In his recently published book Animals and African Ethics, Kai Horsthemke makes two important and related claims. The first is that most African metaphysical, religious, and ethical positions and perspectives on animals are anthropocentric. Second, he states that if there are one or more principles of duties regarding other animals derivable from these positions and perspectives, they are at best “indirect duties.” In this article, I critically engage with these claims in the context of the ontological beliefs and (...) ethical standpoints that flow from anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. I argue that the African metaphysical worldview and African practices on animals are not anthropocentric. The nub of my argument is that a closer examination of African practices on animals and one dominant African metaphysical worldview—one that Horsthemke engages with in the book—presents us a different conclusion, one that suggests that the worldview and practices are conceivably biocentric or ecocentric rather than anthropocentric. (shrink)

(2024). African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy. South African Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 217-222.

This book focuses on African metaphysics and epistemology, and is an exercise in decoloniality. The authors describe their approach to "decoloniality" as an intellectual repudiation of coloniality, using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Focusing specifically on both African metaphysics and African epistemology, the authors put forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. They emphasize that this book is not a project in comparative (...) philosophy, nor is it geared towards making Africa/ns the object/subjects of philosophy. Rather, the book highlights and discusses philosophical insights that have been produced from the African perspective, which the authors argue must be further developed in order to achieve decoloniality in the field of philosophy more broadly. (shrink)

The modus operandi of this paper is centered on governance and the metaphysical forces in Ogba Land. In other words the main focus of the article is that theocracy is concomitant with Ogba metaphysics. The salient points discussed include Maduabuchi Dukor’s reflection on African cosmic environment as posited in Dukor’s four great works on African philosophy. Others include Jewish theocratic tradition, Islamic theocratic tradition and Ogba theocracy and metaphysics in the light of Dukor’s philosophy. The researcher (...) adopted the literature approach to achieve the aforementioned objectives. (shrink)

Scholars of African moral thought reject the possibility of an African religious ethics by invoking at least three major reasons. The first objection to ‘ethical supernaturalism’ argues that it is part of those aspects of African culture that are ‘anachronistic’ insofar as they are superstitious rather than rational; as such, they should be jettisoned. The second objection points out that ethical supernaturalism is incompatible with the utilitarian approach to religion that typically characterises some African peoples’ orientation (...) to it. The last objection argues that religious ethics by their very nature require the feature (of revelation), which is generally lacking in African religious experiences. The facet of revelation is crucial for a religious ethics since it solves the epistemological problem of knowing the will of God or the content of morality. In this article, I construct a vitality-based African religious moral theory; and, I argue that it can successfully meet these objections. (shrink)

The theme of the human person and immortality has currently and forcefully become an issue in the face of modern materialism and dehumanization. The purpose of this paper is to investigate some philosophical issues involved in this theme with reference to Ibo mataphysics as a contribution in this area. The approach is partly interpretive and partly analytical of some cultural ideas of the Ibos. The Ibos are not total materialists in their fundamental views of reality, especially with regard to the (...) human person of which they have high regard. An analysis of some of their primitive notions and traditions shows the transcendental or metaphysical aspect of the human person. By analyzing human presence metaphysically, it is shown that personhood is a manifestation through the body. The person or Thou survives the decay of the body. The Ibo notion of death as a "passage," the cult of ancestors, belief in reincarnation and an analysis of some dreams indicate the native sense of personal immortality. In conclusion, a warning is given against imported materialism which poses a threat to the Ibo holistic view of man since the problem today is how to integrate modern scientific and technological achievements with the traditional values without losing sight of the vital transcendence of the human person. (shrink)

The claim that is examined in this chapter is that, as is bivalent logic, trivalent logic occupies a place in the field of logic. A trivalent logic is a three-value logical system, and a bivalent logic is a two-value logical system. As part of advancing this claim, the chapter uses the examples of trivalent logic in Charles Sanders Peirce’s thought, the trivalent logic of Janus, the Aymará trivalent logical system, and African trivalent logic. Using the example of ancestorhood, where (...) characteristically an ancestor, as a living dead, is both a spiritual and physical entity or is considered neither a spiritual nor physical being, the overarching view or thesis that is defended and advanced is that African trivalent logic mirrors a trivalent African metaphysics or ontology. (shrink)

Aribiah David Attoe’s central question in this book is the idea of what he calls in his subtitle “predeterministic historicity,” which I want to focus on here. There is a lot else we could discuss, but it seems like a good idea to focus on the book’s central project.

Aribiah Attoe took issue with the materialist and the non-materialist African conceptions of death by arguing that the reality of death puts pressure on the human conception of life’s meaning. He admits the reality of an afterlife experience through a causal principle that sees events in the world as the product of interactions between predetermined past events. It is an afterlife where a decomposing body continues interacting with other things in the world, not an afterlife involving consciousness. While conscious (...) meaning-making ends in the death of the body in Attoe’s materialist view, thereby affirming the conclusion that human existence is meaningless and the universe is purposeless, the conviction about life’s meaninglessness is also reinforced by the possibility of a second death, that is, the death of the transcendent consciousness in the traditional African view. In this article, I will mount two objections to Attoe’s submission. First, I argue that Attoe’s refutation of life’s meaning may be faulted by a world view devoid of the ideas of the afterlife and immortality. Life’s meaninglessness for him should have been limited to the facts of human existence in the world, not the human inability to continue meaning after death. Second, Attoe’s conception of death as finality questions his principle of causality that suggests the reality of an endless afterlife. Attoe’s overarching submission on life’s meaninglessness gives the impression that theories of life’s meaning must be anchored on the thought of an afterlife and immortality. (shrink)

This chapter considers the status of metaphysical capacities in the debates on personhood and value theory in African philosophy. Specifically, it considers whether metaphysical capacities are morally neutral, instrumentally good or intrinsically good. The inquiry into the status of metaphysical capacities arises because it is important for the concept of human dignity in African thought. This question emerges because there are scholars that reject capacity-based theories of value and personhood (the minimalist view of personhood) for the performance/merit-based theories (...) of value and personhood (the maximalist view of personhood), which debate has implications for the concept of human dignity in African philosophy. This chapter presents Ikuenobe’s personhood/merit-based theory of human dignity, and it further provides three reasons why we should prefer the metaphysical capacity-based theory of human dignity. The capacity-based theory of value has the theoretical advantages of being more useful in bioethical debates, animal ethics and political theory. The chapter argues that there are good moral-political reasons to attach intrinsic value to the metaphysical capacities of our nature, where intrinsic dignity (minimalist personhood) is primary and achievement dignity (maximalist personhood) is secondary in African moral thought. (shrink)

In the literature on African moral philosophy, it is common to find normative conclusions about the way we ought to act directly drawn from purported metaphysical facts about the nature of ourselves and the world. For example, Kwame Gyekye, the most influential sub-Saharan political philosopher, attempts to defend moderate communitarianism, roughly the view that agents have strong duties to support others in ways that do not violate human rights, by contending that it follows from the dual nature of the (...) self as both social and individual. In this article, I critically analyze this sort of rationale, and contend that it is unsound. I propose several reconstructions, but conclude that they cannot plausibly bridge the ‘is-ought gap’, and that similar arguments found in the field of African ethics, such as the frequent claim we must treat nature with respect since everything in the universe is interdependent, also fail to do so. (shrink)

I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well-being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is (...) better understood as a social-moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social-moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well-being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values. (shrink)

In this paper, I tried to show how Western attitude to reality can be traced to the divisive exclusivist type of mind-set behind Aristotle’s conception of the world. I gesture toward some of the severest consequences of approaching the world with such a mind-set, and how such has complicated matters in some of the major debates in African philosophy. By recourse to ibuanyidanda or complementary philosophy, the author explores ways of addressing some of the challenges approaches of this kind (...) present in view of resolving issues that have relevance for authentic existence. Keywords : Aristotle, ibuanyidanda, complementary ontology, Tempelsian Damage, ihe mkpuchi anya, missing link of reality. (shrink)

Book Title: African Philosophy: Reflections on Yoruba Metaphysics and Jurisprudence Book Author: Oladele Abiodun Balogun Publisher: Xcel Publishers. Pages: 387. Year of Publication: 2018.

The main aim of this book is to discuss fundamental developments on the question of being in Western and African philosophy using analytic metaphysics as a framework. It starts with the two orthodox responses to the question of being, namely, the subject-verb-object language view and the rheomodic language view. In the first view, being is conceived through the analysis of language structure, where it is represented by subjects, objects, and relations. In the second view, there are different variations; (...) however, the common idea is that the world's structure is revealed in the root verb of terms. This suggests a holistic and dynamic conception of being, where everything is in a continuous process of action. The book builds on analytic philosophy and explores metaphysical concepts such as space-time, modality, causation, indeterminism versus determinism, and mind and body. The book shows that in both Western and African thought, similarities in different studies confirm that philosophy is a universal activity, differences within a context and beyond confirm the perspectival nature of human knowledge as individuals attempt to interpret reality, and language influences the conceptualization of being in a particular area. One of the novel aspects is the development of visual and mathematical African models of space and time. (shrink)

Divided into eight sections, each with introductory essays, the selections offer rich and detailed insights into a diverse multinational philosophical landscape. Revealed in this pathbreaking work is the way in which traditional philosophical issues related to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, for instance, take on specific forms in Africa's postcolonial struggles. Much of its moral, political, and social philosophy is concerned with the turbulent processes of embracing modern identities while protecting ancient cultures.

African Philosophy is a collection of previously unpublished essays that address epistemological and metaphysical concerns that have emerged from the sub-Saharan regions of Africa. The primary focus of the book is on traditional African conceptions of mind, person, personal identity, truth, knowledge, understanding, objectivity, and reality. The collection also discusses traditional African conceptions of causation, destiny, and free will.

In African countries there has been a surge of intellectual interest in foregrounding ideas and thinkers of African origin--in philosophy as in other disciplines--that have been unjustly ignored or marginalized. African scholars have demonstrated that precolonial African cultures generated ideas and arguments which were at once truly philosophical and distinctively African, and several contemporary African thinkers are now established figures in the philosophical mainstream. Yet, despite the universality of its themes, relevant contributions from (...) class='Hi'>African philosophy have rarely permeated global philosophical debates. Critical intellectual excavation has also tended to prioritize precolonial thought, overlooking more recent sources of home-grown philosophical thinking such as Africa's intellectually rich liberation movements. This book demonstrates the potential for constructive interchange between currents of thought from African philosophy and other intellectual currents within philosophy. Chapters authored by leading and emerging scholars: recover philosophical thinkers and currents of ideas within Africa and about Africa, bringing them into dialogue with contemporary mainstream philosophy; foreground the relevance of African theorizing to contemporary debates in epistemology, philosophy of language, moral/political philosophy, philosophy of race, environmental ethics and the metaphysics of disability; make new interventions within on-going debates in African philosophy; consider ways in which philosophy can become epistemically inclusive, interrogating the contemporary call for 'decolonization' of philosophy. Showing how foregrounding Africa--its ideas, thinkers and problems--can help with the project of renewing and improving the discipline of philosophy worldwide, this book will stimulate and challenge everyone with an interest in philosophy, and is essential reading for upper-level undergraduate students, postgraduate students and scholars of African and Africana philosophy. (shrink)

Supposing that an African metaphysics grounded on the notion and/or value of vitality is true, can it do a better job in terms of informing an African religious ethics than its Western counterparts, specifically, the Divine Command theory (DCT)? By ‘religious ethics’, in this article, I have in a mind a meta-ethical theory i.e., an account of moral properties whether they are best understood in spiritual rather than physical terms. In this article, I articulate an under-explored (...) class='Hi'>African meta-ethical theory grounded on vitality, and I argue that the Euthyphro problem is not a successful objection against it like it is usually thought to be for DCT. This relative advantage of the vitalist meta-ethics does not necessarily render it plausible, but it gives us some ground to seriously consider the future of African religious ethics grounded on it. (shrink)

This book focuses on under-explored and often neglected issues in contemporary African environmental philosophy and ethics. Critical issues such as the moral status of nature, African conceptions of animal moral status and rights, African conceptions of environmental justice, African relational Environmentalism, ubuntu, African theocentric and teleological environmentalism are addressed in this book. It is unique in so far as it goes beyond the generalized focus on African metaphysics and African ethics by exploring (...) how these views might be understood differently in order to conceptualize African environmental ethics. Against the background where environmental problems such as pollution, climate change, extinction of flora and fauna, and global warming are plain to see, it becomes useful to examine how African conceptions of environmental ethics could be understood in order to confront some of these problems facing the whole world. This book will be of value to undergraduate students, graduate students and academics working in the area of African Philosophy, African Environmental Ethics and Global Ethics in general. (shrink)

The concern of this paper is to argue against Maduabuchi Dukor’s conception of African philosophical ideas of man, universe and God as“theistic humanism”. Dukor’s submission is an anti-thesis of the claims by many pioneer scholars in African philosophy who claimed that if Africans do not live in a religious universe perhaps one can affirm that their universe is theistic. But indeed the Africans’ perceptions and attitude to life in their various manifestations reveal an idealistic metaphysical orientation without an (...) attenuation of humanistic elements. It is argued in this paper that Dukor’s philosophical idea of reality in the African context though contributes to knowledge, it is in sharp contrast to African metaphysical theories such as Placide Temple’s theory of vital forces, Olubi Sodipo’s theory of mystical causality, Dagogo Idoniboye’s theory of spiritism among others. Even Sophie Oluwole, who argues that the Yoruba idea of morality is humanistic, still concludes that in moral issues the gods act as agent of sanction. In situating the African idea of reality in context, the Yoruba example is used in this paper with a view to establishing, contrary to Dukor’s“theistic humanism”; that reality among the Yoruba is better construed as“humanistic theism”. (shrink)

African philosophy has for long been rejected on the basis that it is not known, or has not been written down. Behind this view is the idealist presumption that for something to exist, it must first be perceived. However, for something to be perceived, it must first exist. African Philosophy: Critical Dimensions examines what constitutes African philosophy in terms of its meaning, foundation, sources, methodology, characteristics, and relevance. The book analyses traditional African philosophy from the political, (...) social, ethical, epistemological and metaphysical angles. The book further critically discusses modern African political philosophy, modern African social philosophy, modern African economic philosophy, and modern African philosophy of religion. It ends with the identification of the different conclusions that were derived from the study and general recommendations, some specifically for researchers and writers, especially in the area of African philosophy. Wilfred Lajul joins other authentic voices examining African Philosophy. (shrink)

Reincarnation has received substantial treatment in African philosophy. The dominant view of African scholars and researchers on the subject is that it is a belief that prevails in African culture. The task of this paper is to revisit Innocent Onyewuenyi’s “philosophical reappraisal” of this African belief. Onyewuenyi’s position is that the African communion with ancestors and their influence on their living descendant’s has been incorrectly labeled “reincarnation” by Western anthropologists. But whereas Onyewuenyi portrays the problem (...) as being one of semantics, I shall in this paper argue that the challenge of explaining African cultural phenomenon is one of hermeneutics. The question is a question of hermeneutics, because its focus is not on whether ancestors are metaphysical entities, but rather on what they mean within African existence. The paper adopts the conversational method of African philosophy endorsed by the Conversational School of Philosophy. It aims to show how conversationalism as a procedure of philosophical discourse plays out within the context of its specific canons. In the final analysis the paper promotes the thesis that there is not a belief in reincarnation in African culture strictly speaking, but a belief in the regeneration of life. For the African, life is not cyclical, it is rather eternal. Keywords: Innocent Onyewuenyi, reincarnation, conversationalism, hermeneutics, African metaphysics, living-dead, regeneration of life. (shrink)

This critical reader addresses African environmental ethics in a unique way by drawing from a variety of authors with diverse perspectives on underexplored and often neglected issues in African philosophy and ethics. Central issues in contemporary African environmental ethics are addressed such as: The moral status of nature, Ubuntu and the Environment, African conceptions of animal moral status and rights, African conceptions of environmental justice, African relationalism, theocentric and teleological environmentalism. The book goes beyond (...) the generalised focus on African metaphysics and African ethics by exploring further how these views might be understood differently in order to conceptualise plausible African environmental ethical perspectives. (shrink)

Existentially, Igbo-African metaphysics swivels around ethics, morality, justice, and medicine. This state of being is evident in their credo on the ontology of the deities, which they see as a strategic variable in their hierarchy of beings and a critical agent in their quest for sane, responsible, peaceful existence and co- existence. Based on these premises, this paper interrogated these variables to establish the symmetry between them. In doing this, this research employed the critical analytic cum existential model (...) in its analysis. After which, it became palpable that the existence and ontology of the deities accentuates the mode of operation of the Igbo-African and from that position; it was blatant that the communal life of the Igbo-African makes African metaphysics a lived-metaphysics or what I have called anthropologised-metaphysics. (shrink)

Communalism and its cognates continue to exercise a vise grip on the African intellectual imaginary. Whether the discussion is in ethics or social philosophy, in metaphysics or even, on occasion, epistemology, the play of communalism, a concept expounded in the next section, is so strong that it is difficult to escape its ubiquity. In spite of this, there is little serious analysis of the concept and its implications in the contemporary context. Yet, at no other time than now (...) can a long-suffering continent use some robust debates on its multiple inheritances regarding how to organize life and thought in order to deliver a better future for its population. Given the continual resort to communalism as, among others, the standard of ethical behavior, the blueprint for restoring Africans to wholeness and organizing our social life, as well as a template for political reorganization across the continent, one cannot overemphasize the importance of contributing some illumination to the discourse surrounding the idea. This essay seeks to offer a little illumination in this respect. Additionally, it offers a criticism of what all—proponents and antagonists alike—take to be a defensible version of communalism: moderate communalism. I shall be arguing that communalism, generally, has a problem with the individual. And the African variant of it, mostly subscribed to by the African scholars discussed below and defended by them as something either peculiar to or special in Africa, has an even harder time accommodating the individual. Yet, as history shows, until the modern age in which individualism is the principle of social ordering and mode of social living, a situation that privileges the individual, above all, various forms of communalism never really accorded the individual the recognition and forbearances that we now commonly associate with the idea. T he strongest variants of moderate communalism discuss ed here have a difficult time taking the individual seriously. I am not aware of anyone else ever having made such a case. These arguments are offer ed to show that Africa and Africans need to take individualism seriously and such have been the historical transformation that our diverse societies have undergone in the course of the last half a millennium that the types of communalism that are on offer do not appear to take this fact of radical change with the necessary urgency. (shrink)

Surrogacy as a practice is supported by science, technology, morality and legality. It follows that the issues concerning it cut across all facets of life. And different arguments have being advanced for and against this practice. The belief espouse in this paper is that one cannot discuss successfully the moral, the science or the legality of surrogacy without delving into the cultural question of who is a mother. In other words, it is possible to have simple scientific and legal understandings (...) of the practice and still disagree on the cultural level because of its stronger emotional appeal. The purpose of this work is to expose the Yoruba-African religio-cultural beliefs that have bearing on the understanding of motherhood or ownership of a child. This will be done through a critical analysis of Yoruba cultural beliefs about personhood and the metaphysical underpinning between birth and the ontology of life itself. Theargument here is that given some Yoruba ontological belief about life, motherhood and personhood it may be difficult for the products of surrogacy to fit-in into the society in terms of personal and social development. This work goes further to recommend that cultural beliefs should be taking into consideration when making laws to guide surrogacy in order to avoid conflict between the mothers and the child. (shrink)

An important belief in African Traditional Religion holds that everything, both animate and inanimate objects, are imbued with an imperceptible energy known as life force. Since life force is the greatest value, it is the grounds of morality. However, it is undertheorized in contemporary African ethics, with work on personhood and harmonious relationships taking centerstage. I seek to fill this gap in the literature by further developing an entirely secular and naturalistic moral theory of life force that avoids (...) metaphysical controversies and is known as liveliness, which was first gestured at by Thaddeus Metz (2012, 2022). I demonstrate that while a series of objections that Metz levels against liveliness affect teleological versions, they do not apply with equal force to deontological versions. Liveliness, particularly deontological versions, ought to be considered as a contender for the best African moral theory alongside those that focus on personhood or harmonious relationships. (shrink)

In this book, Maduabuchi Dukor presents a comprehensive interpretation of African Philosophy that is informed by the idea that everything in the universe includes a 'spiritual' dimension, what he calls theistic humanism. Imperceptible agents such as God, lesser divinities, and ancestors, as well as forces such as witchcraft and magic, play prominent roles in Dukor's accounts of not just metaphysics, but also ethics, aesthetic, and epistemics. By highlighting the diversity in intellectual world currents philosophy stimulates intercultural dialogue, (...) class='Hi'>African Philosophy in the Global Village. Theistic Panpsychic Rationality, Axiology and Science is a response to major contemporary socio-cultural challenges in the global village. (shrink)

Personhood is an extensively discussed theme in contemporary African philosophy, which has taken metaphysical, epistemological and normative dimensions. In Western philosophical traditions, discourse on personhood is transmuting to debates on transhumanism. Missing in the African philosophical literature is consideration of transhumanism and an explication of the relationship between personhood and transhumanism. In this article, I critically examine the relationship between personhood and transhumanism in an African context. Drawing on Barry Hallen’s African metaphysical account of personhood and (...) Thaddeus Metz’s Afro-communal normative conception of personhood, I argue that while some transhumanist elements are embedded in African normative and ontological conceptions of personhood, some others are not. In the final analysis, I defend an Afrofuturistic account of personhood that is compatible with some censored essentials of transhumanism in African thoughts. Keywords : Personhood, Transhumanism, Barry Hallen, Thaddeus Metz, Africa, Yoruba. (shrink)

A fundamental valuation of present day technology requires an investigation of its supporting metaphysics. Although technology ostensibly is the exact opposite of any kind of metaphysics, its metaphysical foundations, which co-determine its influence on values and worldview formation, can be indicated. Western technology is reconsidered from the perspective of Heidegger's critique on technology. Technology need not determine values in a deterministic way. We are challenged as created co-creators to give a human face to technology. Africa can be considered (...) relatively free of the influence of high technology. The way technology is imbedded in African metaphysics, myth and worldview is investigated from the perspectives of life force and ubuntu. Although the African example may be foreign to Westerners, it proves that it is possible to live in a technological world without losing the values indispensable to humanity. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(2) 2003: 173–183. (shrink)

The main claim in this article is that the traditionally Western and currently dominant understandings of the figures of “Nature” and “Animal” underlie and structure different forms of oppression and should be critically confronted. The racial-sexual subjugation of the colonized African draws symbolically on the older Western symbolic subjugations of Animal and Woman. In the Great Chain of Being of Western metaphysics it is Woman’s sexual body that links humans to the domain of the animal, and Man’s intellect (...) that distinguishes and separates humans from that same domain. Situated in the border between human and Animal, Woman merges with the chaos and fleshiness of Animal and Nature. With the emergence of race as a category of classification and colonial justification, the African is placed at the furthest remove from Western Man, the epitome of reasonable humanity. African Woman, in particular, is seen as the Animal Other. The colonial-“civilizing” project thus institutes a certain flight from Nat... (shrink)