“The Will to Believe” defines the religious question as forced, living and momentous, but even in this article James asserts that more objective factors are involved. The competing religious hypotheses must both be equally coherent and correspond to experimental data to an equal degree. Otherwise the option is not a live one. “If I say to you ‘Be a theosophist or be a Mohammedan’, it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive.” (...) James, WB, p. 3. Analogously, in A Pluralistic Universe James is at pains to convince the reader that his own religious hypothesis is just as “objective,” makes just as much sense, etc. as alternative possibilities: the “only thing I emphatically insist upon is that it [pluralistic pantheism] is a fully coordinate hypothesis with monism. This world may, in the last resort, be a block universe; but on the other hand, it may be a universe only strung along, not rounded in and closed. Reality may exist distributively just as it sensibly seems to, after all. On that possibility I do insist.”William James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909) p. 328.Here, once again, before the will to believe can be employed, the objective factors of competing hypotheses, their equal coherence and correspondence, must be brought out.When reconstructed, James' overall outlook has a “qausi Kuhnian” taint to it- though obvious differences remain. Much of what goes on in evaluating competing scientific hypotheses is either not forced, or not living, or not momentous, but rather “typical,” “dead,” and “avoidable,” in short very “normal.” But there are moments in the history of science where the decision between hypotheses might well be forced, living and momentous, and sometimes James comes close to recognizing this.Analogously, a good deal of what goes on in religion is not forced, not living or not momentous - in short it is all too “normal”. In The Varieties of Religious Experience for example, James proposes to ignore the institutional branch of the religious domain and to concentrate on personal and psychological factors, his reason being that the institutional aspect concentrates on the routine, the normal. “Worship and sacrifice, procedures for working on the dispositions of the deity, theology and ceremony and ecclesiastical organization, are the essentials of religion in the institutional branch. Were we to limit our view to it, we should have to define religion as an external art, the art of winning the favor of the gods.” James, VRE, p. 29. and again “The word ‘religion,’ as ordinarily used, is equivocal. A survey of history shows us that, as a rule, religious geniuses attract disciples, and produce groups of sympathizers. When these groups get strong enough to ‘organize’ themselves, they become ecclesiastical institutions with corporate ambitions of their own. The spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are then apt to enter and to contaminate the originally innocent thing; so that when we hear the word ‘religion’ nowadays, we think inevitably of some ‘church’ or other.” Clearly here religion has a normal, i.e. trivial side, just as does science. On the other hand, there are revolutionary moments in religion, such as that of choosing between theism and materialism in Pragmatism, or choosing among theism, monistic pantheism and pluralistic pantheism in A Pluralistic Universe. Such moments involve the will to believe and are clearly more personal than their counterparts in the domain of normal institutionalized religion. Going further, there are no doubt differences of degree between the will to believe decisions in science and the will to believe decisions in religion. These have been explicated in more specific terms by Ian Barbour in his article, “Paradigms in Science and Religion.” ...each of the ‘subjective’ features of science... is more evident in the case of religion: (1) the influence of interpretation on data, (2) the resistance of comprehensive theories of falsification, and (3) the absence of rules for choice among paradigms. Each of the corresponding ‘objective’ features of science is less evident in the case of religion: (1) the presence of common data on which disputants can agree, (2) the cumulative effect of evidence for or against a theory, and (3) the existence of criteria which are not paradigm-dependent. It is clear that in all three respects religion is a more ‘subjective’ enterprise than science. But in each case there is a difference of degree - not an absolute contrast between an ‘objective’ science and a ‘subjective’ religion. Ian Barbour, “Paradigms in Science and Religion,” in Paradigms and Revolutions, edited by Gary Gutting (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980) pp. 242–43. Barbour correctly notes that the “...choice is not between religion and science, but between theism, pantheism, and naturalism, let us say, as each is expressed in a particular historical tradition. No basic beliefs are capable of demonstrable proof.”Ibid., p. 243. James sometimes comes close to recognizing this but his oscillation on the status of the everyday world of common sense, or the perceptual world, causes him not to see the issue clearly. When the animated world of the perceptual is taken as the all inclusive ‘really real,’ science is viewed as an abstract, second class citizen. But James offers what we would consider a more sophisticated and adequate perspective when he views the world of common sense, having become linguistified, as itself suspicious, and consequently views all three tiers - common sense, scholastic philosophy, and science - as “regional ontologies”, or “language games” in Wittgenstein's terminologySee Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), paragraph 7, paragraph 23. For the notion of “regional ontology” see Edmund Husserl, Ideas, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1962) p. 57ff; p. 158ff. - and opposes all three to a more primordial or prereflexive level. When James takes this second approach it is easier to see that the basic distinction he began to make in “The Will to Believe” was between the scientific and religious domain where the will to believe was to be employed, and the domain of “ordinary” religion and science. Finally this position anticipates his ultimate metaphysical outlook, viz. “pure experience” as approachable through language on a series of diverse regional levels, but nonetheless not completely describable within language. It is important to recall that in The Varieties of Religious Experience James distinguishes between the science of religions and what he calls living religion: [T] he science of religions may not be an equivalent for living religion; and if we turn to the inner difficulties of such a science, we see that a point comes when she must drop the purely theoretic attitude, and either let her knots remain uncut, or have them cut by active faith. James, VRE, p. 489. The study of religion, in short is not the activity of religion; the latter is animated, personal, and, we would argue, necessitates a commitment in terms of the will to believe. Once again, however, James hesitates over offering the same two-fold delineation in other areas of science. On the one hand he tells the reader that “science-has ended by utterly repudiating the personal point of view.”Ibid., p. 491. On the other hand, he offers the following comment a few pages later on in a footnote: ...the divorce between scientist facts and religious facts may not necessarily be as eternal as it at first sight seems, nor the personalism and romanticism of the world, as they appeared to primitive thinking, be matters so irrevocably outgrown. The final opinion may, in short, in some manner now impossible to forsee, revert to the more personal style, just as any path of progress may follow a spiral rather than a straight line. If this were so, the rigorously impersonal view of science might one day appear as having been a temporarily useful eccentricity rather than the definitely triumphant position which the sectarian scientist at present so confidently announces it to be.Ibid., p. 501, Footnote. The burden of this paper has been to indicate that when James' two-fold outlook on perception and/or common sense is properly reconstructed, the raproachment between science and religion is not so “impossible to forsee.”. (shrink)

This book is an outgrowth of a series of articles originally published in The Progress Magazine under a pseudonym, in which I sought to account for the prevailing mental unrest regarding subjects of religious and philosophical import. These articles attracted much attention from careful students of the times, and there have been many requests for the republication thereof in book form under my own name. Accordingly, the publishers of the articles requested me to revise the several papers, and to add (...) thereto such further matter as I might think proper. I have gone over the original articles, taking away a little here and adding much there. Several entirely new subjects have been considered and inserted in their proper places in the text. At least one third of the present book is entirely new, having been added to the revised form of the original articles. I have purposely quoted freely from good authorities, that the reader may have the benefit of the thought of a number of competent persons upon the various phases of the subject, in addition to what I have personally thought and written. I have sought merely to tell my story in a plain, simple manner, without any attempt at fine writing, literary excellence, or display of technical philosophical knowledge. My desire has been to place in the hands of the everyday busy man and woman a book from the pages of which they may gain a general knowledge of the causes of the modern mental unrest-an idea of what is going into this great melting pot of thought; what is happening there; and what is likely to be poured forth from it. To many, the numerous new "isms," "ologies" and cults, are entirely new- something sprung full grown from the brains of their founders. The absence of an elementary acquaintance with the history of philosophy, on the part of the average man and woman, has given to many new prophets and founders of cults an unmerited and unwarranted importance and authority. I trust that this book will enable some of those who have been perplexed and worried over these new (?) "isms," and teachings, to learn the true sources of those startling conglomerations of metaphysics, philosophy and theology, and thus once more to regain their mental bearings. It is also my hope that some who have a tendency toward philosophical study may be inspired by this book to go to the proper sources of such knowledge-to the masters of this branch of thought-instead of sitting at the feet of the, too often, freakish, irresponsible, and bizarre founders and teachers of the pseudo schools and cults, who have been revamping the old teachings, dressing them in fantastic garb, and offering them (usually at a high rate of compensation) to those who have felt the hunger for wisdom and the thirst for information, but who lacked the knowledge of the places where these things could be had at first hand, pure and free from the adulterations of these self constituted middle men in the great market of Philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52  Reviews FREEDOM ISN’T ACADEMIC W B Educational Studies / U. of British Columbia Vancouver, , Canada   .@. Conrad Russell. An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalism. London: Duckworth, . Pp. . £. (hb). Academic Freedom. London and New York: Routledge, . Pp. xi, . £. (pb). ho is the intelligent person of the first title? Is it the (...) brainy reader who Wknows about liberalism, and merely wants to update her knowledge? Is it the clever author who offers a guide out of the goodness of his heart? Or more likely, is it the sharp publisher, who knows a good selling point when he or she sees one? One guesses it is the publisher. But as to the present volume, few will complain of the title’s ambiguity, for it entices readers into an compact, well written, and timely argument on political matters of the first importance. Conrad Russell was the author of Academic Freedom, a well regarded and similarly compressed discussion of academic freedom. Academic Freedom preceded the Guide to Liberalism by six years. It was as though Russell had first to taste and see the awful effects of neo-conservatism in his beloved University of  Conrad Russell has a world reputation as an historian of the English Civil War, of the whole seventeenth century, and of the social history of politics before . His several books and hundreds of articles and reviews show that he had an apparently effortless mastery of most world history since the Reformation. I have been unable to deal with Conrad’s historical output in this review, but have discussed it in a forthcoming biographical essay about Conrad Russell in the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, “Conrad Russell as Political Intellectual”, forthcoming in . _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52 Reviews  London and then, six years later—after due reflection upon the whole horrid mess—to provide a compelling political remedy to the evil apparatus of Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Major. Academic Freedom, a sister volume to the Guide, dealt with the intellectual and administrative liberty that university teachers must have if their work is to be academically viable and socially valuable. Already in , Academic Freedom offered a sharp attack on the Thatcherite use of league tables and performance indicators, and on high civil servants, vice-chancellors, and government ministers who rely on the numbers. In effect, accountants and managers and long lists of numbers had overtaken much that universities did. Academic Freedom ended with a straightforward prescription: university teachers and (on occasion) responsible administrators should make the hard academic decisions to which they are called—not civil servants, not numbercrunchers, not politicians. This view did not mean elected politicians were released from the burden of honest choice and decision, particularly in regions of governance and public life for which they had direct responsibility and care. But Russell’s point remained: it would be madness if statistical tables replaced responsible and able human beings, or if those human beings accepted that they must become automatic “decision machines”. Conrad Russell died on  October , but must have had a form of prescience. For in , more than thirty academic units and fields were eliminated in United Kingdom universities on grounds of efficiency, ranking in league tables, and performance indication. Each time the administrator concerned threw up her hands, claiming she had no choice, as the league table or the last Research Assessment Exercise “made me do it”. Up the line, politicians have gone further, even rejoicing in the New Management of British higher education and the pleasant prospect of even greater “efficiencies” in the next decade. Conrad Russell well understood that freedom is not just academic. An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalism relies, then, on recent political history to provide its main narrative thrust. By the mid-point of the book, one has the impression that current events have shaped his liberalism, and that his understanding of the history of liberalism is “presentist”. But Conrad Russell starts by saying that he doesn’t pretend to be writing history (or philosophy) in his Guide. To call Conrad Russell “presentist” is to underplay... (shrink)

Your classic Jaguar XK 120 stands useless by the roadside. Why? Because you gave priority to the admittedly gorgeous 6 cylinder straight six engine; because you privileged the highest value part. Rubber pipes perish, though, and now thanks to a leak in a cheap hose the head gasket has blown. You are stranded and facing a costly bill. More seriously, your mechanical gaffe is a sign of your misunderstanding of Deleuze. Like Sir William Lyons, he engineers systems where the (...) concept of priority must not be confused with independence, separateness, abstraction or ethical superiority. As a good engineer, Deleuze's constructions are holistic and opposed to abstract hierarchies: if a crucial small, actual part perishes in a particular practical situation where it has a role to play, then it does not matter how much virtual power you have in reserve. Your feet are still in a pool of hot water as you survey the wasted potential of actual motion and ideal expressions, hand made in Coventry. (shrink)

: Undoubtedly, in the formation of history, relations between religious structures and political powers, which are shaped within certain principles, have an important place. The course of these relations determines the strength and domain of both sides. This form of relationship, in some cases, evolves in favor of political power, and sometimes manifests itself as a political direction of religious interests. It is possible to see politics as a direction of religion or to use it in the direction of its (...) own interests in the politics that the Soviet Union has implemented since the Second World War. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union, which has embraced the ideology of official atheism and struggled against religious beliefs, did not stop using religion/church for conjuration in its own interests. In this context, The Soviet leader Stalin has almost reconstructed the Russian Orthodox Church, which he had been trying to destroy since the early years of the Second World War. Even, Moscow has made serious attempts to make Patriarchate the pioneer of the Orthodox world. In this article, we aim to emphasize Stalin’s church politics and reasons. We will also stress the reasons behind the Council of the Orthodox Churches, which Stalin sought to achieve through the Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Finally, we will touch on the policy of the Fener Greek Patriarch against these developments. Summary: Throughout history, politics of states have been under the influence of religion. Likewise, religions have directed political authority in the direction of their own interests. Sometimes a religion takes the state under its influence; sometimes under a state takes a religion under the influence and they try to use the other one in the interests of itself. Concepts that define religion-state relations have emerged under the influence of experiences experienced over time. Secularism is at the head of the concepts that determine religion-state relations today. What secularism is and how it is practiced is much debated in the scientific circles. Despite all these struggles, however, no binding definition has been reached for all political issues. Certainly, the subjective structure of states plays an important role in regulating religion-state relations. The political ideology adopted by this political structure and the world view varies. Sometimes political structures with official atheist ideology can break the principle of secularism. While these ideologies are ungodly in their nature, they benefit from political interests. As an example, it is possible to show the Soviet Union with an atheist ideology. Because the Soviet regime used religion in the direction of political interests between 1943-1948. The Russian Orthodox Church, which was very active and competent during the reign of Tsarist Russia, lost its power with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Soviet regime has made the Russian Orthodox Church an illegal institution. The struggle against the church by the regime continued until the Second World War. With the Second World War, Stalin's church politics changed. There is no doubt that this political change has become more than one reason. The first is that the state has entered into a war. Stalin did not want to continue the struggle with religion while the war was going on. Another reason for pushing Stalin for a policy change towards the Church is the anti-Soviet propaganda carried out by the Germans. As a matter of fact, the Germans defined themselves as the savior of the Russian people. It was also alleged that Germany was waging a war against the Soviets in order to free Russian people from communism. Even brochures were taken from the airplanes in this frame. The Germans aimed to break the resistance of the Russian people with this method. Stalin acted to ward off this propaganda of the Germans. Stalin therefore had to keep an eye on church politics and stopped the oppression against the church. In this framework, opportunities were provided for the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, have been approved to organize rites in churches. The priests are encouraged to strengthen hand the people. Also closed churches have been reopened by Stalin. In this way the German propaganda has been wasted. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union. Stalin, however, continued to use the church after the war was over. So why did Stalin continue to support the church as an atheist? What were the reasons for pushing Stalin into this policy? Stalin's post-war church policy has multiple causes. The most important of these is spreading the Soviet influence over the entire Balkans and Middle East geography through the Russian Orthodox Church. Undoubtedly this is related to the long-term policies of the Soviets. Because the war has changed all the balances in the world. This has given new opportunities to the Soviets. At the beginning of these, the Orthodox world comes to the Soviet influence. It seems that the steps towards this have been started to be started from 1945. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church found important activities. For example, the Moscow Patriarch has established relations with other Orthodox Churches. Jerusalem, Athens, Cyprus, Antakya churches were visited. In the end, an attempt was made to collect the Orthodox Council. The struggle of the Western and Eastern bloc emerged after the Second World War divided the Orthodox world into two camps. In this process, the Greek, Cyprus and Jerusalem Orthodox churches under the leadership of the Fener Patriarchate were under American influence. The Serbian, Bulgarian and Antiochian Orthodox Churches under the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate were under Soviet influence. For these reasons, the Soviet regime, which has been fighting for the Church since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, has given up its position. It is understood from this historical fact that a regime adopting irreligion as an official ideology uses religion in its own interests as needed. This indicates that secularism is relative. This study will try to show how the Soviet Union uses the Russian Orthodox Church in its own interests despite the atheism ideology. (shrink)

Usually, when we determine the authenticity of a performer in popular music then we do so either through their biography or their inherence within a tradition. The question of authenticity then becomes one of betrayal. This article argues that there might be a unique way of approaching authenticity through affects, where authenticity is impersonal rather than personal. It uses the work of Pierre Schaeffer to describe the difference between indexes and signs on the one hand, and affects on the (...) other, to develop a concept of abstract subjectivity, which is not the same as the individual. It explains abstract subjectivity through Will Oldham’s description of his performance. Finally, it compares this method of listening to popular music with Blanchot’s description of literature as free indirect discourse, speaking without a first person. It is abstract subjectivity that allows popular music to resist its own commodification, which is the very opposite of authenticity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Wilfrid Sellars and Phenomenology: Intersections, Encounters, Oppositions ed. by Daniele De Santis and Danilo MancaHeath WilliamsDE SANTIS, Daniele and Danilo Manca, editors. Wilfrid Sellars and Phenomenology: Intersections, Encounters, Oppositions. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2023. xiv + 272 pp. Cloth, $95.00This is an eminently readable and engaging collection of essays. There is much more here than merely comparing and contrasting two disparate thinkers. There are important contributions to metaphysics, (...) epistemology, thought about the relation between science and culture, and the future of phenomenology and pragmatism. It has what one wants from a collection of edited papers: very few contributions that are obscure or tangential, with nearly every one addressing a broadly relevant philosophical topic.The two major motifs running through the various works in this edited book are epistemologically orientated questions on the myth of the given, and metaphysically orientated questions arising from the contrasting scientific and manifest images. As Landfredi states, these "are two main theoretical dimensions in which phenomenology and Sellars's approach critically confront each other."To the metaphysical motifs firstly. Husserl's thoughts on the relation between the scientific and manifest image is outlined in his Crisis of the European Sciences and Sellars's in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. In contemporary metaphysics, the competition between the manifest and scientific image has been heightened thanks to the aggressive scientific realism of works like Ladyman and Ross's Everything Must Go, coupled as it is with a dismissal of our commonsense perceptual and cognitive capacities.Both Lanfredi and Manca take a conciliatory approach, aiming to minimize incompatibility between Husserl's manifest and Sellars's scientific images. Manca's attentive and judicious reading makes apparent the origins of the metaphysical commitments of both thinkers. The former accepts the power of the scientific method of mathematization but warns that its ontology remains forever incomplete until the lifeworld is considered. The latter's scientific realism ultimately affords science the final say on what exists. The difference between them comes down to whether the emergent properties of a system are ultimately reducible to parts and the arrangement between them. Sellars thinks they are, while for Husserl "the parts are not juxtaposed from without but integrated with each other in such a way that they become able to generate new [End Page 546] properties." A thematically related analysis is found in the contribution of De Santis, who argues that Simons's adaptation of Husserlian mereology fails to provide a solution on how to build complex particulars out of basic ones.Hopp's article connects our two domains of critical encounter as he suggests that you can get from a phenomenological epistemology to a metaphysical reification of items in manifest image, because fulfilled perceptual knowledge claims presuppose the existence of that which is perceived. He thinks there are resources within Husserl not only to defend this position but to use it to critique many of the claims that undergird Sellars's prosecution of the myth. Hopp ends by asking what current experimental evidence the scientific realist has to rule out the existence of macrosized phenomenologically given objects. One might refer to the above-mentioned work by Ladyman and Ross by way of reply.Epistemological themes include the claim that aspects of phenomenology can be imported or modified to forge a coherent account of perceptual knowledge that (a) affords perception a role in epistemology and (b) explains the concomitant, vexing relation between the space of reasons of causes while (c) avoiding the myth of the given.Two authors who demonstrate close parallel between Husserl and Sellars are Nunziante and Rump. Nunziante shows that one of Sellars's attempts at (a) comes via his account of "perceptual takings," which is influenced by, and homologous to, Husserl's account of the passive synthesis of prepredicative perception in Experience and Judgement, as handed to Sellars by Farber. These prove to be essential stepping stones in Sellars's thinking about how the perceptual realm marries to the intellectual one.Rump shows that Sellars's attempt to solve the regress problem for coherentism in order to solve (a) stumbles on the problem of how causal, nonconceptual, noncategorial, and nonpropositionally structured protoperceptual experiences furnish... (shrink)

Humankind is concerned with scientific enquiry because humans want to understand the milieu in which they find themselves. They want to engineer and reliably control or cooperatively modulate as much of the environment as possible to sustain, enrich, and propagate their lives. Following this path, the goal of science is to gain a reliable description of all natural phenomena so as to allow accurate prediction (within appropriate limits) of nature’s behavior as a function of an ever-changing environment. As such, science (...) is incapable of providing us with absolute truth. Rather, it provides relative knowledge, internally self-consistent knowledge, about the relationships between different phenomena and between different things. The goal of engineering, on the other hand, is to build on this fundamental understanding to generate new materials, devices, structures, attitudes, moralities, philosophies, and so on, for producing tangible order, harnessing the latent potential in nature’s phenomena and expanding human capabilities in an ever-changing environment. In this context, medicine is to human biology as engineering is to physical science. As each of us rides the “river of life,” the great consciousness adventure, we perceive events occurring around us, but more often than not, we do not perceive the total information content inherent in those events nor the true reality of those events. The latter point is so because what we take as the reality of an observation is actually a convolution between (1) what our sensory system actually senses and (2) our mindset or belief structure that filters and/or selectively amplifies segments of the basic gathered data stream. Further, only what we call the five physical senses are well-developed and integrated in our overall sensory system, so only a portion of the total available data becomes our basic internal data stream. We are thus always making personal observations through the distorting and spectrally-limited lens of our mindsets, and we have no way at present to perform a deconvolution and perceive the pure information inherent in our basic input data stream. By using designed instruments to access information patterns in nature, we gain a more objective perspective of these events. However, we must always remember that these instruments were designed on the basis of the logic of our average cognitive development and therefore probably also have only a limited access to the total information spectrum for these events occurring in nature. In particular, these instruments only respond to positive energies. Over the course of the past four to five centuries, we have learned how to conduct true scientific investigations, first under the rubric of classical mechanics and, more recently, quantum mechanics. Let us now look a little more deeply to see what this means. (shrink)

Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...) The idea is that choosing partners based on looks seems essentially similar to other objectionable forms of discrimination. (In particular, the preference for attractive partners is arguably both unfair and harmful to a significant degree.) One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I consider three possible replies. The first has to do with the possibility of controlling our partner preferences. The second pertains to attractiveness and “good genes”. The last attempts to link certain aspects of attractiveness to a prospective partner’s personality and values. I argue that the first two replies fail conclusively, while the third only amounts to a limited defense of a particular kind of attractiveness preference. So the idea that we should often avoid preferring attractive partners is compelling. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 147 The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas. By ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P. Studies in historical theology. v. 6. Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990. Pp. xxiv + 214. $14.95 (paper). The Godly Image presents a retouched version of the author's dissertation, first published in 1982 as Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding (Washington, DC: University Press of America). (...) Seeking a broader audience, the author has dropped the dissertation's numerous Latin footnotes, shortened and enlivened the chapter titles, and streamlined some of his arguments (e.g., pp. 9395 ). He has as well corrected (e.g., on Pannenberg, p. xxii; on Anselm, p. 157) or toned down (e.g., the description of monastic theology, p. 1) earlier statements. Reference to the possibility that Aquinas suffered a nervous breakdown disappears (p. 18). Still, the work remains substantially the same, reproducing even some typos (e.g., William of St. Armour [sic], p. 3) from the original. The new subtitle, Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas, is unfortunate. First, it leads one to expect a survey of the major soteriological positions articulated in the period between the two, hut such is not forthcoming. The work remains what the original title indicated, a study in the thought of Aquinas. Second, in that work Anselm plays hut a perfunctory role, serving as the foil from whose mercantile model (p. 73) or juridical mentality (p. 91) Thomas can advance to a more appropriately interpersonal grasp of the mode of our salvation. This reading of Anselm, however, leaves him in the hands of liberal Protestant historians of doctrine of the nineteenth century, and, as the bibliography indicates, it ignores more recent literature which rightly stresses the metaphysical and religious depth of Anselm's key concept of iustitia. For a precise rendering of the relation between Anselm and Aquinas, one may wish to place greater emphasis on ST III, q.14, a.I, ad 1. In that text Aquinas accomplishes two things. First, he integrates Anselm's concept of satis· faction with the traditional religious insight that, in some sense, Christ suffered what sinners deserve to suffer. At the same time he deepens the concept by rendering explicit the place of love and obedience as the formal element in satisfaction and thus rejoins Anselm in rejecting any strict notion of penal substitution. These reservations aside, the author's thorough, comprehensive, and competent investigation into Aquinas fills a lacuna in the history of soteriology, a lacuna, one regrets to say, still left open by the work of his immediate predecessor, B. Catao. At the same time the scope 148 BOOK REVIEWS of the author's work offers a further and important contribution. By researching Thomas's thought on satisfaction in the context of penance as well as soteriology, the author manages to suggest, and explicitly, that the generative matrix for Thomas's theoretic work in both areas lies in the cruciform dynamics of Christian conversion, the life of grace. With this insight he opens a door from historical theology to a contemporary systematics. Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. WILLIAM P. LOEWE Free Will and the Christian Faith. By W. S. ANGLIN. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. vii + 218. $55.00 (cloth). W. S. Anglin, a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in Mathematics at McGill University, has produced a highly compact and compelling volume which attempts in just 218 pages to prove God's existence, to argue for personal immortality, to defend the coherence of theism against the problem of evil, to provide cogent analyses of both omnipotence and omniscience, and to examine criteria for distinguishing divine revelation from other forms of communication. The thread holding these rather motley swatches of cloth together is the author's concentration on libertarian freedom which weaves throughout the above issues in one way or another. It shows up in the expected places (e.g., in the so-called 'free will defense' of the problem of evil) but also in places hitherto unexpected (Anglin nicely argues that if humans are truly free in the libertarian sense, then it is appropriate and necessary that the Scriptures take the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Justice and the General Will:Affirming Rousseau's Ancient OrientationDavid Lay WilliamsThere is much confusion about how to characterize the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His thought has at various times been related to such dissimilar thinkers as Plato and Hobbes. From Plato he is said to have acquired his affinities for community and civic virtue. And one does not have to look too hard to find his praise for the great (...) sage of the Academy: "Plato only purified the heart of man."1 He was often eager to affiliate his ideas with those of antiquity. He yearned for modern society to rekindle the flames of a once-great civilization. "[W]hat keeps us [the moderns] from being men like them [the ancients]? Our prejudices, our base philosophy, and the passions of petty self-interest, concentrated together with egoism in all hearts by inept institutions in which genius never had any share."2 Despite his obvious admiration for the perceived greater ideas of the past, however, Rousseau also expressed some skepticism. James Miller has suggested that he held Plato's theory of the Forms to be unsustainable.3 Allan Bloom has likewise argued that Rousseau's "teaching is not... a revival of those of Plato.... If he admires the practice of antiquity, he does not accept the theory."4This has led many to argue that Rousseau is best understood as student of Thomas Hobbes. Roger D. Masters, for example, has suggested that "Rousseau's principles of political right can... be best described as a reformulation [End Page 383] of Hobbes' conception of the social contract."5 Arthur Melzer also argues, "The purpose of the doctrine Rousseau elaborates in the Social Contract is essentially the same [as Hobbes']."6 This view is argued on the grounds that the General Will is a positive or arbitrary standard, functioning as the primary principle of Rousseau's constructive political program. Yet the vision of Rousseau as a Hobbesian or modernist also merits skepticism. While he employs a social contract, as does Hobbes, he explicitly rejects traditional forms of positivism. "What is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions."7 Whatever one might say about such passages, it at least raises the possibility that Rousseau is no modernist in the Straussian sense of defining Justice as human agreement.Much of what contributes to the conflicting interpretations of Rousseau can be attributed to different understandings of the relative priority and relationship of two central concepts in his writings. One of these is the well-discussed notion of the General Will. The dominant fashion is to read the General Will as a conventional substitute for natural law or transcendent Ideas. According to this reading, the General Will is grounded on nothing more than consent and functions as the first principle of all legitimate political societies. The other term central to Rousseau's program is the far less discussed but equally important concept of Justice. Little has been written on his understanding of Justice and, for that matter, he himself rarely discussed it explicitly. But it, too, could also be considered a primary principle. While it would be foolish to dismiss the importance of the General Will to Rousseau, it would be equally problematic to explore it independently of his Idea of Justice. The question in understanding his work is which of these two principles—the General Will or Justice—is primary or fundamental. If it is the General Will, a case can be made that the Straussians are right, and Rousseau is a positivist. If Justice is prior, on the other hand, then there is reason to believe that he was something much different.I argue that the positivist reading of Rousseau is flawed. Indeed, my thesis is that he is among the greatest and most thorough Platonists of the modern era.8 His rejection of Hobbes is not merely rhetorical. In fact, it represents the [End Page 384] true impetus of his social contract. This contract is designed explicitly to counter Hobbesian positivism. In the same way that Plato responds to Protagoras' positivism with his theory of the Forms, Rousseau responds to Hobbes... (shrink)

The ArgumentMany of the epistemological issues that occupied natural philosophers of the seventeenth century were expressed visually in title-page engravings. One of those issues concerned the relative status to be accorded to evidence of the senses, as compared to knowledge gained by faith or reason. In title-page illustrations, the various arguments were often waged by a series of light metaphors: the Light of Reason, the Light of Nature, and the Lights of Sense, Scripture, and Grace. When such illustrations are examined (...) with the authors' theological views in mind, it becomes apparent that in the first half of the seventeenth century, Catholic authors favored the Light of Reason as a source of truth, while Protestant authors favored the Light of Nature. Since by the end of the century it was widely accepted by scientists of all religious persuasions that certain knowledge must be grounded in sense evidence and the direct study of nature, one might argue that in this instance Protestantism was responsible for nurturing an important development of the Scientific Revolution. However, the skewed nature of the sample and the large number of counterexamples available mitigate against taking this offshoot of the Merton thesis too seriously. (shrink)

This article discusses Alfred Chandler’s intellectual journey, in which he dedicated himself to understanding the role of management in developing and utilizing productive resources. During the first part of that journey, from the 1950s through the 1980s, Chandler viewed the role of management almost entirely in terms of the utilization of productive resources, as evidenced in Strategy and Structure and The Visible Hand. During the 1980s, as Chandler wrote Scale and Scope, his attention shifted from the utilization to (...) the development of productive resources. He delved into organization and competition in the consumer electronics, computers, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals industries. An understanding of the dynamics of industrial capitalism requires, as Chandler ultimately showed, a theoretical analysis of the role of management in ensuring both the development and utilization of productive resources. This dual focus is important for business strategy, organizational structure, and industrial finance. (shrink)

Summary Although Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo's An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie has long served as an invaluable resource for those interested in Beattie's life and thought, there has been little scholarship on the genesis of Forbes's book. This article considers the role played by Dugald Stewart—as well as that of his friend, Archibald Alison—in the making of Forbes's Life of Beattie. It also examines the reasons for Forbes's decision not to print Stewart's (...) letter in its entirety in the Life of Beattie and explores the letter's significance for understanding Stewart's philosophical development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:30 HUME'S APOLOGY Imagine our reaction if some moralist were to pronounce, in all apparent seriousness, that even the best people do not live up to what morality requires of them, and it is a good thing that they do not. Suppose he then offers an apology in behalf of humankind, an excuse for our moral mediocrity: we are painfully limited creatures, our lives are so complex, events are (...) so ambiguous, there are so many contingencies — in short, we can't help it. Besides, humanity is better off when people are not too strict in their moral stance. Certainly we would be surprised, even shocked, by these assertions. After a little reflection we would want to scrutinize the conception of morality which figures in this moralist's reasoning — has he been entranced by some false and unworkable ideal? Something has surely gone wrong. David Hume apparently has the viewpoint we have imagined. He offers the apology, the excuse, in a little-noticed footnote in the Enquiry Concerning Morals. If it were another philosopher we might let this strange note pass as a slip or oddity, but with 2 Hume we must take the apology seriously. The truth is that Hume's innocent-seeming footnote of moral apology precisely touches a sore spot in modern ethical theory, a point of instability which threatens to topple the whole edifice that rests on the twin cornerstones of Hume and Kant. Only recently has any clear awareness of the problem 3 begun to emerge in the philosophical literature. In this paper I will draw attention to the problem of which Hume's apology seems to be a warning sign. 31 I. Hume's Picture of Morality If we are to appreciate Hume's apology, we must first remind ourselves of the things morality, in Hume's view of it, requires of people. Hume's account of value is founded upon a general fact of nature, namely, that animals react with feelings in a wide variety of circumstances. These feelings may be crudely categorized as pleasures and pains. Our natural reactions form the basis for every judgment of value, however refined; at bottom what is good, in Hume's view, is pleasurable experience and what is bad is painful experience. There are two kinds of case to be considered. we may find something immediately pleasant or painful, as when we taste chocolate or burn our hand on the stove, or we may find that a thing produces a pleasant or painful result, as when manure makes plants thrive or salt kills the grass. In the latter kind of case the thing is good (or bad) because of its utility. For Hume all assertions concerning value must hinge on immediate feeling reactions, utility, or both. Now someone might hastily conclude that Hume must be a subjectivist in ethics. After all, if he thinks the whole enterprise of valuing things rests upon our feeling reactions, which are notoriously variable, then he must hold that value judgments are variable too. Moral communication becomes a matter of venting each individual's supply of feelings and radical relativism threatens to engulf us. However, we do not as yet have Hume's finished picture of morality; the most important qualification remains to be seen. Hume will effectively quell the threat of subjectivism by showing how we can and do adopt standards in the area 4 of feeling. We do so for the sake of being able to 32 communicate regarding values, especially the important moral values. The general problem of communication, for Hume, is the problem of transferring ideas (mental pictures) from one mind to another using language as a medium. In the Enquiry Concerning Morals it is taken for granted that we can communicate our ideas. Moral communication involves something more, namely, the transfer of feelings as well as ideas. If moral communication is successful, the parties involved will actually share a feeling. How do we manage to transfer feelings? we use language, but the words we use are special ones. They contain as part of their meaning, their sense, something which moral beings feel. The meaning of a word can include a pleasure or a pain, and not... (shrink)

While Edith Stein never developed an ethics of her own, her work is nonetheless suggestive of an “ethics of renewal,” which appears in nuce in various moments of her corpus. First, in her phenomenological treatises, Stein analyzes the ethical development of personality in the unfolding of the personal “core” as responding to ever higher value domains. During the 1930s, this becomes a project of living out a moral vocation bestowed by God. In Endliches und ewiges Sein, the moral life (...) becomes a work of renewal in connection with the Teresian metaphor of the “interior castle.” Morality, for Stein, emerges from out of an inner, personal work of the soul’s conscious refurbishment according to its essential structure by coming to terms with the value-world and with God. This paper will attempt to develop Stein’s account of the nature of the moral task as renewal and some implications for moral theory. (shrink)

This essay claims that ‘access to justice’ has erroneously been assumed to be synonymous with invisible concepts instead of access to a lawyer’s language. The Paper outlines how a language concerns the relation between signifiers, better known as word-images, on the one hand, with signfieds, better known as concepts, on the other. The signifieds are universal, artificial and empty in content. Taking the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an example, officials have assumed that Charter knowledge has involved signifieds (...) (such as rules, principles, doctrines and tests) as if the signifiers were transparent. But any one signifier differs from another signifier without the lawyer ever accessing the invisible signifieds. Ironically, although the lawyer, law professor or law student believes that s/he is studying legal ‘practice’ and although legal knowledge has been considered a matter of signified concepts, the knowledge has really concerned the differentiating relations of signifiers. As a consequence, the moment of accessing the concepts (signifieds) has been forever deferred. ‘Access to justice’ has become access to the special language of signifiers, a language which lawyers alone are privileged to enforce. Turning to the Charter, lawyers claiming to know the special Charter language became indispensable to social life. Even the meaning-constituting human subject became a signifier, better known as ‘the legal person’ defined by Charter rights. Charter language, however, has deferred an access to the invisible concepts such as ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’, terms in Section of the text. Access to justice’ has become access to the language of the privileged class of lawyers. The lawyer’s language has become a theoretical language in the name of access to justice. And yet, because the theoretical language has been propagated as concerned with ‘practice’, it has been difficult to challenge the social-cultural content of the language of lawyers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A DIFFERENT METHOD; A DIFFERENT CASE: THE THEOLOGICAL PROGRAM OF JULIAN HARTT AND AUSTIN FARRER WILLIAM M. WILSON University of Virginia, OharlottesvUZe, Virginia, WRITERS COVERING the work of Julian Hartt or Austin Farrer-the :llew that there ar~generally find that the hest introduction is a straightforward acknowledgement that what is to come is unique. Basil Mitchell, for instance, has said that no matter how one catalogues contemporary theologians, a (...) footnote will be needed, reading " and then of course there is Austin Farrer." 1 Likewise, David Kelsey has said that Hartt's work "is not identi:firuble as a variant on any of the options on the present scene." 2 Those already aicquainted with Hartt and Farrer will no dorurbt agree with the sense o[ these assessments; but if they have heen carefol students they will demand, nev,ertheless, a slight qualification : Hartt,and Farrer.are unique as a party of two. Farrer is a " variant " on Hartt; Hartt belongs down in the footnote aibout Farrer. But from the claim that these two are unique it does not follow that their wo:vk is something akin to those bold " new theologies " fashioned from the innocent's quest for a faith untouched hy either the hands of tradition or the perplexities of our time. Farrer's: anchorage in tradition is obvious throughout his writing and clearly stated in the preiface to his first 1 ' Austin Marsden Farrer,' A Oelebmtion of Fa,ith, ed. Leslie Houlden (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1970), pp.13-14. 2" Christian Sense Making: Hartt's 'Theological Method and Imagination,"' The J owrna,Z of ReUgion Vol. 58 (4), October 1978, p. 428. 599 600 WILLIAM M. WILSON work. There he said that he was " possessed hy the Thomistic vision" and w:as incapable of "thinking it wrong."3 As to novelty, he had this to say:. •. it is indeed absurd to propose new grounds for belief in the existence of God. The belief has stood for more than ~.ooo years if we are to speak of the essentials of transcendental theism. If belief has been reasona9le it has had a reason, and our only business must be to draw this out and restate it.4 It is.fair to say, to 1be sure, that Farrer "drew out" and "restated " that reason in a. way unlike that of any other contemporary Thomist. There are some who would deny him even the label.5 And it is in this sense that Mitchell's statement about him must remain: If " transcendental," " Neo-," and " traditional " Thomist are three current categories, Farrer is a footnote to them. Hartt, unlike Farrer, has ne,ver labeled himself, hut none of his readers can miss his hostility to any pretense to novelty, even to those which have become our standard fare. The good ship theology (has taken) on a radioactive cargo, its company attracted by the dynamic and dazzle of it all. Relevance~ Historicism, several varieties of analysis, Secularism-what a promising manifest! 6 The " spirit of the age " is not to illuminate the gospel, according to Hartt, rather it is the gospel which illuminates the spirit of the age.7 s Finite and Infinite: A Philosophical Essay, Ibid., p. 1. 11 But see note 5 above. JULIAN HARTT AND AUSTIN FARRER 603 I. The Uniqueness of Hartt and Farrer In a recent encydopedia entry, David Kelsey arranges a useful chart of contemporary theology according to the answers given to " the array o:f decisions theologians must make in the course of doing theology." 12 According to Kelsey, theologians must decide the subject matter o:f theology, the importance o:f cultural context, the 1wudience, the significance of the theologian 's vantage point, the goals o:f theology and the best means o:f accomplishing them. For our purposes o:f identifying Hartt and Farrer, however, we need concentrate only on the first and the last-the question o:f subject matter and the question o:f the hest means £or attaining theological ends. The latter (being the last question the theologian must face) best :identifies the overall mind o:f the theologian at work. Thus, against the standard answers given here, I shall try... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PEIRGE'S MARGINALIA IN W. T. HARRIS' Hegel's Logic Among the most eminent philosophers of nineteenth-century America were William Torrey Harris (1835-1909) and Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914 ). The former, by his establishment in 1867 of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, furnished a starting point for American philosophical maturity. The latter, who contributed to that iournal, has been considered America's greatest logician. It may therefore (...) be of interest to examine Peirce's marginalia in the first edition of Harris' chief work, Hegel's Logic: A Book on the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1890). Discovered by the present writer on a New York book-stall, in a cheaply priced, coverless, and water-stained copy, and now in his possession, it bears imprinted on the reverse of the title page: "Harvard University: Philos. Dept. Library. Gift of Mrs. Charles S. Peirce. June 28, 1915." Shortly after Peirce, in depressed circumstances, died on April 19, 1914, the Harvard Philosophy Department acquired from his wife the manuscripts that were published in the Collected Papers.1 Harris' Hegel's Logic, which presumably accompanied that transaction, contains several marginal annotations, mostly in faded ink, in a neat, small hand, similar to that reproduced in the frontispiece to Volume IV of Peirce's Collected Papers. Recalling a notable philosophical conjunction, the markings also reveal aspects of Peirce's character and confirm his complex attitude toward Hegel, crucial to the development of his philosophy. Peirce's shifting view and persistent concern regarding Hegel may be traced in some other remarks. For example, in a letter to Harris dated January 1, 1868, he says, "I admit there is music in the logic of Hegel, but that is all I discover there. ''2 In another letter to Harris, dated May 13, 1868, he indicates his ambivalence: "But as I should draw the line... I should come on the same side as Hegel, because I am idealistic. I do not 1eel very much opposed to Hegel, though I think his main point.s tin his own estimate of importance) are wrong. ''s About 1890, Peirce declared, "I reiect his philosophy in toto, ''~ and about 1896, he accused Hegel of reaching "each category from the last preceding by virtually calling 'next!'-5 Yet, in 1903, he acclaimed Hegel "in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived. ''6 And, in the very same year, reviewing another treatment of Hegel's logic, and including a reference to Harris' t Eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss,and Arthur Burks (Vols.I-VIII; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). 2,.C.S. Peirce to W. T. Harris." ed. WallaceNethery, The Personalist,XLIII (19fi2),37. I am indebted to Dr. Nethery for his kindness in letting me see these letters in advanceof publication. sIbid.,40. 4Collected Papers,I, 193. 5 Ibid., I, 246. eIbid., I, 277. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 83 treatise, Peirce flatly remarks: "But all these Hegelians--Harris, XVallace, Hibben, Everett, etc.--who dog the steps of their master in almost textual comments, are profoundly unfaithful to the spirit of his philosophy... the Logik now condemns itself. ''7 A constant feature in Peirce's negative attitude toward Hegel concerns the latter's failure to equip himself scientifically to deal with a subject the American considered basically scientific. For instance, about 1899, Peirce writes: Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following out for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent in itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had been chiefly laid up. It was a misfortune for Hegelism~ a misfortune for "philosophy," and a misfortune (in lesser degree) for science: Although Peirce adds, "My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume, ''9 and his dialectic parallels Hegel's, he attempts to escape the Hegelian subjectivism by an "objective logic" and by avoiding Hegel's supposed mathematical ignorance. "Most of what is true in... (shrink)

Anger is probably one of the mostly debated basic emotions, owing to difficulties in detecting its appearance during development, its functional and affective meaning (is it a positive or a negative emotion?), especially in human beings. Behaviors accompanied by anger and rage serve many different purposes and the nuances of aggressive behaviors are often defined by the symbolic and cultural framework and social contexts. Nonetheless, recent advances in neuroscientific and developmental research, as well as clinical psychodynamic investigation, afford a new (...) view on the role of anger in informing and guiding many aspects of human conducts. Developmental studies have confirmed the psychophysiological, cognitive and social acquisition that hesitate in the pre-determined sequence appearance of anger and rage in the first two years of life. The so-called affective neurosciences have shown the phylogenetic origin of the two circuits underlying the emergence of anger along with its evolutionary role for promoting survival. This view has been integrated by the psychodynamic theory of motivational systems that attribute a double role to anger: on the one hand, this affect works as an inwardly directed signal concerning a pressure to overcome an obstacle or an aversive situation; on the other hand, anger is also an outwardly directed communicative signal establishing differentiation and conflict within interpersonal relationships and affective bonds. Of course, human peculiar mental functioning requires the appraisal of such signals by higher cortical functions and, there is little doubt that the meaning that orientates individual behaviors is, eventually, construed on a social and cultural level. At the same time, everyday life experiences as well as clinical insights into psychopathic, narcissistic and borderline personality pathology clearly illustrate the necessity to correctly interpret and give answers to the basic questions raised around the topic of anger as a basic emotion. (shrink)

Organized after an almost complete term of office, but the end of which was marked by the resurgence of the community-linked problems and by the departure of the Ministers of the Volksunie, the parliamentary elections of 24th November 1991 will remain characterized by the punishment inflicted by apart of the voters, not only on the majority's parties, but also on the traditional parties as a whole.The opposition of the dissatisfied voters did not show itself either in a reduced participation to (...) the vote, a rather normal phenomenon in a country where voting is compulsory, or in a rise of the blank and spoilt ba/lot papers. The 1991 figures are, in these respects, very similar to the average figures of the last thirty years.The opposition was first characterized by high variations in the choice of the voters, which dit not, however, exceed the size of the movements noticed at previous elections. The rate of external mobility, as computed by us, is ranked fifth among the 22 levels that have been counted since universal suffrage has been introduced in Belgium. In 1991, this rate was the highest in Brussels, which is traditional, but it was also considerably higher in Flanders than in the Walloon Region, which quite seldom happens.Then, the opposition found expression in a setback for the Jour ruling parties.This set back amounted to about 8% and even 10% if account is taken of the Volksunie which was part of the Government until the very last weeks before the dissolution of the Houses of Parliament. Such a setback for an outgoing majority is not exceptional; a more unusual phenomenon lies in the f act that this decline was not profitable, on the whole, to the third traditional "family", i.e. the Liberals. As a result of this simultaneous setback for the three traditional families, these total only about 70% of the valid votes, which is the worst result of the whole Belgian electoral history.The political formations that are progressing are the Ecologists, on the one hand, and the far-right lists, on the other hand. Ecolo improves its results considerably in the Walloon Region and in Brussels, without however reaching the level obtained at the 1989 European elections, while Agalev only registers a slight progress.On the contrary, the winner of the elections in the Flemish Region, is unquestionablythe Vlaams Blok, as well as the "Rossem" lists that draw some 5% of the angry voters.If the far-left trend has almost disappeared from the Belgian political scene, the far-right parties, on the contrary, are making a breakthrough on it. The current made up by the Vlaams Blok and the openly far-right lists wins a bit less than 8% of the votes in the whole country. It is likely, however, that those who voted for the Vlaams Blok do not all adhere to the far-right ideas, but that some of them are attracted by the Flemish autonomist stands. The real electoral power of the far-right parties can then be assessed at 6 to 7%, which is much more than in 1987, hut does not make a record in comparison with other European countries.The votes of opponents without any clear political orientation, the bulk of which is won by the "Rossem" lists, amount to some 3%, which is new for Belgium.In a country where voting is optional, many of these voters would probably have stayed at home.This being so, and as f ar as these concepts still remain meaningful, the Belgian electoral pendulum shifted some 5% towards the right, at the expense of the left for more than 3% and the centre for a bit less than 2%.As far as the Parliament is concerned, the situation is clear in the Walloon Region and in the French-speaking Community where the Socialist Party, by far the most important party, is almost inevitable. It is however much more vague on the Flemish side, where the CVP's setback and the dispersion of the polical farces make several types of coalitions possible. (shrink)

This chapter considers simpler prototype of a Star Trek transporter: a matter‐energy‐matter (MEM) converter. The MEM converter works in three stages. First, it scans an object and records the positions and states of all of the fundamental physical particles that compose it. Second, the converter disintegrates the object. Third, it assembles an exact replica of the object by repositioning fundamental physical particles according to the record it created during its original scan. Constitutionalism is an exciting theory that is the (...) basis for many Star Trek episodes. But it faces the fission problem, which Commander Riker experiences first hand in second chances (TNG). If survival is just as good as identity, then even if the human who comes out of the transporter isn't really the human who went in, the replica is still indistinguishable from that human. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Rethinking Utopia and Utopianism by Lyman Tower SargentWilliam James MetcalfLyman Tower Sargent. Rethinking Utopia and Utopianism. Ralahine Utopian Studies 26. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2022. 412 pp. Softcover, US$61, £53, €40. ISBN 978-1-80079-489-4.In the field of utopian studies, Lyman Tower Sargent is well known and respected globally. His new book, Rethinking Utopia and Utopianism, is well written, witty, and persuasively argued, reflecting on, and updating, his life’s [End Page (...) 137] work. It includes several previously published pieces, such as Sargent’s oft-cited “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited” (1994), along with his current thinking across the broad field of utopian studies.Sargent admits to naiveté when, as a young scholar in the 1960s, he set out to write a “history of utopian literature”—probably thinking it wouldn’t take long! This field, he soon found, ever expands the more one looks. Sargent continues to look for, and discover, examples from around the world—many of which he has made available online in Utopian Literature in English: An Annotated Bibliography from 1516 to the Present.1 But now, at eighty-two years of age, he accepts that this project will require “quite a few lifetimes, lifetimes that are not available to me, so I hope that others will take up these topics” (349).Sargent thinks utopianism is best understood as “social dreaming—the dreams and nightmares that concern the ways in which groups of people arrange their lives and which usually involve a radically different society” (7). Utopia, he points out, “expresses deep-seated needs, desires and hopes” (42). This, he asserts, is a universal phenomenon—part of being human—certainly not confined to the Western Christian tradition, as some scholars have argued.We must be careful, Sargent warns, not to equate utopia with perfection; utopias are about betterment, not perfection. He argues that equating utopia with perfection is a ruse employed “by those opposed to the idea that human beings can bring about significant social change and is intended to undermine that possibility” (323). Sargent argues that all humans “need the idea that a better life is possible” (325) and this is what utopianism provides.As someone who has spent much of my professional life studying intentional communities, I have always recognized that almost all such groups have an underlying utopian impulse. So I came to utopianism research as a subset of intentional communities research. Sargent, on the other hand, sees “communitarianism as a sub-category of utopianism” (85). He acknowledges that intentional community members are “trying to find better ways of living together, making decisions about all important aspects of life, whether it is political, economic, religious, or sexual.... They are actually doing with their own lives what literary utopias describe in words” (93). Perhaps our different paths are a bit like asking whether the chicken or egg came first?Sargent quite correctly observes that many intentional community members reject the label of “utopian” because they confuse it with the naïve, and unobtainable notion of perfection—and I have often observed the same. Nevertheless Sargent asserts “that continued utopian thinking is essential to the overcoming of [End Page 138] the dystopian reality of... the last century” (178). This, he argues, is why intentional communities are important test sites for enacting utopian dreams.In discussing dystopia, Sargent points out how utopian aspirations occasionally lead to the creation of dystopias. “The hopes of communism became the dystopia of Stalinism.... The utopian dreams of Pol Pot became the dystopia of Kampuchea” (172). “Utopian visions from Lenin to the Taliban that purported to have the potential of producing an enhanced life have been hijacked and turned into dystopias” (175). While acknowledging that some colonization schemes, particularly for New Zealand and South Australia, had a utopian angle, nevertheless those schemes generally created dystopia for the Indigenous peoples. “The original inhabitants’” idea of the good life “inconveniently did not include having their land stolen, being enslaved, and being slaughtered” (262).That reminds us that utopianism, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder. Sargent offers a wonderful personal example, “my utopia would include a strong right to die” whenever and however he... (shrink)

This book is an expanded catalogue of an exhibit of mid‐fifteenth‐ through seventeenth‐century drawings, woodcuts, engravings, and etchings emphasizing hands as objects of study, as teaching tools, and as reflections of the human being. In addition, it contains an extended introduction by the curator of the exhibit, Claire Richter Sherman, and four essays by other contributors on pertinent topics: the hand as an instrument of the intellect, manual reckoning, music, and chiromancy . These essays, which precede the catalogue itself, are (...) only loosely connected to the exhibit, but each deals with its subject clearly and crisply.In his composition on the hand as a means of expression, Martin Kemp traces the legacy of ancient thought as reflected in the various anatomical drawings from Leonardo through the detailed Bidloo prints. Kemp concludes that the hand remains “a prime mechanism for personal expression—for the manifestation of individual character and identity.” In the following essay Sachiko Kusukawa provides a succinct sketch of finger numeration, noting that a system alluded to by ancient authors was fully described by the Venerable Bede in the eighth century. Bede also wrote of a method of using the hand as a mnemonic aid in determining the proper date for Easter and other movable feasts. Finger counting remained popular throughout the Middle Ages but gradually fell into disuse in the West by the sixteenth century and was merely quaint by the eighteenth. Kusukawa does not, unfortunately, suggest a reason for the decline, but the spread of computation with Arabic numerals was surely a major factor.Next, Susan Forscher Weiss discusses the use of the hand in teaching music theory and scales. Although there are some indications of this practice in antiquity, variations on a system developed in the eleventh century by Guido of Arezzo were used to teach music through the sixteenth century. Finally, Brain P. Copenhaver discusses the history of the pseudoscience chiromancy . Already in existence in antiquity, palmistry, and other forms of divination, flourished despite the prohibitions of the church. Copenhaver concludes with a witty discussion of the hard times on which palmistry has fallen recently in California.As for the catalogue, it consists of eighty‐three monochrome illustrations, each with an extensive commentary about the artist, the subject, and the reason the item was included in the exhibit. These descriptions are frequently fascinating short essays in themselves, enticing the reader to investigate further. The organization is thematic rather than chronological, with six divisions : “Reading the Writing on Hands,” “Handiwork of the Creator,” “Messengers of the World,” “Knowledge on Hand,” “Whole World in the Hand,” and “Guiding Hands.” The faults are minor. Although the themes of the divisions themselves are clearly described in Sherman's introduction, several of the illustrations seem to have only a general association with the stated theme. A few are filled with details too small to be legible in the necessary reduction of plates to fit the book. Most of the illustrations, however, are excellent examples of the main subject of the exhibit and are fascinating studies in their own right.Generally, this volume is a valuable work for anyone interested in the history of the hand in science and the arts. The four prefatory essays are particularly instructive, and the prints are reproduced clearly, with elaborate descriptions of their historical context and their meaning. Accordingly, this book is much more than merely a catalogue; it is an important work in its own right. Throughout, the substantial references to other works indicate directions for further study. One only regrets that the exhibit itself was shown in only two venues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 155 Humanae Vitae: A Generation Later. By JANET SMITH. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991. Pp. xvi + 425. $42.95 hardcover; $17.95 paper. This is an ambitious and important study. I will first offer an overview of the volume to indicate its scope and note some of its major features. I will then respond briefly to some of the major criticisms Smith makes (...) of the argument against contraception advanced by Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and myself. The work contains 8 chapters and 4 appendices. Chapters 3 and 4, as Smith says, "provide an analysis of Humanae Vitae itself and thus constitute the heart of the hook" (p. xi). Since this is so I will first summarize briefly Chapters 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 and then center atten· tion on the two central chapters and the four appendices. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the context for Humanae Vitae. The first chapter is devoted largely to an account of the so-called " Minority " and "Majority" documents of the Papal Commission for the Study of Problems of the Family, Population, and Birth Rate, while the second seeks to summarize Catholic teaching on Christian marriage prior to the encyclical. This summary draws principally from Pius XI's Casti Connubii and from nn. 47-52 of Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes. Smith takes up in some detail the issue of the" primacy" of procreation, concluding that Gaudium et Spes " seems to sidestep " this issue which, in her judgment, is irrelevant to the question of contraception. She thinks that this central document of Vatican II sent " mixed signals " on the question of contraception, although she believes that several passages " can very plausibly he read to support the position that contraception is portrayed as a violation not only of the procreative good of marriage hut also of the values of conjugal love" (p. 66). Chapter 5 deals with a wide range of theological issues: the biblical foundations for the teaching found in Humanae Vitae, the relevance of the concept of munus for this teaching, the possibility of acting " in good conscience " in a way contrary to its teaching, and the infallibility of the teaching. Of special value is the extended discussion of the con· cept expressed by the Latin term munus. Smith examines the rich meaning of this term in several magisterial documents, including Gaudium et Spes as well as Humanae Vitae. While a munus implies duties, it is essentially a noble, honor-bringing "gift" or "reward," signifying a vocation and sublime honor. Paul VI, in developing the integral vision of marriage in his encyclical, uses this concept to show that God, in giving to spouses the munus of handing on new life, has conferred on them the honor of sharing with him in the work of bring· 156 BOOK REVIEWS ing new life into the world. Smith shows beautifully how the rich theological meaning of this term helps " illuminate and enrich " the teaching of the encyclical. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate the arguments presented by dissenting theologians after Humanae Vitae to justify their repudiation of its teaching. In Chapter 6 Smith considers the views of Charles Curran and Bernard Haering, while in Chapter 7 she examines the proportionalist approach to moral issues developed by Joseph Fuchs, Richard McCormick and others. She provides intelligent criticism both of Curran and Haering and of proportionalist thought, focusing on the repudiation of specific moral absolutes. In Chapter 8 Smith provides a very helpful summary of Pope John Paul II's understanding of the human person, human sexuality and marriage. In particular, she takes up his notion that in marriage and in the act proper rto it man and woman make a " gift " of themselves to one another. Simultaneously to choose to give themselves to each other in the marital act and to contracept is then seen to involve an inner contradiction, a falsification of the " language of the body " (pp. 230258 ). Smith also takes up some of the major criticisms levelled against John Paul II's thought, in particular Lisa Sowle Cahill's, which charges him with an overromantic view of love and a failure to recognize that... (shrink)

Peter Fitzpatrick’s writings prove once and for all that it is possible for a law professor to write in beautiful English. His work also proves once and for all that the dominating tradition of Anglo-American legal philosophy and of law teaching has been barking up the wrong tree: namely, that the philosopher and professional law teachers can understand justice as nested in empty forms, better known as rules, doctrines, principles, policies, and other standards. The more rigorous our analysis or decomposition (...) of the forms, we have believed, the more closely do we access the identity of laws. Justice has been assumed to be a matter of intellectually accessing such analysed forms. Fitzpatrick’s articles and books embody an implicit critique of the analytic view of law and of justice. My entry point into this critique is his preoccupation with Jacques Derrida’s theory of laws as universals and with Derrida’s theory of justice as an inaccessible immediacy or presence in context-specific or concrete experienced events. Each event is experienced in an official’s decision. Such a decision represents what Derrida, Fitzpatrick, and Hegel call ‘individuality’. -/- Derrida’s theory of law presents a conundrum. Derrida misses the possibility that law may exist by virtue of its content rather than its form. Derrida misses this possibility because, heavily influenced by Kant (in Derrida’s theory of law), Derrida associates law with universals. This is so because Kant (and Derrida) are preoccupied with the identity of what counts as a law (lois) rather than with a law’s legitimacy. A universal cannot exist unless it is legitimate, and it is legitimate, I claim, by virtue of its content. In his association of law with universals, Derrida presupposes that legal knowledge exists with reference to a territorial-like boundary. The forms are represented or signified by signs (signifiers) within a boundary of the ultimate form (the state, the nation, or humanity). This ultimate form as a universal, like the discrete rules or forms, lacks socially contingent content. A boundary separates knowable universals from the unknowable world on the exteriority of the boundary. The unknowable world is constituted by concrete events experienced in context-specific circumstances. In his legal theory Derrida hones in upon the decision as the experienced event. In a decision, one is present or immediate with the event. Derrida considers such immediacy as justice. The immediacy, however, can only be represented as a sign (sometimes called a signifier). The sign, in turn, represents an empty signified or form, according to Derrida. Because the immediacy remains a representation rather than a presentation of the experienced event, laws as universals cannot be just. The rupture between the inaccessible immediacy of a decision on the one hand and the represented empty forms on the other is critical to Derrida’s theory of law. -/- I claim that this rupture permeates Derrida’s writings about law because Derrida possesses a territorial-like sense of legal knowledge. I shall argue to this effect as follows. In the first section I shall explain the importance of Fitzpatrick’s exposure of the vacuity of the foundation of the system or structure of universals. In the second section I shall flesh out two elements of Derrida’s legal theory: law as form and the ipseity or concrete event that the form excludes from law. This takes me to the third section, where I shall elaborate how Derrida’s legal theory presupposes knowledge as territorial. I shall argue in the final section that this very sense of territorial knowledge prevents justice from accessing law and law from accessing justice. I conclude with the hint of a very different sense of law, one that draws from experiential knowledge in contradistinction to territorial knowledge. (shrink)

Heroides 11 has long enjoyed a favourable reputation among critics, largely because Ovid appears to show a tactful restraint in his description of Canace's last moments and to refrain, for once in the Heroides, from descending into what Jacobson terms ‘nauseating mawkishness’. Despite appearances, however, Ovid's wit is not entirely extinguished in this poem, for a devastating irony accompanies the certainty of Canace's imminent death. My objective is to demonstrate the nature of this irony by adopting a methodological approach which (...) owes much to Kennedy's analysis of Heroides 1 in the light of the later books of the Odyssey. Kennedy's argument – that without knowing it Penelope is about to give her letter to its intended addressee – is based on two premises which are postulated by the epistolary mode of the poem. The first is that we are to imagine Ovid's heroines writing at a specific moment within a dramatic context; the second is that they have a specific motive for writing at that moment. In Kennedy's hands, this approach assumes the privileged position of the reader of Heroides 1 who, through access to the Odyssey, is alive to the ironies which Ovid's Penelope cannot realize. I propose to establish a similarly privileged position for the reader of Heroides 11, a position from which Canace's death can be seen to be both ill-timed and unnecessary. The key to identifying the ironic circumstances of Canace's death lies in reconstructing the background to the Canace and Macareus myth and the possible precedents which Ovid drew on in his treatment of the story. The situation is more complex than in the case of Heroides 1, however, since the literary sources familiar to Ovid and his readers have, in this instance, largely been lost to us and can only be reconstructed from fragmentary evidence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Foam-Born Aphrodite and the Mythology of TransformationWilliam HansenIn his account of the birth of Aphrodite (Theogony 176-200), Hesiod tells how Kronos castrated his father, Ouranos, and threw the severed genitals into the sea.1 The narrator envisions Kronos waiting in ambush upon the mainland (or, from another perspective, upon his mother Gaia) with a sickle in his hand. When Ouranos descends, stretching himself out over Gaia in order to engage (...) in sexual intercourse, Kronos takes hold of his father's genitals with his left hand, cuts them off with his adamantine sickle, and casts them behind him. As the severed organ hurtles through the air, blood falls from it onto the land below, impregnating Gaia with several kinds of offspring. It settles finally upon the waters of the sea; in time foam issuing from the organ surrounds it, and within the foam a girl coalesces. Making her way to land, she passes by the island of Kythera, located off the southern coast of the Peloponnese, and reaches distant Cyprus, where she emerges [End Page 1] onto dry land.2 The circumstances of her birth, Hesiod explains, account for her epithet "Fond-of-genitals," just as her particular route is commemorated in the epithets "Cytherean" and "Cyprus-born," which link her to particular sites. She can be said to have been born on Cyprus because it was there that she emerged from her foam-womb, the matrix in which she developed.3180185190195200 [End Page 2]Great Ouranos came bringing on night, and around Gaiahe spread himself out in his longing for love, and was stretched outin every direction. From ambush his son reached outwith his left hand and with his right hand took the huge sickle,180 long and saw-toothed, and furiously cut offthe genitals of his own father and threw them backwards to be bornebehind him. But they did not escape his hand without effect,for all the drops of blood that rushed outGaia received, and in due time185 she brought forth the powerful Erinyes and the great Giants,shining in their armor and with long spears in their hands,and the nymphs whom they call Meliai on the boundless earth.Now after he had cut off his genitals with adamantand had cast them down from the mainland to the stormy sea,190 they were borne along the sea for a long time, and around them whitefoam arose from the immortal flesh, and in it a girlgrew. First she approached holy Kythera, and from thereshe reached sea-washed Cyprus.Out of the sea the reverend and beautiful goddess stepped, and round about195 grass grew beneath her slender feet. Her["Foam-born" goddess and fair-garlanded "Cytherean"]gods and men call Aphrodite, becauseshe grew in foam, "Cytherean" because she reached Kythera, and also"Cyprus-born" because she was born on stormy Cyprus, and200 "Fond-of-genitals" because she came forth from genitals.In this passage the poet manifestly strives to bring Aphrodite into association with as many aspects of her cult as possible while at the same time maintaining a dramatically coherent narrative. Aspects of the goddess that the narrator acknowledges explicitly include the name Aphrodite itself (she develops in aphros, "foam, slaver, froth, sperm");4 her epithet "Fond-of-genitals" (she is born from a severed sexual organ), which suggests also her role as goddess of sexuality; her epithet [End Page 3] Kythereia (she passes near Kythera); and her epithet Kyprogeneia (she comes ashore at Cyprus).5 Aspects of the goddess that are possibly signaled here implicitly are her role as a divinity of the sea (she is born at sea) and her title Aphrodite Ourania ("Aphrodite, Daughter of Ouranos" and/or "Celestial Aphrodite" as opposed to Aphrodite Pandemos, "common Aphrodite").6 So the narrative teems with references to different aspects of Aphrodite.An element of considerable importance in this narrative is foam. The goddess originates in it, and she gets her name from it. The reason why the myth brings Aphrodite and foam into a significant relationship is doubtless because in popular etymology her name... (shrink)

Four decades ago, E.O. Wilson famously declared that “the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." One still finds Wilson’s idea echoed frequently in popular science writing today. While I’m not going to deny that evolutionary biology and other sciences have important things to tell us about morality, I think there is a lot of confusion about what exactly they can tell us, and how much they can tell us. My (...) aim here is first to make some distinctions and sort out some issues, and then to examine one overreaching claim in particular, about the explanation of our moral beliefs by appeal to evolutionary causal influences. That is a claim used by some philosophers to argue that evolutionary biology somehow forces on us either a skeptical or a purely subjectivist understanding of morality. I will explain why I think this is misguided and is a poor use of science in philosophy. (shrink)

There is a plethora of confirmation measures in the literature. Zalabardo considers four such measures: PD, PR, LD, and LR. He argues for LR and against each of PD, PR, and LD. First, he argues that PR is the better of the two probability measures. Next, he argues that LR is the better of the two likelihood measures. Finally, he argues that LR is superior to PR. I set aside LD and focus on the trio of PD, PR, and (...) LR. The question I address is whether Zalabardo succeeds in showing that LR is superior to each of PD and PR. I argue that the answer is negative. I also argue, though, that measures such as PD and PR, on one hand, and measures such as LR, on the other hand, are naturally understood as explications of distinct senses of confirmation. (shrink)

Introduces and explains the basic argument for a causal theory of action‐explanation, and defends it against various non‐causal views of action: explaining an action is explaining why something happened, and an explanation of why something happened is always a causal explanation. But what is involved in the claim that reason‐explanation is a form of causal explanation? The chapter begins to answer that question. First, it considers the relation between causal explanation, on the one hand, and the singular relation of (...) causation, on the other. Second, it considers the relation between mental causation and physical causation, defending the idea that we cannot take a purely mentalist view of mental causation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Athenian Agora: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at AthensWilliam C. WestA. Geoffrey Woodhead. The Athenian Agora: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Vol. XVI, Inscriptions: The Decrees. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1997. xx 1 531 pp. 1 plan. 32 pls. Cloth, $100.A. G. Woodhead characterizes his work as “a still (...) photograph, extracted from a process of discovery, discussion, and reevaluation constantly in motion... a representation of the status rerum... at the end of 1991” (viii). Nonetheless, this is a remarkable book. It reprints and discusses up-to-date texts of Athenian decrees from the Agora and classifies them in five sections: (1) to the fall of Athens in 404 B.C.; (2) from one restoration of democracy to another, 403/2-307/6 B.C.; (3) the “Macedonian Century,” 307/6-201/200 B.C.; (4) Athens and the Roman Republic, 200–86 B.C.; and (5) Athens in the Roman Empire, 86 B.C.-A.D. 203 (xi). The reader is thereby helped to an appreciation of Athenian diplomacy and bureaucracy within the framework of recognized historical periods. [End Page 458]A total of 342 inscriptions are presented: 28 in section 1; 78 in section 2; 149 in section 3; 76 in section 4; and 10 in section 5. Two phases of Agora excavation are represented: 1931–45 and 1946–67. After each section an appendix on material discovered after 1967 lists new discoveries with appropriate references. New studies and new texts are assimilated in the presentation of each item up to the end of 1991. Decrees of the Athenian state form the bulk of the collection, but decrees of other bodies, such as demes, gene, orgeones, etc., are also included. Excluded by intention (vii) are the decrees on councilors and their officers (Agora XV) and the decrees honoring ephebes.For each item Woodhead gives an extensive lemma, with brief description of the stone, dimensions of the letters, and bibliography of previous texts and works contributing to their understanding. Each text is followed by a commentary. He frequently comments on the lettering and style of engraving before entering upon discussion of individual lines.For section 1, the fifth century, the texts of IG I3 (1981) are printed, but for the others, in sections 2–5, the best available text is chosen. Where a new fragment of an old text has been discovered in the Agora, the full text of the entire inscription is given. As many decrees were set up on the Acropolis, it is clear that some material was “thrown or brought down from the citadel for reuse” (3). In the case of the Brea decree (no. 7), the contribution of the Agora fragment is slight, but in that of the treaty between Athens and Argos of 417/6 (no. 19) it is significant, providing the length of the line, 76 letters.When an archon is cited in the prescript of an Agora decree, Woodhead supplies a full discussion of the archonship, seeking to show how opinion was formed concerning the date of the office and the calendar. The earliest to be discussed is Polyzelos, 367/6 B.C. (section 2); the latest, Flavius Macrinus, A.D. 116/17 (section 5).In section 2, the fourth century to 307/6, Woodhead calls attention (41) to the spread of Athenian bureaucracy in the increased detail in the prescripts of decrees, the appearance of new formulae, such as that indicating hortatory intent (cf. A. S. Henry, ZPE 112 [1996] 105–19), and stock phrases enumerating the merits of laudandi in honorary decrees. The inevitable restoration of in the prescript of no. 101 brings in this formula for the first time in Agora decrees, although it is known from elsewhere “as early as 334/3” (154). The Agora contributes very significant decrees on the nomothesia (nos. 73, 75, 106C) and Athens’ regulation of the Eleusinian Mysteries (nos. 56, 57).The next section, 307/6 to 201/200, represents for Athens “the high-water mark of its bureaucracy” (167). The texts classified here attest the variety of documents... (shrink)

The paper considers three questions. First, what is the connection between economics and agency? It is argued that causation and explanation in economics fundamentally depend on agency. So a philosophical understanding of economic explanation must be sensitive to an understanding of agency. Second, what is the connection between agency and causation? A causal view of agency-involving explanation is defended against a number of arguments from the resurgent noncausalist tradition in the literature on agency and action-explanation. If agency is fundamental (...) to economic explanation, it is argued, then so is causation. Third, what is the connection between causal explanation and the natural sciences? It is argued that, though the explanations given in economics and other social sciences are causal explanations, they are different in kind from the causal explanations of the natural sciences. On the one hand, then, the causal explanations of the social sciences are irreducible to those found in the natural sciences. On the other hand, the causal relations described by the social sciences are not completely autonomous; they do not float free of, or operate independently from, the causal relations charted by the natural sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 153-156 [Access article in PDF] Gesine Manuwald, ed. Der Satiriker Lucilius und seine Zeit. Zetemata 110. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001. 206 pp. Paper, fi49.90. In mid-February 2001 at the University of Freiburg, a symposium was held under the aegis of Professor Eckard Lefèvre on the theme "Lucilius, Identity, and Alterity." Moving with lightning speed, Gesine Manuwald edited fifteen of the papers (...) given there and had them ready in June so that Beck could publish them in record time. This is the swiftest production of the doings of such a symposium that I have come across. If only there had been some really new things to say about Lucilius, it would make this monograph invaluable. Unfortunately, no new fragments have appeared, and the identity of Lucilius remains shrouded in mystery for lack of new historical evidence. As for alterity, most of the participants in the project did not feel comfortable with addressing that aspect of Lucilius, probably again for lack of useful data on the satirist and his period.Nine of the fifteen papers come from the hands of students and faculty at the University of Freiburg. In addition, there are contributions from Johannes Christes of Berlin, C. J. Classen of Göttingen, Ursula Gärtner of Leipzig, Severin Kostner of Erlangen, Werner Krenkel of Rostock, and Eckart Olshausen of Stuttgart. All of the titles try to link Lucilius with a genre like epic, with a specific poet like Callimachus or Aristophanes, or with a cultural or historical phenomenon like the city of Rome or the times in which the poet lived. One essay alone addresses a specific satire, predictably the Trip to Sicily in Book 3, which provides enough surviving lines to allow a discussion of fifteen pages.Several of the essays illustrate the difficulty of putting a confident hand on the "identity" of Lucilius. Even the famous disclaimer of ambition to become a [End Page 153] publican in the new province of Asia, though firmly linked to Lucilius' name in its text, does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the poet is expressing personal pride as Manuwald claims. A pose is certainly struck, but what exactly is Lucilius proud of, and what does he propose instead? The statement could be the opening to his artistic creed as satirist, but it has other possibilities, e.g., the choice of an Epicurean existence or an attack on equestrian operators, and we need to advance every inference very tentatively. It is indeed quite possible that the lines came from a fictional dramatic situation.The first paper, by Ulrike Auhagen, deals with Lucilius and comedy, an important and difficult topic. In his early poems of the first edition, Lucilius wrote a number of scenes in comic meters. Before he completed that edition, he seems to have decided permanently against those meters, senarius and septenarius, and he confined himself to hexameters in Book 30, the last book of that edition. Did he also abandon the way he used the comic meters? That is, in his early satirical experiments, did he produce little comic vignettes on fictional situations, familiar in Plautus and Terence, or did he use comedy to make satiric commentary on the Rome of his day? If the former, which I had hoped Auhagen would consider, then we can infer the variety of the satura that the poet was exploring. If the latter, then Lucilius is already from his earliest works the hard-hitting moralist that Auhagen imagines, ready to turn any meter and any situation into an arena for his polemics. I would plead for more openness to alterity.Various papers deal with Lucilius' interest in other genres or writers. Thus, Andreas Bagordo downplays the connection with Callimachus, which Puelma Piwonka daringly argued. Bernhard Zimmermann considers Horace's apparent belief that Lucilius depended greatly on Aristophanes, and he puts it rightly into perspective. Manuwald shows how little the satirist admired the Greek and Roman tragedians, but she could have spent more time on the programmatic relevance of his disapproval: he was, after all, staking... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Gildersleeve Prize for the Best Article Published in the American Journal of Philology in 2014 Has Been Presented toWilliam Josiah Edwards Davis, University of Toronto Faculty of LawWilliam M. Breichnerfor his contribution to scholarship in “Terence Interrupted: Literary Biography and the Reception of the Terentian Canon,” AJP 135.3:387–409.Building on the serious and sophisticated attention that has been devoted to literary biography in recent years, Davis shows what (...) can be elicited from the conflicting ancient accounts of Terence’s death. As others have argued, ancient scholarship found biography to be a useful receptacle for literary history and criticism. In Davis’ reading, the mutually incompatible accounts of Terence’s death yield insights into critical debates about the role of literature in republican Rome and the scholarly practices that underpinned it.Terence’s prologues give us a lively sense of the literary debates of his own day, but his biographers, writing in the period when scripts became texts, asked a different set of questions. Did Terence die at sea, or in Arcadia, far from the sea? Was the destination of his final journey Greece, or Asia? Did he die in poverty and neglect, or was he returning to Rome with a literary treasure, a hundred and eight newly adapted Menandrian plays? And who wrote his plays, anyway? Davis analyses ancient responses to these and other questions, teasing out traces of the scholarly argument and cultural polemic surrounding Roman literature in the late second and first centuries BCE and thereby making sense of the questions themselves. Reading Terence’s biography against other literary biographies, for example, he shows how Terence’s fatal journey was exploited to establish a Terentian canon free of the authenticity problems that dogged the Plautine tradition. The story that Terence died in Ambracia, by contrast, pits him against another poet associated with Ambracia, Ennius, and stages their rivalry. Finally, Davis shows, in writing the death(s) of Terence, scholar-poets such as Porcius Licinus and Volcacius Sedigitus and others less well known now but cited by Suetonius or ancient scholiasts inscribed a role for the literary historian, too, as caretaker of the playwright’s literary legacy. By reading the contradictions in the biographical tradition against one another instead of trying to produce a historically plausible version by selection, Davis gives us access to the script, fragmentary but fascinating, of Terence’s earliest reception.Judges for The Johns Hopkins University PressCynthia Damon (Chair) Andrew Ford Sara MyersThe Twenty-seventh Annual Gildersleeve Prize of $1,000 will be awarded for the best article to appear in the Journal in 2015. The Press would like to thank the members of the committee for their time and effort.William M. Breichner Journals Publisher Johns Hopkins University Press [End Page 1]William M. BreichnerJournals Publisher Johns Hopkins University PressCopyright © 2015 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

To acquire one’s native phonological system, language-specific phonological categories and relationships must be extracted from the input. The acquisition of the categories and relationships has each in its own right been the focus of intense research. However, it is remarkable that research on the acquisition of categories and the relations between them has proceeded, for the most part, independently of one another. We argue that this has led to the implicit view that phonological acquisition is a “two-stage” process: Phonetic categories (...) are first acquired and then subsequently mapped onto abstract phoneme categories. We present simulations that suggest two problems with this view: First, the learner might mistake the phoneme-level categories for phonetic-level categories and thus be unable to learn the relationships between phonetic-level categories; on the other hand, the learner might construct inaccurate phonetic-level representations that prevent it from finding regular relations among them. We suggest an alternative conception of the phonological acquisition problem that sidesteps this apparent inevitability and acquires phonemic categories in a single stage. Using acoustic data from Inuktitut, we show that this model reliably converges on a set of phoneme-level categories and phonetic-level relations among subcategories, without making use of a lexicon. (shrink)

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff wrote surprisingly often to British colleagues. Usually it was a matter of a letter or two. The prolonged exchange with Gilbert Murray is the exception. More typical is the brief but important one with Sir James George Frazer. Extant evidence attests that he corresponded with some forty Englishmen and Scots. I omit Anglo-Irish: J.B. Bury, J.P. Mahaffy, L.C. Purser and the papyrologist, J.G. Smyly. The evidence is incomplete because most letters after the letter N were stolen and (...) burned in the Berlin winter 1945–6. A first catalogue of his British correspondents is assembled. Because of the remoteness of much published biographical material, I include references to the important published sources and occasionally publish a document which otherwise would be forgotten. For the first time Wilamowitz's influence on the English scholars of his time is precisely documented. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 29.1 (2005) 73-88 [Access article in PDF] Virgil, History, and Prophecy William Franke Vanderbilt University Virgil has been very widely acclaimed as a prophet, but the grounds of this acclaim have shifted in the course of history. From ancient and especially from medieval times, this recognition was traditionally accorded him first and foremost, if not exclusively, on the basis of a passage from (...) the Fourth Eclogue celebrating the birth of a new progeny ("progenies nova") from heaven and the consequent renewal of the world.1 This passage lent itself to Christian messianic interpretations, thanks especially to its reference to a Virgin ushering in a return of the golden age of peace on earth ("iam redit et uirgo, redeunt Saturnia regna"). Historical research reveals Virgil to have, in all probability, intended in this text to hyperbolically hail the birth of a son to a particular Roman consul.2 Yet, even apart from historical intentions and inevitable doubts about them, to pin Virgil's claim to being a prophet to this text is to miss the momentous discovery that makes him truly a prophet in a way unprecedented in pagan antiquity.Modern treatments of Virgil as prophet have not remained beholden to this Christian medieval framework and have opened suggestive avenues for more accurate elucidation of Virgilian prophecy, particularly in terms of its own historical context and the role of the Latin vates in Imperial Rome.3 What I wish to propose, however, is not a more accurately historicized understanding of prophecy in Virgil, but rather a philosophical interpretation of the conception of history as prophetic that is realized in the text of the Aeneid. This is actually analogous to the medieval Christian misprision of Virgil in that it focusses on Virgil's potential significance in a new and different historical context, our own. The justification for this approach lies in the fact that historical research into prophecy during the Augustan Empire cannot exhaustively [End Page 73] explain the significance of Virgil's text in its astonishing creation of an original conception of history as prophetic, nor in its potential to illuminate the nature of prophecy as it may concern us today. Study of Virgil can help make the concept of prophecy vital to reflection on history and the structure of time in our own post-Heideggerian era.The question of whether Virgil foresaw the birth of Christ concerns prophecy only in the relatively banal sense of being able to foretell the future. In this, Virgil would be no different from myriad seers and divines and sorcerers with which the ancient world was rife. But the originality of Virgil, his particular claim to being an authentic prophet rather than simply, like many other major Roman authors, to have incorporated prophetic topoi into his works rests on his surpassing prophecy in precisely this sense. It is Virgil's single-handed invention, as if out of nowhere, of a genuinely prophetic mode of understanding history that is the seeming miracle on which his justly deserved fame as a prophetic poet has every right to rest.Whereas the certainly rather forced Christian interpretation of the Fourth Eclogue concerns "prophecy" only in a surface sense of factually foretelling the future, the deep meaning of prophecy as it develops in Virgil and Dante and the whole lineage of prophetic poets they foster down through Tasso, Spenser, Milton, and Blake, concerns rather the interpretation of history from its endpoint and seen as a whole, so that every moment in that history receives new meaning in light of a synoptic vision. In the biblical prophetic tradition, this perspective extends even beyond history and time altogether, and this marks a crucial difference from Virgil, whose end-vision is envisaged primarily as intrahistorical rather than as eschatological or as beyond the end (eschaton) of history. Still, in Virgil, just as in the Bible, the prophetic vantage point transcends history in order to understand it as a whole. This transcendence is expressed, among other ways, in the claim to divine inspiration. Whether this claim to inspiration be understood as a figure for heightened human potency or... (shrink)

In 1903 the German art historian Karl Giehlow argued that a 1514 treatise on Greek numismatics, written by the Augsburg humanist Conrad Peutinger and addressed to the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, shed new light on Albrecht Dürer’s mysterious engraving Melencolia I. Since the treatise has never been published, the question has never been investigated. This article presents a transcription, commentary and translation of the treatise for the first time in any language. It also situates Peutinger’s work (...) within the history of scholarship on Greek antiquity and the history of German Renaissance art. The central concern of Peutinger’s treatise turns out to be a precocious and unexpected one: neither the exploits of the ancient hero whom the coin in question depicts, nor the possible lineage of the Habsburg emperor back to Hercules, but the material history of religion on an island in the Hellenistic Aegean. The article describes the leaps and misunderstandings that led Peutinger to endow his object, an everyday piece of ancient currency, with artistic significance and a sacred aura. PaceGiehlow, it is not the Melencolia I that is illuminated by the text, but artworks produced locally: the Prayer Book of Maximilian and the classical and sacred craftsmanship of an Augsburg goldsmith. The interpretation of Greek artworks did not just influence the art of a Christian city: Christian art, on the evening of the Reformation, coloured the interpretation of Greece. (shrink)

1. A Road to Philosophy of Mathematics l became interested in philosophy and mathematics at more or less the same time, rather late in high school; and my interest in the former certainly influenced my attitude towards the latter, leading me to ask what mathematics is really about at a fairly early stage. I don ’t really remember how it was that I got interested in either subject. A very good math teacher came to my school when I was in (...) 9th grade and I got caught up in his course on solid geometry; but he soon left and math then lost its luster again in the hands of teachers who neither liked nor understood it. Calculus wasn’t taught in high school in those days, or at least not in mine: besides geometry we learned some algebra and trigonometry. I doubt that even the word “ philosophy ” passed the lips of any of my teachers. My mother, who worked for a publishing house, brought home for me copies of, among other works, the Jowett translations of Plato’s Dialogues, Will Durant’s Story of Philosophy and Courant and Robbins’ What Is Mathematics?; but I can’t remember why she did that: She wasn’t at all intellectual and, as far as I recall, my interests at the time were mostly confined to sports and girls—in some order. Maybe she just thought it was time for me to develop new interests. After high school, I went in 1948 to Lehigh University, then at least primarily an engineering school, on an athletic scholarship. There I had the good fortune in my first year to have an introduction to philosophy course with Lewis White Beck. He had just moved there from the University of Delaware and shortly thereafter moved on to the University of Rochester, where he became one of the leading lights of American Kant studies. My good luck was compounded when, in my second year, Adolph Gr¨ unbaum arrived at Lehigh, fresh from graduate school at Yale, and stayed at least long enough for me to graduate, before moving to the University of Pittsburgh as Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy of Science.. (shrink)

In 1923, Sir Arthur Keith proposed that many common back problems are due to the stresses caused by our evolutionarily novel form of locomotion, bipedalism. In this article, we introduce an updated version of Keith’s hypothesis with a focus on acquired spinal conditions. We begin by outlining the main ways in which the human spine differs from those of our closest living relatives, the great apes. We then review evidence suggesting there is a link between spinal and vertebral shape (...) on the one hand and acquired spinal conditions on the other. Next, we discuss recent studies that not only indicate that two common acquired spinal conditions—intervertebral disc herniation and spondylolysis—are associated with vertebral shape, but also suggest that the pathology-prone vertebral shapes can be understood in terms of the shift from quadrupedalism to bipedalism in the course of human evolution. Subsequently, we place the aforementioned findings under an umbrella hypothesis, which we call the “Evolutionary Shape Hypothesis.” This hypothesis contends that individuals differ in their propensity to develop different acquired spinal conditions because of differences in vertebral shape that relate to the evolutionary history of our species. We end the article with some possible directions for future research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hobbes on the Grand Tour: Paris, Venice, or London?Linda Levy PeckHobbes scholars have long been frustrated by how little contemporary evidence exists for the period when, after graduating from University in 1608, Hobbes was appointed by Lord Cavendish as tutor to his son Sir William Cavendish. Based on a license to travel granted in February 1610 1 and a parenthetical date in a late seventeenth-century source, 2 scholars (...) from George Croom Robertson (1886) to John Stoye (1952 and 2nd ed. 1989), Miriam Reik (1977), Noel Malcolm (1981), Arnold A. Rogow (1986), Richard Tuck (1989 and 1993), and Johann Sommerville (1992) have asserted that Hobbes and Cavendish left on the Grand Tour in 1610. Scholars have claimed that the trip to France, Italy, and perhaps Germany lasted anywhere from three to five years, and they have speculated as to where Hobbes and Cavendish went and whom they met. Robertson wroteThe first journey, which lay through France, Germany, and Italy, was begun in the year when France and Europe were thrown into consternation by the deed by Ravaillac; and so readily does the fanatic’s name slip from his pen even half a century later, that we may well suppose the future apostle of the inviolability of the sovereign to have been moved by what he may have heard or seen of the tragic event and its consequences at the time. 3 [End Page 177]Arnold A. Rogow in Thomas Hobbes, Radical in the Service of Reaction, expands on Robertson’s point by suggesting thatthe tour of 1610, close in time to the murder of Henry IV, if not overlapping it, may have been decisive in convincing Hobbes of the dangers to society and civil peace of religious fanaticism. Guy Fawkes and his coconspirators in the 1605 Gunpowder Plot and François Ravaillac were all fanatical Catholics, and Hobbes, although he wrote nothing about these conspiracies at the time, may have decided when still a young man that the single most important condition for domestic order and stability was the total and absolute submission of religion to political authority. 4While noting that the first forty years were the “dark years” in Hobbes life, Miriam Reik agrees on the date of the trip: “In 1610, the Baron sent his son for that indispensable part of a seventeenth century nobleman’s education, the Grand Tour; Hobbes went along as an escort the journey receives scant notice in his writing.” 5 Stoye commented that “Perplexed biographers can only state that Hobbes accompanied Cavendish on a journey to France and Italy, commencing in the year 1610.” 6Noel Malcolm tried to establish a chronology for the Grand Tour in his article “Hobbes, Sandys and the Virginia Company,” 7 demonstrating that Cavendish was back in England for the Parliament of 1614 to which he was elected although he was soon back in Venice on a second trip. 8 Later, in his De Dominus (1984), 9 Malcolm suggested in a footnote that the account book of the first Earl of Devonshire (Chatsworth, Hardwick Ms. 29), supported only one trip between 1614 and 1615 but he provided no detailed evidence. In his edition of Thomas Hobbes: The Correspondence (1994) Malcolm remains cautious and does not address the issue. Richard Tuck, however, is more confident: he writes that “And when Lord Cavendish sent his son off on what would later be called ‘the Grand Tour’ between 1610 and 1615, Hobbes accompanied him as a tutor.” 10 Tuck argues that Hobbes and Cavendish met Paolo Sarpi and other Venetian controversialists at the height of the Venetian interdict controversy between 1610 and 1615. [End Page 178]Between 1610 and 1615 Hobbes accompanied Cavendish as his tutor... on a tour of Europe in which Venice seems to have been a particularly important stopping-place. (Noel Malcolm (1981, pp. 319–20) claims that Cavendish sat in the 1614 Parliament, and that therefore the tour must have been interrupted; but it is probable that Cavendish’s cousin (also called William), later the Earl of New-castle, was elected for both East Retford and the county of Derbyshire, and that he was the only William Cavendish in the 1614 Parliament... (shrink)

Much philosophical progress has been made in elucidating the idea of evolutionary contingency in a recent re-burgeoning of the debate. However, additional progress has been impaired on three fronts. The first relates to its characterisation: the under-specification of various contingency claims has made it difficult to conceptually pinpoint the scope to which ‘contingency’ allegedly extends, as well as which biological forms are in contention. That is—there appears to be no systematic means with which to fully specify contingency claims which (...) has led to a tendency for authors to talk past each other. Secondly, on the matter of evidence, recent research has focused on the evidential import of convergent evolution which is taken to disconfirm the evolutionary contingency thesis. However, there has been a neglect of convergent evolution’s converse: ‘evolutionary idiosyncrasies’ or the singular evolution of certain forms, which I argue is evidentially supportive of evolutionary contingency. Thirdly, evolutionary contingency has often been claimed to vary in degrees and that the debate, itself, is a matter of ‘relative significance’. However, there has been no formal method of evaluating the strength of contingency and its relative significance in a particular domain. In this paper, I address all three issues by proposing a systematic means of fully specifying contingency theses with the concept of the modal range. Secondly, I propose an account of evolutionary idiosyncrasies, investigate the explanations for their occurrences, and, subsequently, spell out their significance with respect to the evolutionary contingency thesis. Finally, having been equipped with the evidential counterpart to convergent evolution, I shall sketch a likelihood framework for evaluating, precisely on the basis of a sequence of opposing data, the strength and relative significance of evolutionary contingency in a particular domain. With this in hand, the relative observations of idiosyncrasies and convergences can be informative of the strength and relative significance of contingency in any particular domain. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 156-160 [Access article in PDF] S. J. Harrison, J. L. Hilton, and V. J. C. Hunink, trans. Apuleius: Rhetorical Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. x + 225 pp. Cloth, $65. Apuleius of Madauros, as this book reminds us, was no one-trick burro. Indeed he was always eager to reveal just how many tricks he had in store. "Uno chartario calamo me (...) reficere poemata omnigenus apta virgae, lyrae, socco, coturno, item satiras ac griphos, item historias varias rerum nec non orationes laudatas disertis nec non dialogos laudatos philosophis, atque haec et alia eiusdem modi tam graece quam latine, gemino voto, pari studio, simili stilo" he tells us in what is actually one of his more muted fanfares on the theme of his own versatility ( Flor. 9.27-29); there was still more to the man. Polymath and poet, Platonist and philologue, writer, rhetor, raconteur, and Wortjongleur in two tough tongues, he was also (he reminds us) a globe trotter, a snapper-up of historical trifles, a connoisseur of cults and maven of mysteries, a public performer, a popular idol, a grateful pal to the great and powerful, and the toast of the coast of northern Africa—all these boasts of omnicompetent cultivation just part of the pose and professional program of the second-century sophist (10).We certainly can use the reminder. In North America at any rate, the works of Apuleius— The Golden Ass, of course, apart—have slipped into something close to deep background (even the Latin texts are hard to come by), the skids greased, I suspect, both by the substantial difficulties in knowing just how to take in these strange and showy products and by the booming attention deservedly [End Page 156] paid to The Golden Ass itself. But there remain Apuleians dedicated to changing all that. Especially over the last dozen years or so, a new generation of scholars has been preparing a new store of editions, commentaries, and critical assessments that, even if they do not permanently refix our gaze, should at least allow these works to be more widely accessible to the literary and cultural historians and students of rhetoric and Middle Platonism whose interest in Apuleius and his manifold contexts has surged.Translation seems the logical next step. And now, three scholars have teamed up to offer the first translations in nearly a century of texts they group together as Apuleius' "rhetorical works": the Apology, Florida, and On the God of Socrates (trans. Vincent Hunink, John Hilton, and Stephen Harrison, respectively; Harrison also edited the volume and provided its general introduction). As a compromise between the divergent views of two of the book's contributors, they present the paragraphs that introduce On the God of Socrates in the manuscripts, but which are often taken to belong properly to the Florida, in a separate section as the "False Preface" to the former (trans. Hilton). Each work is accompanied by an informative literary-historical introduction and substantial explanatory notes, most useful to the philologically experienced.The book has two contrasting ambitions for the translations it contains. On the one hand, it presents them in a familiar OUP manner as matter for the archives, things to be consulted, not read. All the visual rhetoric of documentary publication is here: the official-looking fonts, the footnotes seeping up from the bottom of the page, the text itself obtrusively divided into numbered segments for ease of reference to the authorized Latin editions. On the other hand, there are the statements of the translators themselves, which assert a different status for the works they are translating. Hunink puts it most directly in his introduction to the Apology: "Apuleius' speech is an interesting document. It is also a useful source of knowledge in a wide range of areas... But there is more to it: this self-defence may properly be called a literary masterpiece" (11). Literary masterpieces, of course, are there to be read, not simply consulted; and these works in particular—masterpieces or not—chafe at archival treatment. Ultimately, at issue are not only their status but also... (shrink)

There is a crisis of leadership in sport. Leadership as an athletic excellence is under threat from the deepening influence of coaches on in-game decision- making. To appreciate what is being lost in this shift of responsibility, it is necessary to understand the challenge of athlete leadership. Captaincy is the quintessential on-field leadership role. However, the role of captain, and athlete leadership more widely, remains philosophically untheorized. This paper initiates a discussion of leadership in sport by providing the first (...) normative account of captaincy. Rugby union is used as a case study, as this sport preserves an especially demanding and complex form of captaincy that may provide a rough template for the revival of athlete leadership in other sports. A virtue theoretical analysis of the role is developed based on a functionalist conception of virtue. It is argued that discharging the responsibilities of such captaincy requires two key virtues: ‘sporting judgement’ and ‘responsibility’. (shrink)

My title is taken from the frontispiece to Ogilby's translation of Aesop ; since every Renaissance poet believed the statement to be true, let me start with my own example. John Denham's only play, The Sophy, published in August 1642, is a tale about the perils of jealousy. The good prince Mirza, after a miraculous victory over the Turks, returns in glory to his father's court, but leaves it shortly thereafter. In his absense, Haly, the evil courtier, follows a friend's (...) advice to " work on [the king's] fears, till fear hath made him cruel"1 and poisons the king's mind with jealousy against his son. Mirza returns only to be brutally blinded and killed, and the emperor soon dies stricken with remorse. Now it happens that Parliament justified all its actions in the months preceding the civil war on the grounds of the "fears and jealousies" that the king had inspired. Charles was incensed by the slogan and claimed angrily that he, if anyone, had the most cause for fears and jealousies.2 Denham obviously decided that here was the all-consuming topic around which a predominantly royalist drama could be written. He followed what I believe was the standard practice - the method that Fulke Greville said Sidney used and that Congreve repeated at the end of the century when he declared of The Double Dealer that "I design'd the Moral first, and to that Moral I invented the Fable."3 He found a plot in Thomas Herbert's Travels into Diverse Parts of Asia that recorded some terrible cruelties and catastrophes caused by jealousy, and he added the point that the emperor's mind had been wrought upon by his counselor. There is no evidence that the play was ever acted, but the most casual reader would have said to himself, "Yes, history reminds us that states destroy themselves through fears and jealousies, and we should abate our own before it is too late." · 1. Sir John Denham, The Poetical Works, ed. Theodore Howard Banks, 2d ed. , p.245. The references to fear and jealousy are so ubiquitous in the play that they need not be listed here.· 2. On March 1, 1642, in the angriest of his replies to Parliament so far, Charles exclaimed, "You speake of Jealousies and Feares: Lay your hands to your hearts, and aske your selves whether I may not likewise be disturbed with Feares and Jealousies: And if so, I assure you this Message hath nothing lessened them" . Although phrases like "distempers and jealousies" had been used earlier, Clarendon on two occasions is quite specific that "fears and jealousies" were "the new words which served to justify all indispositions and to excuse all disorders" in January 1642 . Taken with other evidence, Clarendon's remarks strongly suggest that The Sophy was written after Coopers Hill, and during seven months preceding its publication in August 1642.· 3. William Congreve, The Complete Plays, ed. Herbert Davis , p. 119. And compare John Donne in Sermons, ed. Evelyn M. Simpson are George R. Potter , 9:274: "All wayes of teaching are Rule and Example: and though ordinarily the Rule be first placed, yet the Rule it selfe is made of Examples...for, Example in matter of Doctrine, is as Assimiliation in matter of Nourishment; The Example makes that that is proposed for our learning and farther instruction, like something which we knew before, as Assimilation makes that meat, which we have received and digested, like those parts which are in our bodies before."John M. Wallace, author of Destiny His Choice: The Loyalism of Andrew Marvell and articles on Milton, Dryden Denham, Traherne, and Arnold, is professor of English at the University of Chicago. (shrink)