children as strengthened in core developmental processes important for intersubjective exchanges such as self-regulation and affect integration. In addition, parents saw their children and their own contributions more clearly, and their transactions were described as more supportive and positive.ConclusionThe results from this study give support to TIC as a developmentally supportive approach to therapy, with potential effects on children’s core developmental processes, their parents’ ability to both see and scaffold the child’s development and positive effects on the transactions between children and parents. The positive effects likely result from the integration of the different parts of TIC and the synergies taking place between them, rather than any one component by itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a (...) time of the world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

Philosophical debates about the metaphysics of time typically revolve around two contrasting views of time. On the A-theory, time is something that itself undergoes change, as captured by the idea of the passage of time; on the B-theory, all there is to time is events standing in before/after or simultaneity relations to each other, and these temporal relations are unchanging. Philosophers typically regard the A-theory as being supported by our experience of time, and (...) they take it that the B-theory clashes with how we experience time and therefore faces the burden of having to explain away that clash. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether these intuitions about the experience of time are shared by the general public. We asked directly for people’s subjective reports of their experience of time—in particular, whether they believe themselves to have a phenomenology as of time’s passing—and we probed their understanding of what time’s passage in fact is. We find that a majority of participants do share the aforementioned intuitions, but interestingly a minority do not. (shrink)

Deconstruction and duration are arguably the two most important theories of time to emerge from French philosophy in the twentieth century. Yet, despite the resurgence of interest in Bergson, scholars have ignored Derrida’s own discussions of Bergson, both positive and negative, throughout his career. This lack of attention obscures an important influence on Derrida’s early thought, and hampers our ability to understand the nature of Derrida’s relationship to fields such as new materialism, posthumanism, and affect studies, that frequently turn (...) to Bergson for inspiration. This paper addresses this gap by tracking Derrida’s readings of Bergson and comparing two related pairs of their concepts: duration and différance, and intuition and spacing. The paper concludes by arguing that Derrida’s critical engagement with Bergson leads to an anti-presentist model of life, which gains new relevance in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

We present a conceptual framework on the experience of time and provide a coherent basis on which to base further inquiries into qualitative approaches concerning time experience. We propose two Time-Layers and two Time-Formats forming four Time-Domains. Micro-Flow and Micro-Structure represent the implicit phenomenal basis, from which the explicit experiences of Macro-Flow and Macro-Structure emerge. Complementary to this theoretical proposal, we present empirical results from qualitative content analysis obtained from 25 healthy participants. The (...) data essentially corroborate the theoretical proposal. With respect to Flow, the phenomenally accessible time experience appeared as a continuous passage reaching from the past through the present into the future. With respect to Structure, the individual present was embedded in the individual biography, emerging from past experiences and comprising individual plans and goals. New or changing plans and goals were being integrated into the existing present, thus forming a new present. The future appeared as changeable within the present, by means from the past, and therefore as a space of potential opportunities. Exemplarily, we discuss these results in relation to previous empirical findings on deviant experiences of time in Autism Spectrum Disorder that is presumably characterized by a breakdown of Flow and concomitant compensatory repetition resulting in an overly structured time. Finally, we speculate about possible implications of these findings both for psychopathological and neuroscientific research. (shrink)

A long needed book which will be widely welcomed and used. It is unique in its scope and in the sympathetic intelligence of its exposition. Twenty-eight philosophers from the anonymous redactor of the Book of Genesis to writers still living are represented. Each author is grouped with anywhere from one to four others under a common heading. Sherover has written about 165 pages altogether of introductory remarks to these eight groupings. The remarks are lucid, exhibiting his rare balance and flexibility (...) as both advocate for and critic of the authors, who are otherwise allowed to speak for themselves. His headings may disturb someone who has not confronted the author’s problem. Why, for example, should Whitehead be put under "The Analysis of Temporal Concepts" rather than "Time and Reality"? The answer is that the order of the chapters is historical, and the titles of the sections they fall under indicate a dominant type of philosophical approach when the given author was writing. I find this well done, having faced the problem in an incomplete manuscript which—thanks to the present work—I can now happily put aside. (shrink)

How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the (...) order the words are experienced as having? A number of recent authors (Phillips Experience and Time, ‘The Temporal Structure of Experience’, Soteriou ‘Perceiving Events’, Hoerl ‘“A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession”’, Rashbrook) claim, to paraphrase Martin (399), that inheritance best characterises how our temporal experience seems to initial reflective intuition. For this reason, Phillips takes the principle to form part of our naïve view of temporal experience. An opposing group of theorists object that inheritance is subject to empirical counter-example. This article surveys such challenges. Section 2 considers Grush's case against inheritance based on postdiction. Section 3 examines Watzl's anti-inheritance argument based on silencing effects. Finally, Section 4 explores a number of alleged counter-examples proposed by Lee (‘Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience’). Section 1 provides essential background to the debate. (shrink)

This book explores the important yet neglected relationship between the philosophy of time and the temporal structure of perceptual experience. It examines how time structures perceptual experience and, through that structuring, the ways in which time makes perceptual experience trustworthy or erroneous. -/- Sean Power argues that our understanding of time can determine our understanding of perceptual experience in relation to perceptual structure and perceptual error. He examines the general conditions under which (...) an experience may be sorted into different kinds of error such as illusions, hallucinations, and anosognosia. Power also argues that some theories of time are better than others at giving an account of the structure and errors of perceptual experience. He makes the case that tenseless theory and eternalism more closely correspond to experience than tense theory and presentism. Finally, the book includes a discussion of the perceptual experience of space and how tenseless theory and eternalism can better support the problematic theory of naïve realism. -/- Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience originally illustrates how the metaphysics of time can be usefully applied to thinking about experience in general. It will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of time and debates about the trustworthiness of experience. (shrink)

If, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes, “True philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world,” and if Merleau-Ponty is accordingly often described as a philosopher of the body or a philosopher of painting, how are we to understand the apparently new turn to music that Merleau Ponty makes toward the end of the final completed chapter, entitled “The Intertwining—The Chiasm,” of The Visible and the Invisible? I argue that the course of the “Chiasm” chapter moves from a concern for the (...) reciprocal intertwining of body and world to a concern for the Ineinander of temporality. Thus, there are two dimensions involved in forming Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic structure of the flesh: the fecundity of the sensible world in the dimension of simultaneity and the transcendence of the subject in the dimension of succession. The aim of this article is to explore the part of this structure that pertains to the temporal movement of transcendental intersubjectivity. Focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s adaptation of Husserl’s term, Ineinander, I trace the musical context of the term from Merleau-Ponty’s course notes, “Philosophie aujourd’hui” to the final passages from the “Chiasm” chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, understanding the Ineinander as it pertains to the relation of past and present. Contrary to the overflowing sense of presence experienced by the body in the world, the Ineinander is characterized by succession—by the écart—and finds its natural expression in the movement of music. Thus, the chiastic structure at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the flesh expresses not only the immersion of a body in the world that sees; it expresses also, as that which is no longer and that which is to come, a creative, melodic movement of time. (shrink)

This paper explains the phenomena that compose the experience of the passage of time and argues that this experience represents the temporal direction of causal processes. The experience of the passage of time comprises several more specific experiences, namely: (1) the experience of continuously advancing to later times; (2) the observation of continuous change, both in the things around us and in ourselves; (3) the feeling of a lack of control over (1) and (2); (...) and (4) the experience of a number of phenomena that we describe as animated, dynamic, or flowing. The experience of passage is a causal process whose function is to promote survival and reproductive success by representing the temporal direction of causal processes (including itself). It does this primarily via the specious present, wherein later content is presented as more vivid than earlier content. The experience of passage is veridical and is compatible with either the B‐theory or the A‐theoretic views of time. (shrink)

This paper insists on similarities between Heidegger’s presentation of Dasein’s authentic understanding of time in Being and Time (§§ 79-80) and Thomas Mann’s attempts to “narrate time itself” in The Magic Mountain. It shows that Thomas Mann’s temporal experiments can contribute to a phenomenology of temporality, not merely by “illustrating” philosophical theses, but also by achieving something that goes beyond any phenomenological consideration on time: the enactment of fundamental temporal experiences.

Temporal passage is an irrefragable and ineliminable feature of our lived experience of time. In this essay, I argue that, regardless of whether one adopts a three-dimensional, A theory of time or a four-dimensional, B theory of time, the subject of lived experience of time has to be conceived of as something that stands outside of the physical order in order for the experience of temporal passage to actually occur. This implies the truth (...) of Dualism as the only account of mind that can accommodate the facts of the lived experience of time. (shrink)

The paper examines narrative operations involved in the temporal configuration of experience within a general framework of the phenomenological treatment of temporality. Taking as its point of departure a most basic instantiation of temporal experience, namely that of a ticking clock, it argues that the narrative dynamics which give form and charge the interval between tick and tock with significant duration are directly derived from the time-constituting operations of the embodied mind and, as such, are independent of (...) their linguistic articulations. Thus, it critically invokes Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, more specifically his model of retention-primary impression-protention, first in the context of Francisco J. Varela’s account of the neurodynamics of lived time, and then with reference to David Carr’s argument for continuity between narrative and the world of our experiences and actions. Building on these critical trajectories, the paper outlines how proto-narrative elements of lived time form a basis for the properly narrative operation of emplotment and, in its final section, discusses some of the complex relations between lived time and narrative time by contrasting Carr’s account of narrative with Paul Ricoeur’s model of triple mimesis. (shrink)

This article explores three different comics by creators with brain tumors: _Rick_, written and drawn by Gordon Shaw; _Going Remote_, written by Adam Bessie and drawn by Peter Glanting; and _Parenthesis_, written and drawn by Élodie Durand. It examines how the affordances of the comics medium enables the creators to present an experience of subjective time that is multiple, diffuse, and contradictory, in contrast to the regular apportioning of time via calendars, schedules, and pathways essential to institutional (...) neuro-oncology. The question of time here is significant because the side effects of brain tumors can include blackouts, seizures, and periods of extreme fatigue, during which the experience of time can be significantly disrupted. The title of the article therefore evokes a temporal duality: on the one hand, it refers to the common phrase used to describe what clocks do, as well as our ability to read them; on the other hand, it speaks to one of the most important qualities of graphic medicine, which is that it allows patients dealing with medical or health issues to tell time differently. The article explores the representation of personal time in _Rick_, social time in _Going Remote_, and lost time in _Parenthesis_. (shrink)

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first (...) part of the article, the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal and impersonal dimensions. Interpretative developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the “unified view of time”. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of “today”, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances. (shrink)

The similarities between William James’ Stream of Consciousness and Henri Bergson’s La durée réelle have often been noted. Both emphasize the fundamentally temporal nature of our conscious experience and its constant flow. However, in this article, I argue that despite surface similarities between the OP theories, they are fundamentally different. The ultimate reason for the differences between the theories is that James believed that we should reject psychological explanations that depend on synthesis within the mental sphere. This is because (...) such explanations are incompatible with empiricism. Instead, we should look to the physiological mechanisms underpinning mental states. In contrast, Bergson was an adamant defender of a form of mental processing which he called qualitative synthesis. Duration itself, for Bergson, is a form of qualitative synthesis. However, in 1906, less than five years before James died, Bergson convinced him to change his mind. This results in a huge shift in James’ thought. Unless we understand how far apart James and Bergson were prior to this shift, we will not have a proper picture of the full influence of Bergson on James’ thought, nor of the major changes to James’ philosophy that occurred near the end of his life. (shrink)