In this paper, we will question Heisenberg’s claim that the unpredictability of the experimental findings of quantum physics also affects the self-evident attitude about the universal and necessary nature of the principle of causality. We will try to answer the aforementioned problem by confronting Heisenberg’s criticism of Kant’s position on the universal and necessary/absolute nature of the principle of causality with Kant’s distinction between perceptual and experiential judgments. The distinction between perceptual and experiential judgments reveals that even in Heisenberg’s experimental (...) results that indicate the smallest degree of expectation, predictability, or uniformity of natural events, universal and necessary conditions of knowledge to which Heisenberg denies absolute value still preexist. (shrink)

Kant claims that the cognitive consensus about the deductive consistency and coherence of constructive geometric concepts, and their subsequent precise application in the realm of experience, results from the transcendental ideality of space and time and the distinction based on it; the distinction between phenomenal reality and reality as it is. All objects of possible experience are necessarily perceived in universal and necessary space-time relations, and this is also the condition for the possibility of universal, necessary, and precise application of (...) geometric principles in the field of experience. In this paper, we will partially agree with Kant’s position on the universality and necessity of geometric principles. However, we will also argue that Kant’s propositions unjustifiably extend beyond the limits of their validity when they move from the realm of universality and necessity to the realm of precise application of geometric principles within experience. The problem of the precise application of geometric principles remains unsolved within Kant’s transcendental conception. (shrink)