An important source for 19th century church history is conserved in the Acta Episcoporum Brugensium of the Archive of the Diocese of Bruges. The Acta of Bishop Jean-Baptist Malou contain the transcripts of some letters and a rather lengthy report, dated July 10, 1852: Notes sur les erreurs nouvelles, contraires à la religion révélée, à ses dogmes, à sa morale. Ecoles qui méritent une attention spéciale. It appears that this text was to be sent to the Consultors on the (...) Fornari Commission in Rome, who at that time were preparing a draft for the Bull on the Immaculate Conception, and who wanted to insert a solemn condemnation of modern errors. Towards that end, the Commission contacted several outstanding scholars all over Europe. Though the identity of these scholars is known, the response of the marquis Donoso Cortes was the only one known until now. The particular contribution of this article is to also make known the full text of the response of the Bishop of Bruges, and the related correspondence. In addition, when compared with the documentation already known, these documents help to clarify the rather confusing history of the earliest efforts to draft a Syllabus Errorum. For example, it appears that immediately after the revolution of 1848, some of the scholars contacted by the Commission in June of 1852, and by Fornari in August of the same year, were not prepared at that time to devote their efforts to a condemnation of errors. Secondly, it seems that a substantial discussion of what was intended to be the second chapter of the Bull unduly delayed the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and so the Syllabus project was subsequently postponed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:136 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 1 JANUARY 199 ~ to the principle of acting for the common good are played down by Grant in her discussion of Locke. Nevertheless, Grant advances the important proposition with respect to the tradition of liberalism as a political doctrine that "Locke's political theory contains two tendencies that are not entirely harmonious." That is, there is an uneasy blend of radical (...) and conservative elements in Lockean liberalism, and "this ambivalent attitude is an expression of the central axis of conflict within liberal theory generally" (204). For those who seek to understand Locke's role as a progenitor of liberalism and the persistence of certain types of arguments and problems which retain their significance for thinkers who identify themselves with that political theory, therefore, John Locke's Liberalism provides an excellent starting point. RICHARD ASHCRAFT Universityof California, Los Angeles Fabio Todesco. Riforma della metafisica e sapere scientifico. Saggio suJ. H. Lambert (z 7281777 ). CoUana di Filosofia, vol. x5. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987. Pp. 348- L 3o,ooo. Voltaire expressed his view of Wolffian metaphysics in a letter to Prince Frederick of Prussia: "Ce sont des 6clairs au milieu d'une nuit profonde; c'est tout ce qu'on peut esp~rer, je crois, de la m~taphysique. "~ Voltaire's attitude towards metaphysics was not shared by Condillac, who in his Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines (1746) distinguishes two kinds of metaphysics: one, ambitious and obscure of itself, pretends to discuss the essences of beings and the inscrutable causes of things; the other, more circumspect, confines itself to the analysis of knowledge, and so provides the only possible basis for a clarification of mind; it is "la science qui contribue le plus ~ rendre l'esprit lumineux, precis et 6tendu, et qui, par cons6"quent, doit le preparer ~ l'6tude de toutes les autres." It started with Locke, and is to be treated with the same exactitude as geometry in order to give a clear and invariable meaning to the words used, and a simple and easy order to the propositions." Maupertuis, who in 1746 became the President of the newly re-founded Berlin Acad~mie Royale des Sciences, hoped for the application of mathematics to metaphysics; nevertheless, he didn't expect the same degree of certitude from the latter as from the former. 3 In 1761 the Berlin Academy proposed a prize question as to whether metaphysics were capable of the same degree of evidence as mathematics. Lambert answered the question by claiming that geometrical demonstrations might be applied to metaphysics. 4 Four years afterwards (January 1765) Lambert was enrolled as a merei Letter of 1 September 1736, in Voltaire'sCorrespondence,ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1954), 5: 232. " Oeuw-esPhilosophiquesde Condillac,ed. Georges Le Roy (Paris: P.U.F., 19~7), 1:3. DesDevoirsde l'Acadg, micien, in Histoirede l'AcademieRoyaledesSciencesetBelles-Lettres,~5 vols. (Berlin, 1746-71), 1 (1746): 142-43. 4 "Llber die Methode, die Metaphysik, Theologie und Moral richtiger zu beweisen.... "ed. K. Bopp, Kantstud,en, suppl. 4~ (1918). BOOK REVIEWS a37 ber of the Berlin Academy; in the speech he delivered on that occasion he maintained that the simple concepts first formulated by Locke were the basis of human knowledge. From these simple concepts were drawn axiomata and postulata, the starting points of demonstrations that were necessarily and strictly to follow "l'ordre et le rigueur g~ometrique. ''~ In his own research, Lambert's point of departure was the philosophy of Christian Wolff, who had applied geometrical method to philosophy and provided demonstrations of its propositions, and definitions of all its constituent terms. The result Lambert obtained is very different from that of Wolff's metaphysics, which was constructed by deduction from the most general concept of ens, elaborated through a series of classifications per genera et species. Lambert abandoned this Wolffian system of classification in order to follow the anatomical method introduced by Locke, and by which the fundamental constituent elements of thought might be reached. The metaphysics of Lambert is a reversal of that of Wolff: it is built up from simple ideas derived immediately from sense perception: these simple ideas, being indivisible, are... (shrink)