In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant diagnoses an antinomy of taste: either determinate concepts exhaust judgments of taste or they do not. That is to say, judgments of taste are either objective and public or subjective and private. On the objectivity thesis, aesthetic value is predicable of objects. But determining the concepts that would make a judgment of taste objective is a vexing matter. Who can say which concepts these would be? To what authority does (...) one appeal? On the subjectivity thesis, aesthetic value is not predicable of objects. But this threatens judgments of taste with a sort of relativism. Can we not firmly assert the aesthetic value of any object? Have we no authority to make criticisms of taste? Following John McDowell’s “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World”, I will hold that aesthetic value is neither objective nor subjective, but rather intersubjective. But, contra McDowell, I will argue that the validity that intersubjective aesthetic value bestows on judgments of taste must assume an indeterminate absolute conception of reality, of the world as it is in itself. Only such a conceptual resource can in turn make intelligible the notion of a shared or common sense according to which a judgment of taste can be universally valid, that is, valid for all subjects. Finally, I will consider an objection to common sense in matters of taste. (shrink)

A theory of aesthetic value should explain what makes aesthetic value good. Current views about what makes aesthetic value good privilege the individual’s encounter with aesthetic value—listening to music, reading a novel, writing a poem, or viewing a painting. What makes aesthetic value good is its benefit to the individual appreciator. But engagement with aesthetic value is often a social, participatory matter: sharing and discussing aesthetic goods, imitating (...) aesthetic agents, dancing, cooking, dining, or making music together. This article argues that we should understand aesthetic value in a way that centers these social forms of aesthetic engagement. To this end, the article argues that there is a social practice of aesthetic valuing, characterized as a participatory practice governed by the value of aesthetic community, which engages us in the social development of our capacities for discretionary valuing and volitional openness. Current theories of aesthetic value have trouble capturing the character of the practice of aesthetic valuing, and this motivates a novel communitarian theory of aesthetic value: aesthetic value is what is worthy of engagement in the social practice of aesthetic valuing. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of climate change have mainly conceived of it as a moral or ethical problem, but climate change also raises new challenges for aesthetics. In this paper I show that, in particular, climate change (1) raises difficult questions about the status of aesthetic judgments about the future, or ‘future aesthetics’; and (2) puts into relief some challenging issues at the intersection of aesthetics and ethics. I maintain that we can rely on aesthetic predictions to enable us to (...) grasp, in some sense, aesthetic value in environments affected by climate change and, through a discussion of three hypothetical cases, I argue that, although moral considerations will press on aesthetic judgments, aesthetic value will not necessarily be trumped by them. (shrink)

In his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, Friedrich Schiller draws a striking connection between aesthetic value and individual and political freedom, claiming that, ‘it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom’. However, contemporary ways of thinking about freedom and aesthetic value make it difficult to see what the connection could be. Through a careful reconstruction of the Letters, we argue that Schiller’s theory of aesthetic value serves as (...) the key to understanding not only his view of aesthetic engagement, but also his distinctive account of individual and political freedom. In Part I, we develop a reconstruction of Schiller's view that aesthetic value is the only path to individual freedom and in Part II we analyze how Schiller connects aesthetic value to political freedom. In the end, we show that Schiller defends a non-hedonic, action-oriented, communitarian theory of aesthetic value and a theory of freedom that makes the aesthetic not just supererogatory but fundamental for any fully autonomous life. Although we have lost touch with this way of thinking about aesthetic value and freedom, we submit that it is illuminating for contemporary thinking about both. (shrink)

This chapter talks about the power of music, how characters in South Park use it in telling stories, and how music conveys ideas in the context of Western philosophy. But South Park does raise questions about music that philosophers— particularly Plato—have dealt with again and again. Despite their flaws, these Greek thinkers' views were instrumental to asking questions about music's impact (often referred to as ethos), its mathematical properties in relation to the universe, and how these two aspects interact with (...) one another. Phil Collins and Asia may not survive history's merciless aesthetic filter, just as the aulos instrument vanished long ago, but where the underlying philosophy is concerned, the issues are timeless. (shrink)

Scientists often use aesthetic values in the evaluation and choice of theories. Aesthetic values are not only regarded as leading to practically more useful theories but are often taken to stand in a special epistemic relation to the truth of a theory such that the aesthetic merit of a theory is evidence of its truth. This paper explores what aesthetic considerations influence scientists' reasoning, how such aesthetic values relate to the utility of a scientific theory, (...) and how one can justify the epistemic role for such values. The paper examines ways in which the link between beauty and truth can be defended, the challenges facing such accounts, and explores alternative epistemic roles for aesthetic values in scientific practice. (shrink)

Can one have an aesthetically valuable experience of fiction that takes an immoral perspective? Some have argued that one can. However, some important objections have been raised against this idea. Two objections are: that the immorality involved is confined to fictional reality, and that the aesthetic value of immoral fiction is dictated by a pluralistic attitude that not everyone accepts. My aim is to respond to these challenges and to argue, on the basis of two examples, that even (...) an unlimited immoral perspective can enhance a widespread aesthetic value. (shrink)

Local food is often defended on environmental grounds. However, environmental defenses of local food are flawed, and all environmental defenses are limited as they at most establish that local food is instrumentally valuable. These deficiencies motivate a different approach. By drawing on the aesthetics of engagement, a theory of environmental aesthetics, I argue that local food has an overlooked intrinsic value; it can allow people to become engaged with—and thereby aesthetically appreciate—the environment. My argument charts a comparatively neglected area (...) of aesthetics: the aesthetics of taste and smell and, more specifically, the role that these senses play in the aesthetic appreciation of the environment. (shrink)

This book defends Aestheticism- the claim that everything is aesthetically valuable and that a life lived in pursuit of aesthetic value can be a particularly good one. Furthermore, in distilling aesthetic qualities, artists have a special role to play in teaching us to recognize values; a critical component of virtue. I ground my account upon an analysis of aesthetic value as ‘objectified final value’, which is underwritten by an original psychological claim that all (...) class='Hi'>aesthetic values are distal versions of practical values. This is followed by systematic accounts of beauty, sublimity, comedy, drama, and tragedy, as well as appendix entries on the cute, the cool, the kitsch, the uncanny, the horrific, the erotic, and the furious. (shrink)

In this concise survey, intended for advanced undergraduate students of aesthetics, Alan Goldman focuses on the question of aesthetic value, using many practical examples from painting, music, and literature to make his case. Although he treats a wide variety of views, he argues for a nonrealist view of aesthetic value, showing that the personal element can never be factored out of evaluative aesthetic judgments and explaining why this is so.

In this paper, I attempt to formulate an Ingardenian conception of the literary work’s aesthetic value. Following Mitscherling’s lead, I attempt to place Ingarden’s aesthetics within his overall phenomenological-ontological project. That is, I argue that Ingarden’s aesthetics can only be properly fathomed in the context of his ontological deliberations, since, as he himself often enunciated, all his philosophical investigations constitute a realist rejoinder to Husserl’s turn toward transcendental idealism. To this end, I bring together insights from his aesthetics (...) and ontology to establish a coherent account of values, where artistic and aesthetic values are analyzed as they manifest themselves in the literary work of art. By attending to the ontology of its aesthetic (and artistic) values, I argue, the literary work’s stratified formation becomes more explicit. Keywords: Roman Ingarden, aesthetic value, artistic value, the literary work of art, ontology, aesthetics. (shrink)

According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic (...) class='Hi'>value. The aim of this paper is to point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two standard positions by defending a third neglected answer to the question above, the answer of the Value-Meriting-Pleasure [VMP] advocate. According to this answer, a certain kind of (cognitive and responsive) pleasure is connected to aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically. VMP is the view that objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to pleasure insofar as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are valuable (those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the attitude they merit. (shrink)

And indeed we think it not manly to perform music, except when drunk or for fun.Composing, performing, and listening are three familiar musical practices, each having various forms and manifestations. Aesthetic value is usually ascribed to objects—whether artistic or natural. But “object” needs to be understood here in a very wide sense, including, for example, a theatrical production or a ballet. In dealing with music, I assume that complete works are the primary bearers of such value, but (...) we need not deny it from the practices of composing and performing, for they are imbued with those properties and aspects that make their products objects of aesthetic value. I shall not deal with the many problems raised by... (shrink)

Although recent work in philosophical aesthetics has brought welcome attention to the beauty of nature, the aesthetic appreciation of animals remains rarely discussed. The existence of this gap in aesthetic theory can be traced to certain ethical difficulties with aesthetically appreciating animals. These difficulties can be avoided by focusing on the aesthetic quality of “looking fit for function.” This approach to animal beauty can be defended against the view that “looking fit” is a non-aesthetic quality and (...) against Edmund Burke’s famous critique of the connection between fitness and the beauty of animals. (shrink)

This article discusses selected conceptions of aesthetic value formulated by representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, including Kazimierz Twardowski, Władysław Witwicki, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Mieczysław Walfisz-Wallis, Stanisław Ossowski, Leopold Blaustein, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński.

The default theory of aesthetic value combines hedonism about aesthetic value with strict perceptual formalism about aesthetic value, holding the aesthetic value of an object to be the value it has in virtue of the pleasure it gives strictly in virtue of its perceptual properties. A standard theory of aesthetic value is any theory of aesthetic value that takes the default theory as its theoretical point of departure. (...) This paper argues that standard theories fail because they theorize from the default theory. (shrink)

Aesthetic value cannot be discussed separately from aesthetic experience. According to Western aesthetics discourse, the paradigm of aesthetic experience is a s.

This is a response to invited and submitted commentary on "The Pleasure of Art," published in Australasian Philosophical Reviews 1, 1 (2017). In it, I expand on my view of aesthetic pleasure, particularly how the distinction between facilitating pleasure and relief pleasure works. In response to critics who discerned and were uncomfortable with the aesthetic hedonism that they found in the work, I develop that aspect of my view. My position is that the aesthetic value of (...) a work of art is its capacity to elicit from a suitably well-informed consumer a specific kind of pleasure. (shrink)

This article has two aims. The first is to open up a line of inquiry into whether epistemic and aesthetic values interact, at the most general level. Does an overall increase in epistemic or aesthetic value in the world have an effect on the alternative value? The second, and more specific, aim is to argue that yes, it does. In particular, I argue that an increase in epistemic value would result in a decrease in (...) class='Hi'>aesthetic value, across two important dimensions. First, I argue that, if beliefs universally aligned with a commonly accepted epistemic principle—namely, doxastic correctness—then there would be less aesthetic diversity in the world. And second, I argue that, if beliefs universally aligned with doxastic correctness, then there would also be less overall aesthetic value in the world, at least in some important respects. (shrink)

The article is part of a longer argument, the gist of which stands in direct opposition to the claim implied by the article’s title. The ambition of that larger whole is to offer a theory of art evaluation together with a theoretical model showing how aesthetic value judgements can be inter-subjectively tested and justified. Here the author therefore plays devil’s advocate by citing, strengthening, and inventing arguments against the very possibility of justification or explanation of aesthetic judgements. (...) The reason is his conviction that such arguments have not been fully met. The article is thus intended as a challenge: any theory of art evaluation which assumes, or tries to establish, that some works of art are better than others or that aesthetic judgements are not just statements expressing personal likes and dislikes, should show how such arguments can be demolished. (shrink)

This work by fourteen authors, on the topic of aesthetic values, ethics, and education, gathers contributors from diverse backgrounds. University professors, theologians, international practitioners, music performers, and literary artists from different continents, i.e. Africa, Asia, and Europe, explore the profound intersection between intercultural and universal values, ethical considerations, and education through arts. The book presents essays and poems addressing the value and role of arts in challenging cultural and societal norms to nurture reasoning and social responsibility, and ultimately (...) to promote intercultural dialogue and understanding with ethics in aesthetic value and education to foster respect and collaboration. In exploring the profound intersection between these parameters through arts, this book invites readers to reimagine the world, ethics, and critical thinking in contemporary society. (shrink)

It has been claimed by Diana Raffman, that atonal (and in particular serial) music can have no aesthetic value, because it is in an important sense meaningless. This worthlessness is claimed to result from cognitive/psychological facts about human listeners that have been confirmed by empirical investigations such as those conducted by Lerdahl and Jackendoff. Similar assertions about the necessary inferiority of 12-tone music have been made by, among others, Taruskin, Cavell, and Goldman, some of whom echo Raffman’s suggestion (...) that both composers and performers of atonal music are committing a kind of fraud. This paper responds to all of those allegations. In particular, it points out that even if the empirical claim about human cognitive capacities with respect to the discernment of “local structure” in atonal works is assumed to be correct (which is actually quite doubtful), all the arguments brought by the “prosecution” against atonal music that rely on this claim are invalid. It is noted that such arguments by tonality advocates somewhat ironically rely on their own variety of what Taruskin has called “the poietic fallacy,” a gaff which he has frequently accused serialists (and perhaps alea supporters) of committing. Readers are reminded that the main basis for claims of aesthetic worth (or worthlessness) can never be primarily theoretical, but must be principally based on the experiences of beholders. (shrink)

An object has aesthetic value (henceforth: a-value) because a certain sort of cognitive engagement with it is beneficial. This grounding in mental activity expl.

Engagements with aesthetic value pervade human life. We choose these shoes because they beautifully match the pants; travel to Petra on account of its beauty; o.

The article is devoted to identifying the value of the phenomenon of aesthetic value and beauty of mathematical knowledge and the beauty of mathematical theory of teaching mathematics. The aesthetic potential of mathematical knowledge allows the use of theater technology in the educational process with the active dialogic interaction between teacher and students. The criteria of beauty in mathematical theories are distinguished: the realization of beauty as the unity of the whole, and in the disclosure of (...) the complex through the elementary; methodological interpretation of the beauty in the community of mathematical structures and optimal information content of the meta-language of mathematics; the practical embodiment of beauty in the formalization of the infinite through the finite. The beauty of mathematics is the force that permeates all the ‘layers of knowledge‘ not along, and across, although the effectiveness of mathematical activity due to aesthetic laws, which do not always lend themselves to unambiguous interpretation. In the article it is stated that, depending on the educational goals of communicative impact on the audience, in fact, ‘mathematical lectures theatricality‘ can have different characteristics, the most important of which are teachers artistry and artistic director’s work of a teacher. This cultural phenomenon that includes the theatrical talent, helps create an atmosphere of cooperation needed in varying degrees of activity for pedagogical interaction. The author believes that such approach, developed on the basis of the Stanislavsky system, allows university professors of mathematics significantly improve mathematical lectures. (shrink)

The method and criteria that are used for detecting the aesthetic value in works of art are among the key themes of aesthetic epistemology. The object of this study is to attempt a rational reconstruction of the background of art criticism. In tradition Western thought, aesthetic value lies in archieving unity in complexity, unitas multiplex. In the 20th century, this duality was enriched by a third category, intensity. In 1989, Tomáš Kulka suggested that these three (...) categorical features could be detected within works of art by applying a falsification proving method to the aesthetic value. Kulka described an intuitive process of assessing the aesthetic value of works of art by finding possible alternations that would contribute to improving and/or damaging the work of art. The number of possibilities thus found may lead us to recognize the aesthetic value of the work of art. This paper addresses Kulka's concept, emphasizing some of its potential problematic aspects and concluding with a suggested percentage modification of Kulka's concept that might better correspond with an practical background in assessing the aesthetic value of works of art. (shrink)

This chapter discusses key issues and questions about aesthetic experience and valuing of natural objects, processes, and phenomena. It begins by exploring the character of environmental, multisensory aesthetic appreciation and then examines the central debate between “scientific cognitivism” and “noncognitivism” in contemporary environmental aesthetics. In assessing this debate and the place of knowledge, imagination, and emotion in aesthetic valuing, it is argued that non-cognitive approaches have the advantage of supporting a critical pluralism that recognizes the variety and (...) breadth of aesthetic engagement with nature. Interactions between aesthetic and ethical values are also discussed, especially with respect to their role in philosophical positions such as “aesthetic preservationism” and the call for developing aesthetic theories that are consistent with environmentalism. (shrink)

In his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, Friedrich Schiller draws a striking connection between aesthetic value and individual and political freedom, claiming that, ‘it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom’. However, contemporary ways of thinking about freedom and aesthetic value make it difficult to see what the connection could be. Through a careful reconstruction of the Letters, we argue that Schiller’s theory of aesthetic value serves as (...) the key to understanding not only his view of aesthetic engagement, but also his distinctive account of individual and political freedom. Whereas in Part I, we developed a reconstruction of Schiller's view that aesthetic value is the only path to individual freedom, in Part II we analyze how Schiller connects aesthetic value to political freedom. In the end, we show that Schiller defends a non-hedonic, action-oriented, communitarian theory of aesthetic value and a theory of freedom that makes the aesthetic not just supererogatory but fundamental for any fully autonomous life. Although we have lost touch with this way of thinking about aesthetic value and freedom, we submit that it is illuminating for contemporary thinking about both. (shrink)

Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen’s proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we (...) care about arriving at good aesthetic beliefs for the sake of the values that arise in the process of doing so. The engagement is the point, so we must use our own capacities in first-hand encounters. Here I challenge Nguyen’s account. I argue that it misconstrues the value of aesthetic belief; it conflicts with restrictions on aesthetic testimony; and it has trouble harnessing engagement-value for a theory of aesthetic value. A better approach emphasizes the social character of aesthetic valuing. On this view, aesthetic valuing is a social practice structured around the collaborative exercise and improvement of certain special capacities. The autonomy and acquaintance principles tell us to engage these capacities in forming our aesthetic beliefs. Understood aright, and contrary to consensus, these rules are identical. (shrink)

This paper explores Moritz Geiger’s work on the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation and shows its potential for contemporary research. Drawing on the main tenets of Geiger’s phenomenological aesthetics as an aesthetics of value, the paper begins by elaborating his model of aesthetic appreciation. I argue that, placed in the contemporary debate, his model is close to affective models which make affective states responsible for the apprehension of the aesthetic value of an artwork, though (...) Geiger also makes important concessions to the intellectualist. Indeed, like proponents of the affective model, Geiger argues that a work’s aesthetic values are extracted by means of an affective state though the affective state in question is neither an emotion nor a feeling but a “liking”. In fact, like the intellectualist, he considers that a focus on the emotions might on certain occasions interfere in the aesthetic appreciation of the artwork. Next, I reconstruct Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in terms of a distinction between two types of emotional responses to artworks. It is argued that Geiger’s distinction offers a powerful tool to distinguish those emotions that are intrinsically related to aesthetic values from those that are not and that this distinction can be useful to understand how different kinds of emotions contribute to aesthetic appreciation. I proceed to examine the historical sources of Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in Theodor Lipps’s aesthetics and compare Geiger’s account with the works of other early phenomenologists working on values. In the final part, I illustrate the place of Geiger’s model in the contemporary discussion by means of an example. (shrink)

Modern media, particularly the Internet, have made it harder than ever to deny that the world is, in a large part, a place of misery and suffering. The war in Ukraine, the recent Turkish earthquake...

Scientists often refer to their experiments, theories, images and instruments as beautiful and report that their scientific work is a source of aesthetic experiences. How do such aesthetic values affect scientific activities, and can aesthetic values play a cognitive role in science? In this chapter, I identify the different levels at which aesthetic values shape scientific products and processes, reflect on how philosophers have justified the cognitive role of such aesthetic values, and draw insights from (...) recent discussions on the aesthetics of scientific practice for the values in science debate. (shrink)

What possesses aesthetic value? According to a broad view, it can be found almost anywhere. According to a narrower view, it is found primarily in art and is applied to other items by courtesy of sharing some of the properties that make artworks aesthetically valuable. In this paper I will defend the broad view in answering the question: how should we characterize aesthetic value and other aesthetic concepts? I will also criticize some alternative answers.

Can experiments be appreciated for their aesthetic value and what would this appreciation be focused on? This chapter identifies a number of categories that are the focus on our aesthetic appreciation of experiments and shows how these categories are rather stable across different experimental traditions. It is argued that we can find aesthetic value in the phenomena unveiled in the experimental set up, the instruments and tolls used, the results that are obtained, the process of (...) conceptualisation of the experimental set up, the experimental design and the very performance of the experiment. The chapter draws a distinction between immediately accessible to the senses beauty and intellectual beauty and argues that the ultimate source of aesthetic value is to be found in the relationship between design and significance. (shrink)

Aesthetic experience and aesthetic value are intimately connected. There are some who think the connection has been overblown and has misled philosophers to mis.

The objective of the study is to trace the evolution of costume design in the Song Dynasty, highlighting key aesthetic influences, materials, and techniques employed in clothing creation and to explore the underlying aesthetic principles and thoughts that guided costume creation in the Song Dynasty, including notions of beauty, harmony, and symbolism. This study try to investigate the specific materials and techniques used in creating Song Dynasty costumes and their impact on the overall aesthetic value, considering (...) aspects such as fabric, embroidery, dyeing, and tailoring methods. In the course of the aesthetic study, this study looked very closely at artworks from the Song Dynasty in an effort to comprehend the aesthetic concepts such as beauty, harmony, and symbolism that influenced costume design during that time period. During the materials and techniques investigation, this study used scientific approaches to get a better understanding of the materials that were used in the production of the costumes. Additionally, this study worked with specialists to get a more in-depth examination of the processes used for dyeing, embroidery, and tailoring. According to the findings, the aesthetic ideals that guided costume production underwent a process of evolution during the course of the Song Dynasty. During the early decades of the 20th century, there was an emphasis placed on elegance and harmony with nature. This is shown in the usage of delicate silks and subtle floral designs at the time. When Neo-Confucianism became more popular, ideas of integrity and symmetry began to influence costume design (Table 1 and Table 2). This resulted in color combinations that were more harmonious and the integration of yin-yang symbols.. Pseudo-evidence on silk, sophisticated needlework, state of the art natural coloring procedures and ahead tailoring techniques demonstrate how such components played their particular part towards the attractiveness of cloth products made under Song Dynasty. Firstly this research gives an understanding of the interplay diverse influences such as changing circumstances from historical, cultural and artistic perspectives that fused together to form a rich legacy in beauty and elegance that adds immensely to the understanding of the aesthetic nature of costume design throughout Song Dynasty. (shrink)

Abstract: Every sentient organism needs constantly to re-assess its environment in order to adjust to any changes in it and to ascertain which aspects are, or become, salient for its current purposes. Such adaptation is of basic evolutionary importance, but for human beings it can be difficult to achieve in the face of radical novelty or when different frames of reference are in conflict. Art by virtue of its integrated structure presents examples of how a partial unification of experience may (...) be envisaged. Art thus helps to meet our constant need for orientation and re-orientation, though its operation in this respect is invariably outside consciousness. So art can be said to have intrinsic value only within a strictly subjective, phenomenological perspective; more broadly considered from a third-person viewpoint, the value of art is instrumental. Questions then arise concerning our motivation for seeking or producing art, about the relation of art to other cultural activities, and about the role of pleasure in connection with aesthetic experience; these are briefly discussed. (shrink)

This entry surveys issues at the intersection of art and morality. Particular emphasis is placed on whether, and in what way, the moral character of a work of art influences its artistic value. Other topics include the educational function of art and artistic censorship.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a parody by the rap group 2 Live Crew of Ray Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" was "fair use" and thus did not infringe the copyright. Although the court insisted that it was not evaluating the quality of the parody, I argue that it does in fact make several aesthetic evaluations and sometimes even seems to praise the content of the parody. I first consider the stated reasons for the claimed refusal of (...) the court to evaluate aesthetic quality. Second, I examine the evaluations which the court in fact does make, at least some of which are clearly aesthetic evaluations. I then argue that aesthetic value judgments are both necessary and possible for determinations of "fair use" for such works as the "Pretty Woman" parody. (shrink)

I develop an account of the relationship between aesthetics and knowledge, focusing on scientific practice. Cognitivists infer from ‘partial sensitivity’—aesthetic appreciation partly depends on doxastic states—to ‘factivity’, the idea that the truth or otherwise of those beliefs makes a difference to aesthetic appreciation. Rejecting factivity, I develop a notion of ‘epistemic engagement’: partaking genuinely in a knowledge-directed process of coming to epistemic judgements, and suggest that this better accommodates the relationship between the aesthetic and the epistemic. Scientific (...) training (and other knowledge-directed activities), I argue, involves ‘attunement’: the co-option of aesthetic judgements towards epistemic ends. Thus, the connection between aesthetic appreciation and knowledge is psychological and contingent. This view has consequences for the warrant of aesthetic judgement in science, namely, the locus of justification is those processes of attunement, not the aesthetic judgements themselves. (shrink)

I believe the first thing to say about value is that it is something that we do. We value things. There is no value out there independent of valuing beings. Thi.

Matthes and I both hold that the central ethical harm of continuing to engage with the work of immoral artists lies in what doing so inadvertently expresses to others. (Matthes, 2021; Matthes, 2022; Willard, 2021; Willard, 2022). We also agree that there’s little wrong ethically with continuing to engage the work of immoral artists in private or within interpretive communities poised to place the ethical and the aesthetic in dialogue with each other. Matthes (2022, p. 523) notes that part (...) of his motivation for writing the book was the countless conversations he had with friends, colleagues, and strangers about the problem of immoral artists, and my experience–—everywhere from the doctor’s office to the classroom to the bike shop—was similar. Interpretive communities reappraise immoral artists’ art together.Outside of those contexts, we both advise caution. Liao (forthcoming) suggests that doing so comes at an unrecognized cost to our aesthetic agency because the source of aesthetic value is social. In response, Matthes (2022) argues that attending to the social expression of one’s aesthetic pursuits does not compromise our aesthetic agency. This seems right. Any reasonable account of the value of aesthetic agency should presumably allow for ordinary human decency to restrain one’s public expression of one’s aesthetic loves. The proper exercise of aesthetic autonomy requires not unbridled freedom, but sensitivity to the right kinds of reasons. (shrink)