In the literature on Hannah Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, two sorts of claim have been made by different interpreters. First, there is Beiner’s observation that there is a shift in Arendt’s thoughts on judgment, which has led to the idea that Arendt develops two distinct theories of judgment. The second sort of claim concerns Arendt’s use of Kant’s transcendental principles. At its core, it has led to the critique that Arendt detranscendentalizes — or empiricalizes — Kant, by linking (...) Kant’s judgments of taste to an empirical sociability. In this article, I argue against both of these claims. Early fragments of Arendt’s on judgment make clear that she develops only one theory of judgment. It is only that it is not until later in her life that she fully elaborates it. Nor does Arendt confuse Kant’s idea of enlarged thinking with an actual dialogue with others. In fact, Arendt introduces an interesting interdependence between judgment and speech, or communication. I develop my argument by first outlining the problems Arendt hoped to resolve via judgment. Through my reading of the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, I show how Arendt interprets Kant’s Critique of Judgment not as his theory of aesthetic judgments, but as an answer to the more general question ‘How do I judge?’ I also clarify the difference Arendt draws between common sense and community sense. With community sense, Arendt uncovers a foundation not only for men as political beings but also for the idea of humanity. This finding is often overlooked in the literature. I conclude with another Arendtian distinction that is often overlooked, that between spectators and the solitary philosopher. (shrink)

In this article, I claim that Arendt understands Hobbes not only as the theoretical father of totalitarianism, but also of what Arendt calls ‘the social.’ I do so by first presenting her view on imperialism and the rise of the bourgeoisie as a general framework. Then, I focus on her reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan. Hobbes gives birth to a state that asks for absolute obedience, depriving all his subjects of political, or participation rights. This leads to Arendt’s understanding of sovereignty (...) as domination. According to Arendt, Hobbes’s Leviathan not only gives rise to power politics, but also to totalitarianism. Hobbes’s new model of politics is reduced to a function of society and has ‘socialized’ men. Politics is reduced to government, while human beings are reduced to bourgeoisie. As I show, these changes give rise to another monster, the social, or what Pitkin calls ‘the Blob.’ Thus, Hobbes is not only the theoretical father of totalitarianism, but also of ‘the Blob.’ This leads me to sketch Arendt’s metaphysics of presence, that is, how only actual acting brings about the political. To do so, I contrast Arendt with Claude Lefort’s theory of democracy. (shrink)