The question of postures is a relatively recent concern for the actors involved in teacher education. It is important for the teacher educator to identify the postures he adopts so that the student teacher can learn to practice his profession independently and develop his professional singularity. In the same way, the mentor during the induction period, by adopting certain postures, plays a major role in the professional development of the beginning teacher. These aspects have been the subject of a doctoral (...) research conducted through a qualitative multiple-case study in a context of teacher induction. From the conversations between the mentors and the beginning teachers, several postures were identified. In addition, semi-structured interviews with the mentors revealed their conceptions relating to the accompaniment, which gave an orientation to the postures adopted. Once the theoretical framework of the accompaniment postures exposed, this paper states the link between these and the ethical principles underlying their practice, the vision of their role and their position towards the beginner. (shrink)

This article presents the experimentation of a device for trainees focusing on strengths, in the context of initial university training. Based on a theoretical corpus and self-analysis of the practices of a supervisor, this device was implemented with a dozen trainees. The concepts of psychopedagogy of well-being, positive professional identity, as well as the postures of supervisors will explore how a force-based approach to coaching trainees can help them develop their professional skills. but also to a positive identity development in (...) order to face the multiple challenges of the profession. (shrink)

The paper aims at detecting and evaluating Deleuze’s symptomatological and minoritarian concepts at work within his transcendental theory. By using these two philosophical items, the paper refers to the Nietzschean posture Deleuze develops within the transcendental field and to the N-1 formula that accompanies his conceptual path. In this vein, the essay retakes the issue highlighted by Rametta in his essay «The Transcendental and its Metamorphoses in Modern Thinking». In particular, if Rametta insists on Deleuze’s reading of Kant as a (...) kind of deconstruction of the relationships between philosophical concepts and the primacy of Representation, but also on the freeing of multiplicities that such a deconstruction allows, the present essay proposes three minoritarian paths that Deleuze takes from the history of philosophy and lead to transcendental empiricism. The first path is focused on “experience”, the second on “forces and violence”, while the third on “events and concepts”. (shrink)

“Enthusiastically acclaimed in Europe, Cornelis Verhoeven’s The Philosophy of Wonder starts with the premise that any authentic philosophy begins as a posture of wonder before reality. “Wonder is the foundation of the whole of philosophy,” he states. “It is not the beginning of thought in the sense that it might lead on to something better founded, something like philosophical principles, which could be cheerfully manipulated without any ambiguity. Nor does the philosopher begin by wondering, proceed to an examination, and thus (...) rid himself of a tiresome guest. It is not the beginning but the principle, the basic structure. It is not only the beginning but also the end; it guides and accompanies thought. It has not only the first but also the last word” Verhoeven develops his posture-the posture of one who thinks rather than one who merely learns a system-from the starting point of a striking reverence for reality. Wonder is possible only to one who is truly open to what reality is, is ruled by it, and who stands in fascination of the fact that what is there is there. Verhoeven’s approach to authentic thought and philosophy implies a rebellion against prevailing attitudes, against the tyranny of mediocrity that today’s world often imposes. Wonder is a rebellion against certitude and security. Authenticity demands that one remove himself from the tyranny of the revenge, that one slow down in a past-moving world. It demands that one receive reality with reverence and in a mood of contemplation rather than manipulation.The Philosophy of Wonder is neither a textbook nor a do-it-yourself philosophy book with “foundations” and “concepts.” Rather, it is a prod that engenders wonder. Wonder is not a quasi-romantic, wide-eyed passivity; it is an aggressive action, an exciting adventure, an exercise in free fall. Whenever philosophy has become a system, says Verhoeven, it has surrendered its birthright.”- Publisher. (shrink)

Mind has played the starring role in the West's arts, humanities, and sciences, while an embodied notion of oneself, others, and the physical world has been customarily pushed under the rug. In view of radical new theories, methods and techniques that have emerged during the past century and a half, the notion of complementary, sympathetic co-participation, and its accompanying re-enchantment, merits attention. C. S. Peirce is at the crossroads between modernism, enchantment, and misplaced concreteness, on the one hand, and postmodernism (...) and its attendant poststructuralism, on the other. His categories of feeling, sensation, and thought, and his triadic, all-encompassing concept of the sign, can help bring all facets of human creativity, concrete living, and understanding into a proper balance. Three coined terms — homogeny, hierogeny, and heterogeny — serve to elucidate how Peirce's triadic vision can offer a middle path, a way of mediating between antagonistic modes of sensing, living, and thinking. This middle path follows traditional tenets of logic and reason — identity, non-contradiction, and excluded-middle — while at its fringes, it allows deviation — by way of process, inconsistency, and incompleteness — from the rigidity that lies therein. Studies of feminist postures and various cultural processes in Latin America bear out the premise that a dose of conformity accompanying a tendency toward resistance can synethnically help keep broad cultural processes on an even keel, balancing mind and body, conflicting theories and methods and modes of living, and styles of reason and unreason in equilibrium. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sick with PassionAlfred LouchOpera: Desire, Disease, Death, by Linda and Michael Hutcheon; xvi & 294 pp. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996, $40.00.IDriving east from the Auvergne you may chance upon La Chaise-Dieu, a charming village where a very acceptable cafe confronts the fortress-like Abbatiale de St Robert across the village square. The church itself is an imposing monument to the ephemeral glory of the Avignon Pope Clement VI, (...) but its most extraordinary feature is a fresco in the aisle to the left of the choir. Called the Danse Macabre, it depicts death as a sequence of skeletons, each of which beckons, pleads with, consoles, or compels its many victims—young and old, rich and poor, exalted or mean—toward their inevitable end. At times the skeleton’s posture is sinister and threatening, at others, as with children, it seems to turn away, as if to shield them from its fearful aspect. The skeletons seem to catch the movement of a single dancer as they select one partner after another, taking the life of each in a graceful though ghastly movement.The fresco depicts the Black Death—art inspired by disease and contagion. But even if you were as innocent of history as the typical American tourists you would confront in the fresco the undeniable image of death, and the caprice of its visitation, a thought contrasting strangely with the enduring granite of the church. Your experience may be enriched by history and lead you to moralize on the contrast [End Page 155] between the pomp and grandeur of the papal builder and the fresco’s depiction of the vanity of human wishes. But it would be a jarring note if some know-it-all in the company of viewers were to lecture for all to hear on the transmission and symptoms of pasteurella pestis. That is another story, and an interesting one, but not here and now.And so it is, if not so abrasively, with a recent book by Linda and Michael Hutcheon on desire, disease, and death in opera. They hope to shed new light, by combining literary analysis and the medical theory of disease and contagion, on the themes and purposes of opera, or certain operas anyway. Somehow the passages on mycobacterium tuberculosis, treponema pallidum, and vibrio cholerae, together with graphic descriptions of the symptoms caused by these micro-organisms, and an accompanying photograph of syphilitic gummæ seem intrusive, just as talk about the etiology and the pathology of the plague strikes a discordant note as we look upon the Danse Macabre in wonder and fear. The Hutcheons, a husband and wife team who practice, respectively, medicine and literary criticism, tell the reader they are opera lovers. I hope their affection is not prompted only by infection.But why shouldn’t medicine and its history be relevant to literary, artistic, or musical creation? Think here of a question Wittgenstein asks in Zettel (paragraph 610): “Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it was upset.” He did not mean to say that it would not be surprising if someone talked and acted and looked like a person but turned out to have an empty skull. But he did mean surely that talk about human projects and emotions is complete as it stands; what is going on in the neurons and what busy microbes are doing are other stories. Literature is about human projects, the skill or clumsiness with which they are pursued, the responses to success and failure, achievement and frustration. Opera, which, ever since someone had the idea of putting story to song, raided literary invention for its subject matter, is the same. Heroes and villains may of course be expected to be vulnerable to the various vicissitudes of life. Diseases may lay them low, as well as passing trains. But disease enters their stories to delay or frustrate or put period to their projects, not as new characters on the stage. If you read about the death of Ivan Illych and come away dissatisfied because Tolstoy failed to identify the... (shrink)

Here, we describe how Casas Grandes Medio period (AD 1200 to 1450) shamanic practices of the North American Southwest used tobacco shamanism, a ritual stance called the Tennessee Diviner (TD) posture, and cultural expectations to generate trance experiences of soul flight and divination. We introduce a conceptual model that holds that specific trance experiences are the emergent result of human minds interacting with additional factors including entheogens, cultural expectations, physiological states, postures/movement, and sound/stimulation. Experimental and ethnographic evidence indicates initiating trance (...) with either tobacco intoxication or the TD posture accompanied with a rapidly beating drum or rattle corresponds with perceptions of soul flight, transformation, and divination/information acquisition. Both have similar results but pairing them together as they were during the Medio period likely helped ensure the culturally desired trance experiences. This practice of mutually reinforcing factors was likely part of tobacco‐based shamanism found in other New World cultures as well. We suggest our general model can be applied to other contexts to examine how various aspects of trance induction interact to produce the cultural patterns (and resulting cosmological and spiritual frameworks) anthropologists have documented in other cultures. (shrink)

Based on our empirical research on global meaning in people with spinal cord injury and people with stroke, we formulated ‘inner posture’ as a concept in rehabilitation. Inner posture, as we concluded from our empirical data, refers to the way in which people bear what cannot be changed. It helps them to live with their injury. Considering that much has already been written about meaning from a variety of disciplines, the question arises whether the concept of inner posture adds something (...) new to the existing literature, or is just another name for a phenomenon that has already been described before in different terms. In this paper, we aim to investigate this and to clarify our conceptualization, by comparing the concept of inner posture with influential concepts in healthcare literature which seem to be more or less related. In the work of Puchalski regarding spirituality, Pargament regarding religion, Eliott regarding hope and Frankl regarding attitude, we found definitions and descriptions that seemed to come close to the phenomenon we refer to as inner posture. Because these concepts have various theoretical backgrounds, the comparison can help to better understand our concept of inner posture, through a process of dialogue between traditions, following Gadamer’s notion of dialogue as fusion of horizons of understanding. We conclude that inner posture differs from the other concepts in several ways. Some of these differences are more fundamental, other are partial. This suggests that we identified a new perspective on a phenomenon partially described earlier. The comparison also inspired us to slightly adjust our definition and to formulate new research questions. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore links between the phenomenology-inspired philosophy of emotion, especially discussions of affective intentionality and situated affectivity, and those strands of work in the field of cultural affect studies that take their inspiration fromSpinoza and Deleuze. As bridges between these fields, I propose the concepts ‘disclosive posture’ and ‘affective arrangement’. ‘Disclosive posture’ condenses insights from phenomenological work on affectivity, especially those pertaining to what Heidegger calls Befindlichkeit. ‘Affective arrangement’ is a descendant of Deleuze and Guattari’s term agencement. (...) It refers to heterogeneous ensembles of elements coalescing into a sphere of heightened affective intensity in a local setting. I develop this notion into a tool for analyzing situated affectivity. As it does not yet figure prominently within debates in the philosophy of emotion, I will outline what is meant by ‘affective arrangement’ in some detail. Throughout, I discuss a productive tension between these two conceptual strands. (shrink)

In this theoretical contribution, we interpret the notion of professional development in the light of concepts coming from cognitive development. This brings us to consider teacher training as not only having to allow the elaboration of skills, but also as having to encourage the development of new cognitive structures. We explore the theoretical concepts in relation with certain processes revealed by the reflexive texts of the students. Finally, we propose ways that could foster certain dimensions of global professional development in (...) learners, among which self-regulated learning, the focus on certain concerns and taking into account certain types of information. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dmitry Khanin THE POSTMODERN POSTURE Postmodernists—the sectarians ofour day—proclaim that the old kingdom of historical narrative and historical subject has perished, and is now being replaced by a new one of ahistorical discourses and ahistorical characters. According to these prophets, "history" is anyway just changes in ways of talking about history. Anyone who does not agree with the ahistoricity of the postmodern world oudook may be accused—and tried on (...) the spot—of defending the cause of the totalitarian Reason against the most liberating movement of today. This postmodernist abuse of history is paradoxical, since the very notion of history coming to its end and giving way to the ahistorical kingdom of freedom and merry debauchery is itself a very old idea, even a mythological one. The description ofhistory as marching toward its own demise relies on a whole tradition which portrays history as a drama. Aristode's conception of tragedy as a sequence of actions culminating in a dénouement has no doubt shaped this view of historical process. Christian and other religious millenarians have announced the end of history already many times. Yet another notorious instance of such eschatological daydreaming is the futurology of Karl Marx, who envisaged the kingdom of communism as occupying this same ahistorical space. A rather obsolete idea, perhaps, but it seems still to attract postmodernists, though they give it a characteristic twist, since they sincerely believe theory, discourse, écriture (i.e., theoretico-symbolical activity) are much more important than any actual historical contentprocesses and events. One of the most notable spokesmen for this approach is Arthur Danto, who insists that world history evolved in a good Hegelian manner until the theorists came to understand that history depends on their Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 239-247 240Philosophy and Literature texts much more than theorists themselves depend on historical processes and events.1 Many theoreticians working in an otherwise Marxist tradition similarly are glad to assert with FredricJameson that we must say farewell to Marx's positivistic illusion that history is driven by laws disguised as economic forces.2 In the epoch of "late capitalism," says Jameson, consumption gains the upper hand over production and becomes the mainspring of history. Of course, in light of recent doings in Europe I am tempted to ask if we owe it to postmodernists—and their ahistorical, inconsistent, and generally confounding claims about history lying in ruins—that the Berlin Wall actually is in ruins and Vaclav Havel is president of Czechoslovakia. Even more daring theorists may now declare an era of "very late capitalism." Here it will not be merely the mass media that act transformatively on society (as McLuhan claimed), but rather consumer goods themselves, like state-of-the-art washing machines or French perfumes, which create a new aura of intellectual discourse. TL· Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-AesÜietics, a book by two Canadian authors, Arthur Kroker and David Cook, promotes such a sea change in the theoretical landscape and along the way presents a joyous recapitulation ofthe latest fads in postmodern thinking. The new apostolic generation ofpostmodern critics seems to enjoy the beautiful new things that can be bought for bucks, worrying at the same time that bucks may be losing some of their purchasing power. Like Hari-Krishnas dancing in the street they luckily possess a sort of happy consciousness which also recalls their puritanical great grandfathers who regarded profligacy as the greatest sin and much preferred saving to spending. In what follows I want to draw a portrait of this new postmodern posture. A few main assumptions underlie Kroker's and Cook's wake for postmodernism, which, in its peculiar genre of philosophic obituary, epitomizes and thus prepares for future oblivion views which were exceedingly popular in the preceding decade. First of all, the authors adopt Baudrillard's equation of Marx and Nietzsche: "Marx and Nietzsche shared a deep and common affinity in meditating upon historical (Christian) and materialistic (capitalist) expressions ofthewill ofpower."3 From Baudrillard's perspective Marx appears as a pathetic romantic who tried to defend the "referential illusion" by renaturalizing concrete labor even though its entirely abstract character was brilliandy revealed in Das Kapital. Baudrillard... (shrink)

In psychological research, ressentiment is alluded to as a negative emotional response directed at social groups that are mostly marked as ‘inferior others’. However, conceptual work on this notion is sorely missing. In our conceptual proposal, we use the notion of ‘moral emotions’ as a starting point: typically referred to as “other-condemning” moral emotions (Haidt), psychologists have loosely conceptualised anger, contempt and disgust as a set of negative emotions that have distinct elicitors and involve affective responses to sanction moral misconduct (...) of ‘others’. Though this conglomerate of different other-condemning emotions might describe emotions of ressentiment, we argue that the phenomenon itself is a more complex sentiment. Therefore, we apply Withy’s concept of ‘disclosive posture’ to account for the different psychological processes underlying ressentiment. Disclosing refers to a specific openness to the world, which in the case of ressentiment implies a specific awareness of and sensibility for instances of inequality, grudge, or disfavour. Ressentiment thus becomes a perceptual tool in morally relevant everyday situations. The term ‘posture’ refers to a habitualised, embodied comportment or action tendency that leads to the adoption of a negative attitude and stance towards others. Drawing on Withy, we discuss ressentiment’s similarities (and differences) to the closely related concept of hatred (Szanto, Vendrell Ferran) to embed the analysis of ressentiment in a broader social framework. (shrink)

Within bioethics, Kant’s conception of autonomy is often portrayed as excessively rationalistic, abstract, and individualistic, and, therefore, far removed from the reality of patients’ needs. Drawing on recent contributions in Kantian philosophy, we argue that specific features of Kantian autonomy remain relevant for medical ethics and for patient experience. We use contemporary end-of-life illness narratives—a resource that has not been analyzed with respect to autonomy—and show how they illustrate important Kantian themes, namely, the duty to know oneself, the interest (...) in elaborating universalizable principles, and the emphasis on ideals as points of orientation that guide behavior without ever being fully realized. As Kant does, the patient-authors discussed here perceive the end of life as a moment to reflect on the constitutive principles which have governed that life, thereby offering a privileged moment to pursue self-knowledge. We argue that bioethical conceptions of autonomy stand to gain if they revise their conception of Kantian moral philosophy as too formal, abstract, and detached from emotions and personal relationships to be helpfully applied. (shrink)

Persistent Postural-Perceptual Dizziness, also known as PPPD or 3PD, is a chronic functional vestibular disorder characterized by persistent sensation of rocking or swaying unsteadiness and/ or non-spinning dizziness without vertigo lasting at least 3 months. Symptoms typically worsen with upright posture, head or body motion and exposure to busy or visually rich environments. The article describes the application of Infra-Low Frequency Neurofeedback over 32 sessions on an unmedicated individual with symptoms related to PPPD that were still present 3 years after (...) the initial diagnosis. Along with significant reduction in those symptoms, other accompanying symptoms were markedly improved with ILF NFB. Consistent symptom tracking from session to session, as well as before and after CPT data were used to document reported changes with ILF NF. (shrink)

Physical fatigue negatively affects postural control, resulting in impaired balance performance in young and older adults. Similar effects on postural control can be observed for mental fatigue mainly in older adults. Controversial results exist for young adults. There is a void in the literature on the effects of fatigue on balance and cortical activity. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the acute effects of PF and MF on postural sway and cortical activity. Fifteen healthy young adults aged 28 ± 3 (...) years participated in this study. MF and PF protocols comprising of an all-out repeated sit-to-stand task and a computer-based attention network test, respectively, were applied in random order. Pre and post fatigue, cortical activity and postural sway were tested during a challenging bipedal balance board task. Absolute spectral power was calculated for theta, alpha-2, beta-1, and beta-2 in frontal, central, and parietal regions of interest and baseline-normalized. Inference statistics revealed a significant time-by-fatigue interaction for CoPd and CoPv, and a significant main effect of time for CoP variability. Post hoc analyses showed a significant increase in CoPd and CoPv following PF but not MF. For cortical activity, a significant time-by-fatigue interaction was found for relative alpha-2 power in parietal areas. Post hoc tests indicated larger alpha-2 power increases after PF compared to MF. In addition, changes in parietal alpha-2 power and measures of postural sway did not correlate significantly, irrespective of the applied fatigue protocol. No significant changes were found for the other frequency bands, irrespective of the fatigue protocol and ROI under investigation. Thus, the applied PF protocol resulted in increased postural sway and CoP variability accompanied by enhanced alpha-2 power in the parietal ROI while MF led to increased CoP variability and alpha-2 power in our sample of young adults. Potential underlying cortical mechanisms responsible for the greater increase in parietal alpha-2 power after PF were discussed but could not be clearly identified as cause. Therefore, further future research is needed to decipher alternative interpretations. (shrink)

This article focuses on the ethics of education and training, from an interdisciplinary perspective that is itself structurally embedded in the multi-referential nature of the education and training sciences. We draw on Daniel Sibony's conceptualization of the in-between as a professional position in education and training to consider ways of reconciling educational and training support and proximity with the realities of physical distance in digital interventions, all in an ethical way. We discuss the conditions under which support can be successfully (...) incorporated into distance learning (1), dialecticize presence and digital technology in education and training (2), and finally lay some groundwork for an ethics of benevolent digital support, based on the concept of authority and its mutations in hypermodern democracies (3). (shrink)

abstract: Anaxagoras is notorious for his view that every perception is accompanied by pain but that not all concurrent pains are distinctly felt by the perceiving subject. This thesis is reported and criticized by Aristotle's heir Theophrastus in his De Sensibus. Traditionally, scholars believe that Theophrastus rejects Anaxagoras's thesis of the ubiquity of pain as counterintuitive, with the appeal to unfelt pain looking like a desperate category mistake given that pain is nothing but a feeling. Contra the traditional view, this (...) paper argues that Theophrastus neither aims to defend ordinary phenomenology nor is bothered by the concept of unfelt pain; instead, he develops a series of new Aristotelian arguments to defend a controversial, optimistic picture about the distribution of affective qualities in animal life. More than a supplement to Aristotle's psychology, his engagement with Anaxagoras reveals an important yet often ignored ethical concern behind the Peripatetic philosophy of perception. (shrink)

Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in subject matter; some meaning shift is not. In this paper I argue that an account of linguistic meaning can accommodate the first kind of case, but that a theory of concepts is required to accommodate the second. Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts that provide the stability. The stability provided by concepts allows for genuine disagreement and ameliorative change (...) in the context of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Is it possible to develop a discourse that describes human experience but avoids theoretical concepts such as consciousness and qualia, and do so in such a way that the difficult problems are resolved? It strikes me that Gordon Globus is attempting to do something like this. It seems an honorable project from the perspectives of both the analytic philosophy of mind and the postmodern celebration of multiple discourses. I want to suggest, however, that in his account the problems of qualia (...) and consciousness are not really dissipated, but simply dressed up in different garb. (shrink)

Maker education mainly involves “hands-on” as the core concept and combines various educational theories to redefine interactions between learners and teachers in a learning environment. Identification of meaningful “hands-on” behaviors is crucial to evaluate students’ learning performance, although an instructor’s observation of every student is not feasible. However, such observation is possible with the aid of the artificial intelligence image processing technique; the AI learning behavior recognition system can serve as the second eyes of teachers, thus accounting for individual differences. (...) However, in previous studies, learning behavior recognition was applied to the traditional or static classroom. A behavior recognition system for identifying “hands-on” actions in the learning context has still not been developed. Therefore, this study designed a human posture evaluation system, obtained human articulation node information from learning field images, and built a learning behavior recognition model suitable for maker education based on the AI convolutional neural network. A learning behavior model was defined, along with a number of student behavior indexes. Subsequently, the effectiveness of the model and behavior indexes was verified through practical learning activities. The model evaluation results indicated that the proposed model achieved a training accuracy of 0.99 and a model accuracy of 0.83. Thus, the model can be applied to dynamic maker activity learning environments. (shrink)

Formal implication is usually represented by symbolization such as ‘ φx ⊃ Ψx,’ which may be read, “for all values of ‘x’, φx implies Ψx.” If the values of the variable ‘x’, in ‘φx’ and ‘Ψx’ be ‘x1’ ‘x2’ ‘x3’, etc., then … ‘φx’ formally implies ‘Ψx’ if and only if, whatever values of ‘x’, ‘xn’, be chosen, ‘φxn’ materially implies ‘Ψxn’ …However, this still leaves it doubtful which of two possible interpretations of expressions having the form ‘ φx ⊃ (...) Ψx’ is to be taken as correct. … It means one thing to say, “Every existent having the property φ … has also the property Ψ,” and it means quite a different thing to say, “Every thinkable thing which should have the property φ must also have the property Ψ.” The second of these holds only when having the properly φ logically entails having the property Ψ; when ‘Ψx’ is deductible from ‘φx’. … The first of them, however, holds not only in such cases … but also in every case where among existent things, one property is universally accompanied by another. (shrink)

Objections arise to the concept of artistic intention based upon the psychology of a period. Here too we experience trends or volitions which can only be explained by precisely those artistic creations which in their own turn demand an explanation on the basis of these trends and volitions. Thus "Gothic" man or the "primitive" from whose alleged existence we wish to explain a particular artistic product is in truth the hypostatized impression which has been culled from the works of art (...) themselves. Or it is a question of intentions and evaluations which have become conscious as they find their formulation in the contemporary theory of art or in contemporary art criticism. Thus these formulations, just like the individual theoretical statements of the artists themselves, can once more only be phenomena parallel to the artistic products of the epoch; they cannot already contain their interpretation. Here again this parallel phenomenon would, in its entirety, represent an extraordinarily interesting object of humanistic investigation, but it would be incapable of defining in detail a methodologically comprehensible volition. So, too, the view of art which accompanies a period's artistic output can express the artistic volition of the period in itself but cannot put a name to it for us. This view can be of eminent significance when we are seeking a logical explanation for the perception of tendencies dominating at a given time and thus also for the judgment of artistic volition at that time, which must also be interpreted.Erwin Panofsky, the renowned art historian, was professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, until his death in 1968. Among his many books and articles are Meaning in the Visual Arts, Early Netherlandish Painting, and Renaissance and Renascenes in Western Art. Kenneth Northcott is professor of German and comparative literature at the University of Chicago and the translator of Arnold Hauser's Sociology of Art . Joel Snyder is chairman of the committee on general studies in the humanities at the University of Chicago. (shrink)

Some concepts of collective action have been examined. It is found that collective action is formed as a result of interaction of individuals within the group, collective etc. Such social environment in which collective action appears, is the educational process, which aims to provide protection, safety and educational needs of direct interaction between the preschool children and children of younger school age. The forms of work: group and collective, have been analyzed. It is found that acting in a group or (...) team, the participants of educational process gather around the common goal, collective action, that occurs, becomes the value in the process of achieving this goal. That is, it encourages the collective, group to act in the given direction. This action is accompanied by the interaction, due to which raises the phenomenology of collective, above- and beyond the individual. It is based on the formation in the mind of each individual subject of communication the subjective model of the content and the process of interaction, which seems to be shared with other participants (the subject feels as if its co-author) and the presence of which can be displayed in the form of a general image of the subject of interaction that occurs in interpersonal space and fills it. (shrink)

By employing Peirce’s semiotics, Totalitarianism is distinguished indexically from forms of Dictatorship and Authoritarianism. The former can be cast, as Arendt argued, to initiate a project for world domination dispensing with any sense of Authoritarianism in forwarding some purely fictitious conception where violence is manifested in terror. Alternatively, distortion of intellectual activity may issue within Populism so that the rule of Demagogy emerges initiating Despotism or a form of Dictatorship – either Commissarial or Sovereign form – where lawless violence (...) is sustained by secret police inducing fear but not terror. In the case of Authoritarianism induced iconically in a populace, violence may be tolerated accompanying either lawmaking or lawpreserving, both to be separated from Benjamin’s sense of pure violence. The latter – whether humanistically or spiritually understood – transcends both utilitarianism and sheer arbitrariness. (shrink)

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self-contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self-contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self-contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a (...) sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic. (shrink)

As kendo continues to gain in international popularity, there are hopes for its adoption in the Olympic Games as an international competitive event, even while moves to further this aim have not necessarily occurred in Japan or elsewhere. One reason for the efforts to achieve a form of globalization of kendo different from Judo is the attempt to adhere to and preserve the unique concepts kendo, the sport embodies by remaining true to the forms of traditional Japanese culture. This is (...) epitomized by the importance given to zanshin (the combination of posture and fighting spirit after striking), one of the key concepts that constitute yuko-datotsu in kendo. Our purpose in this study is to discuss the intersubjective nature of the decisions regarding the conditions for point-scoring in competitive sports. In particular, we will focus on the aesthetics required for zanshin in kendo, focusing on the theory behind yuko-datotsu (point score), which will also considerably influence its international dissemination. Kendo is characterized from the perspective of western rationalism as an appreciation of form and rules of behavior referred to as formalism and, in this respect, it has unique characteristics differing from those of modern sports that are disseminated internationally. In martial arts, besides refinement and proficiency in the rules of behavior by rigidly adhering to form and rules of behavior and repetition, the aim is to transcend said form and the rules of behavior and embody the spiritual nature dwelling in the background. Kendo should remain traditional path and keep zanshin in the value of point (yuko-datotsu) for its virtue. Kendo has not yet developed into an international competitive sport, but it is in the process of traversing that Geido path as a Do for the purpose of character building through it. Throughout life, one should try to devote oneself to kendo with thought for the value of transcending form and the rules of behaviour, and embodying the spiritual nature of the sport that inheres in its background. That is why one may perceive an evident hesitation or indeed negativity regarding the possible internationalization or development as an Olympic event. (shrink)

In this paper, I deal with recognising an appropriate criterion for distinguishing two competing conceptions of the propositional content among the content realists—the Fregean and the Russellian—especially in connection to some classical proponents of the realist view (Frege, Moore, and Russell). My starting point is a survey characterisation of the two conceptions and the accompanying classification of Russell’s and Moore’s conceptions of the propositional content, which I find problematic on several accounts. I set up a context for my consideration and (...) elaborate on why I find it problematic. My central point is that, given how the classical proponents of propositions understood their respective conceptions, as well as how more recent proponents of propositions (for example, David Kaplan) understood them, one should draw the distinction between the Fregean and the Russellian conception on the grounds of what propositional components do rather than the nature of propositional components (unless, of course, one ultimately reduces the latter to the former). (shrink)

: The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report issued in April 2005 shows how severely our civilisation is degrading and overstressing the natural systems that support human life and all other lives on earth. An important critical challenge, especially for the eco-humanities, is to help us understand the conceptual frameworks and systems that disappear the crucial support provided by natural systems and prevent us from seeing nature as a field of agency. This paper considers the currently popular concept of a cultural landscape (...) as an example of a concept that downplays natural agency, and discusses the epistemology of nature scepticism and nature cynicism that often accompanies its vogue in the humanities. Can some philosophical disentangling of senses of nature (often considered the most complex term in the language) allow sceptics their main points without placing them on such a strong collision course with the requirements of commonsense and survival? (shrink)

In The Concept of Model Alain Badiou establishes a new logical ’concept of model’. Translated for the first time into English, the work is accompanied by an exclusive interview with Badiou in which he elaborates on the connections between his early and most recent work-for which the concept of model remains seminal.

The recent upsurge of interest, political and professional, in the notion of spiritual education would appear to have been accompanied by no greater clarity in our understanding of teaching, learning and development in the spiritual domain; indeed, most official and other literature on the spiritual aspects of schooling seems blissfully unaware of much need for rigorous analysis regarding a domain of usage which licenses different and not clearly consistent conceptions of spiritual experience and enquiry. While attempting to give more precise (...) expression to these competing views, this paper proceeds to argue for the greater coherence of one particular conception over its likely rivals. (shrink)

One way to characterize the special relation that one has to one's own body is to say that only one's body appears to one from the inside. Although widely accepted, the nature of this specific experiential mode of presentation of the body is rarely spelled out. Most definitions amount to little more than lists of the various body senses (including senses of posture, movement, heat, pressure, and balance). It is true that body senses provide a kind of informational access to (...) one's own body, which one has to no other bodies, by contrast to external senses like vision, which can take many bodies as their object. But a theory of bodily awareness needs to take into account recent empirical evidence that indicates that bodily awareness is infected by a plague of multisensory effects, regardless of any dichotomy between body senses and external senses. Here I will argue in favour of a multimodal conception of bodily awareness. I will show that the body senses fail to fully account for the content of bodily experiences. I will then propose that vision helps compensate for the insufficiencies of the body senses in people who can see. I will finally argue that the multimodality of bodily experiences does not prevent privileged access to one's body. (shrink)

Current approaches to machine consciousness (MC) tend to offer a range of characteristic responses to critics of the enterprise. Many of these responses seem to marginalize phenomenal consciousness, by presupposing a 'thin' conception of phenomenality. This conception is, we will argue, largely shared by anti- computationalist critics of MC. On the thin conception, physiological or neural or functional or organizational features are secondary accompaniments to consciousness rather than primary components of consciousness itself. We outline an alternative, 'thick' (...) conception of phenomenality. This shows some signposts in the direction of a more adequate approach to MC. (shrink)

This is the first critical edition and study of a unique and important Muslim polemic against Christians and Jews. The Book of Disputation was written in Arabic by a Mudejar (subject Muslim living under Christian rule in late medieval Iberia) and offers new insight into the cultural and intellectual life of this Muslim minority. The text advances arguments drawn from natural philosophy-largely from Aristotle and Averroes-along with more traditional revealed sources such as the Qur'an and the Bible. Mudejar communities suffered (...) a diminution of religious and political intelligentsia over time. This text, however, highlights the author's particular conception of the world as the creation of God in his defense of Islam, demonstrates the vitality of intellectual life among Muslims in medieval Christian Iberia, and documents the continued cultivation of natural philosophy within these Muslim communities. (shrink)

The subject of the article is the concept of a universal language and a reflection on its importance for law. The starting point is a presentation of the history of the concept of a common language for all mankind, a concept that has always accompanied man – it is present in the Bible, in the ancient writings of Near Eastern peoples, it was alive in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, and it experienced its particular heyday – among other (...) reasons because of the gradual abandonment of Latin as the language of science – in the seventeenth century, an age that was reformist by definition. Since its inception, the concept of a universal language has been inextricably linked with the idea of world peace and universal happiness for all people. It is significant that in most universal language designs, regardless of the era, there were, to a greater or lesser extent, references to the utility of such languages for law. The author, tracing the development of the concept of a universal language, focuses on its fullest contemporary development: Esperanto. Esperanto, like previous universal language designs, places particular emphasis on ideas linked to the concept of a universal language, especially the idea of peaceful coexistence and understanding between peoples. In this context, it is reasonable to ask what role Esperanto can play in the development of certain branches of law, especially international law. Given the position of English as the language of legal acts of international importance, the answer to this question is currently not clear. (shrink)

In this paper, I critique two conceptions of mechanisms, namely those put forth by Stuart Glennan (Erkenntnis 44:49–71, 1996; Philosophy of Science 69:S342–S353, 2002) and Machamer et al. (Philosophy of Science 67:1–25, 2000). Glennan’s conception, I argue, cannot account for mechanisms involving negative causation because of its interactionist posture. MDC’s view encounters the same problem due to its reificatory conception of activities—this conception, I argue, entails an onerous commitment to ontological dualism. In the place of Glennan and (...) MDC, I propose a “modified conception” of mechanisms, which (a) obviates the problem of negative causation by reinterpreting MDC’s activities according to a “descriptivist” account, and (b) avoids MDC’s problem by postulating a monistic ontology of entities. Thus, by solving these problems, my modified conception offers a cogent, more adequate alternative to Glennan’s and MDC’s conceptions of mechanisms. (shrink)

The article focuses on the concept of the state in the works of the German sociologist M. Weber and his contemporary, the anarchist G. Landauer. Specifically, it is commonly thought that Weber has a unique interpretation of the state, its nature, and inalienable characteristics. This Weberian approach did not fit into any of the traditions that existed at that time in Germany (for example, represented by H. Kelsen, G. Jellinek, and O. von Gierke). However, the author of the article tries (...) to demonstrate that three main Weberian aspects of the state — 1) the monopoly on legitimate physical violence, 2) the relationship of domination, which is accompanied by a minimum desire to obey, and 3) the chance for the regular reproducibility of these relationships — are consonant with Landauer’s concept of the state. This discovered conceptual affinity allows one to look at Weber’s sociology from new angles, without being impacted by the personal beliefs of the German scientist, who very critically treated anarchism as a socio-political movement. In the final section of the paper, the author discusses the modern project of “anarchist sociology”, which also uses Weberian methodology. The paper argues that “anarchist sociology” might be a promising social science with ts unique vision of several key sociological topics, such as domination, power, or social inequality. (shrink)

This article focuses on the two types of conception of time, namely, the time of history and the time of ethics. The former is a conception of time that one views or situates one’s lifetime in or with history, whereas the latter a time of our personal lifetime interrupted by the intervention of the other and the accompanied ethical significance. This article argues that Classical Confucianism has interesting specifications of these two conceptions of time. In particular, it shows (...) a correspondence and interaction between the two. Then, it is not difficult to catch up with what our tradition has been aiming at through ethical practices, and the tradition in turn prompts us to be ethical. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Key Concepts: Criminal ResponsibilityCarl Elliott (bio)AbstractMentally disordered persons occasionally do things for which we would ordinarily blame or even punish a non-disordered person. We often do not blame mentally disordered persons for these actions, however, because we regard mental disorders, at least in some circumstances, as an excuse from moral responsibility. For moral philosophy and the law, the challenge is to understand the specific circumstances under which a mental (...) disorder should excuse an offender from responsibility for his or her actions. Because different types of psychopathology influence a person’s intentions and character in very different ways, judgments of responsibility crucially depend upon the specific nature of a mental disorder. They also depend on adequate understandings of concepts such as moral understanding, especially in the case of psychopathy, as well as an understanding of the reasons why mental disorders may excuse a person from responsibility.Keywordsintention, M’Naghten Rules, irresistible impulse, personality disorders, psychopathyThe mentally ill often do things for which they are not responsible. This has long been recognized, by both morality and the law. But just which mentally ill persons should be excused, and under what circumstances, is an altogether more complicated affair.In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes two types of involuntary actions, for which (by implication) a person might be excused from responsibility: those done in ignorance, and those that were compelled. Both excuses are variations on the theme of non-intention. If a person did not intend to act as he did—either because he did not know what he was doing, or because he could not help acting as he did—then he is not responsible for the action. Intention is also a key point for the law, which traditionally has said that for a crime to have been committed, it must be accompanied by evil intent, or mens rea (literally, “guilty mind.”)The problem comes in saying how these distinctions play out for the mentally ill offender. The most widely used standards for determining criminal (legal) responsibility are based on the M’Naghten Rules, which excuse a person from responsibility for an act if, as a result of a mental disorder, he did not know the nature and quality of the act, or did not know that the act was wrong. This standard works nicely for the paradigmatic cases of mentally ill offenders; it would excuse, for example, the person with paranoid schizophrenia who strikes out violently at a person he falsely believes is threatening his life. However, it is unclear on several other points, the most famous of which relates to Aristotle’s excusing condition of compulsion. How should we regard those people, for example, whose psychosis impairs their ability to control their behavior, or whose mental disorders involve the control of their unusual desires, such as kleptomania, pyromania, pedophilia and voyeurism? Many of the [End Page 305] latter such persons are aware of the nature and quality of what they desire to do, and they are aware that it is wrong, but they find great difficulty in resisting their desires.One well-known effort to remedy this deficiency was the “irresistible impulse” test, which excused those persons who as a result of their condition had acted on desires that were irresistible. Yet the difference between an irresistible desire and a desire not resisted has proven notoriously difficult to distinguish, in practice as well as in theory.Another chronic source of philosophical controversy is the question of responsibility for one’s character. In psychiatry, this debate surfaces most often with patients who have personality disorders. Ordinarily, since persons cannot control whether they incur a mental illness, they can be excused from responsibility for some actions they have taken while they were mentally ill. However, personality disorders are also (in some sense) beyond a person’s control, being the product of genetic inheritance and upbringing. This raises old issues of psychological determinism: if personality disorders are beyond a person’s control, is it just to hold that person responsible for the actions that result from them?On the other hand, even if personality disorders are within the proper domain of psychiatry, they are obviously quite different from... (shrink)

Igal Kvart A Coding Conception in Action-Directed-Pragmatics -/- I present formal Pragmatics for a domain in Pragmatics that I call Action-Directed Pragmatics, which focuses on the Pragmatic riddle of how implicit contents are conveyed and understood, by adopting a coding model, in which the speaker and addressee simulate each other iteratively in a deliberative context (an ‘action-pregnant’ one). The implicit content, conveyed by a speaker and decoded by her addressee, in such cases, consists in the specified steered-to action, plus (...) modulations on the action-polarity (pro or con) and the degree of the so-called Steering Thrust that accompanies such assertions and is conveyed by verbal locutions, intonation, and/or bodily and facial gestures. There are two main tasks to model (in a given setup and conversational context): First, how is the speaker, with a steered-to action in mind (and Steering Thrust), to select an assertion so as to (say) optimize the successful transmission and decoding of its implicit pragmatic content by her and her addressee? Second, how does the addressee, given an assertion by the speaker, decipher the implicit pragmatic content conveyed via it? Both will invoke pertinent information they have about each other and the setup/context in order to best encode and best decode the implicit pragmatic content. (This coding mechanism proposed here is not offered for the ubiquitous ‘frozen’, ‘trivial’ or ‘routinized’ pragmatic messages.) A prelude to this formal Pragmatics is a general formal Pragmatic account of Assertibility in contexts that are multi-normative (which is the common case). I focus here only on Epistemic/Semantic and Instrumental Norms. A linear representation of degrees of Overall Assertibility (i.e., taking into account various operative norms) will be an n-dimensional qualitative vector space with a function that computes them given different degrees of sub-normative Assertibility on each axis. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

Igwebuike is a traditional knowledge system undergirded by the metaphysical assumption that the world is a totality of interconnected and interrelated entities.1–4 African scholars in West Africa often invoke igwebuike to make sense of African ethical, social and political perspectives that are grounded in the theory of Afro-communitarianism. Afro-communitarianism is primarily a socioethical theory that is concerned with the articulation of the moral relationship between the individual and the community. The term igwebuike is derived from the Igbo root words igwe (...) (number), bu (is) and ike (strength). Thus, the term igwebuike translates as ‘number is strength’.3 4 As an ethical theory, igwebuike espouses the ontological relatedness of the variety of entities in the world and the moral relatedness of all humans by virtue of their common possession of life, with the accompanying human capacity for feeling and thinking. Resultantly, it prescribes solidarity, companionship and identification with others as virtues that promote human flourishing. The reverence for life and humanness explicitly forbids actions that diminish this superlative and irreplaceable quality.5 This concept can be helpful in offering a conceptual framework for making healthcare more …. (shrink)

This essay examines the concept of criticism in the early works of Walter Benjamin. Critique is for Benjamin an attitude toward objectivity that treats it as a medium of reflection, and embodies a politics of ‘sobriety.’ This critical posture provides the early Benjamin with an original method of critiquing capitalism as a form of religion. Capitalist religion is characterized by the proliferation of ‘debt’ that robs the subject of the capacity for critical experience. Art critique and the critique of capitalism (...) are two valences of the concept of critique: positive critique, and negative critique. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, first, that Kant's technical definition of purposiveness in § 10 of the third Critique is designed to abstract from all forward-looking considerations (teleological, intentional, normative, etc.) that accompany the conventional understanding of the term. Kant seeks to establish a strictly backward-looking, etiological conception of purposiveness in order to capture the causal link connecting artifacts with their concepts. I argue, second, that he succeeds. Kant's etiological conception of purposiveness neither collapses into mere mechanism, nor (...) smuggles normative considerations in through the backdoor. I frame my discussion by critically engaging Hannah Ginsborg's reading of § 10 – a leading representative of normative interpretations of Kant's notion of purposiveness. (shrink)

We point out some concepts that appear rather frequently in physics discussions, which, despite a seemingly innocent initial appearance, turn out to have important implicit implications that put into question the very assumption of their meaningfulness. The message of this essay is that, in order to avoid the ensuing confusions, their usage should be accompanied with clarifications that make them meaningful, and then to confront the often uncomfortable underlying assumptions required to do so. In particular, we will visit the notions (...) of novel physics occurring at a certain energy scale, or at certain distance from a black hole’s event horizon, and the various meanings of the word “fluctuations”. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to clarify Kant’s conception of self-contentment, which is a particular kind of satisfaction associated with being a virtuous person. I do so by placing the term in the context of Kant’s answer to an objection made by Kant’s contemporary Christian Garve, namely the objection that if virtuous action is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction, then virtuous action might only performed in order to experience this feeling of satisfaction . I begin by illustrating (...) the main features of Kant’s concept of self-contentment before turning to Garve’s objection and Kant’s response to it. I conclude by clarifying the differences between self-contentment, respect for the moral law, and Kant’s concept of moral pleasure. (shrink)

Much liberal theorizing of the past twenty years has been built around a conception of neutrality and an accompanying virtue of reasonableness according to which citizens ought to be able to view public policy debates from a perspective detached from their comprehensive conceptions of the good. The view of “justifi catory neutrality” that emerges from this view is discussed and rejected as embodying controversial views about the relationship of individuals to their conceptions of the good. It is shown to (...) be based upon a “protestant” assumption according to which conceptions of the good can be cashed out in terms of propositional beliefs. An alternative conception of reasonableness, grounded in the stable disposition of individuals to prefer social peace over conflict is described. It is argued that it better satisfies the neutralist requirement than do theories of justifi catory neutrality. (shrink)

_‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material are consistently high.' – __Chris (...) Daly, University of Manchester, UK_ Ever wondered about Gunk, Brains in a Vat or Frankfurt’s Nefarious Neurosurgeon? With complete explanations of these terms and more, _Metaphysics: The Key Concepts_ is an accessible and engaging introduction to the most widely studied and challenging concepts in metaphysics. The authors clearly and lucidly define and discuss key terms and concepts, under the themes of: time particulars & universals realism & antirealism free will personal identity causation and laws. Arranged in an easy to use A-Z format, each concept is explored and illustrated with engaging and memorable examples, and accompanied by an up-to-date guide to further reading. Fully cross-referenced throughout, this remarkable reference guide is essential reading for students of philosophy and all those interested in the nature of reality. (shrink)