To date, the genre of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal as a document of Islamic argumentation theory remains unclear. Modern scholars paid little attention to this important document preserved in Ibn Fūrak ’s Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī. Scholars disagree on whether the main constituent elements of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal are they theological or philosophical. Based on the terminology, the procedure and the purpose of dialectical questions and answers in al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, I argue that this document borrows its method (...) to juridical dialectics. (shrink)

History and development of al-Ashʻarīyah Islamic doctrines in Malay Archipelago.

Ash’ariyyah is the biggest school of Islamic Intellectual History. It is a sect based on the ideas of al-Ash’ari, who is accepted as its imam and founder. Among al-Ash’ari’s thoughts on belief, one of the most interesting is his views on faith. His view of faith has a different place in the understanding of faith in Islamic thought. In this study, al-Ash’ari’s view of faith, which is one of the main points of separation of the Islamic Sects, is discussed. In (...) addition, the Risalah he wrote on this subject was examined. Although al-Ash’ari wrote more than a hundred works, there are very few works that have reached us and whose existence is known. Among them, the works of Maqālāt, Ibānah, al-Lumaʿ, Risalah ila Ahl al-Thaghr and Istihsan al Khawd have found fame in the world of science, studies have been made on them, and they have been translated and published in Turkish. While this is the case in terms of the five works mentioned, the work related to Faith, which we will talk about in this article, did not find much fame in the world of science, and as far as we can determine, there has been no study or translation on it in our country, and the Arabic text of the work has not been published. In order to fill this gap, a study has been carried out that includes both al-Ash’ari’s view of faith and the evaluation of his work, as well as the Turkish translation and the Arabic text. Thus, with this article, it is aimed to contribute to presenting all of al-Ash’ari’s existing works to the benefit of science aspirants in our country. (shrink)

This article re-examines Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theological insights on the interplay between faith and reason, challenging previous fideist interpretations, particularly Imran Aijaz’s view. I introduce the concept of guided theistic rationalism, situating al-Ashʿarī’s approach within a tripartite model: contexts of discovery, justification, and review. In the discovery phase, al-Ashʿarī draws inspiration from Qur’anic verses to formulate rational arguments for God’s existence, akin to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd. The justification phase rigorously validates these arguments through independent logical (...) reasoning. I further propose a context of review, where individuals critically assess pre-existing arguments, ensuring faith is rationally grounded while accommodating divine submission. Al-Ashʿarī’s balanced approach harmonizes reason with revelation, advocating rational scrutiny of prophetic claims followed by wholehearted acceptance. This nuanced framework, integrating rational inquiry with devout submission to divine revelation, holds broader relevance for contemporary monotheistic traditions. (shrink)

To date, the genre of al-Ashʿarī’s (d. 936 CE) Adab al-jadal as a document of Islamic argumentation theory remains unclear. Modern scholars paid little attention to this important document preserved in Ibn Fūrak (d. 1015 CE)’s Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī. Scholars disagree on whether the main constituent elements of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal are they theological or philosophical. Based on the terminology, the procedure and the purpose of dialectical questions and answers in al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, I argue that (...) this document borrows its method to juridical dialectics. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa o debate acerca dos atributos divinos na teologia islâmica medieval, mais especificamente na teologia mu‘tazilita e ash‘arita. Nele se compara a abordagem da teologia islâmica medieval com a de Moisés Maimónides, filósofo judeu do período medieval. Em particular este artigo debruça-se sobre a identficação dos atributos divinos com a essência de Deus na teologia mu‘tazilita, que se desenvolveu na primeira metade do século IX, e analisa a reação dos ash‘aritas que se seguiu e que insistiu em considerar (...) os atributos divinos enquanto entidades reais, separadas da essência de Deus. Maimónides, conhecedor da tradição do kalam, apresenta uma solução que não envolve a predicação de atributos divinos que comprometeria a unidade divina. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Mu‘tazilitas. Ash‘aritas. Kalam. Maimónides. Atributos divinos. Predicação. Filosofia medieval. Teologia islâmica. (shrink)

Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yusuf b. Muhammad al-Miklâtî is an Ash’arî scholar who lived between the years 550-626 (1155-1229). He has a work entitled Lubāb al-ʿuqūl fī radd ʿalā al-falāsifa fī ʿilm al-uṣūl to defend the opinions of Ahl al-Sunnah by criticizing philosophical views. Miklātī is one of the most important figures who lived in the Muvahhidī state. He is a professor who contributed to learning of Ash’arī kalām system in the North Africa and Andalusia. But today it has not been demonstrated. Therefore, (...) in this article we looked at some theological views of Miklātī in the context of his criticism of the philosophical views.Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yûsuf b. Muhammad al-Miklātī is an Ash’arī scholar who lived in North Africa and Andalusia between the years 520-626 (1155-1229). He is one of the tutors working at madrasahs of the Muvahhidī state established by Ibn Tumart. Becoming meeting point of Salafī and philosophical understanding is one of the main factors which makes important the period and the region where he lived. Muvahhidīs on the one hand called for the returning to the Book and the Sunnah, and ordered to burn the works of Malikī fuqahā related to the branches (furūʿ) with the reason that they became distant from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. On the other hand, the last great represantatives of Islamic Philosophy, Ibn Tufayl and Averroes wrote their most precious works at Muvahhidî palace.Only extant work of al-Miklâtî is Lubâb al-‘uqûl fî radd ‘alâ al-falâsifa fî ‘ilm al-uṣûl. In Lubâb al-‘uqûl, al-Miklâtî by giving a place to the philosophical opinions about theology, prophethood and the hereafter criticizes the viewpoints of Aristotle, from Periphatetic philosophers al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, from Mu’tazilah Abu Hudhayl al-‘Allaf and Qa’bî. He has benefited from the works of Ash’arî theologians like Baqillanî, al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazzâlî when he make criticism. Especially in the theology section, when he considers some subjects he has followed the method which al-Ghazzalî used in his Tahâfut which was written to criticize the philosophers. However, with the impact of the fuqahâ, who has Salafî understanding, and that of the Islamic philosopher Averroes, the ruler of the region ordered to burn the works of al-Ghazzâlî and notify that whoever has these works will be killed and whose wealth will be seized. In this regard al-Miklâtî’s work has an important contribution to the settlement of Ash’arî theology against Salafî and philosophical opposition.The main reason of the opposition of Salafî understanding towards the science of Kalâm is the claim that Kalâm has been established through outward impacts at a philosophical basement. The main reason of opposition of Averroes towards Kalâm is that Kalâm follows argumentative (jadalî) methods not instead of demonstrative ones (burhânî). This work of al-Miklâtî provides benefits to the establishment of Kalâm with the hands of Muslims and on the Qur’anic base and also has contributed to the development of a demonstrative tradition against philosophical opposition. Because according to him, the purpose of a theologian is to declare the demonstrative proofs which help for the soundness of the religious creed. Principles of the science of Kalâm are introduction, by which a theologian establishes his demonstrative proofs. (shrink)

Language and languages; linguistics; Arabic language; sufism.

In this paper I argue that al Ash'ari was a Theological Determinist whose position on free will and human responsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between two senses of the word 'can' (yastati'u ). I also compare al Ash'ari's position with that of the Mu'tazilite thinker al Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar. I conclude that their positions may not have been so much opposed to each other as merely different. This, I suggest, should invite us to re evaluate the (...) nature and extent of the disagreement between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites on the free will question. (shrink)

The science of Kalām aims to prove the existence and attributes of Allah. For this purpose, the theologians adopted a method that turns from the sensible universe to the unseen universe. This method, named as qiyāṣ al-ğāib alā alā al-shāḥid, created a common ground in the discussions with the dissenters. Because the sensible universe is open to human perception in a way that does not allow for denial. From this point of view, the universe, which is defined as "everything other (...) than Allah" in Ashʿarite Kalām, has been discussed in terms of both structure and functioning. Based on the principles determined by the theologians, the universe is said to be composed of substance, accidents and bodies. The said entities are basically constructed in a way that is dependent on each other and on a higher will. Based on this construct, the Ashʿarite tradition preferred to explain the functioning of the universe with the theory of custom. In fact, their basic assumptions about the universe and Allah necessitated this preference. This is because they envision Allah as a fāil al- mukhtār deity with absolute will and power. Everything in the universe, except for the events or situations deemed impossible by the mind, is within His power. In this respect, the universe is described as an area of possibilities. The Ashʿarite tradition, which is based on the nonpermanent nature of accidents, insists that accidents should be recreated at every moment. This basic defense completely reveals the dependence of the universe on Allah. Built on these basic assumptions, the theory of custom uniquely explains the functioning of the universe without imposing any limitations on Allah, who has absolute will and power. This theory, which reflects the Ashʿarite tradition exactly, enables them to explain all theological issues, especially the relationship between Allah and the universe, in a consistent manner. This study aims to examine the basic principles that led the early Ashʿarite tradition to accept the theory of custom by analyzing them under several headings. For this aim, the views of the early Ashʿarite theologians have been identified through a literature review analyzed and interpreted in the context of the matter. (shrink)

RésuméLe gros de la recherche orientaliste consacrée à la littérature théologique islamique a négligé les idées théologiques Ibāḍī à portée cosmologique, ce qui a conduit à une compréhension incomplète de la théologie islamique et à un manque considérable dans la recherche occidentale. L'omission de ce mouvement important de l'Islam est compréhensible étant donné que les textes Ibāḍī ne sont accessibles, publiés, diffusés et traduits que de façon très partielle. Cette étude vise donc à combler certaines de ces lacunes dans la (...) recherche sur la première théologie islamique. Les objectifs de cet article sont de: 1) caractériser la littérature Ibāḍī classique portant sur la théorie atomiste de la substance et de l'accident; 2) examiner les textes d'auteurs Ibāḍī duiiie/ixesiècle dialoguant et discutant avec d'autres écoles théologiques islamiques, à savoir les Muʿtazilites pré-Bahshamiyya (Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, d. 321/933) et les Ashʿarites (Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, d. 324/936), en lien avec la théorie atomiste de la substance et de l'accident; 3) passer en revue le grand nombre d'opinions soutenues parmi les premiers théologiens Ibāḍī, et examiner les sources et les thèmes spécifiques susceptibles d'avoir influencé cette école de pensée diversifiée. Cet article cherche aussi à identifier des traits communs dans l'approche Ibāḍī durant la période de formation de la théologie islamique, et à explorer les voies grâce auxquelles ces premiers théologiens ont pu avoir accès à des thèmes cosmologiques antérieurs à l'Islam. (shrink)

İtikadi mezhepler arasındaki en temel tartışma konularından birisi, insanın dine taalluk eden eylemleri söz konusu olduğunda, ilahi fiillerin gerçekleşmesine esas teşkil eden mananın nasıl tanımlanacağı problemidir. İnsan, dine uygun ameller işlediğinde Allah’ın da bunu destekleyecek fiiller yapması gerektiğine inanan Mu’tezile “zorunluluk” fikrine ulaşırken, gerekçe ne olursa olsun Allah’ın hiçbir şeye mecbur olmadığına inanan Eş’arîler “keyfilik” olarak anlaşılabilecek bir yaklaşımı benimsemişlerdir. Kanaatimizce itikadi mezheplerin, aynı inanç paradigması içinde olsalar bile belli bir konuda iki uç noktada konumlanmalarının temel sebebi arkasında siyasi, kültürel (...) ve sosyal faktörlerin olduğu mezhebi asabiyettir. Mezhebi asabiyetin doğal sonucu, Kur’an’ın mevzubahis konudaki hükümlerini bütünlük içinde ele almada gösterilen zafiyettir. Bu çalışmada, Mu’tezilîler ile Eş’arîlerin, insanın dine taalluk eden amelleriyle ilgili olarak gerçekleşen ilahi fiillere dair yaklaşımları hülasa bir şekilde ele alındıktan sonra, Kur’an’ın bu konudaki yaklaşımına yer verilecektir. Kur’an’ın bu husustaki yaklaşımını belirlemek üzere önerdiğimiz kavramsal çerçevenin, mezhebi refleksler sebebiyle göz ardı edilen bütüncüllüğün korunmasında işlevsel olduğunu düşünmekteyiz. (shrink)

The attention to the deductive method began with Imam Al-Ash’ari and the establishment of the rules of theorizing from the first moment of the emergence of the Ash’ari school of thought at the hands of the founder of the school of thought, Abu Al-Hasan Al-Ash’ari, and the scholars who followed after him who wrote theological works. This reflects the great care of the Ash’arism in rooting and theorizing the methods of theory, and setting the methodological rules of reasoning, so he (...) dealt with The research examines the most important comprehensive theological rules through which the Ash’ari reasoned in the doctrinal issues on which Ash’ari theological thought was founded, taking into account the extent of stability or change that occurred in some of these rules along the path of the Ash’ari doctrine. The aim of this study was to answer an important methodological question in formulating the verbal thinking curriculum: It is: What is the impact of comprehensive verbal rules in achieving intellectual consistency and methodological consistency in the theory of verbal reasoning according to the Ash’arism between theory and application? The answer to the nature of this research required delving into the journey of exploring the idea of comprehensive verbal grammar in the theological heritage. It was appropriate for this task to adopt the historical approach in collecting the material and searching for comprehensive grammar in its context from the verbal works approved in the Ash’arite school. It was necessary to study the origins of the theory of verbal grammar. Comprehensive and anticipating the methodological features governing inference, adopting the analytical approach; The approach adopted in this study was a combined approach of the two approaches: historical and analytical, in order to reach the impact of comprehensive verbal rules in both theoretical and applied studies. (shrink)

There is a close relationship between Ashʿarism and Ḥanbalism since the emergence of Ashʿarism. However, they often conflicted with each other as they approached to religious matters from different perspectives. These conflicts were not only limited to theological discussions but also turned into social conflicts, which occasionally resulted with deaths. First massive events occurred in 429/1038 in Baghdād between Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalities. When Niẓām al-Mulk was appointed as vizier, the conflicts reached a peak. The apparent reason of the conflicts was (...) the theological controversy between these two sects. However, the rise of Ashʿarism, which was usually against Ḥanbalism, was the main reason of the social conflicts. Supports of the Ashʿarite thought by the leading statesmen of the era such as Niẓām al-Mulk and Ayyūbid sultans, and accusations of some Ashʿarite preachers about Ḥanbalities relying on this political support were also among the factors that led to these conflicts. Nevertheless, even if any accusation was not made, it occurred that the members of both sects resorted to violence in case of criticisms about their beliefs. This shows that the most important reason of the conflicts was sectarian fanaticism.Summary: Ashʿarism is the name of the sect that was formed around the ideas of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. It is a continuation of Kullābism in terms of general thought system. Ashʿarism replaced Kullābism by the end of the 5th century of the Hijrah, and started to be called as an independent sect. It spread mostly among the Shāfiʿites and Mālikites in Iraq, Khurāsān, Damascus, Maghreb, and Yemen. When it was arrived to the last quarter of the 5th century, it became the common theological sect of most of Shāfiʿites and Mālikites. Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fūrāk (d. 406/1015), and Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s (d. 418/1027) efforts played an important role in rising of Ashʿarism in this period. In the following periods, contribution of the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) to Ashʿarism was massive by establishing the Niẓāmiyah Colleges to strengthen the Ashʿarites against the Hanafites in Khurāsān and against the Ḥanbalites in Baghdād. The Niẓāmiyah Colleges were donated by Niẓām al-Mulk to Shāfiʿite scholars for the mission of primarily limiting the influence Shīʿī thought. The condition of belonging to Shāfiʿites in waqfiyyah (endowment certificate) of the colleges provided some important advantages for Shāfiʿites and Ashʿarites. On the other hand, the Ayyūbids provided important contributions to Ashʿarites in the regions of Egypt, Damascus and Yemen. They worked for strengthening Ashʿarism during their ruling for two centuries. It was a state policy for the Ayyūbids to support Ashʿarism starting from the founder of the state, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193).This rapid rise of Ashʿarism led to a tense relationship between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites who became the most important representative of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth (people of the traditions of the Prophet) after the period of Miḥnah (period of religious persecution). Undoubtedly, the first respondents of these tense relations were Kullābite scholars. At the beginning of the 4th century of the Hijrah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī became the natural inheritor of the Ḥanbalite reaction to the Kullābites. He conflicted with the Ḥanbalites because of his different approach on the debate regarding creation of the Qur’ān. Ḥanbalite reactions to Imam al-Ashʿarī continued after his death. When he died in Baghdād in 324/935, officials buried him secretly as they worried about Ḥanbalite attacks against his funeral. Hence, after his burial some Ḥanbalites tried to destroy his tomb several times. After Ashʿarī died, the first social events between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites took place in Iṣfahān, one of the most important cities of West Khurāsān, in the end of the 4th century of the Hijrah. The debate started around the question of whether the letters of the Qur’ān were created or uncreated between the Ḥanbalite scholar Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and Ashʿarite scholar Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038). This debate led to prolonged events between the supporters of these scholars. Abū Nuʿaym, saved his life from various attacks and finally he had to leave Iṣfahān.The tense relationships between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the peak in the 5th century of the Hijrah. Many events occurred in Baghdād during this century. The discussion on interpretation of the revealed attributes of Allah turned into conflict between the two sides from time to time. The Ashʿarite scholars accused the Ḥanbalites with tashbih (affirming Allah’s similarity to humanity) and tajseem (anthropomorphism) by pointing at Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’s work titled Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt. The ʿAbbāsid caliphs generally supported the Ḥanbalites in this debate. For example, when al-Qāim bi-Amr Allāh re-published the famous declaration known as the Qādirī Creed in 433/1042, he proclaimed that rejection of the Ḥanbalite approach on the issue of the revealed attributes of Allah would be regarded as a cause of blasphemy. The paper was read in a meeting where several scholars from various sects were present. It was signed firstly by Ashʿarite scholar Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn ʿUmar al-Qazwīnī (d. 442/1051). However, he was one who had criticized Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt in 429/1038, which caused conflicts in society at that time. This shift in his position is remarkable as it shows that the declaration was primarily response to him.In the middle of the 5th century of the Hijrah, Ashʿarite scholar al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071) became a victim of the tension between the Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalites. Khatīb had protection of vizier Ibn al-Muslima and under his protection he lectured on Hadith in the Mansur Mosque. However, after the death of the vizier, he was subjected to harassment of the Ḥanbalites because of some expressions in his work titled Tarīkh Baghdād. So much so that he began to worry about his life, thus he had to leave Baghdād and went to Damascus in 451/1059.The tense relations between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the summit in the period of Niẓām al-Mulk who was the vizier of Seljuk Empire. In fact, some events resulted with deaths. For example, in the events of 469/1076, which lasted years, the Ḥanbalites attacked Ashʿarite scholar Abū Naṣr ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 514/1120) who accused them with tashbeeh and tajseem. As a result, around twenty people died during these events. The gradual rise of the Ashʿarite thought with the support of Niẓām al-Mulk and abusive discourses of some Ashʿarite scholars who relied on this support can be mentioned among the basic reasons of the events at that time.After the death of Niẓām al-Mulk in 485/1092, for a long time there was no serious event between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites. In the middle of the 6th/12th century, the relations started to become tense again in the regions of Egypt, Damascus, and Yemen under the Ayyūbid dynasty. In addition to these places, various events occurred in Khurāsān region, in cities such as Marw. Nevertheless, unlike some previous events, the current tensions were not against a whole sect but only targeted some individual scholars. Moreover, unlike the previous periods, oppressed and victimized people were mostly Ḥanbalite scholars this time. No serious events took place between two sects after this period. Therefore, it can be said that their struggle to dominate society led to the above-mentioned events. (shrink)

The text of “The Four Premises” (Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a), which began with Sadr al-Sharī‘ah (d. 747/1346), centralizes on the actions of human beings by connecting it with the problem of good and evil in the field of kalām, Islamic philosophy and logic, and fıqh. It was also commented in with incisive and critical footness by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). In Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a, al-Kastalī (d. 901/1496) discusses the two main issues. One of them is good/husn-evil/qubh, the other is human (...) actions. Good-evil dichotomy here is axiological, whereas the human actions are examined within an ontological structure. The quest for the origin of moral values is a husn-qubh debate. Identifying the hierarchy of human actions in ontology is another problem. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the theological discussions in the Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a which were written following the order of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror/Fatih. This text addresses the origin of moral judgment and the question of freedom and destiny in human actions linked to the problem of good and evil. Discussing these two fundamental issues, has made it necessary to thoroughly investigate perhaps all the subheadings which concern the entire paradigm that falls under the framework of understanding the God, nature, and humanity. By looking at the treatise, the main sources of the issues being discussed are mostly generated from an Islamic jurisprudence works, entitled Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ. It can easily be discerned that the direct quotations that were made or taken indirectly were from these two sources. References to other sources were quite seldom. However, the excerpts that were taken from primary sources were interpreted and expounded by the author and amended anew. In this article al-Kastalī’s comments will be analyzed. He’s work Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be analyzed in depth and will be published for the first time with a critical edition. Text of Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a product of a culture of criticism and critical thinking has two foundations: Disproval and verification. Critical thinking is then bidirectional. It is wrong to carry out the criticism activity in only one direction. It is insufficient to simply refute the opposing idea. It is not enough to show the wrong. The so-called right idea also needs to be justified. In the Tawdīh, Sadr al-Sharī‘ah criticizes al-Ashʿarī in the issues of husn-qubh and human actions. According to this criticism, good and evil should be based on the reason. On the other hand, human is free in his actions. As it is known, goodness and badness was based on religion according to al-Ashʿarī. Acquisition (kasb) given to man was unclear. It is al-Taftāzānī who wrote an annotation on Tawḍīḥ with the name of Talwīḥ. He’s comments are successful in terms of theology. However, these interpretations do not mean that he accepted the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a. In terms of al-Taftāzānī, proofs of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah is weak. The theological disputes in Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ have reached the level of tension in the following works. The origins of the divergence are based on the differentiation between the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. In fact, these schools are not different from each other in terms of the method they use. Although the roads walked were the same, the results achieved were different. The main reason for this is that the issue is ambiguous and the problem of good and evil is multidimensional. It is directly related to God and human. It is also connected with ontology and epistemology together. The position on the husn-qubh issue is also decisive for other theological problems. The root of the evil problem or theodicy is mostly based on this problem in Islamic thought. The actions of God and human are questioned here. The value judgments that actions will take are examined. Which action is more moral and better? Another major problem discussed in this article is human actions. It is a matter of freedom of human volition. The volition of man before the absolute God is a problem. Because God has absolute power, will and knowledge. On the other hand, God imposes responsibility on man. But what are the limits of this responsibility? Al-Kastalī discusses all these problems in the context of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah and al-Taftāzānī. In the big picture there are representatives of the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kastalī doesn’t paint a new picture, rather makes the lines in the picture clear. In this article, the texts will be analyzed mutually. The content and uses of the concepts will be given importance. Ideas will be discussed from their main sources and the roots and different reach of the issues will be touched. The interactions of different schools of thought will also be included. (shrink)

Ijmā is ranked as the third shariah evidence after the Qur’ān and Sunnah in the science of Uṣūl. Shafi was the first one who made Uṣūl which had been known and used by the Islamic scholars, into a written document and who ascertained that Ijmā was the third of the shariah evidences. Kalām is one of the sciences in which Ijmā evidence is used. The scholars of Kalām used this evidence as far as the science of Uṣūl made it possible. (...) They always used it without changing any basics of religious beliefs and acceptances. That the aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been supported with Ijmā which is regarded as one of naqly evidences, played an important role in eliminating suspicions which were tried to be aroused in momins’ mind. In this article, the function and importance of Ijmā evidence, which is one of the primary sources of the science of Uṣūl, in the science of Kalām and Aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been studied.SummaryWhat the Qur’ān demands from us is to emphasize the spirit of unity among ummah and to keep out the factors that could trigger separation and division. Indeed, Allah emphasizes in the following verses in the Qur’ān on the protection of the unitary structure of the ummah: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Āl a-Imrān 3/103) and “And do not be like the ones who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them” (Āl al-Imrān 3/105). Allah has commanded the Ulul ‘Azm Prophets to hold the religion upright and to avoid division. (al-Shūrā 42/13). The command of holding the religion upright and not to be divided in this religion means to certify what needs to be confirmed in the religion of Allah and to obey those that must be obeyed. This is also the proclamation of the principle of religion that all the prophets have consensus over.Ahl al-Sunnah understanding of Islam is identical to the understanding of the Prophet and his companions. For this reason, Ahl al-Sunna is the school that represents the main backbone of Islam. In Ahl al-Sunna, in many subjects, be it usūlî / primary or furū’ī / secondary, there has been ijmā. These ijmās are Sahaba ijmās and deductive ijmās that come from mutakallimūn (theologians) ijtihāds. Therefore, ijmā and ijtihād are closely connected to each other. Ijmā is supported by ijtihād and ijtihād is also the source of ijmā. Thus, the issue is no longer just a pure ijtihād; it turns out to be a degree that gives a solid knowledge after it has risen to some degree just after the nass/texts.Ahl al- Sunnah theologians are talking about two kinds of ijmā. The first is “ijmā taṣdīqī” (approval consensus) which is the consensus based on Sahaba İjmā. These are the ijmās that occur on the principles called ḍaruratal-diniyya (necessities of the religion), and accepted as solid proofs in religion. Issues such as the principles of faith, obligation of prayer and the fasting are the subjects that are determined by the solid/definite ijmā. Such ijmās are valid approvals on existing provisions. These ijmās based on solid nass (verses and hadiths). Such ijmās do not give any new information. The existing information is strengthened by the alliance of Muslims. In these areas, ijtihād cannot be done and Muslims do not need ijtihād on these issues. There is an consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars about the unfaithfulness of the one who denies one or more of the principles which are accepted as the main obligatory principles in Islam. The other is the “deductive ijmā which the ijtihāds have roles over. This kind of ijmās, are formed as a result of mujtahids’ consensus over the same opinion on the issue of theological secondary issues. The issues related to the secondary theological issues which were open to the ijtihāds and the different results obtained on matters are not accepted as the cause of takfīr. However, depending on the subject he/she can be a sinner. Istidlālī/deductive ijmās are not considered as an independent proofs in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, rather a supportive ones and are considered as textual evidences.Since, texts that are accepted as sources give supposed information. In this regard, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars accepted other members of the sect who have in secondary theological issues opposed the ijmā of the salaf / predecessor as Ahl al-Qibla, but named them as Ahl al-Bid’a (innovator in religion) because of their opposition to Salaf’s İjmās. Moreover, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah did not see them appropriate to participate in the Ijmās, which could occur between the generations that come after Sahābas/companions.Not all disputes have been criticized in Islam. It is a blessing for the ummah to claim different opinions on the issues subject to ijtihād. Since the ummah, in this way, will bring new solutions to emerging issues and as a result, Islam will have a mechanism to produce a dynamic solution. This can only be possible through ijtihād. Dispute is to propose different views on a subject. If this view is not in the actual matters that could harm the unity of the Ummah, rather in the case of ijtihādi issues, this conflict could turn to be mercy.The reason why the methodists evaluate the ijmā within the scope of the authorized evidence is that because they think it is essential that the ijmā be based on a proof. From this point of view, the alliances that occurred in mental matters were not considered as ijmā. The theologians always tried to support their claims with nass/textual proofs. When the ijmā is realized, whether known or not, they have stated that there is certainly a religious proof behind it. Because, the provisions that were reached through ijmā, cannot be against the provisions of the Prophet.Many issues in Islamic Belief and Kalām works are supported by the mental and textual evidences as well as by deductive ijmā. However, many of the claims of Ijmās in these works reflect the inter-sect ijmās of the Ahl al-Sunnah. The sects outside the Ahl al-Sunnah were excluded. This attitude is, above all, the aim of ensuring the integrity within the sect, and trying to protect the Ahl al-Sunnah belief. Since the ijmā evidence has a function that prevents all kinds of arbitrary and divisive thoughts and turns the supposed knowledge into the qat’ī/certain one, it raises the provision to the next level just after the nass, rather than merely being a ijtihādi provision. In the case of the forerunner of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Māturīdes and Ash‘arites have not differed in in understanding of ijmā in terms of methodology.Although they have different views on the definition and content of the ijmā, they have a common understanding of alliances of Mujtahids on the same view. The mutakallims (theologians) of Māturīdī and Ash’arī schools have used the proof of ijmā as supportive evidence in the cases related to Kalām. al-Ash’arī not only adopted the proof of ijmā but also used it in practice in. He did not make any distinction in proof of ijmā as practical, theological, methodological or sub-divisional; he used it freely in every field. Māturīdī and Ash’arī scholars decided that the ijmā could occur in religious matters and that there would be evidence when it was formed; In the case of mental issues, they have required the knowledge to be based on solid information. In the case of ijmā in purely mental issues, they have disputed over the issue. While some Ahl al-Sunnah scholars stated that since purely mental matters were certain knowledge and therefore don’t need ijmā, they also ruled that because the mujtahids could get this knowledge from religious texts, therefore ijmā could occur in mental matters as well. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the Arabic theological work al-Tamhīd fī bayān al-tawḥīd, authored by the Transoxanian scholar, Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī. A jurist and theologian, he belonged to the kalām -school in the succession of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, and which, based on Ḥanafī tradition, forms the second pillar of the Sunni confession alongside the doctrines of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and his followers. Despite increasing activities in the field of editions during the last few decades, details of Māturīdī speculative theology (...) still remain insufficiently studied. This deficiency applies, on the one hand, to the utilization of texts, partially or not yet available in text-critical and analytically focused editions. On the other hand, a profound and pressing need for systematic research remains, particularly with regards to the relationship between Māturīdism and Ashʿarism, given that the latter has been studied in much greater detail. Against this background, al-Sālimī is presented in his historical and intellectual milieu. It is shown that his treatise is in the Ḥanafī–Māturīdī tradition, but his doctrines sometimes differ from other Māturīdī teachings. Subsequently, some key topics of the Tamhīd are addressed. A special focus is on the beginning of the dispute between Māturīdī theologians and the Ashʿariyya, where issues of epistemology, prophecy, the doctrine of God’s names and attributes, and the conception of faith that serve as typical examples of Ḥanafī jurisprudence and theology are also treated. Finally, a case study illuminates important issues at the heart of Māturīdī theology, as well as the integration of juridical topics into kalām. Through this approach, this paper intends to introduce the text as a valuable source for the study of Sunni theology in a more comprehensive sense than has previously been considered. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

The younger brother of the famous Ashʿarī theologician and Shāfiʿī jurist Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Aḥmad al-Ghazālī was a Ṣūfī shaykh who lived and preached in the Saljuq state and, in some cases, possibly influenced its fortunes. Owing to his best known and probably most important work, the Sawāniḥ, he is treated in the Persian Ṣūfī tradition as one of the principal representatives of the so-called "School of Love". However, he remained virtually unknown in the West, outside the narrow circle (...) of experts on Persian Ṣūfism, until the publication of Nasrollah Pourjavady's English translation of the Sawāniḥ in 1986. The aforementioned translation, which... (shrink)

This article tries to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one of Ash‘arī theologians of the contracting period, showed a Mu‘tazila tendency regarding the ontic value of divine attributes and his successors followed him in this regard. The problem of divine attributes, a heated discussion area of theology, has been interpreted differently by the theological sects over centuries. Mu‘tazila scholars before Abu Hāshim al-Jubbāī regarded those attributes as nominally attributed to God. For the first time, with Abu Hāshim, this relation was (...) approached with a realistic attitude: Although divine attributes are not accepted as particular realities, they are viewed as states/ahwāl, the universal model of kalam atomism. The pre-Gazzālī Ash‘arī theologians, on the other hand, ascribed real existence to divine attributes as particular properties, whether they adopted this universal model or not. According to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the founder of Ashʿarism, which does not include the universal category in any way, the attributes carried by God’s essence consist of particular qualities. al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, who, like Abu Hāshim, made room for universals under the name of states, accepted particular qualities that led to universal attributes in a system compatible with Ashʿarism. Muta’akhkhirūn Ash‘arī theologians, building their thought system within the framework of the particular-universal dichotomy, felt the need to apply the theories of universals and predication to overcome the paradox caused by the famous motto “Attributes are neither Him nor other than Him”. On the basis of universal properties that have a lower degree of existence compared to particular properties, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theory of particular attributes is intended to be associated with Abu Hāshim’s theory of universal (state). In this context, the value of divine attributes discussed on the ontic ground by the mutaqaddimūn theologians was drawn to the epistemic ground in the muta’akhkhirūn period. From the first kalām works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to the last kalām works, he was distant from the ontic value of divine attributes. The statement that the derived word “knower”, which is appropriate for being a predicate in the propositional structure, and the infinitive “knowledge”, which is not appropriate for being a predicate, meet the same purpose, and that divine attributes are considered divine essence are the most important indications of this distance. Reviewing the works of prominent theologians, scholars of the time such as Fakhr al- Dīn al-Rāzī, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, Sa‘d al-dīn al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, and al-Dawānī, this article aims to demonstrate that Abu Hāshim’s view of the divine attributes in the ontic context was welcomed and that the evaluation of divine attributes shifted from particular realities to universal ones in the ontic context. The meaning of “God is knower” proposition according to the pre-Mu‘tazila in the ontic context will be analyzed. Then, its meaning according to Ash‘arite theologians from their framework of universals, will be investigated. (shrink)

al-Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf -- Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʻarī -- al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī -- ʻAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī -- Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī -- Abū Yaʻlá -- Imām al-Ḥaramayn -- al-Ghazzālī -- Ibn Khaldūn -- al-Qalqashandī.

According to Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, al-Ghazālī was the renewer of the Muslim faith at the end of the 5th / 11th century, whereas al-Rāzī was the renewer of faith at the end of the 6th / 12th century. That al-Ghazālī deserves such an honour can hardly be disputed, and his importance in the history of Islamic thought is generally recognised. However, the same cannot, as easily, be said of al-Rāzī, whose historical significance is far from being truly appreciated, and some (...) of the most important books of whom still await publication. Much is known about his views on particular philosophical and theological problems, and about the historical backgrounds to, and the relations amongst, some of these views. Some rather general observations on his thought are also common; for instance, that he is a heavily philosophising Ash‘arī mutakallim, a master dialectician, and an influential critic of Ibn Sīnā. (shrink)

In this article, the solution proposed by Osman Afīf Efendi, a late Ottoman scholar, to the problem of the creation of human actions in his Risālat al-irādat al-juzʾiyya will be discussed. Although the problem of the role of human beings in their actions, which has been debated since the early period of theology, has been the subject of works with different titles such as ḳaẓā wa ḳadar, ḫalḳu'l-aʿmāl, and efʿāl al-ʿibād, in the Ottoman scholarly tradition it was mostly dealt with (...) in the treatises on the particular will (al-irādah al-juz’iyyah). Osman Afīf Efendi's treatise is one of the last examples of this genre. In addition to al-Jabriyya, the majority of the Muʿtazilites, the famous view of the philosophers, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-36), Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027), Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), and the Māturīdī school, the author mentions an eighth view. Osman Afīf Efendi touches only the main ideas of the well-known views of the Jabriyya, the majority of the Muʿtazilites, and the Philosophers. On the other hand, he gives relatively more space to the views of al-Ashʿarī, al-Isfarāyīnī, al-Bāqillānī, and the Māturīdī school. Osman Afīf Efendi states that the solutions proposed by Sunnī scholars are united in the common denominator of being the middle way in the faith and emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences between these solutions. There are some indications in the treatise that the author endeavored to bring a different perspective to Ashʿarī's idea of Kasb. His explanations in the context of al-Bāqillānī and al-Isferāyīnī's views are in the form of a response to the criticisms levelled against the approaches of these scholars. One of the most striking points in the treatise is the statement that the view of the Māturīdī school is the same as that of al-Bāqillānī. Osman Afīf Efendi also touches upon the issue of human will, that is, the universal and particular will. In this context, he states that the particular will is not created. However, he does not provide a clear explanation of the ontic structure of the particular will, and he mentions the different opinions expressed by later Māturīdī scholars, such as the juzī will being a dispositional or intizāʿī state. (shrink)

The Ismāilī/Bātinī movement was criticized by early Ahl al-Sunnah kalam schools on different matters, one of which is the angel belief that is also related to other principles of faith. However, the issue of angels was not a direct subject of criticism; instead, it was mostly discussed in connection with related matters such as prophethood and the afterlife. On that note, the Ismāilī/Bātinī teaching, due to their views on prophethood and the afterlife, was accused of denying angels by some Ash‘arī (...) mutakallims. While Hanafī-Māturīdī kalam scholars found faults with the same points, they did not make such an accusation. Moreover, pointing out as the source of the opinions above to philosophers increased the merit of these criticisms. In the present study, after alluding to the claims and the accusations of the parties concerned, the matter of angels will be discussed in relation to prophethood and the afterlife from the viewpoint of the Ismāilī/Bātinī teaching. While doing so, their own works will be consulted. Subsequently, the criticisms of Ahl al-Sunnah will be compared with the views of the Ismāilī/Bātinī doctrine concerning the issue of angels. Also, the significance and value of different viewpoints put forward by the related schools of thought will be presented in terms of the consequences of those views. (shrink)

Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi is one of the most important Ash'ari theologist in the 15th century North Africa. It is known that he wrote in most of the theological sciences which mainly in theology and mysticism. The fact that logic science is also included among these sciences, reflects the level of development in terms of "istidlal". Senûsî's booklet named "Umm al-berahin” was written with the purpose of proving the belief that "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his (...) messenger" is the source of all faith. In addition to the inferences about Allah and His attributes he also explained the attributes that must be found in the messengers based on the word "Muhammad is His messenger" and also tried to prove these features, which are considered to be truthfulness, rescript and notification, with various arguments. According to Sanusi, who defends the opinion that belief to the Hereafter, other prophets, angels, sacred books were entering this context, this is because the Prophet brought religion as a means to attest to all this. He based his inferences about the messengers adjectives on the inverse analogy in "Umm al-barahin". Besides, he used "inference by using miracle", "arrangement two original according to a result", "chained analogy", "arrangement according to two original results" and "abbreviated analogy" forms. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) was one of the prominent figures of Khorasan Shafiʻīsm and a jurist among the Aṣḥāb al-Wujūh. He received education in Irāq from important scholars in the fields of theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and hadīth. After returning to Nishabur, he taught at a madrasa built in his name. He trained students such as ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-38), Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī (d. 450/1058), Abu al-Qāsim al-Isqāf al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 452/1060), Abu al-Rabīʿ Ilākī (...) (d. 465/1073), and Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), who later influenced the course of Shāfiʿīsm. He authored works as an important hadith scholar and Ashʿarī theologian. Although most of these works have not survived to the present day, we learn about his views through excerpts from them. He held views, reflected in the prin-ciples of jurisprudence, that led to criticism for being influenced by the Muʿtazila. Despite being a theologian, his adoption of the jurists' method in jurisprudence further emphasizes the importance of his views. The aim of this study is to reveal Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī's thoughts on the principles of jurisprudence, specifically in the areas of hadīth, consensus (ijmā), indepen-dent reasoning (ijtihād), and imitation (taqlīd), and to identify their reflecti-ons on the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence. Since there is no specific study on Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s thoughts on jurisprudence in our country, we beli-eve that this research will contribute to future studies on his legal scholarship. (shrink)

The Coronavirus pandemic has been ongoing for almost two years now. Not only did it surprise the whole world in the initial stages of its occurrence, but also the world left it in shock. Therefore, the instant solution strategies included complete lockdowns in order to prevent the spread of such a disease. However, as the lockdowns lasted longer, it generated negative psychological effects on people globally. This being the case, collective endeavors and efforts were performed, in the hope of achieving (...) a concrete solution in order to overcome the bad repercussions that seemed visible on societal levels, which of course, included religious aspects; and in some cases resulted in social separation as well as a dramatic rise in suicide rates. On the one hand, this caused a retraction from the religion and religiously oriented rituals, but on the other hand, it also made people turn more to religion as it provided a psychological relief from the heavy burdens of the pandemic. These psychological conditions had theological resonances that made already complicated issues even more complex. Among them, the nature of God’s actions and the human position in this matter can be given as examples. This article is an attempt to place and define the issue of the pandemics and plagues from the perspective of Islamic theology, in particular, to shed light on three main points. The first is the problem of pains and aches, and how it was mentioned in theological literaturey and discussed by Islamic theologians (Mutakallimūn), as the issue of pandemics and plagues indisputably fall under this matter. The second point tackles the problem of whether “such calamities as pandemics and plagues come from God's Decree, or not?”. The last point focuses on the issue of fatalism and tries to show whether the de facto acceptance that pandemics are from God’s Decree would require the servant to stop taking measures in response to them. To answer the questions at stake, this paper will focus on four different perspectives of the Mu’tazila, Ash‛arī s, Māturīdis, and Ahl al-Hadīth, by using a selective methodology and focusing on their prominent and pioneering theologians (Mutakallimūn) of these schools. (shrink)

In the history of Islamic thought, it is prominent to examine the sects according to certain facts. In this research, it is aimed to read the development of the sect through aqāid works by taking the aqāid texts into the center. By centering Ash'ariyyah, we determine the aqāid literature of this sect in general terms and center two Ash‛ari aqāid works. These two aqāid texts that we have examined are the works identified with the Seljuk and Ottoman madrasahs. Al-Juwaynī’s al-Aqīda (...) an-Nizamiyyāh and al-Ījī’s al-Aqāid al-adudiyya hare extremely valuable identity texts in terms of Ash‛arī aqāid tradition. As a product of the Seljuk world of thought, al-Juwaynī’s work deals with aqāid issues with much broader titles and explanations. Al-Juwaynī lists his criticisms by targeting Mu‛tazila on most issues. Al-Ījī’s al-Aqāid al-adudiyya is one of the basic books of Ottoman madrasahs. In al-Ījī’s work, on the other hand, plain narration and a concise aqāid presentation attract attention. When we look at the work, it draws attention that the audience has changed and the opposition to the Mu‛tazilite is not too dominant. In addition, while a political interpretation over the imamate/caliphate issue is included in the creed in al-Ījī’s text, virtuousness, which is the perception of the Sunni companions, is also emphasized. The aqāid works of al-Juwaynī and al-Ījī bear the traces of the historical development of Ash‛arism, depending on their addressees, the period in which they were written, and many other reasons. (shrink)

One of the issues of discussion between Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu‛tazila, who differ in many issues, is the relationship between divine command and divine will. Among those who express their opinion on is the Ash‛arī theologian Salmān al-Nīsābūrī. The author, who first cites his sect’s approach on this issue and then explains that Mu‛tazila’s contrary view, adopted the view that the belief, which follows as worship and good deeds commanded by Allah will be the same from his servants. In (...) this matter he basically elaborates three arguments the Mu‛tazila. He states that they build the first of these proofs on the impossibility of the commandment and the will being in a separate direction, and secondly on the fact that the desire for evil is bad. Finally, he adds that they bring evidence from the verses which translates as Allah desires the good of his servants and doesn’t intend his evil deeds. Nīsābūrī, doesn’t pass on these Mu‛tazilite proofs with an immediate answer, but also puts on his agenda possible other objections to those answers that he is giving. He makes the debate very comprehensive, especially on the first evidence he attributes to them. In this sense, he tries to refute the Mu‛tazila argument that the ruler cannot have a will contrary to what he ordered, based on some other rulers who would not want their orders to be fulfilled. Nīsābūrī, who cites some other objections on this issue, states that while there are claims regarding the necessity of order-will harmony, it isn’t consistent that these claimants develop their objections to the examples that show the opposite of their views. In other words, he says that these regarding cases invalidate Mu‛tazila’s claim of necessity. Nīsābūrī includes abrogation in the later stages of the debate and argues that abrogation, which means the abolition of a decree, hits a blow to their understanding of the necessity of order-will. The author also takes objections to his agenda and responds to them. He also examines Mu‛tazila’s approach on the content that if the will is contrary to the order, the rebel and the submissive will be confused, so they must be compatible. Since this claim confirms the meaning that the unbelievers obey Allah’s will with their blasphemy, he makes explanations that obedience will be achieved by order, not by will. On the other hand, the author tries to bind his interlocutors by emphasizing that there’s no room for discussion when it is seen at the relevant verses and seen that Allah doesn’t wish (some) unbelievers to believe. Nīsābūrī, also examines the argument made by Mu‛tazila as to the necessity of conformity between divine command and divine will, that wishing for evil is also evil. Nīsābūrī, who makes relatively more concise explanations on this subject, pointing to the source of this evidence and stating that it is reached from the realm of the perceptible (qiyas bi’l-shāhid). Then, he makes some explanations that the visible realm and the invisible realm cannot be evaluated in the same way and draws attention to the fact that Allah’s being unwise isn’t inferred from the worldly affairs that are happening against Muslims. Nīsābūrī also deals with Mu‛tazila’s evidence for the harmony of divine will and divine order through verses stating that Allah wouldn’t wish his servants to harm. At this stage, he makes comments that the relevant verses are suitable to be evaluated in another way. For this, sometimes makes linguistic explanations, sometimes refers to the content of other verses, and sometimes points to the meaning of the verse used as the evidence. In all of them, he ultimately tries to show that the verses raised by Mu‛tazila do not support their claim. While the author refutes those evidences, he also points out the problems that may arise if the view defended by Mu‛tazila would accepted. In this sense, Nīsābūrī points out that this view will also mean the occurrence of deeds that Allah does not want, and this would bring harm to the divine judgement. As a result, Nīsābūrī underlines that at least Allah’s order towards His servants, whom He knows won’t believe, isn’t in the same direction. (shrink)

The Umayyad period. The beginnings of sectarianism ; The Khārijites ; The Shīʻtes ; The Murjiʼites and other moderates -- The first wave of Hellenism 750-950. The historical background ; The translators and the first philosophers ; The expansion of Shīʻism ; The Muʻtazilites ; The consolidation of Sunnism ; Al-Ashʻarī -- The second wave of Hellenism 950-1258. The historical background ;The flowering of philosophy ; The vicissitudes of Shīʻism ; The progress of Sunnite theology ; Al-Ghazālī ; Sunnite theology (...) from 1100 to 1250 ; Theology and philosophy in the Islamic west -- The period of darkness. The historical background ; The sclerosis of philosophical theology ; The vitality of the Ḥanbalites ; The transformation of Shīʻism -- The new dawn. The prospect for theology. (shrink)

In a seminal modern work of uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Ākhund al-Khurāsānī argues that the two terms ṭalab and irāda are coined to refer to a single concept. Within the argument he implies that the Ashʿarīs, and some modern Twelver Shīʿa who lean towards their position, fall foul of a linguistic fallacy when they assert that ṭalab and irāda are distinct. For al-Khurāsānī, both ṭalab and irāda may be used in two distinct modes, a real mode or an initiating mode. The former (...) denotes a real seeking or willing within the essence of an actor, whereas the latter simply seeks to initiate the meaning of seeking or willing. Accordingly, an initiating ṭalab may be distinct from a real irāda, and a real ṭalab may be distinct from an initiating irāda, without undermining the position that ṭalab and irāda are conceptually identical. Analysis of al-Khurāsānī’s arguments, and some criticisms of it by later modern and contemporary scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, will aim to broaden our understanding of the category of inshāʾ in Arabic, hitherto analysed through the lens of J. L. Austin’s notion of performatives. More generally, the paper takes the treatment of this linguistic issue as an example affirming the continued importance of modern and contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh for engaging with Arabic philosophy of language and argument. (shrink)

Such questions that may it be essential, necessary, recommended, or free to believe in some matters will be addressed in the article. It is concluded that such an approach is possible for Māturīdis and Ash'arīs. In the study, it was thought that the following two problems should be solved first. The first problem is how can a definitive confirmation be made with speculative information (zannī). Second, if it is a contradiction that the ulema of the relevant school construct the subject (...) of belief with an āḥād report (khabar) even though they explain the true report as mutawātir in the works of Kalām? In the article, three different solutions are proposed for the first problem, and the second problem is tried to be solved with the proposition that tawātur is compulsory for the universal or essential subjects of theology. Then, by giving two examples for each decree (hukm), it was tried to determine what this idea means in practice. It has been determined that the main controversial issues between the Ahl al-sunnah and the Mu'tazila arise in the category of wājib to be believed. It has been determined that the scholars of the aforementioned sects fall into dispute among themselves in matters presented as sunnah to be believed. As a result, in terms of the principles set forth by the Ahl al-Sunnah, it has been deemed possible to implement ʾafʿālu al-mukallafīn (deeds of those obligated) to theological issues. (shrink)

Newly accessible source material calls for a revision of our picture of the more technical transmission of sceptical epistemologies in the intellectual landscape of early Islam. Abū al‐Qāsim al‐Balkhīʼs (ninth/tenth century) Book of Doctrines shows that naẓar as the basic argumentative method of kalām is defined by the encounter with a broad spectrum of sceptical strategies. By the beginning of the tenth century, Greek traditions were amalgamated in a complex way with other intellectual traditions, most notably dualist ontologies. This situation (...) has shaped the evolution of kalām methodology decisively. Based on extensive paraphrases in Ibn al‐Malāḥimī (twelfth century) going back to Nawbakhtī (tenth century), it can be seen that arguments of the Greek sceptical tradition were accessible in Arabic in the early tenth century. The scarcity of coherent information on sceptical approaches before that time rather has to do with the problem that in general few sources of this earlier formative period of Islamic theology are preserved. Early Muʿtazilī treatises from this period are superseded by Ashʿarī texts in the later transmission. Sceptical approaches, being systematically involved in the very formation of early Muʿtazilī theology, are particularly invisible due to this process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late AntiquityJohn RistLloyd P. Gerson, editor. The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. 2 vols. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 1313. Cloth, $240.00.1313 pages, including 915 pages of text and 200 of bibliography; 51 authors—in about 800 words! The editor of the present Cambridge History makes plain that his new two-volume monument is the successor to Armstrong’s Cambridge History (...) of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy—8 contributors—and is intended to build on its strengths and correct its deficiencies in the light of some 40 years of highly successful investigation of the thought of late antiquity. The result is a professional structure in which the “giants” (Plotinus and Augustine) are awarded comparatively modest coverage, while figures often neglected, such as Damascius, of whom our understanding has greatly increased of late, are given much more space. Damascius secures 30 pages: the only individual to get more is Porphyry (33), while Augustine has 29 and Plotinus 24 (four more than Hierocles). There are those (as Tacitus might have put it) who will fear that the wood has been lost for the trees, and at least it must be said that one overall impression of these volumes is that some of their authors are recounting what will be of interest to a worldwide group of aficionados whose number can be counted on the fingers of a mutilated hand—and the importance of which lies less in philosophical achievement than in the handing on of a great tradition.Gilbert Ryle is supposed to have asserted that in France everyone can talk about philosophy but that there are no philosophers; some of Gerson’s more philosophically minded readers may find their prejudices confirmed that in late antiquity there were many who talked about Plato and Aristotle but few who understood what they were trying to do. For it is clear that a general theme of the present volumes is that in late antiquity philosophers were largely concerned to “interpret” Plato and (especially after Porphyry) Aristotle while occasionally seizing the opportunity not merely to rubbish their similarly-engaged predecessors but to add (if shamefacedly) something of their own. Except, that is, for the Christians, whose enterprise was very different and who, quite properly, are more visible in Gerson’s account of late antique thought than in that of Armstrong (though there remain strange omissions in a work on this scale: Methodius, Ambrose, Evagrius).Gerson has tried to contextualize his story by including short (and helpful) historical introductions by Elizabeth DePalma Digeser to the various epochs with which his volumes are concerned, and which can perhaps be divided into four sections: pre-Plotinian Platonism [End Page 136] (plus extras) from Cicero to Numenius; later pagan Platonism, including extensive treatment of the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle; Christian thought before Constantine; and later Christian philosophy-cum-theology. Rounding off the volume are introductions to the transition from “ancient” to “medieval” thought in the Latin West (Gersh), in Byzantium—a remarkably honest presentation of a largely stagnant philosophical world by Ierodiakonou and Zografidis—and (in a magisterial improvement on what is to be found in Armstrong) in Islam (Cristina d’Ancona) where (inter multa alia) the roots of the virtually inevitable later destruction of a flourishing philosophical tradition founded by al-Kindi and al-Farabi are identified in the more “orthodox” and theocratic approach—here there are Byzantine parallels—of the followers of al-Ash’ari (885).Gerson’s readers can inspect philosophical wisdom and conceptual muddle among late antique intellectuals—Christians, a few Muslims, pagans—down to Scotus Eriugena and al-Farabi. But some of them may suspect that an opportunity has been lost to reflect on the origins and nature of early Christian thought, and to ask why Christians soon jumped for Platonism rather than Stoicism (Aristotle, let alone Epicurus, was not—yet—considered a serious option)—and that is not intended as criticism of the excellent, if brief, treatment of important Christian thinkers such as Origen. But it was an adventure for Christians to begin to philosophize, and when they embarked on this adventure—here the significance... (shrink)

In his book, the Author establishes a connection between al-Juwayni's thought system and the period in which he lived by dealing in detail with the political and legal environment of al-Juwayni's time. This connection is valuable as it helps to clarify his thoughts in many fields. It allows us to understand the intellectual project in the mind of al-Juwayni. This academic project also requires that he not treat his al-Juwayni's works as separate units. The Author's approach was in this direction. (...) According to him, al-Juwayni has an intellectual project seen in his books. The Author, aware that this idea, which shaped al-Juwaynî's academic concerns, was not formulated in a vacuum, examines the sociopolitical environment that left an indelible mark on him. In this context, the Author emphasizes that al-Juwayni witnessed the debates between the Ashʿarīs and the Muʿtazila on the intellectual stage. According to him, the tension produced by the contradictory epistemologies of these two schools in al-Juwayni was influential in his search for certainty in knowledge. While the Author cares about the influence of al-Juwayni's intellectual environment on him, he also states that this is not the only influence on al-Juwayni. According to him, the fact that al-Juwayni lived in a politically turbulent period should also be considered, especially in the search for the certainty of knowledge and continuity of Islamic society. al-Juwayni lived at a time when the rise of powerful dynastic families forced the ʿAbbasid Caliphate into a position of only nominal power and, in a short period, saw contradictory policies implemented against the Ashʿarī/Shāfiʿīs. It led him to preserve and maintain religious thought apart from politics. As a result, al-Juwayni started to think about the role of the leader in maintaining the social order and the role of the scholars in protecting the religion. In an environment where the political elites are constantly changing, his focus has been on enabling the Muslim community to continue its existence in any case. (shrink)

In this study, some postscripts (Ḥashiyah) written on Sharḥ al-Aqâid in the Ottoman Empire were examined and their sectarian identities were tried to be determined in the context of the Takwīn. Our aim is to determine the correctness of the opinion that the Ottoman Empire adopted the Ash’arism based on the reading of Ash’arian kalâm books in the Ottoman madrasahs. The book of al-Taftâzânî named Sharḥ al-Aqâid is an important kalâm book that was read together with its postscripts in the (...) time of the Ottoman Empire. This book, in which the views of Omar al-Nasafī in his book named Aqâid is evaluated from the perspective of Ash’ari, is one of the important examples of the commentary and postscript period. In this book, al-Taftâzânî explained both the views of al-Nasafī, who adopted the school of Mâturidism, and his own evaluations together. This structure of the book led to the writing of postscripts and to discuss the views of the two theological schools of Ahl al-Sunnah through this book. In this study, the postscripts written by the Ottoman period famous kalâm scholars such as Ahmad b. Mûsâ al-Khayâlî (875/1470), Muṣliḥ al-dîn Moṣtafâ al-Kastalî (901/1496) and Ramaḍân b. Moḥammad (1017/1608) on the views of al-Taftâzânî were examined. In order to understand the views of al-Khayâlî, the postscripts of Ḳûl (or Ḳavl) Aḥmad b. Ḫıżır al-Kâzarûnî (950/1543) and Abd al-Ḥakîm al-Siyâlkûtî (1067/1657) are also included. (shrink)

Human actions have been one of the most discussed topics in the science of kalām since the first centuries of Hijra. Many scholars from different schools of kalām have tried to solve this problem. Efforts to solve the problem have brought different views. In this framework, three main views emerged Jabrī, Qadarī/Muʿtazilī and Salafī/Sunnī. The views of Islamic philosophers were added to these and this number was increased to four. Nevertheless, Sunnī scholars, who agree on the basic propositions, disagreed on (...) the nature of kasb. While there are differences of opinion between Ashʿarī and Māturīdī schools, there are also those who put forward different views among scholars belonging to the same school. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) and Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Sadr al- Shrīʿa (d. 747/1346) and Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457) are the most obvious examples of this. These views on human actions have been mentioned in their works by scholars of kalām. One of these scholars is Gelenbevî Ismāʿil (d. 1205/1791). In this article, the views on human actions will be examined in the context of Gelenbevî’s work named Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al ʿAqāʾid al ʿAḍudiyya. Gelenbevî makes concise or detailed explanations about the views mentioned in his work with the exception of Ibn al-Humām. In addition, he also mentions the views of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). While Gelenbevî mentions these views and the discussions that took place around them, He makes use of his works Ījī’s (d. 756/1355) named Mawāqif, Taftāzānī’s (d. 792/1390) Sharḥ al Maqāṣ̣ıd and Jurjānī’s (d. 816/1413) Sharḥ al - Mawāqif. Gelenbevî states that Ashʿari’s view is middle jabr (jabr al muṭavaṣṣıṭ) and even he is accused of being pure jabr (jabr al- maḫẓ). Based on the concept of partial will (al-irādah al-juzʾiyyah), he says that the views of Bāqillānī and Māturīdī school are the same and states that this view is more successful than Ashʿari’s in explaining human responsibility. This thought indicates that he is closer to the Māturīdī view of human actions than to Ashʿarī. He points out that Isfarāyīnī’s views are open to criticism in some respects. He implicitly states that he does not agree with the idea that Juwayni agrees with the Islamic philosophers. Rather than Muʿtazila’s views, it focuses on whether their views and the views of Islamic philosophers are the same. (shrink)

One of the most influential figures in the history of Islamic thought is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). The identities of mushakkik, which creates problems on many subjects, especially metaphysical and theological ones, the muhaqqiq who tries to solve the problems above the sects, and the jâmî who brings many different views together in the highest concepts, have seriously affected all the thinkers after him. Therefore, in the tradition, all schools had to inherit the philosophical and scientific dynamism that he (...) created and displayed an attitude about the problems he created and the solutions he offered. The real important motive that makes Râzî so indispensable and effective is his problematic identity (mushakkik), which carries the kalām to philosophy and philosophy to kalām, and criticizes philosophy on the basis of the kalām, and the kalām on the basis of philosophy. For this reason, when we look at the works of Râzî, who has been evaluated politically and sociologically within Ash'arism throughout his life, it is clearly seen that he is a thinker who is suitable to be embraced by different schools and to be interpreted in different ways. The fact that many Ahl as-sunnah theologians emphasized the works written by Râzî with a theological-Ash'ari theme, caused his supra-sectarian identity to be overshadowed. On the other hand, it is seen that some thinkers are making an effort to know and recognize Râzî as a philosopher-theologian and muhaqqiq. This effort is clearly seen especially in scientific figures who benefited from Kamaladdin Ibn Yûnus (d. 639/1242) in some way. Afḍal al-Dīn Khūnajī (d. 646/1248), Athir al-Din al-Abharî (d. 663/1265), Najm al-Din al-Qazwinî al-Kâtibî (d. 675/1277) can be given as examples. These personalities, on the one hand, played an active role in the spread of Râzî's scientific heritage and they were effective in bringing Râzî to the fore with his supra-sectarian identity on the other. Sirāj Al-Dīn Al-Urmawî (d. 682/1283), who inherited his scientific legacy, is among the important names who established his identity as a muhaqqiq who mostly solved supra-sectarian problems. Human actions are at the forefront of the issues in which this facility has clearly emerged. Urmawî tries to revise al-Arba'în's expressions, which seem to ignore the power and influence of human beings in terms of human actions as well as criticizing Razi's arguments very seriously. In his work Lübâb, on the one hand, he summarizes al-Erba'în of Razî he seriously criticizes Razi's Ash'ari attitude towards human actions on the other. He does this largely on the axis of the arguments that Râzî himself expressed from his encyclopedic works such as al-Matâlibu'l-'âliyya mina'l-'ilmi'l-ilâhi. It is clear that this is not an ordinary situation. Because human actions are at the forefront of the issues that determine the thinkers' conception of divinity and the relationship between God and man. In this study, Râzî's attitude on this issue and Urmavi's philosophical and theological criticisms will be tried to be determined. Thus, it is clearly seen that he is trying to establish Râzî as a muhaqqiq in the axis of human actions. (shrink)

In a seminal modern work of uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Ākhund al-Khurāsānī (d. 1911) argues that the two terms ṭalab (seeking) and irāda (willing) are coined to refer to a single concept. Within the argument he implies that the Ashʿarīs, and some modern Twelver Shīʿa who lean towards their position, fall foul of a linguistic fallacy when they assert that ṭalab and irāda are distinct. For al-Khurāsānī, both ṭalab and irāda may be used in two distinct modes, a real (ḥaqīqī) mode or (...) an initiating mode (inshāʾī). The former denotes a real seeking or willing within the essence of an actor, whereas the latter simply seeks to initiate the meaning of seeking or willing. Accordingly, an initiating ṭalab may be distinct from a real irāda, and a real ṭalab may be distinct from an initiating irāda, without undermining the position that ṭalab and irāda are conceptually identical. Analysis of al-Khurāsānī’s arguments, and some criticisms of it by later modern and contemporary scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, will aim to broaden our understanding of the category of inshāʾ in Arabic, hitherto analysed through the lens of J. L. Austin’s notion of performatives. More generally, the paper takes the treatment of this linguistic issue as an example affirming the continued importance of modern and contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh for engaging with Arabic philosophy of language and argument. (shrink)

In the verse (2:31) of the Qur’ān, it is mentioned that all names were taught to Adam (PBUH). This verse indicates that revelation is decisively the source of language. On the other hand, it is a common fact that people have been constantly producing symbols to express new ideas and concepts. This situation makes it necessary to associate the utterance (muṭlaq) and static with the relative (al-muqayyah) and dynamic between language and reality in religious thought. In the historical process, Mutakallims (...) have undertaken the responsibility of understanding and interpretation between the transcendent dimension of the religion (ad-Dīn) indicated in the Qur’ān and the innovative and dynamic dimension of life. The Mutakallims’ responsibility continues today. However, to establish the relationship among language, thought, and existence in today’s kalâm, it is necessary to identify the roots of this subject in kalām’s classical sources. In our study designed for this purpose, the truth and value of naming divine meanings in the context of ta‘līm al-asmā’ are examined. On the other hand, since dealing with such a large subject in a limited study is not possible, it is just focused on the research of linguistic theories, the relationship between language and thought, and the issue of whether the names used in the main sources to indicate the meanings are divinely determined (tawqīfī). In fact, it has been determined that the subject of ta'līm al-asmā’ is overshadowed by the vehement debates over the createdness of the Qur’ān (Khalq al-Qur’ān) and the relationship between Allāh’s essence and His attributes, although it is a Qur’ān-centered issue. As can be seen in the study, the approach of the Mutakallims to the issue of ta‘līm al-asmā’ is parallel to their understanding of Allāh’s essence and His attributes. As stated in this research, if the divine names were determined by Allāh, then Allāh’s names will be eternal. Besides, if the names expressed in human languages are the same as the essence of Allāh, this will lead to the problem of eternality. If it is said that the names are separated and unrelated from Allāh’s essence, there will be also more than one independent and eternal being. The idea of multiple eternal beings is against the principle of tawḥīd. However, in cases where the distinction between attributes and essence of Allāh is separated from each other in the mind, it causes attributes to be considered as something existing independently of the essence of Allāh. Therefore, as stated in the study, Mu‘tazilite theologians, who were very sensitive about this issue, attached great importance to the concept of eternity (qadīm) while transcending the essence of Allāh from the attributes of the created. As they appealed to tanzīh by which they transcend Him from all the originated things in time, they were focused on His eternality (qidam). In this regard, all His actions concerning the universe are regarded as temporal, in other words, originated in time (ḥādith). From this point of view, according to them, Allāh’s names specified in the Qur’ān are created just like the Qur’ān itself. Although their meanings are within the boundaries of the Divine Knowledge, their wordings (lafiẓ) belong to humans. Therefore, these names (asmâ’) that people use to describe Allāh in their speech, as Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī argues, are determined by the convention of the human. It has been determined by people via consensus, like other words of the language, to indicate the essence and attributes of Allāh in a language because of communication. Then, Allāh has sent down His message to people with these words. The conclusion that Mu‘tazilite theologians have regarded the connection of names with the meanings in Allāh’s knowledge as a linguistic use, while Sunnī theologians have addressed this issue based on the creative act (Khalq) of Allāh. There is another explanation which is known as the theory of faculty or habitus as an alternative way. Some Ash‘arî and Māturīdī theologians supported this theory. Today, the importance of this new perspective is clear, which appears another association of both ideas. In this context, it has been determined that the views of Māturīdī, who attributes the content (or meaning) of revelation (waḥy) to Allāh while arguing that its wordings belong to humans, are more appropriate to the theory of the faculty (malakah). (shrink)

Afghānī, Jamāl al-Dīn, 1838-1897; views on; philosophy; rationalism; Islam and reason.