디그나가는 집량론 k.6ab와 자주(vṛtti)에서 욕망 등의 자기인식(svasaṃvitti)도 의지각(mānaspratyakṣa)으로 직접지각(pratyakṣa)이라고 한다. 본고는 구사론에서의 감수작용(受 vedanā)에 관하여 바수반두의 입장을 중심으로 고찰하여 디그나가의 심작용과 자기인식 그리고 의지각의 상관 관계를 미시적으로 모색해 보고자 한다. 구사론의 「세간품」에서의 증어촉(增語觸 adhivacana-saṁsparśa)의 순수(順受 vedanīya)와 심수(心受 caitasikī vedanā)의 의근행(意近行 manopavicāra)은 디그나가의 인식의 2상성(二相性 dvirūpatā)으로 분석되어 삼수(三受)는 인식 결과(pramāṇaphala)에 해당한다. 따라서 구사론의 감수작용은 디그나가의 심작용의 자기인식이 진행되는 과정을 구체적으로 보여 준다. 즉 욕망, 분노, 어리석음, 즐거움, 고통 등은 직접경험의 결과로 자기인식(svasaṃvedana)이라 할 수 있다. 또한 심작용의 자기인식은 ‘의에 의해서(mānasa)’만 일어나는 직접경험으로 (...) 문자 그대로 ‘의지각(mānasapratyakṣa)’인 것이다. 여기서 직접경험(anubhava)은 감수작용의 정의인 동시에 직접지각(pratyakṣa)과 동일한 의미이다. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception ( mānasapratyakṣa ), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] ( mānasa ) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here (...) equally called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ ( idam iti jñānam ). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense. (shrink)

Framed as a consideration of the other contributions to the present volume of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, this essay attempts to scout and characterize several of the interrelated doctrines and issues that come into play in thinking philosophically about the doctrine of svasaṃvitti, particularly as that was elaborated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Among the issues thus considered are the question of how mānasapratyakṣa (which is akin to manovijñāna) might relate to svasaṃvitti; how those related doctrines might be brought (...) to bear with respect to some problems addressed with reference to the further doctrine (also closely related to svasaṃvitti) concerning pramāṇaphala; and the distinctiveness of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument for svasaṃvitti. A question recurrently considered throughout the essay has to do with whether (following Akeel Bilgrami) svasaṃvitti reflects a perceptual or a constitutive understanding of self-awareness. (shrink)

This paper begins with a contrast between two different views about whether the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by vikalpa. For the Abhidharmakośa, the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by the svabhāva-vikalpa whose nature is vitarka; but for Yogācāra, the five sensory consciousnesses are without that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa because vitarka is regarded as belonging merely to the mental consciousness. My hypothesis for explaining such difference is that Yogācāra assigns that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa to mental consciousness rather than (...) to the five sensory consciousnesses. I then look for possible functions of vitarka-vicāra that could map to svabhāva-vikalpa: (a) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (b) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state; (c) nonconceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (d) non-conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state. I argue that the svabhāva-vikalpa in the Abhidharmakośa should map to (c) and (d), which in Yogācāra maps to mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) stipulated by Dignāga. This refers to the discernment of the shape of a cognitive object in the foreground against the background. I end this paper with some general observations about why Yogācāra maps the svabhāvavikapla to the mental consciousness, and about the different senses covered by the Buddhist notion of vikalpa, which is broader than the sense of "conceptualization" as we now understand it. (shrink)